EFTA01764420.pdf

From: Office of Terje Rod-Larsen Sent: Friday, November 9, 2012 10:27 PM Subject: November 9 update 9 Articl= 1. <https://mail.google.com/mail/./0/html/compose/static_filesiblank_quirks.htmItta> Foreign Affairs Why the U.S.-Israeli Alliance Is G=od for America Michael Eisenstadt and David Pollock Articl= 3. <https://mail.google.com/mail/./0/html/compose/static_files/blank_quirks.htmIttc> Ahram Online Egypt divided: a reading into a cr=sscrossed map Hani Shukrallah Articl= 5. <https://mail.google.com/mail/=/0/html/compose/static_files/blank_quirks.htmltie> TIME The Anti-Assad Offensive: Can the =est Oust Syria's Strongman? Vivienne =alt <http://world.time.com/author/=iviennewalt/> Articl= 6. <https://mail.google.com/mail/./0/html/compose/static_filesiblank_quirks.html#f> Carnegie Endowment for International Pea=e Why Japan Still Matters=/b> James =choff <http://www.realclearworld.com=authors/?author=lames+Schoff&id=1557> EFTA_R1_00071694 EFTA01764420 Ar=icle 1. Foreign Affairs Why the U.S.-=sraeli Alliance Is Good for America Michael Eisenstadt =nd David Pollock November 7, 2012 --=At the final presidential debate of the 2012 campaign season, President Ba=ack Obama and Governor Mitt Romney mentioned Israel some 30 times, more th=n any other country except Iran. Both candidates called the Jewish state "a true friend," pledging to stand =ith it through thick and thin. Some political commentators criticized thes= effusive declarations of support as pandering, suggesting that the candid=tes were simply going after Jewish and pro-Israel votes. But if support for =srael is indeed such a political winner, then it's at least in part beca=se the voters know best. The U.S.-Israeli alliance now contributes more th=n ever to American security, as bilateral cooperation to deal with both military and nonmilitary challenges has grow= in recent years. The relationship may not be symmetrical; the United Stat=s has provided Israel with indispensable diplomatic, economic, and militar= support totaling more than $115 billion since 1949. But it is a two-way partnership whose benefits to the =nited States have been substantial. The other, less tangible costs of the =.S.-Israeli alliance -- mainly, damage to Washington's reputation in Ara= and Muslim countries, a problem also caused by American interventions and decades of U.S. support for auto=ratic leaders in the Middle East -- pale in comparison with the economic, =ilitary, and political gains it affords Washington. U.S.-Israeli securi=y cooperation dates back to heights of the Cold War, when the Jewish state=came to be seen in Washington as a bulwark against Soviet influence in the=Middle East and a counter to Arab nationalism. Although the world has changed since then, the strategic logic for the U.S=-Israeli alliance has not. Israel remains a counterweight against radical =orces in the Middle East, including political Islam and violent extremism.=It has also prevented the further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the region by thwarting Ir=q and Syria's nuclear programs. Israel continues to=help the United States deal with traditional security threats. The two cou=tries share intelligence on terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and Middle E=stern politics. Israel's military experiences have shaped the United States' approach to counterterrorism and homeland=security. The two governments work together to develop sophisticated milit=ry technology, such as the David's Sling counter-rocket and Arrow missil= defense systems, which may soon be ready for export to other U.S. allies. Israel has also emerged as an impor=ant niche defense supplier to the U.S. military, with sales growing from $=00 million per year before September 11 to $1.1 billion in 2006, due to th= wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Israel's military research and development complex has pioneered many cu=ting-edge technologies that are transforming the face of modern war, inclu=ing cyberweapons, unmanned vehicles (such as land robots and aerial drones=, sensors and electronic warfare systems, and advanced defenses for military vehicles. The U.S.-Israeli al=iance has paved the way for the countries to cooperate on far more than ju=t traditional security issues. In part because of the long-standing politi=al and security relationship between the United States and Israel, most Israelis know the United States and har=or positive feelings toward it. Israeli companies looking for a global mar=et for their products have often viewed their American counterparts as par=ners of choice. So today, Israeli civilian technological innovations are helping the United States maintain =ts economic competitiveness, promote sustainable development, and address = range of non-military security challenges. 2 EFTA_R1_00071695 EFTA01764421 Dozens of leading U=S. companies have set up technology incubators in Israel to take advantage=of the country's penchant for new ideas, which is why Bill Gates observe= in 2006 that the "innovation going on in Israel is critical to the future of the technology business." Likewis=, Israeli high-tech firms often turn to U.S. companies as partners for joi=t production and marketing opportunities in the United States and elsewher=, creating tens of thousands of American jobs. And although Israelis make up just three percent of the population o= the Middle East, in 2011 Israel was the destination of 25 percent of all =S. exports to the region, having recently eclipsed Saudi Arabia as the to= market there for American products. U.S. companies' s=bstantial cooperation with Israel on information technology has been cruci=l to Silicon Valley's success. At Intel's research and development cen=ers in Israel, engineers have designed many of the company's most successful microprocessors, accounting for some 40=percent of the firm's revenues last year. If you've made a secure fina=cial transaction on the Internet, sent an instant message, or bought somet=ing using PayPal, you can thank Israeli IT researchers. Israeli innovators =ave also come up with novel solutions to the water and food security chall=nges posed by population growth, climate change, and economic development.=By necessity, given the geography of the Middle East, Israel is a world leader in water conservation and manage=ent and high-tech agriculture. Israel recycles more than eighty percent of=its wastewater -- the highest level in the world -- and has pioneered wide=y used techniques of conserving or purifying water, including drip irrigation and reverse osmosis desalina=ion. And a number of Israeli companies are leaders in the development of r=newable energy sources; BrightSource Industries, for example, is building = solar power plant in California using Israeli technology that will double the amount of solar thermal elec=ricity produced in America. These innovations, bolstered by the substantia= American investment in Israel, contribute to long-term U.S. domestic and =oreign policy objectives relating to sustainable development. To be sure, the all=ance with Israel has not been without risks or costs for Washington. The 1=73 War between Israel and its neighbors brought America to the brink of co=flict with the Soviet Union and prompted an Arab embargo on oil exports to the United States. Following the 1982 Is=aeli invasion of Lebanon, the Reagan administration dispatched U.S. marine= to help stabilize the country, which ultimately resulted in costly attack= on American diplomats and military personnel there. And U.S. diplomatic and military support for Israel has r=inforced negative attitudes toward the United States in many Arab and pred=minantly Muslim countries. But these costs sho=ld not be overstated. Beyond leading to largely symbolic UN votes against =S. positions, Washington's support for Israel has hardly damaged the Un=ted States' ties with its Arab and Muslim allies. Standing with Israel certainly has not hobbled U.S. policy toward =he region as much as the war in Iraq or Washington's backing of autocrat=c Arab regimes. Meanwhile, no Arab ally of the United States has ever, as = result of its pro-Israel posture, refused to cooperate with Washington on counterterrorism or denied its req=ests for access, basing, or overflight rights. In fact, the U.S.-I=raeli alliance has at times helped spur closer U.S.-Arab relations, on the=theory that only the United States could convince Israel to make concessio=s in negotiations; this was part of the logic behind Egypt's shift away from the Soviet Union and toward the=United States in the 1970s. And even during the past decade of close U.S.-=sraeli cooperation, and despite an impasse in the Israeli-Palestinian peac= process, Arab ties with the United States have largely flourished: bilateral trade and investment are booming= as U.S. exports to the Middle East in 2011 reached an all-time high of $5= billion. Defense cooperation is as close as ever, indicated by the severa= multi-billion-dollar arms deals that Washington has struck with Gulf allies in recent years. Moreover, sev=ral states, including Egypt and Jordan, along with the Palestinian Authori=y, share intelligence with Israel and at various times have worked behind =he scenes to enlist Israel as an intermediary with Washington. This has been the case even with Egypt's p=st-revolutionary government. All this underscores the fact that self-inter=st, not ideology, is the primary driver of the Arab states' relations wi=h Washington. Despite the ties th=t continue to bind the United States and some Arab countries, the last two=years of upheaval have brought turmoil to many of Washington's tradition=l allies in the region. At a time of great uncertainty, particularly as 3 EFTA_R1_00071696 EFTA01764422 tensions with Iran mount, the United St=tes is even more likely to depend on its somewhat stable nondemocratic all=es, such as Saudi Arabia, and its stable democratic allies, such as Israel=and Turkey, to secure its interests in the region. If anything, recent events have reinforced the logic underp=nning U.S.-Israeli strategic cooperation. The benefits to the=United States of its relationship with Israel belie the argument that the =lliance is based solely on the two countries' shared democratic values, =n the popularity of Israel in American politics, or on the elusive pursuit of progress in the peace process. It i= a relationship based on tangible interests -- and will remain so for the =oreseeable future. It isn't always e=sy being Israel's ally (and Israeli actions don't always make it easie=). The country faces many challenges, including the unresolved conflict wi=h the Palestinians, internal socioeconomic gaps, voices around the world that deny its right to exist, and now Iran=92s nuclear program. Israel has made uneven progress toward addressing the=e issues and needs to do more to remain an attractive partner for the Unit=d States. But its past successes in incorporating huge numbers of immigrants, bridging deep social divides, an= showing remarkable resilience in the face of war and terrorism provide re=son to believe that Washington can continue to count on its closest partne= in the Middle East, and will continue to benefit from its alliance with the Jewish state. MICHAEL EISENSTA=T is senior fellow and director of the Military and Security Studies progr=m at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. DAVID POLLOCK is Kaufm=n fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. This article was adapted from their report Articl= 2. Guardian Jordan: threa=ened by the drama next door David Hirst <http://w=w.guardian.co.uk/profile/davidhirst> 8 November 2012 Wissam Hassan, the Lebanese intelligence chief, and the sharpening of t=nsions it produced, was the most recent, dramatic illustration of it. Turk=y's far-reaching support for the Syrian opposition has bred retaliation fr=m President Assad in the form of renewed support for the PKK, the separatist Kurdish militants, who are on =he warpath again. As for Iraq, it becomes ever clearer that the "Syri=n crisis" — a full-scale civil war — and its own "crisis&quo=; — involving endemic tensions among Kurds, Sunnis and Shiites that fall short of that but constantly seem to threaten it — are=intimately bound up with each other.. But is a fourth neighbour, Jordan, g=ing the same way? Perhaps the most artificial of the region's western-crea=ed states, surrounded by much larger, stronger or richer ones, it was always peculiarly exposed to influences fr=m beyond its borders. "Can Jordan survive?" was once a regular h=adline in western newspapers. Yet, to begin with,=Jordan weathered the upheaval that is the Arab spring with relative ease. =he country, presided over by the Hashemite monarchy, was a typical Arab au=ocracy, with some of its typical flaws — not least corruption and cronyism — yet never in the same degenerate=league as the republics, born of those "revolutions", of which S=ria's was one of the worst. King Abdullah, like his father Hussein, retain=d some real legitimacy in his people's eyes. True, the 4 EFTA_R1_00071697 EFTA01764423 people took to the streets, but, unlike elsewhere, their rallyin= cry was never "the people want the downfall of the regime"; rat=er, they wanted its "reform". Nor does Jordan suf=er from those sectarian antagonisms that have disfigured what, in Syria, b=gan as a popular, peaceful movement for freedom and democracy. It has no K=rds; it is almost uniformly Sunni. Most of its people favour the Syrian rebels; but the regime itself has sou=ht "neutral" ground between the two sides, fearing reprisals fro= one or the other if it didn't. But events of the past two weeks show just=how serious Jordan's exposure to the drama next door could become. These include the first death of a Jordanian soldier <http://www.msnb=.msn.com/id/49501704/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/jordanian-soldier-ki=led-clash-syria- bound-militantsk along the Syrian-Jordanian border; clashes=between the army and groups of jihadists seeking to cross it; and the unma=king of an alleged al-Qaida plot and the arrest of 11men — all Jordania=s — planning multiple bomb and mortar attacks on high-profile targets in Amman. The noted Jordanian columnist Ur=yb al-Rintawi recalled the 2005 bombings that killed 60 people in three Am=an hotels. These were staged by the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian= from his base in Anbar — the western, exclusively Sunni province of Iraq — then a virtual fief of al-Qaida. Fo= Jordan, Rintawi said, Syria now risked becoming "Anbar 2"— bu= an "Anbar" with only 100km of populated territory between it an= Jordan's capital, rather than 1,000km of empty desert away. Disturbing, of cour=e. Yet terrorism on its own never really works; it requires the "righ=" context to be effective. And, in the final analysis, it is on Jorda='s basic political, social and economic health that its ability to resist the Syrian contagion depends. And Jordan's heal=h is, in fact, looking increasingly poor. The relationship between ruler a=d ruled is deteriorating, as the latter intensify their pressures for refo=ms and the former persists in efforts to dilute or block them altogether. On the constitution=l front, King Abdullah has made what are seen as minor, cosmetic changes t=at do little to transfer ultimate authority from the palace to parliament =nd the people. He also insists on =reserving an electoral law that favours the Transjordanian segment of the =opulation - the minority from which the monarchy traditionally derived i=s support — at the expense of the urban one. That penalises the numerically larger, better educated, economically =ore productive segment, the Palestinians. They have long considered themse=ves second-class citizens and, if things got bad, this faultline could be =s dangerous as those sectarian and ethnic ones now playing havoc in neighbouring countries. The law also disadv=ntages the Muslim Brotherhood, Jordan's most powerful political party, who=e support is strongest in urban areas and especially among the Palestinian=. It now seems headed for a major confrontation with the regime over parliamentary elections due at the end of the year. 1=, as threatened, it boycotts these, that will produce a parliament with no=real legitimacy, making a mockery of Abdullah's reformist pretensions. Then there are the =alafis. Some of Jordan's have gone to Syria to fight the heretic Alawite r=gime, now a prime target for Sunni jihadists everywhere. After at first se=ming to turn a blind eye to this, Jordan is now seeking to prevent it, for it threatens to boomerang against itself= As the alleged al-Qaida plot shows, for some Jordanian Salafis jihad in S=ria is merely a preparation before returning home to take on their own reg=me which — orthodox Sunni though it is — is impious on other grounds. Whatever the outcom= of the Syrian civil war, Jordan's own reform-related troubles are now suc= that it might make little difference whether Assad survives or falls. For=Abdullah both alternatives look bad. If Assad survives, with at least the perceived connivance of Jordan, that =ill increase the hostility of Jordan's Islamist-led opposition towards the=throne. If he falls, that will greatly strengthen them, because they will =ave the full support of the new order — doubtless heavily Islamist — that will emerge in Assad's place= In either case the more stubbornly the king resists the clamour for =eaningful reform, the more the opposition will be inclined to go the whole=hog and raise the slogan: "The people want the downfall of the regime." Article 3.<=p> 5 EFTA_R1_00071698 EFTA01764424 Ahram Online=/p> Egypt divided= a reading into a crisscrossed map Hani Shukrallah 8 Nov 2012 -- Trium=hant revolutions tend to unite the majority of the population. Not so stal=ed revolutions. Nearly two years after the great 18-day popular uprising, =gypt is a deeply divided nation The Egyptian revolu=ion blew the top off a deeply divided society. It did much more, as its cr=ators recreated themselves, the few thousands became hundreds of thousands= and a nation in which political space had all but withered away, found itself politicized in ways and to such a =egree, unprecedented for generations, possibly since the birth of politics=on the banks of the Nile in themid-to-late 19th century. Yet, if anything, the revolution sharpened the schisms already extant in Eg=ptian society, which had been blunted, controlled, manipulated and hidden =way under the all encompassing lid of the Mubarak police state, held tight=y and seemingly incontrovertibly for 30 years via the twin instruments of unbridled repression and wide-ran=ing clientism. The revolution did so even as it gave birth to new, massive and profound cl=avages which not only created new battle lines, but redrew all of the old =nes. Revolutions, by definition, are never made by the whole people; rather by a=critical mass of the most aware, most courageous, and most socially and po=itically conscious members of the society. To succeed at all they need to =ecure the sympathy, and/or neutrality of a considerable majority of the people. The Egyptian revolution easily fulfilled these two conditions. An estimated=seven million out of Egypt's population of 82.5 million (a critical mass=by any criteria) took an active part in the revolution, while, as Brooking= Institution scholar H.A. Hellyer indicated in an article on Ahram Online not long ago, Gallup polls taken m=ltiple times during 2011 showed 8 out of 10 Egyptians supported the revolu=ion. The Egyptian revolution, nevertheless, was largely an urban phenomenon, not=so much different in this respect from the seminal revolution of modern hi=tory, the great French Revolution of 1789. Rural Egypt, which accounts for=some 42% of the population, stood for the most part on the sidelines during the heroic 18 days of January/Fe=ruary 2011. Triumphant revolutions, by virtue of their seizure of state power, tend to =ull the stragglers along, which in turn enables them to offer the languid =easantry a share of the fruits of revolution, freeing them (to this or tha= extent) from the yoke of the big landowners, and giving them greater access to what peasants everywhere mos= desire, ownership, real or de facto, of the land they till. (The French R=volution gave them as well, revolutionary war, foreign conquest, including=not least, Egypt, and for a period, empire.) Not so, a revolution hijacked: First by the military, soon after by a milit=ry-Muslim Brotherhood alliance, briefly by the military on its own, and fi=ally by a Muslim Brotherhood-military alliance The results of the first round of presidential elections in post-revolution=Egypt are remarkably revealing of the urban-rural divide, as of many other=features of the nation's political map — in so far as they provided us=with our first sense of the real configuration of forces, leanings and inclinations in the country. Overall, the revolution won the great cities of the country while rural Egy=t was split — literally down the middle — between the military's fol=ul (Mubarak regime remnant) candidate, Ahmed Shafiq, and the Muslim Brothe=hood's Mohamed Morsi. Non-Islamist revolutionary candidate Hamdeen Sabbahi easily won Cairo, Grea=er Cairo, Alexandria, and came well ahead in the combined vote of the nati=n's coastal cities. If we add his vote to that of the other main revolut=onary candidate, democratic Islamist Abdel-Monem Aboul-Fotouh, we are faced with a landslide victory for the re=olutionary vote in all these regions, accounting for over 40 percent of th= total national vote, compared to 25 percent for Morsi and 23 for Shafiq. The countryside, including a great many provincial towns went the other way= So glaring was the urban-rural electoral divide that Palestinian politica= writer Azmi Bishara commented in a tweet at the time, describing the Egyp=ian elections as evidencing "classical political sociology", with the great urban centres going for the revolut=on, while the countryside continued to be held in the grip of both religio= and the state. 6 EFTA_R1_00071699 EFTA01764425 No less interesting was the rural divide itself. Give Egypt's first-round=presidential electoral map various colours: say, red for the revolutionary=vote, represented by both Sabbahi and Abul-Fotouh, blue for the counter-re=olution, represented by Shafiq and green for the Muslim Brotherhood/Salafist vote, represented by Morsi, and =ou get an amazing picture. Huge deep red circles engulfing Greater Cairo a=d Alexandria, stretching out to cover the whole Beheira province, a red ba=d running down the Suez Canal coast, a large swath of green covering Upper Egypt, and the Delta in blue. Retrospectively, it makes a lot of sense. Upper Egypt, socially and cultura=ly conservative, interminably neglected by central governments in Cairo, a=d administered by bureaucrats who'd much rather be elsewhere, goes for t=e Brotherhood, while the Delta, an arm's throw of the central government, continued to be held in the tight=grip of state patronage, for decades administered by the erstwhile ruling =DP and associated state bodies. Notwithstanding the January Revolution, elections in the Egyptian countrysi=e remained fundamentally about patronage, not politics. Mainstream fundamentalist Islamism as an ideological and political current =s unique in that it draws on the destitution, degradation and profound fee=ings of injustice among the poor, while being in possession of extraordinarily rich organizations, well able to provide extensive patronage networks of their own, including employment=in a large array of Islamist owned businesses, a host of social services, =ore often than not mosque linked, as well as direct bribes to real and pot=ntial voters, e.g. the famed "gift" bags of sugar and bottles of cooking oil. The numbers from the first presidential electoral round reveal a host of ot=er divisions crisscrossing the nation's political map. Among these is th= Islamist/non-Islamist divide. The combined vote for non-Islamist candidat=s accounted for a surprising 57 percent of the total vote, compared to 43 percent for the Islamist candidates, inc=uding Aboul-Fotouh, whose electoral base embraced a great many non-Islamis=s, who chose him both in his capacity as a revolutionary candidate, and as=an Islamist democrat who could unite the nation. For its part, the second and final round of the presidential election shower a nation split practically down the middle. The mere fact that 48 percent=of the electorate voted for a verbally challenged, corruption- tainted "=emnant" of the Mubarak regime, who moreover had pledged — if in his own largely garbled vernacular — to s=amp out a revolution that 8 out of 10 Egyptians said they supported, was a=stark indication of the depth of dread in which nearly half the voters hel= Brotherhood rule. Urban versus rural, Upper versus Lower Egypt, revolution versus counter-rev=lution, the revolutionaries and the families of the martyrs versus the sec=rity and military bodies that killed, maimed and tortured thousands among =hem, Islamists versus non-Islamists, the poor versus the filthy rich, labour versus state and private sector ow=ers, democratic Islamists versus authoritarian Islamists, pragmatic Islami=ts versus Salafi Islamists, Jihadists versus everybody, patronage versus p=litics, Muslims versus Copts, the valley versus the outlying Bedouin regions, the profound, revolution- based=yearnings for democracy and freedom versus the powerful tendencies towards=authoritarianism — the divisions run every which way, and they run deep. The power structure, for its own part, remains deeply fractured. The milita=y has taken a back-seat, but continues to be a principal, even a paramount=partner in the configuration of power in the country. (There is substantia= evidence that SCAF's ouster was much more an internal military "reshuffle" than the ostensibly "brilriant coup" claimed by President Morsi's fan-club.) Meanwhile, the old oligarchs of the Mubarak regime will continue to vie wit= the up-and-coming oligarchs of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brother=ood itself is increasingly rent with divisions, between the Gama'a and t=e party, and the party and the president, to name but the most prominent. And the domestic security bodies remain an unknown quantity, which seems to=answer to various mainstays of the power structure at the same time and on=y to itself a lot of the time. It seems happy to do the president's bidd=ng when it suits its inherently repressive, vicious inclinations, while all the time playing dirty little games of its=own, both upon request (of whichever source) and gratuitously. A nation so deeply and so extensively divided is a nation that can be saved=only through an inclusive democracy. It is only through democracy in the f=llest sense of the word (not just the ballot box); only through the widest=provision and protection of the civil liberties of all citizens, can the various social, political and cul=ural orientations and interests crisscrossing the nation peacefully compet=, negotiate, build bridges, and ultimately create and recreate new synthes=s of social and political order. Mr Morsi, a word to your ear: authoritarianism simply will not work. 7 EFTA_R1_00071700 EFTA01764426 Hani Shukrallah =s managing editor of Egypt's top newspaper, the daily Al-Ahram. He is also=the Chief Editor of Al- Ahram Online. Articl= 4. AL-MONITOR</=> Abu Mazen Pre=sured By New Hamas Alliances Nervana Mahmoud Nov 8. -- It may be=subtle, it may be slow, but undoubtedly the uprisings in the Arab world =97 particularly in Egypt — have resulted in new dynamics on the Palestin=an front. Hamas, whose members were once shunned and isolated by the Egyptian leadership under former President Hos=i Mubarak, is now slowly gaining strength and support, not just from =he Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan, but also from Turkey an= Qatar. The visit of the <t=pan>Emir of Qatar to Gaza chttp://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/10/qatars-emi=-calls- for-palestinian-unity-on-gaza-visit.html> , and his planned business=support projects, together with the declaration of the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/02/what-wil=-hamas-bring-to- turkey.html> of his intention to visit Gaza are just some of many examples of Hamas's change of fortune. The group that once=was an example of cross-sectarian alliance, Sunni and Shia, within the "=esistance camp" (Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah), is now solidly part of a n=wly emerging Sunni Islamist camp in the Middle East. Hamas, it seems, has chosen its side in the regional sec=arian war playing out in the region. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/09/abbas-la=t-chance-in-new-york.html> , who has=continued to labor for peace with Israel and a state for Palestine <http://www.al- monitor.com/cms/contribute/default/en/sites=almonitor/contents/articles/politics/2012/10/airing-complete-abbas- intervi=w-only-way-to-save-face.html> , is now perceived as a man of a bygone era that does not fit=nbsp;with the Islamist agenda and rhetoric that has animated Hamas and its=new patrons. No one understands =hat better than Abu Mazen (Abbas) himself. Two intriguing news items =ave surfaced in the Arab media that might help understand Abbas' mindset= Palestinian chief negotiator Saeb Erekat <http://www.al- monitor=com/cms/contribute/default/en/sites/almonitor/contents/articles/politics/2=12/10/the-ball-is-in-netanyahus- court.html> accused Hamas of secretly negotiating with Israel through mediators in Switzerland= while Hamas's Abu Marzook denied that such negotiations ever =appened. Regardless of what is really happening behind the scenes, Erekat=92s statement speaks volumes about the anxieties of the leadership in Ramallah. Currently, Abbas is=a lonely man; he has lost many of his traditional supporters, an= neither Israel nor the new Arab leaders take him seriously. His perceived=ambiguity on the right of r=turn <http://www.al- monitor.com/cms/contribute/default/en/sites=almonitor/contents/articles/politics/2012/10/abu-mazen-has-given-up- the-ri=ht.html> could be to steer a successful negotiation with Israel, and he seems to mi=time his moves. This may be as much his limitations, or more having t= deal with Prime Minister=Benjamin Netanyahu <http://www.al- monitor.com/cms/contribute/default/en/sites=almonitor/contents/articles/politics/2012/10/defense-establishment- poised-=ga.html> , who has never met him halfway. 8 EFTA_R1_00071701 EFTA01764427 Nonetheless, Abu Ma=en remains committed to negotiations as a way to end the conflict, an= to achieve a Palestinian state through peaceful means. His hints on the r=ght of return should be welcomed, not rejected by the Israeli leadership. The fact that Netanyahu dismissed Abbas' comm=nts reflects how Netanyahu — in a rather ironic way — shares Hamas' =isdain towards Abbas and his perceived concessions. Regardless of wheth=r the news of secret negotiations in Switzerland is true or false, undoubt=dly, Netanyahu is familiar with former IDF general Giora Eiland <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/10/the-caro=-the-stick-and-who- come.html> 's suggest=on that Israel stop undermining Hamas. What Eiland has suggested seems to make sense to some in Israel. The West Bank =s currently calm, at a relatively low cost, and most of the earaches come =rom the southern region due to rockets attacks from Gaza. Therefore, a rob=st truce with a strong Mamas in Gaza could stop the escalation at the southern front and warm the cold rel=tionships with Morsi's Egypt and Erdogan's Turkey while ending the dre=m of a possible two-state solution. It is unclear whether Netanyahu endors=s Eiland's views or not, but his attitude toward Abbas is highly indicative that the former general may have&nb=p;struck a chord with his views. But is the view of = deal with Hamas correct or even realistic? An answer can be fou=d in Jordan. In a TV interview with Al Arabiyah, Jordanian Musli= Brotherhood deputy leader Zaki Bani Rsheid said that the Brotherhood will complete its regional 'crescent' when the S=rian regime collapses. Eiland's views co=ld work well if Hamas's power and influence remain solely in Gaza and&nb=p;not spread to the West Bank. However, by the end of 2013, it is highly p=obable that Israel might find itself surrounded by Muslim Brotherhood- ruled governments along four of its five borders: Ga=a, Egypt, Jordan, and, at the very least, a civil war in Sy=ia. The once isolated, weak Hamas could find growing popularity and s=pport in all these countries. Hamas and its Jorda=ian supporters understand this fact very well. The group is in no rush and=is willing to wait for years until it finds the perfect opportunity. Thel=rdanian "spring" might or might not happen, but the Brotherhood crescent may soon land] is a work in prog=ess for Qatar and Turkey. An Islamic Spring in Palestine and Jordan would put further strain on King Abdullah II. =slamic agitation in Jordan would soon become correlated with Palestinian a=ger against the Israeli occupying forces, under an Islamic banner. Abandoning Mah=oud Abbas out of spite, negligence, or the whiff of a deal with Hamas=could be a tragic Israeli strategic error. The Jordanian river was once th= route for the Israelites heading to the Holy Land; it can now serve a new front in the Arab-Israeli contest. This =nce far-fetched scenario has its patrons; if it happens, only then would N=tanyahu yearn for the days of Abbas and the negotiations for a two-state s=lution. Nervana Mahmoud =s a blogger and writer on Middle East issues. Articl= 5. TIME The Anti-Assa= Offensive: Can the West Oust Syria's Strongman? Vivienne Walt <http://world.time.com/author/viviennewalt=> 9 EFTA_R1_00071702 EFTA01764428 Nov. 08, 20120 <http://world.time.com/2012/11/08/the-anti-assad-offensive-can-t=e-west-oust-syrias- strongmaniticomments> -- Scarcely hours after his re-election, President Obama was under pressur= from U.S. allies to take stronger action on Syria <http://topics.time.com/syria/> .=Britain's Prime Minister =span style="font- size:18.0pt">David Cameron <http://topics.time.com/david-cameron/> told reporters on Nov. 7, during a visit to a Syrian refuge= camp in Jordan, that "one of the first things I want to talk to Barack about is how we must do more to try and so=ve this crisis." French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius added to the cla=or on Nov. 8, telling reporters he planned to call for more urgency from W=shington on Syria at a planned meeting later in the day with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton <http://topics.t=me.com/hillary-clintonk , promising th=t the message would be reinforced by "swift and necessary" talks between President Francois Hollande and Obama. On=Syria, said Fabius, "The Americans have recently been in the background = little." Some hope that the =bama Administration may be less risk-averse in the wake of the election an= possibly more inclined to arm Syria's rebels. Until now, the U.S. has o=fered only nonlethal support to Syria's disparate rebel groups, largely for fear that weapons could end up in the =ands of elements — which make up a substantial part of the Syrian insurg=ncy — hostile to U.S. interests and allies in the region. While such con=erns remain, "there is now less risk aversion," believes Shashank Joshi, a research fellow at the Royal Unite= Services Institute, a defense think tank in London. "Before, if the wea=ons got into the wrong hands in October and turned on the Turkish forces, =or example, all those things would have been hugely embarrassing for the Administration at a moment when they=wanted to avoid all risk," he says. "It is less important that Obama h=s won than that someone has won." There are still anx=eties about arms being turned against U.S. interests, including possibly i= future attacks against Israel. And yet the anti-Assad offensive is intens=fying. Cameron seemed to move ahead of his more cautious U.S. allies this week, announcing on Nov. 7 that Brit=in would open direct ties with Syrian rebel leaders, which was interpreted=by many as opening the way to more military support for the insurgency. A Libya-style Weste=n military intervention remains highly unlikely, partly because Russia and=China would deny such an operation legal authority in the U.N. Security Co=ncil and partly out of fear of being drawn into an open-ended civil war that has already spilled over Syria's=borders into Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey. Lesser forms of intervention, such =s training and equipping rebel groups or enforcing a no-fly zone over terr=tory they control, would still require substantial military commitment from Western forces. "The British don'= want to do this unilaterally, without trying to get the Americans on boar=," says Salman Shaikh, an analyst at the Brookings Doha Center. "Camer=n will try to get Obama to step up." But whether Cameron= Hollande or anyone else can persuade Obama to commit U.S. assets to a mor= direct role in the Syrian conflict remains to be seen. The British Prime =inister and his fellow Western leaders would prefer that the problem simply go away, in the form of Syrian Presid=nt Bashar Assad's accepting defeat and choosing exile. Midway through hi= Middle East trip, Cameron told al-Arabiya television in Abu Dhabi that le=ders were desperate for "anything, anything, to get that man out of the country," adding, "I am certainly=not offering him an exit plan to Britain, but if he wants to leave he coul= leave. That could be arranged." Not that easily, of=course, given that even Cameron later added that he supports the call for =ssad to face charges at the International Criminal Court for his role in u=leashing the violence that has claimed upward of 20,000 Syrian lives over the past 18 months. The prospect of an =CC indictment and life in prison would remove any incentive for Assad to a=cept defeat. Says Joshi: "If you don't drop the idea of the ICC indict=ent, why would he ever leave?" Not that Assad sees=any reason to pack his bags, having retained the support of his key backer=, Russia and Iran, and effectively fighting the rebellion to a military st=lemate — albeit one that leaves him in control of much less of Syria than he was two years ago. The Syrian str=ngman has already rejected two proposals, one from Tunisian President Monc=f Marzouki last April and the second from the Arab League in July, for saf= passage abroad. Asked during a Russia Today television interview on Thursday whether he might leave the c=untry, Assad fumed, "I am Syrian. I was made in Syria. I have to live in=Syria and die in Syria." 10 EFTA_R1_00071703 EFTA01764429 Of course, Assad'= calculations might change if the rebels acquired the weapons, particularl= surface-to-air missiles, that might neutralize some of the regime's mil=tary advantages. That, together with the efforts of Obama and others, could influence Russia's President Vladimir=Putin to persuade his Syrian client to step down. But that may be some tim= in coming. Until then, the killing is likely to continue. Articl= 6. Carnegie Endowment =or International Peace Why Japan Sti=l Matters James Schoff <http://w=w.realclearworld.com/authorsPauthor=lames+Schoff&id=1557> November 8, 2012-- =ith Japan's lackluster economic growth and seemingly relentless political =urmoil, it's easy to think that Tokyo's relevance is falling with no end i= sight. But Japan remains a vital part of Asia and it will be a major player in shaping the region's future. The =nited States needs to remember Japan's importance. It is true that the=number of Japan optimists have thinned significantly over the last decade =ith their numbers ravaged by Japan's persistent economic stagnation and lo=ming demographic crisis. Others have been converted or distracted by China's spectacular rise. The reported disapp=arance of Japan's once-hopeful champions even prompted JPMorgan economist =esper Koll to suggest he might be the last remaining optimist leftover fro= the plethora of scholars and business leaders who praised Japan's policies and accomplishments in the 1980s and =99Os. But Koll is not the last Japan optimist. Optimists persist a=ong U.S. manufacturers, investors, and farmers who exported over $110 bill=on worth of goods and services to Japan in 2011 (up about 28 percent since=2002). Japan optimists also dwell in America's science and engineering communities, they occupy high positions =t the U.S. Departments of State, Treasury, and Defense, and they roam the =allways of international and regional finance and political organizations.=/span> One can forgive Kol= for feeling lonely, but before the optimists are declared an endangered s=ecies, we should think more comprehensively about what it means for a coun=ry to succeed in Asia in the future. Being "number one" is less important than it used to be. More cr=tical is how the states of the region interact to further common interests=and protect public goods. As happened in Europe, the region is beginning t= coalesce as a productive complement of economies, centers for innovation and finance, and military capabilities, but this is=a fragile process. 11 EFTA_R1_00071704 EFTA01764430 Japan is essential =or Asia's success in this regard, while failure on this front could be dev=stating. Thus, a binary view of Japan as either "in decline" or =quot;on the rise" is an unhelpful way for the United States to consider policy options in the future. The important point is ho= the two countries act as catalysts for cooperative strategies across a ra=ge of sectors. Japan's Troubles There is no doubt t=at Japan is suffering on a number of fronts. Economic growth has been anem=c for almost two decades-including five recessionary periods-and an aging =opulation will continue to drag down growth and consume national wealth. These challenges are most acute in Jap=n's countryside. The lack of opportunity has driven younger residents to b=g cities, feeding a vicious economic cycle for rural towns and prefectures= Fiscal stimulus opt=ons for the central government are limited after years of deficit spending= and Japan now spends nearly one-quarter of its national budget on debt se=vicing (compared with about 7 percent in the United States). Moreover, Japan's t=agic triple disaster-the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear accident-in Marc= 2011 will require taxpayer support for an extended recovery period. The c=untry faces a chronic energy shortfall after the earthquake shook Japan's faith in nuclear power and cut a quarte= of its electricity production. This is all made mo=e difficult given the domestic political environment. Petty political game=manship and gridlock exacerbate these problems and delay effective solutio=s. Japan's Strengths</=pan> But it's not all ba= news out of Japan, and the situation is not as black and white as it seem=. After all, part of the reason that Japan will soon have the world's high=st median age is because it leads the world in life expectancy, thanks in large part to a solid healthcare syste=, low crime rate, and high per capita GOP. The demographics are both an ec=nomic challenge and a sign of success. There is also sufficient fertile ground for Japan to reinvent itself economically. Japan conti=ues to innovate in the fields of manufacturing, renewable energy, and heal=hcare. One sign of this is Japanese firms and individuals receive the most U.S. patents of any country outsiderof the United States, accounting for about one-fifth of the total and thre= times the number of its closest rival, Germany. In addition, Japan =oasts eleven Nobel Prize laureates since 2000, spanning chemistry, physics= physiology, and medicine. And basic research in areas such as advanced ma=erials and stem cells could have dramatic economic and social impacts, provided Japan can keep making progress foste=ing entrepreneurship that capitalizes on this work. Japan's economy is =till the third largest in the world. It has a well-educated, productive po=ulation and an adaptive and globally connected corporate sector, despite t=e headwinds buffeting some of Japan's most famous brands such as Sharp and Panasonic. Less well known are small =ut highly profitable Japanese firms created in the past two decades such a= Axell and Simplex. Japan is also an important investor overseas, becoming=the world's second largest source of foreign direct investment outflows in 2011 and China's biggest investor= Such interdependenc= in East Asia is one of the few positive factors helping to mitigate regio=al conflict over long- standing territorial and historical disputes.=/p> Vital Partner in As=a A key question is h=w this interdependence will evolve and how actively Japan, the United Stat=s, and others will try to shape it in a coordinated and inclusive fashion.=Declining trade barriers and the diversification of economic growth in East Asia could help bolster the sense of community,=but only if the politics of regionalism can be managed effectively.=/p> 12 EFTA_R1_00071705 EFTA01764431 Regional networking=and rulemaking strategies that smack of Chinese containment (or that dwell=too much on military maneuvers) will be counterproductive, so a broader in=titutional approach that includes China will be necessary. Japan can be helpfu= here as it continues to contribute significantly to global and regional i=stitutions. It is the second largest contributor to the United Nations and=the International Monetary Fund, and it contributes the most to the Asian Development Bank and other regional f=nds such as the Asian Bond Fund. Japan can also be an important U.S. ally =or shaping and strengthening the emerging regional architecture that inclu=es the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit. Americans often und=restimate how well respected Japan is in most parts of Asia, notwithstandi=g the territorial and historical disputes that are fueling regional tensio=s today. Many Southeast Asian nations in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s looked up to Japan as the "lead goose&=uot; in their flock of aspiring economies and they emulated Japanese indus=rial policies. As the rest of Asia=modernizes and grows wealthier, Japan might now be