EFTA00160591.pdf

Transcript of 12/5/23 hearing Senate Judiciary Committee Holds Hearing on FBI Oversight LIST OF PANEL MEMBERS AND WITNESSES DICK DURBIN: The Senate Judiciary Committee will come to order. Today we continue our work to restore the committee's traditional oversight role, which I have tried to work on since I've become chair. Director Wray, your testimony marks the fourth time you've appeared before this committee since January of 2021. I want to begin by thanking you for the work that you and more than 35,000 FBI employees do to protect America and uphold our Constitution. I'm troubled that the FBI is facing baseless claims that you have been weaponized for political purposes and dangerous calls to defend the agency. There are people listening to that sort of rhetoric. This irresponsible -- irresponsible charge has real consequences. Just last month, a man from Tennessee pled guilty to a December 2022 plot to attack the Knoxville FBI office and kill the agents involved in the investigation of his co-defendants' participation in the January 6th insurrection. This committee plays a critical role in holding the FBI accountable to the American people, but I urge my colleagues to exercise this oversight in a responsible and respectful manner. I urge my colleagues as well not to engage in bullying or conduct unbecoming a member of this committee. One of the central concerns that I would like to raise is the troubling increase in hate crimes in America, including anti- Semitic, anti-Arab, and Islamophobic attacks in the wake of the Middle Eastern conflict. The FBI must continue to respond swiftly to these threats. In Illinois, we are still grieving the horrific murder of a six year old Palestinian-American, Wadea Al- Fayoume, and the violent attack on his mother by a man who targeted them simply because of their national origin. And we send our support to Hisham Awartani, Tahseen Ali Ahmad, and Kinnan Abdalhamid as they recovery from -- as they recover from their injuries in Vermont. These three young men of Palestinian descent were shot while walking to dinner when they were attacked. Two were wearing keffiyehs, a traditional Palestinian headdress. The Jewish community is also experienced an historic surge in threats, vandalism, and attacks. For example, a Las Vegas man was recently indicted for making threatening calls to our Jewish colleague, Senator Rosen. EFTA00160591 I strongly support the FBI's critical work in combating all of these threats, but there is a need for continued improvement, especially ensuring that more hate crimes are actually reported to law enforcement. At the same time that the FBI addresses domestic threats, it must also respond to international actors. Just last week, the Justice Department unsealed the indictment of an Indian national accused of conspiring to assassinate a Sikh American on American soil at the direction of an Indian government official. As I've said many times in this committee, political violence in all forms is unacceptable. An attack on any individual based on their race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, nationality, religion, or disability is not consistent with the values of America. Every community deserves to feel safe, and the FBI plays an important role in guaranteeing that sense of security. The threat of violent extremism is heightened by the proliferation of guns in America. Since the enactment of the bipartisan Safer Communities Act, the FBI has conducted more than 100,000 enhanced background checks for gun purchases under 21, keeping firearms out of the hands of prohibited people. There is more work to be done. Director Wray, I want to thank you for hosting me yesterday at the FBI headquarters for a demonstration of the FBI's use of Section 702 of FISA. There is no question that Section 702 is a critical tool for collecting foreign intelligence and protecting America. I appreciate the reforms you've put in place with the FISA court to address what the FISA court called widespread and persistent violation of 702 rules. I still remain concerned, though, about protecting the communications of innocent Americans from warrantless surveillance. I look forward to continuing to work with you to reauthorize 702 with the significant reforms we need to protect the privacy of innocent Americans. I now turn to the ranking member, Lindsey Graham, for his opening remarks. LINDSEY GRAHAM: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, inspector -- I'm -- inspector, Director. So, we really appreciate you coming. Now's a good time to have an honest talk with the American people through the committee about the dangers we face, what the FBI is doing every day, and how we can, you know, make you stronger in the face of a lot of threats. You'll be asked about the FBI's role in monitoring religious organizations. The debacle called Crossfire Hurricane hangs in the air in the conservative world. And so, we're going to move forward. You'll be asked some tough questions. And I appreciate you being here today. So, Mr. Chairman, one thing that I will be talking about among the list of threats is a broken border. Mr. Chairman, since President Biden has taken office, we've had 6.6 million encounters with illegal aliens at the southern border. That's larger than 33 states. And EFTA00160592 we're on pace -- the last seven days, we've been avenging about 9,500 a day. Play that out. We're looking at 3.4 million this year at that rate. That puts us at 10 million, and that doesn't count the gotaways. So, we're negotiating how to help Ukraine. Count me in for helping Ukraine. A robust package to help our allies in Ukraine -- Ukraine makes sense to me. Upping the ability of Taiwan to defend itself makes sense to me. Helping Israel makes all the sense in the world. Border security is the fourth plank of this supplemental. We're wildly apart. The negotiations by Senator Lankford and Murphy, I appreciate their efforts. We've made great progress, I think, on asylum. But the Democratic Party seems to be unwilling to address the key problem, parole. This statute is pretty clear. The secretary at DHS has the ability to parole an individual, it's supposed to be an individual, based on a case by case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit. Mayorkas and people at DHS have used that provision to give parole to over 240,000 people from four countries alone, Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. It is not meant to be used in that fashion. Why are we at an impasse? The Biden administration refuses to follow the law as written, refuses to give up this concept of humanitarian parole because it is their way of managing the border. Why are so many people coming now compared to before? The belief is, Mr. Chairman, if you get to America, you've got a really good chance of never leaving. Catch and release is the policy. If you apply for asylum, the initial screening test is way too low and your case is to be heard years from now, you're released into the United States. You're paroled in the United States when we run out of bed space or they just want to parole people. The Democratic governors and mayors of large blue cities are complaining, but their answer is just more resources to process illegal immigration. You will not get a deal from the Republican Party unless we change the policies that are leading to 9,500 on average a day coming to our border. What are we looking for? Not HR 2, but we're looking for policy changes that will spread throughout the world and people will no longer risk their lives, their family lives, pay thousands of dollars to human traffickers to show up at our border. That's what we're trying to do. You don't want to do that. You clearly as a party do not want to change the policies that are attracting so many people. It's inhumane, I think, to lure people through this journey. It's not fair to the American people to be overrun in the fashion we are. Given the threats that exist in the world, it's exceedingly dangerous to have lost control of your border. I'm often asked at home, well, are they incompetent or they want it this way, the Biden administration. I think there are a lot of smart people in the Biden administration. They want it this way. They want to be able to have the ability to use parole -- humanitarian parole, and there's no such creature that allows for blanket admission into the country, as a tool to control the flow. EFTA00160593 They're not interested in deterring the flow. They just want to control the flow, manage the flow. We, on this side, there are some of -- Republicans that won't vote for any aid to Ukraine but they're in a distinct minority in the Senate, and I think the House is at least evenly divided. If we had a border security proposal as part of the supplemental that addressed our own national security needs here at home, I think you'd get a very large vote. So, I don't need any more lectures about the need for Ukraine. I got it. I understand. You're right. I understand why we should help Israel. I understand why we should toughen up Taiwan. What you clearly don't seem to understand or you're not going to accept, the situation at the border is a national security nightmare in the making. It's unfair to the border communities to have to live like this. So, I have urged Governor Abbott, who's been on the tip of the spear here, now it's moving to Arizona, to make it real to senators who seem to object to making the policy changes. I know Chicago is -- has had a lot of illegal immigrants sent there. There are a lot of senators who are refusing to fix the broken border whose states are pretty much immune from the problem, in the sense that they're not having to deal with hundreds of thousands of people coming across and wreaking havoc on the border towns. Fentanyl is at an all-time high coming into the country through our broken southern border, made in -- made in China for the most part. We're never going to stop the flow of fentanyl until we regain control of our border. So, to those who are following these negotiations, let me tell you where they're at. They're stuck. They're not going forward in a productive fashion until the Biden administration is willing to change the policies that are leading, last two days, 10,200. Let me say that again. In the last two days, 10,200 people have shown up at the border. Those are the ones that we know about. The last seven days, almost 9,500 on average. You're on track to do 3.6 million. There will be no deal until you change the policies that lead to this problem. If that's too far for you, I'm sorry. It shouldn't be too far for America. The American people are demanding to regain control of a border where we have lost control. American people want to help Israel, generally speaking. There's division on Ukraine, but I think Ukraine would carry the day with border security. There are so many threats that the director will talk about. But people ask me in the hallway all the time, where are we on negotiating the border? We're stuck, and there will be no deal until the policy changes that would lead to people not coming at the levels they're coming today is enacted. That's where we're at. You seem to be comfortable, my friends on the Democratic side, with making small changes to a big problem, nibbling around the edges of this problem. LINDSEY GRAHAM: It'd be like sending guns to Ukraine without any bullets. You're really robust when it comes to Ukraine, and I'm with you. But when it comes to our border, you're playing a EFTA00160594 game of doing the least amount possible to pick 10 or 12 of us off. It ain't happening. And I've been involved in this issue for 20 years. This is not about immigration reform, and it needs to happen. It's about securing a broken border at a time when the threats to our nation are all time high, and it started with Afghanistan. The world is on fire, multiple fronts, and getting worse every day. There will be no assistance to other nations who are deserving until we assist our own nation. mSo, this attitude of doing the least you can, trying to pick 10 or 12 of us off, is not going to work. We're united over here. We're divided on Ukraine, but I would say two-thirds of our conference would vote for a package including Ukraine aid if it had real border security. And here's the problem you got. I know what real border security looks like, so does Senator Tillis, so does Senator Cotton, so does Senator Lankford, and so does everybody else over here. So you're making a choice. You're putting your nation at risk, and the consequence of this is going to be devastating to the world. DICK DURBIN: Let me lay out the mechanics for today's hearing. After I swear in Director Wray, he has five minutes to provide an opening statement. Then we'll turn to members. Each will have seven minutes, and please try to remain within your allotted time. Director, would you please stand to be sworn? Do you affirm the testimony you're about to give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? CHRISTOPHER WRAY: [Off mic] DICK DURBIN: Let the record reflect that the director has answered in the affirmative, and I now recognize him. CHRISTOPHER WRAY: Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Durbin, Ranking Member Graham, members of the committee. I'm proud to be here today representing the FBI. The threats the bureau's 38,000 men and women tackle every day are more complex and evolving more quickly than ever before, and we continue to work relentlessly to stay ahead of those threats and to outpace our adversaries. For example, last year we disrupted over 40 percent more cyber operations and arrested over 60 percent more cyber criminals than the year before. Over the past two EFTA00160595 years, we've seized enough fentanyl to kill 270 million people. That's about 80 percent of all Americans. We're also focused on other threats that emanate from the border and impact communities all over the country, things like violent gangs and human traffickers. At the same time, given the steady drumbeat of calls for attacks by foreign terrorist organizations since October 7th, we're working around the clock to identify and disrupt potential attacks by those inspired by Hamas's horrific terrorist attacks in Israel. And in recent years, we've seen an increase in hate crimes investigations, including a particularly big chunk involving threats to the Jewish community. That is a troubling trend we were focused on before October 7th. It's only gotten worse in the months since. I could go on and on about the important work the FBI's dedicated professionals are doing across the entire spectrum of threats each and every day to protect their fellow Americans. But in the time I have here this morning, I want to emphasize the importance of one tool in particular that is indispensable to our efforts to combat threats posed by foreign adversaries, one that will expire in just a few short weeks if Congress does not act, and that is FISA's 702 authorities for the FBI. As this committee knows, 702 allows us to stay a step ahead of foreign actors located outside the United States who pose a threat to national security, and the expiration of our 702 authorities would be devastating to the FBI's ability to protect Americans from those threats. So, let me explain just a bit about what I mean by that. When an overseas cybercriminal breaches a transportation hub, a public utility, or even a children's hospital, 702 is often the tool we use to find victims and get them what they need to get their systems back up and running. And just as important, it helps us identify the next targets so they can defend themselves against an attack. In just one recent cyber case, for instance, 702 allowed the FBI to alert more than 300 victims in every state and countries around the world. And I should add that many of those crucial victim notifications were made possible by our ability to conduct US person queries of our existing 702 collection. When it comes to foreign adversaries like Iran, whose actions across a whole host of threats have grown more brazen, seeking to assassinate high level officials, kidnap dissidents, and conduct cyber attacks here in the United States, or the People's Republic of China, which poses, in my view, a generational threat to our economic and national security, stripping the FBI of its 702 authorities would be a form of unilateral disarmament. Or take the elevated threat of international terrorism. 702 is key to our ability to detect a foreign terrorist organization overseas directing an operative here to carry out an attack in our own backyard. And US person queries in particular may provide the critical link that allows us to identify the intended target or build out the network of attackers so we can stop them before they strike and kill Americans. Given the critical importance of 702, we are committed to being good stewards of our authorities. And to that end, I have ordered a whole host of changes to address EFTA00160596 unacceptable compliance incidents, reforms, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, that many members of this committee have seen with their own eyes in live demonstrations of our systems at FBI headquarters. We've improved our systems, enhanced training, added oversight and approval requirements, adopted new accountability measures. On top of that, we stood up a brand new Office of Internal Auditing that's been focused specifically on FISA compliance. Most of the declassified reports that have come out over the past year or so involve compliance errors that predate those reforms, and I have been encouraged by the more recent data showing the significant positive impact that those reforms, those changes, have had. The most recently declassified opinion from the FISA Court, for instance, shows a 98 percent compliance rate and observes that the reforms are, and I'm quoting the court here, having the desired effect. And the two most recent Department of Justice semiannual reports likewise now show a greater than 98 percent compliance rate. And we're proud of the progress we've made so far, but we are by no means done. We recognize that this is an ongoing effort and are determined to work with Congress to get it right. But, but as we enter this critical phase of the renewal process, it is imperative that we not undercut the effectiveness of this essential tool with a warrant requirement or some other restriction that would paralyze us and our ability to tackle fast moving threats like the ones I just described, because crucial to our ability to use this information to actually protect Americans is our ability to review it promptly and efficiently. And to be clear, no court has ever held that a warrant is required for the FBI to query 702 data already lawfully in our holdings. In fact, in fact every court that has considered 702 in its current form, the FISA court, the FISA Court of Review, three different courts of appeals has found 702 to be constitutional. So, restricting the FBI's ability to collect under 702 or to review what's already in our collection, well, that would be a legislative policy choice. And if that's the path that's chosen, what are we going to say to the family whose loved one's care was sabotaged when a hospital was taken offline by a foreign adversary and the FBI wasn't able to stop that cyber attack? What's the justification for not using every lawful tool to stop China from stealing our technology and undermining our freedoms? Because I can assure you the PRC is not holding back and they're not tying their own hands behind their back. And what if there were a terrorist attack that we had a shot to prevent but couldn't take it because the FBI was deprived of its ability under 702 to actually look at key information already sitting in our holdings? Now, I was in FBI headquarters 22 years ago on 9/11. And over the years, I've spoken with families of victims of that horrific attack. Before that attack, well intentioned policy makers had made the choice to build a wall preventing access to national security information sitting in or and our partners holdings. EFTA00160597 Well, I bring that up because allowing 702 to lapse or amending it in a way that undermines its effectiveness would be akin to laying bricks to rebuild another pre 9/11 style wall. What could anybody possibly say to victims' families if there was another attack that we could have prevented if we hadn't given away the ability to effectively use a tool that courts have consistently deemed constitutional? Because let's not fool ourselves. That's what's at stake with the reauthorization of 702. As the threats from foreign adversaries to our homeland continue to evolve, the agility and effectiveness of 702 will be essential to the FBI's ability, really our mandate, from the American people to keep them safe for years to come. And we owe it to them to make sure we've got the tools that we need to do that. So, thank you for having me, and I look forward to your questions. DICK DURBIN: Thank you very much, Director. I'll start the questioning. Thank you for the visit yesterday to your headquarters and the demonstration of I think true advancements in terms of 702 to try to avert any concern about constitutional issues. I still have some of those concerns, as you might expect, and we have proffered an alternative to the current system that we think is reasonable. It has an emergency exception added to it, as it should, because there are issues of grave national security that can't wait even for the process to continue. And secondly, when it came to victimization, we allow consent by the victim to go forward with the collection of information in those situations, as it should be. Since the enactment of FISA Amendment Reauthorization Act of 2018, the FBI has been required to obtain a court order for US person searches in a narrow subset of cases involving predicated criminal investigations unrelated to national security. Has the FBI ever obtained a court order in order to perform a US person search of 702 data in this context? CHRISTOPHER WRAY: To the best of my knowledge, we have not. And that's partly because that's not the way we use 702. DICK DURBIN: That's correct. The answer is zero. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence Annual Statistical Transparency Report for 2020 revealed that the statutory requirement has been triggered approximately 100 times. Is that true? CHRISTOPHER WRAY: EFTA00160598 That I can't speak to the number. I know -- I think the report in question may involve incidents that all occurred before the reforms that we just were talking about, but -- DICK DURBIN: I'd appreciate if you'd take a look at that and answer for the record. Let me take you to another topic that I -- that's been an issue discussed before this committee and voted on several different occasions, and that's CSAM, child sexual abuse materials. Recently, the National Association of Attorneys General sent a letter to Congress asking lawmakers to study the means and methods of artificial intelligence, or AI, being used to exploit children through a generation of child sexual abuse material, or CSAM. In the letter, the attorneys general described how AI could be used to create new images of children in sexual positions or otherwise overlay photos of un- victimized children on photos of abused children to create CSAM. To put this in simple terms, I don't know of any parent or grandparent who is knowledgeable in this area who hasn't warned their children, grandchildren, please be careful what you communicate on the Internet and who you communicate it with. You've highlighted the FBI's work to, "Identify, prioritize, investigate and deter individuals and criminal networks from exploiting children," and you've noted that the proliferation of CSAM on the dark net is threatening. Director Wray, can you elaborate on what the FBI is doing to disrupt technologies used to exploit children? What obstacles are you facing related to this work? CHRISTOPHER WRAY: So I think there is no mission set, no threat that the FBI's men and women tackle that is more righteous and more at the heart of why we do what we do than protecting kids. And I know that last year we arrested something like 3,000 child predators and rescued, something like 2,000 kids from exploitation, the vast majority of which is happening heavily online, but then often leads to what's even worse is, which is the actual hands on abuse. And certainly, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, technologies have continued to advance in a way that makes that threat even more pernicious, including AI, including the ability to create synthetic content, for example. When you ask about challenges that we face, one of the biggest concerns that we have is that the companies, these technology companies are increasingly moving in a direction where they are designing warrant- proof encryption. And what that means to everybody listening at home, is that we're going to be in a situation where the abuse that's happening on those platforms, law enforcement won't have any ability, no matter how rock solid the warrant, to get access to the information we need to protect those kids and take down those monsters. EFTA00160599 And the companies themselves are effectively blinding themselves to abuse that's happening on their own platforms. So what we really need is for the companies to work with Congress, work with the executive branch, work with law enforcement to design their encryption in a way that makes sure that they maintain the ability to respond to rock solid legal process and respond to warrants. DICK DURBIN: So why aren't they cooperating with us? Why are these companies resisting an effort to engage them in solving the problem? CHRISTOPHER WRAY: Well, I can't speak for them in terms of their motivations. Obviously, these issues get into balances of privacy and security and that's a long standing debate. DICK DURBIN: When it comes to children, for goodness sakes, what is the privacy concern there? CHRISTOPHER WRAY: You got me. I will tell you that we get from some of these companies, millions of tips we've had historically about child exploitation. And the idea that we would go into a model where those tips just evaporate, let's be clear, when the tips evaporate, the kids are still out there getting abused. The predators are still out there. The only thing that's changed is our ability to do anything about it because the way in which the companies would be designing their encryption. So it's a way for them to essentially -- and again, I can't speak to their motivation, but it's a way for them to essentially blind themselves to what's happening on their platforms and then indirectly then blind us to our ability to protect kids and go after predators. DICK DURBIN: We're going to be bringing some leaders in the industry before this committee next month and I hope we can ask these questions directly. But I will tell you, we passed overwhelmingly, unanimously, five different bills related to this issue, and I thought that was going to be an avenue to bring them to the floor. The resistance from Big Tech to even pursue this issue despite this overwhelming bipartisan vote troubles me greatly. I want to believe they want to do the right thing. There's very little evidence of that. Senator Graham. EFTA00160600 LINDSEY GRAHAM: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let's pick up on that real quickly. Do you agree that social media systems as they're designed today present dangers to American families? CHRISTOPHER WRAY: Sure. LINDSEY GRAHAM: Thanks. All right. I don't know where to begin other than, is now a good time to fund the FBI below inflation? CHRISTOPHER WRAY: I think -- LINDSEY GRAHAM: Just say no. CHRISTOPHER WRAY: No. I was about to say hell no. LINDSEY GRAHAM: Yeah. Well, yeah. No, no. You can say hell no if you want to. I'll say it for you. DICK DURBIN: Beating the witness. LINDSEY GRAHAM: That's right. Yeah. Yeah. I think that's pretty dumb, given what you've told us. How long have you been associated with the FBI? CHRISTOPHER WRAY: Well, I've been director a little over six years, but I've been working with the FBI my whole career, really. EFTA00160601 LINDSEY GRAHAM: Let's put a fine point on where we're at today as America. How would you describe the threat matrix against America today, from your point of view after having been at the FBI most of your adult life? CHRISTOPHER WRAY: So what I would say that is unique about the environment that we're in right now, in my career, is that while there may have been times over the years where individual threats could have been higher here or there than where they might be right now, I've never seen a time where all the threats or so many of the threats are all elevated all at exactly the same time. That's what makes this environment that we're in now so fraught and why funding our men and women who are working shoulder to shoulder with state and local law enforcement and other partners every day makes it even more important, not less. LINDSEY GRAHAM: So blinking red lights analogy about 9/11, all the lights were blinking red before 9/11. Apparently, obviously, all of us missed it. Would you say that there's multiple blinking red lights out there? CHRISTOPHER WRAY: I see blinking lights everywhere I turn. LINDSEY GRAHAM: OK. All right. I can't say anything better than that. Who's driving all these problems? Let's start with Iran. What is Iran trying to do to America? CHRISTOPHER WRAY: So Iran, which is of course the world's biggest state sponsor of terrorism, let's start there. Iran, just in the last couple of years, if you want to bring it home here to the homeland, in the last couple of years, Iran has tried to assassinate a former US national security adviser on US soil, has tried to kidnap and then try to kill a journalist, American journalist and human rights activist right smack in the middle of New York City, has conducted a cyber-attack on a children's hospital in New England. EFTA00160602 And for extra credit, as Director Ratcliffe and I announced in the fall of 2020, tried to interfere in the last Presidential election. So that's just a start. So if that's not enough to convince people -- LINDSEY GRAHAM: Other than that, they've been pretty good to work with, right? OK. Let's look at, you said we found enough fentanyl to kill 80 percent of American people? CHRISTOPHER WRAY: And that's just in the last two years. LINDSEY GRAHAM: OK. Do you think we missed some fentanyl? CHRISTOPHER WRAY: Absolutely. LINDSEY GRAHAM: OK. What role does China play in the fentanyl problems America has? CHRISTOPHER WRAY: Well, I'd start with China supplies most of the precursors to the cartels in Mexico, which then leads to the fentanyl that comes here and that's been talked about a fair amount and it's a huge problem. But in addition to that, China is also responsible for an awful lot of the pill presses, manufacturing of the pill presses, which of course are also used. And in addition to that, a lot of people don't know this, but China is also responsible for an awful lot of the precursors for the meth that's manufactured South of the border as well. LINDSEY GRAHAM: Do you see that getting better? CHRISTOPHER WRAY: I do not. EFTA00160603 LINDSEY GRAHAM: Let's talk about Russia, what are they up to? CHRISTOPHER WRAY: Well, besides their unconscionable aggression in Ukraine, Russia has one of the most advanced, most widespread offensive cyber programs in the world. They have invested it very heavily and have used it in different ways against us and our allies. They have intelligence officers here in the United States, too many by any measure. They also provide safe haven to cyber criminals, who, whether they're working for the Russian government or not, are conducting cyber-attacks against us and our allies all over the world. So that's just a start. LINDSEY GRAHAM: OK. Let's go to international terrorist organizations. One of my concerns is after Afghanistan, we sort of put international terrorism on steroids. Are you concerned that international terrorism threats to the homeland are rising as the border continues to be broken? CHRISTOPHER WRAY: I am concerned that we are at an elevated threat environment, a heightened threat environment from foreign terrorist organizations for a whole host of reasons and obviously their ability to exploit any port of entry including our Southwest border is a source of concern. There's a lot of discussion about numbers and numbers are important, but let's not forget that it didn't take a big number of people on 9/11 to kill 3,000 people. So while numbers are important, numbers don't tell the whole story and we have seen an increase in so-called KSTs, known as suspected terrorists attempting to cross over the last five years. LINDSEY GRAHAM: Would you say, kind of putting a fine point on this topic, that right now is the largest threat we face as a nation from international terrorist organizations since 9/11? CHRISTOPHER WRAY: Well, it's certainly higher than it's been in a long, long time. Let me put it that way. Because if you just look post October 7th, and I thought the threat was elevated before EFTA00160604 October 7th, but post October 7th, you've seen a veritable rogues gallery of foreign terrorist organizations calling for attacks against us. LINDSEY GRAHAM: OK. So October the 7th was devastating to our friends in Israel. So your testimony before this committee since October 7th, the urging of foreign terrorist organization to attack America has gone up. Is that fair to say? CHRISTOPHER WRAY: Yes. The threat level has gone to a whole other level since October 7th. LINDSEY GRAHAM: OK. Folks, you're on notice. What are we going to do about it? Finally, what should we be doing differently With all these bad actors? I think it's fair to say we've lost deterrence. Do you have any idea, quickly, of what we could be doing differently? CHRISTOPHER WRAY: Well, certainly deterrence requires consequences and so consequences need to be imposed on bad actors in a variety of ways to ensure deterrence. Consequences are also part of disrupting, even without deterrence, disrupting and degrading bad actors' abilities to harm us. LINDSEY GRAHAM: Thank you. DICK DURBIN: Senator Whitehouse. SHELDON WHITEHOUSE: Morning, Director Wray. How are you? CHRISTOPHER WRAY: Fine. Thank you. SHELDON WHITEHOUSE: EFTA00160605 I seem often to have to use our time together to go over old business, for which I apologize, but such is the responsiveness of the department. I wanted to talk to you about Charles McGonigal today. He's an FBI agent who is interesting in two respects. First, he's pleading guilty or has pled guilty to offenses regarding his undisclosed receipt of $225,000 from a foreign national, and he awaits sentencing for the crimes to which he pled coming up in February. The second interesting thing is that he led the New York Counterintelligence Division during the time that it was widely reported that New York FBI agents and former New York US Attorney Rudy Giuliani were pressuring Director Comey to intervene in the Hillary Clinton campaign and do it damage, which as we unfortunately know, Director Comey did with press conferences that violated DOJ rules and procedures. So my experience is that when somebody is in the pre-sentencing mode of a criminal plea, that's a very good time to get information from them and cooperation from them. I don't know what happened in the New York field office during that period, but there's a very good chance that McGonigal does. I'll put into the record three letters. One is me to Attorney General Garland, February 7th, asking about this. The second is Office of Legislative Affairs at DOJ back to me, giving something of an answer to this, and the third is a letter off DOJ's website reflecting the plea agreement between the Southern District of New York and the attorneys for Charles McGonigal. So at this point, what I asked in the letter was that somebody independent of the FBI take a look to see if there were FBI shenanigans during that period in that office, and I've received no confirmation that anything is going on. The plea agreement reflects no signal or sign of cooperation, which as you know is often a feature in plea agreements and sentencings. So there's no sign that he was asked to cooperate outside of the plea. I have been unable to determine whether or not the inspector general is even eyeballing this to see if somebody independent from the FBI, somebody in the department should take a look. What do you know of the status of this, and would it make sense? Would it not make sense, let me put it that way to have an independent set of eyeballs, have a look at what McGonigal knows about what took place in that office at that time, while he is in this helpful position of being subject to sentencing? CHRISTOPHER WRAY: Well, senator, I appreciate you raising the topic. So a couple of things. First, our counterintelligence division, of course, are the people who identified McGonigal's wrongdoing pursued it, arrested him and are very focused on trying to determine in all the ways you would imagine, what, if anything, he might have impacted through his misconduct. That's one. Second, there are I think two US attorney's offices involved both New York, [Inaudible] New York and, I think the District of Columbia as well. EFTA00160606 So two cases that are pre-sentencing and that his cooperation, if you will, could be potentially relevant to. I can tell you, I want to be a little bit careful how far I can go in this, but I will tell you we have involved the inspector general as well because we, like you, want to make sure we understand the full scope of what Mr. McGonigal did and what he knows. SHELDON WHITEHOUSE: So the DOJ Inspector General is involved, or has been notified? CHRISTOPHER WRAY: Has been-- SHELDON WHITEHOUSE: Engaged with? CHRISTOPHER WRAY: Engaged. Yeah. SHELDON WHITEHOUSE: Yeah. OK. Well, that's good to hear. Let's go back to 702 for a moment. I understand that 702, which was originally designed sort of for a counterterrorism purpose, has also been deployed against the international fentanyl trafficking apparatus. Is that correct? And has 702 been important in combating the international fentanyl trafficking apparatus? CHRISTOPHER WRAY: 702 has been important in the fight against the scourge of fentanyl, more so I would say by our intelligence community partners, the CIA, for example, in their work overseas to pursue some of the foreign dimensions of the fentanyl crisis, which of course then have massive ramifications for communities all over the United States. SHELDON WHITEHOUSE: So that's a success of 702? CHRISTOPHER WRAY: It is a success of 702. EFTA00160607 SHELDON WHITEHOUSE: You also mentioned the role of 702 in reaching out to victims of crime, of potential foreign intelligence operations. Could you elaborate in our last minute together, a little bit more on the role of 702 in supporting the government's role in letting Americans and American companies find out that they are the victims or have been the victims of criminal and intelligence attacks and helping them work through the consequences as victims? CHRISTOPHER WRAY: Well, in the short time we have, what I would say is 702, especially the ability to run queries on IP addresses, email addresses, things like that is statistically right now the biggest place in which it's used is cyberattacks. So victims, overwhelmingly, victims of of Russian Iranian Chinese, others, cyber-attacks here in the United States, 702 is what allows us to figure out which company is being targeted, maybe what the entry point is, where the bad guys are going and allows us to then, armed with that information, rush out to those companies and alert them, so that they can take steps to mitigate it before it gets potentially exponentially worse. And we find that there are a lot of instances where we're coming to companies who didn't even know they'd been breached yet. And if we hadn't had 702, both they and we would have been unwitting. SHELDON WHITEHOUSE: If you could share if you could share with us some actual instances, make this a question for the record, obviously, you have to do some scrubbing to make sure that everybody's comfortable with the information being released, but I think the more we can know about actual ways in which actual individuals, even if they have to be anonymized, were helped and we see the factual circumstances that would be useful. Thank you. Thanks, Chairman. DICK DURBIN: Thank you, Senator Whitehouse. Senator Grassley. CHUCK GRASSLEY: You testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee that the Richmond field office anti-Catholic memo was, quote, a product by one field office, end of quote. You testified before the House Judiciary Committee that the memo was, quote, a single product of a single field office, end quote. But the Richmond memo says two other EFTA00160608 field offices of the FBI were involved and that that information had been redacted in versions provided to the Congress. Why did the FBI redact that critical information? And second, did you review the unredacted version before giving your previous testimony? CHRISTOPHER WRAY: So Senator, I think that this notion that other field offices were involved is a garble and let me explain why I say that. The only involvement of the two other field offices was the Richmond authors of the product, included two sentences or something thereabouts, referencing each of these other office's cases, and they sent those sentences about the other office's cases to them, not the whole product and asked them, hey, did we describe your case right? That's all the other offices had. So it was a single field office's product and I stand by that. CHUCK GRASSLEY: Did you review the unredacted memo before giving your previous testimony? CHRISTOPHER WRAY: I have reviewed the unredacted memo. Exactly when I reviewed it, I can't, as I sit here right now, tell you. CHUCK GRASSLEY: OK. In July of this year, I made public what's now known as the Biden Family 1023 FBI document. I've also written you several letters about the same, mostly recently I think October 24th. That letter of October said in part that the confidential human source in the Biden Family 1023 was not connected to known sources of Russian information. That confidential human source is also reportedly a high paid, long running FBI source that the FBI has used in many investigative matters. According to former Attorney General Bill Barr, Barr said that 1023 was deemed sufficiently credible for further investigation. On May 31st of this year, Chairman Comer and I had a call with you. On that call, you told us that the Biden Family 1023 is related to an ongoing ongoing investigative matter. Now, very clearly, these data points show indicators of credibility. This question for you, this FBI 1023 was serialized on June 30th, 2020, over three years ago, when were you first made aware of 1023? EFTA00160609 CHRISTOPHER WRAY: Well, I don't know that I could give you the exact date, but I can tell you that that I learned of the 1023 much, much, much more recently than anything around 2020, that's for sure. CHUCK GRASSLEY: This is a public document. You have an obligation to tell this committee what you knew about it and when you knew about it and if you can't give us that information, I guess I better go on. Are there additional FBI generated I 023s that reference a bribery scheme involving the Biden family? And if so, how many and what are their dates? CHRISTOPHER WRAY: Well, Senator, now you're asking questions that relate directly to Special Counsel Weiss's ongoing investigation and respectfully, I can't really discuss anything related to that investigation. I would refer you to him for that. CHUCK GRASSLEY: The 1023 references alleged text, financial records and audio tapes that prove some sort of scheme involving money with Biden people. These are discrete documents that can be obtained, if they exist, when a high paid, long used federal confidential human source provides the FBI with evidence that three types, different types of records exist that prove a crime involving a political official, then standard FBI practice is to take steps to obtain that evidence. Would you agree with that, what I've said so far about the FBI policy? And if not, why not? CHRISTOPHER WRAY: Well, certainly, I would expect people to do appropriate follow up on anything in a 1023, but obviously, every one of those instances is very fact specific and case specific, case dependent. CHUCK GRASSLEY: That answers. OK. So then based upon what you just told me, did the FBI seek these records in this matter? EFTA00160610 CHRISTOPHER WRAY: Well, let me separate into two different things here. When it comes to the investigation being led by Special Counsel Weiss, which is being supported by our Baltimore field office. That one I'm not going to be able to discuss because it's an ongoing investigation. When it comes to the assessment that occurred in being run out of the office of our field office in Pittsburgh and the US Attorney Mr. Brady, as selected by Attorney General Barr to look at all of this back in the earlier period you're talking about, my understanding is that there was agreement among the team about what steps needed to be taken and with the closing of that assessment. CHUCK GRASSLEY: Have you communicated with White House officials or used a third-party to do so about anything relating to the 1023 as it involves people in the Biden family? And if so, who and when? CHRISTOPHER WRAY: No. CHUCK GRASSLEY: OK. I want to go to a sexual misconduct by the FBI. On October the 5th 2022, I sent you a letter and later made FBI records public that showed widespread sexual misconduct in FBI against females. The data also showed that hundreds of FBI personnel retired to avoid discipline and the senior high level officials received reduced punishment, if any at all. On October the 6th, the FBI told The Associated Press that it had intended to respond to me first and declined to provide sexual misconduct data to the press at that time. It's over one year later and the FBI has failed to provide this data to me. The FBI's blatant lack of action indicates it isn't taking misconduct against women in the workplace seriously. Why has the FBI failed to provide that very important data to this committee and when will it finally be produced, as the FBI told the Associated Press you were going to? CHRISTOPHER WRAY: Well, first, let me say I could not disagree more strongly that we don't take it seriously. I can tell you, I take misconduct, sexual misconduct against our own employees extremely seriously and we've put in place all sorts of new procedures and EFTA00160611 policies to deal with that, and to communicate in no uncertain terms how strongly I feel about that. As to the responsiveness to your letter, let me follow up with my team and find out where that stands, but I do want to make sure that there's not any confusion, none, about how seriously I take this topic. CHUCK GRASSLEY: OK. Then where's the data, if that's what you're going to be willing to take it so seriously? CHRISTOPHER WRAY: I will follow up with you about your letter. CHUCK GRASSLEY: OK. DICK DURBIN: Thank you, Senator Grassley. Senator Klobuchar. AMY KLOBUCHAR: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Thank you so much, Director Wray, for being here. I want to start out with hate crimes. You and I have talked about them before. I have, I know, thanked you and your agents in Minnesota for their work in solving what was a clear hate crime, with a prison sentence of a bombing of Dar al Farouq Islamic Center in my home sta