EFTA01796841.pdf

From: Office of Terje Rod-Larsen Sent: Thursday, February 7, 2013 10:43 PM Subject: February 6 update Articl= 2. <https://mail.google.com/mail/./0/html/compose/static_filesiblank_quirks.html#b> Foreign Policy Saeb Erekat - <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/05/The_Peace_Proce=sor_Palestine_Saeb_Erekat> An interview by Aaron David Miller Articl= 4. <https://mail.google.com/mailN0/html/compose/static_files/blank_quirks.htmIttd> NYT India vs. China vs. Egypt</=> Thomas L. Friedman chttp://topics.nytimes.com/top=opinion/editorialsandoped/oped/columnists/thomaslfriedman/index.html> Articl= 6. <https://mail.google.com/mail/./0/html/compose/static_files/blank_quirks.htmlfif> The Diplomat Getting to the Endgame With Iran chttp://thediplomat.corni=013/02/06/getting-to-the-endgame-with-iranh =/u> Robert Dreyfuss Article 7. The Wall Street Journal A New U.S. International Economic =trategy Robert B. Zoellick <http://online.wsj.com/searchi=erm.html?KEYWORDS=ROBERT+B.+ZOELLICK&bylinesearch=true> EFTA_R1_00133043 EFTA01796841 Ar=icle 1. Washington Post Obama to make=first trip to Israel, part of a potential 'new beginning' with region<=span> Scott Wilson <http://w=w.washingtonpost.com/scott-wilson/2011/03/02/ABt5vmP_page.html> President Obama wil= travel to Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories next month to m=ke an early second-term push for peace negotiations between two divided go=ernments and to assess the broader political developments remaking the Middle East. It will be Obama'= first trip as president to Israel, where suspicions run high in the after=ath of his unsuccessful early efforts <http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-searches-for-middle=east- peace/2012/07/14/gJQAQQKIW_story.html> at Middle East peacemaking. The choice of desti=ation — one that Obama avoided in his first term — suggests a revival =f his ambitions abroad after a year of virtual dormancy on foreign affairs= The timing also points to a willingness on his part to quickly reengage a politically volatile foreign-policy issu= just months after winning his second term. But the visit will =ighlight how much the region has changed <http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/decision2012/us=tries-to-define-relations-with-evolving-arab- world/2012/09/14/c3bff286-fe8=-11el-b153-218509a954el_story.html> since he last visited the Middle East i= his first year in office, with the rise of Islamist governments and the w=dening repercussions of civil revolt. After Obama helped =a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2011/03/09/=R2011030905672.html" target="_blank"> topple Moammar Gaddafi in Libya in 2011, many in the region wondered wh=n he would emerge again to help shape the course of the tumultuous Arab Sp=ing, which has replaced a pair of U.S.-allied dictatorships with elected l=lamist governments. Within the Israeli-=alestinian conflict, much has changed since the direct peace talks Obama inaugurated in September 2010 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/01/=R2010090106666.html> collapsed within weeks. Israel's recent=battle with the armed Hamas movement in the Gaza Strip left many predicting a wider fight in the future <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/some-in-israel-s=e-acquiescence-in-iron- dome-missile-defense-system/2012/12/08/5dc857f4-3d6=-11e2-bca3-aadc967e29c5_story.html> , as divisions deepened=within the Palestinian and Israeli electorates over whether talks or war w=uld resolve the conflict. "To make it a sub=tantive trip that is more than a positive photo-op would require setting u= a specific framework for an agreement and setting a tight deadline to ach=eve it," said Jeremy Ben-Ami, the executive director of J Street chttp://jstreet.orgh = a nonprofit group that advocates the creation of a Palestinian state alon=side Israel. White House officia=s would not provide a date for Obama's trip, which he will squeeze into =he tight schedule he is building around a busy domestic agenda that includ=s immigration, guns and the economy. 2 EFTA_R1_00133044 EFTA01796842 But Israeli media r=ported that Obama is scheduled to arrive March 20 as part of a trip that w=Il include a stop in Jordan, where the civil war in next-door Syria and it= growing refugee crisis is presenting a major challenge to King Abdullah II, a U.S. ally . Obama began his fir=t term by making a strong push for peace talks between Israel and the Pale=tinians, believing the conflict fueled radicalism in the region in general=and toward the United States in particular, given its historical support for the Jewish state. In contrast to pred=cessor George W. Bush, Obama wanted to demonstrate to Arab governments tha= the United States would make demands of Israel in pursuit of a regional p=ace agreement. Israeli Prime Minis=er Benjamin Netanyahu made little secret of his preference for Republican Mitt Romney <http://www.washingtonpost.com/politicsidecision2012/mitt-romney-=alestinians-have-no-interest-whatsoever-in- establishing-peace/2012/09/18/5=18Sa12-0183-11e2-b260-32f4a8db967e_story.html> in last year's U.S. presidential campaign. Net=nyahu and Obama have at times disagreed bitterly over issues relating to t=e Palestinians, including Israel's continued settlement construction in =he West Bank and East Jerusalem. Israel's military=occupied those territories, along with Gaza, in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.=Palestinians view them as the key territorial elements of their future sta=e. In a June 2009 address in Cairo, a speech that asked fora "new beginning=94 with the Islamic world, Obama said: "The United States does not accep= the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlements." He also did not stop =n Israel on that trip, instead visiting Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Germany, where he emphasized the horror of the Holocaust chttp://www.washingtonpos=.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/05/AR2009060500411.html> and the moral imperative of d=fending Israel. Romney, among others, made the omission <http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-israel-romney-wows-cro=ds-but-puzzles-with-grasp-of-palestinian- relationship/2012/07/30/gJOAsBEJL=_story.html> a campaign issue. But on regional sec=rity issues, Obama and Netanyahu have deepened cooperation amid rising U.S= military aid to Israel. Obama has agreed with Netanyahu that Iran must no= be allowed to use its uranium-enrichment program to develop a nuclear weapon, an issue that the two will discuss du=ing Obama's visit. Netanyahu's Likud=party emerged from elections last month as the largest bloc in Israel's =arliament, meaning that he will serve another term as prime minister. But = surprisingly strong showing by a new centrist party is likely to put more pressure on him to pursue talks. "It was a mistake=for Obama not to go in the first term at a time when it could have affecte= Israeli public opinion of him, and now, it has hardened against him to a =oint that I don't believe it can," said Elliott Abrams, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations who se=ved as a senior Middle East adviser to Bush. Obama's visit wil= coincide with growing concern in the region that the two-state solution f=vored by him is in peril, as Israeli settlement construction continues and=as the Islamist Hamas gains clout within the once-secular Palestinian nationalist movement. Hamas The Peace Processor <http:/=www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_eastiin-gaza- surge-of-support-for-hama=-starts-to-fade/2012/11/29/adf3b9ac-3a2f-11e2-b0lf-S155b193f58f_story.html= target=> An interview by Aar=n David Miller February 5, 2013 --=Other than Mahmoud Abbas, Saeb Erekat could be the most recognizable Pales=inian on the planet. The chief Palestinian negotiator is certainly among t=e most passionate in promoting the cause. And nobody on the Palestinian side knows the substance of the issue= or the negotiating history better. 3 EFTA_R1_00133045 EFTA01796843 I first met Erekat =n the late 1980s, while working on the Palestinian issue for then Secretar= of State George Shultz. Back then, the U.S.-educated diplomat was already=showing the brashness and outspokenness that would make him one of the most memorable -- if exasperating -- of the=Palestinians with whom we dealt. He annoyed then Sec=etary of State James Baker by wearing his kaffiyeh around his shoulders at=the opening of the Madrid Peace Conference in October 1991. And over the y=ars, he continued to annoy the Israelis too with his fiery performances on CNN -- though to this day, key Israeli =egotiators, such as Isaac Molho, continue to praise his pragmatism at the =argaining table. It was Erekat's aca=emic bent, analytical chops, and capacity to write in English that would m=ke him so indispensable to the only Palestinian who really counted in thos= days -- Yasir Arafat. Erekat was a unique figure -- neither a fighter (no nom de guerre for him), nor a PLO i=sider, nor an organization man from Tunis. Rather, he was a West Banker fr=m Jericho, and he succeeded in maintaining his relevance in a Palestinian =olitical scene dominated not by fellow academics, but by hard men defined by struggle and intrigue. During=the heady days of the peace process, he became a key point of contact for =he Americans, the Israelis, the Arabs, and much of the rest of the interna=ional community. I came to know Erek=t not only as a negotiator, but as a person. He sent his kids to Seeds of =eace, a conflict resolution and coexistence organization that I ran briefl= after leaving the State Department, and my daughter befriended his and stayed with the Erekats in Jericho. Sae= and I have yelled at each other, defended our respective positions, laugh=d, and mourned opportunities that were never adequately explored. But thro=gh it all, what he said about himself was true: He wasn't as pro-Palestinian or pro-Israeli as much as he was pr=-peace. That peace has prov=n elusive to this day. But with all our differences -- and there are many =- I believe Erekat believes in its possibility. Who else would list as an =quot;objective" on his resume: "Solve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict based on a two state negotiated solution thro=gh diplomatic offices"? If, or perhaps when= another effort to negotiate a deal is made, one thing is clear -- Erekat =ill be in the middle of it. Last week, he agreed to answer my questions on=the past and future of the Israeli-Palestinian problem. FP: What were your best and worst moments in the Israeli-Palestinia= negotiations, and what was the greatest missed opportunity? Saeb Erekat: Though I was not the chief negotiator at that moment= the connection between [then Prime Minister Yitzhak] Rabin and President =rafat made everyone around them, including myself, feel that peace was possible. There was significant progress in al= tracks until Rabin's assassination by an Israeli terrorist -- after he wa= killed, no Israeli leader had the vision to understand that the window of=opportunity for a two-state solution would close as fast as they continued their colonization policies. =/p> The missed opportunity has definitely b=en Israel throwing away the Arab Peace Initiative, which offers normalizat=on of relations of 57 countries with Israel in exchange for Israeli withdr=wal to the 1967 border. They threw it away by bombing Gaza, by intensifying collective punishments, and by in=reasing settlement construction all over the occupied West Bank, particula=ly in and around Occupied East Jerusalem. FP: 2013 is the 20th anniversary of the Oslo negotiations. What was=Oslo's greatest success, and its greatest failure? SE: The fact that, two decades after Oslo, we are still a nation un=er occupation shows that Israeli governments did derail it. The interim ac=ords were not supposed to last for 20 years but only five. After that, we were going to enjoy freedom and sov=reignty. But Israel increased its settlement exp=nsion. In fact, within 20 years, the number of settlers almost tripled. Th= institution-building efforts led by the Palestinian government have been =ompletely undermined by the lack of freedom. 4 EFTA_R1_00133046 EFTA01796844 This situation cannot continue. Oslo succeeded in bringing bac= 250,000 Palestinians from the diaspora and building the capacity for our =tate. The international community failed though, by granting Israel an unp=ecedented culture of impunity that allowed them to use negotiations as a means to continue rather than stop c=lonization. FP: What is the most important thing Israelis don't understand=about Palestinians? SE: That we are not going anywhere. As simple as that. We are not g=ing to disappear just because their government builds an annexation wall a=ound us. They should close their eyes and imagin= their state within 10 years time. What do they see? If they continue thei= policies, they are going to officially adopt the form of an apartheid reg=me, which I think is not what many Israelis want. FP: What is the most important thing Palestinians have learned abou= Israelis? SE: That Israelis will not take back the ships that brought them he=e to leave somewhere else. We got to understand that we have to live side =y side. The rules of engagement, though, cannot be those of apartheid, but those of freedom. FP: What do you expect from the next Israeli government on the peac= process? SE: I don't think there is room for optimism, but our position hasn=t changed. We don't see any other solution than a two-state solution. Any =sraeli government that recognizes this fact and respects what previous governments have agreed upon should become=a partner for peace. FP: Is Hamas-Fatah unity possible, and what would the impact be on =he future of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations? SE: We expect to have progress in the near future, with Hamas allow=ng the Central Elections Commission to register new voters in Gaza. I beli=ve there is political agreement -- in fact, there is a signed agreement. We expect to have elections as soon =s possible, which is the right way to solve our differences: Let our peopl= decide, those in Palestine as well as our people in the Diaspora. Having said so, Hamas has recognized th= Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole and legitimate representati=e of the Palestinian people, including its mandate to negotiate a final st=tus agreement with Israel. Once that is achieved, we expect to hold a national referendum. FP: How would you describe Egypt's role in the peace process now? W=at do you expect from President Barack Obama's administration with regards=to the peace process? SE: Egypt has played a central role, and continues to do so. We tru=t that Egypt, under President Mohamed Morsy's leadership, will continue to=play a strong role because Palestine and Egypt have a common interest in achieving peace. President Obama had stated that he has = personal commitment to bring peace to the Middle East. We, the Egyptians,=and the rest of the Arab world tell him that we are ready for peace. We ha=e the Arab Peace Initiative. This goes in line with the stated U.S. national interest. Washington's failure =o explicitly say that Israel is to blame for choosing settlements over pea=e has contributed to Israel's culture of impunity. FP: Can America be an effective broker in negotiations? SE: If the U.S. decides to be an honest broker, it could not only b= effective but in fact could bring real peace to the region, a just and la=ting one. The U.S. has a moral obligation toward the Palestinian people, who have been under occupation and living i= exile for decades. FP: Is a two state solution still possible? 5 EFTA_R1_00133047 EFTA01796845 SE: Yes, but only if there is a political will. So far, Israel's wi=l is about colonization, and the international community has failed to put=an end to decades of double standards by treating Israel as a state above the law. We don't see any other soluti=n than a two-state solution, though Israel is taking us to a one-state rea=ity. Aaron David Miller is a distinguishe= scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Articl= 3. The Daily Beast The Mixed Leg=cy Of Shimon Peres Dan=el Gavron <http://w=w.thedailybeast.com/contributors/daniel-gavron.html> Feb 4, 2013 -- Now that he has finished his consultations with the country's politi=al parties and charged Benjamin Netanyahu with forming a new coalition, Is=ael's respected President, Shimon Peres, is once again very much in the =ews. In his speech inviting Netanyahu to form the next government, the President spoke forcefully about peace an= even seemed to influence Bibi to mention peace, a word he never used in h=s election campaign. Peres has rightly earned respect for this from many q=arters, but now, as the coalition is being formed, it might be a good time to examine one aspect of Israel=92s political culture: the lack of respect for the task of a parliamentary=opposition. Peres is at least partly to blame for this, as he almost alway= preferred to join various administrations—even as a junior partner —rather than lead the opposition, ofen citing "our =rave situation" and "national responsibility." Now is surely a=better time to criticize Peres than in June, when the world (maybe even in=luding President Barack Obama) will be coming here to celebrate his 90th b=rthday. Then, surely, everyone will be paying deserved tribute to the wisdom of this elder statesman and proph=t of peace, and it would be a shame to spoil the party. So let's clear t=e air right now, well before the festivities. Before we get to the matter of coalition politic=, which is very much on our minds right now as Netanyahu struggles to put =ogether a government, let us consider the other negative part of the Peres=legacy: his stint as Defense Minister under Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin from 1974 to 1977. Today Peres is widel= respected as the architect of the Oslo Accord of 1993, achieved while he =as Foreign Minister. It was the first political move toward a settlement b=tween Israel and the Palestinians, and Peres deserves huge credit for securing the agreement. However, two de=ades earlier, as Defense Minister, he supported the Jewish settlement proj=ct in the newly-conquered Palestinian territories, both overtly and covert=y. Not for nothing did Rabin label Peres in his mem=irs as "an indefatigable intriguer." In 1975, while Rabin was doing hi= utmost to prevent the settlement of Elon Moreh, near Nablus, Peres contin=ously sabotaged his efforts. After no less than eight settlement attempts, which were ruled illegal by Israel'= Supreme Court, a "compromise" was reached, and Elon Moreh was establi=hed five kilometers to the east of the original site. Moreover, during the=furor over Elon Moreh, Defense Minister Peres quietly facilitated the creation of Ofra, near Ramallah. These two s=ttlements, which have become flagships of the settlement movement, were th= start of Jewish colonization in Samaria, the northern part of the West Ba=k. The previous year, as a young reporter, I interv=ewed Peres, after he and his political ally Moshe Dayan had refused "on =rinciple" to join the government of Golda Meir. "If a single child can=learn that politics is not just intrigues," Peres told me, "I will be satisfied that we have done our bit." Just o=e week later, when he and Dayan had reversed their position for no discern=ble reason, and were seated snugly around the cabinet table, I asked Peres=what he had to say to the "single child." His aides sniggered, but Peres didn't bat an eyelid: "Just what my men=or, David Ben-Gurion (Israel's first Prime Minister) told me: when the s=curity of Israel is laid on one side of the scales, and everything else on=the other side, security tips the balance." Peres subsequently used that self-same argument =o join every government that would have him. The late Menachem Begin lost =ine elections before finally becoming Israel's Prime Minister in 1977. H= served as a pugnacious and 6 EFTA_R1_00133048 EFTA01796846 dedicated leader of the opposition. Peres almost never headed the opposition, always=preferring a ministerial appointment, once even designing a grotesque syst=m of "rotation" with Yitzhak Shamir, so that he could be in the govern=ent. He proposed the ideal of "national unity," a=d greatly devalued the democratic concept of parliamentary opposition. For=er Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni ruined her reputation when she refused to =oin Netanyahu in his last government. While it is quite true that Livni was an ineffective opposition leader, it=is the very fact of her refusal to join the administration and "influenc= it from within" that has provoked most of the criticism by Israeli poli=ical commentators. Similar criticism is currently being leveled at =abor Party leader Shelly Yachimovich for stating clearly that she would no= join Netanyahu's next government, but would serve as leader of the oppo=ition. There are certainly many reasons to criticize Yachimovich, but not her eminently democratic decision to lea= the parliamentary opposition. Very few of our political commentators have=ever expressed respect or even understanding for the concept of opposition= The most popular political idea in Israel today is national unity—better still, a National Unity Governm=nt: "We should all rally round the flag and support our government in th=se critical times." This position, widely espoused, echoes what Peres ha= said repeatedly over the years. So, although the Peres vision of peace is a positive legacy, he has=also taught us less helpful lessons. The settlements are a supremely negat=ve inheritance, but I would argue that the anti-democratic rejection of the concept of a parliamentary opposition=is an even more harmful bequest handed down to us by President Shimon Pere=. Daniel Gavron, w=o lives in Israel, is a former journalist and the author of nine books, th= most recent of which is Holy Land Mosaic, stories of cooperation and=coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians (Rowman & Littlefield, 2008). Articl= 4. NYT India vs. Chi=a vs. Egypt Thomas L. Friedman <http://topics.nytimes.comitop/opinioniedirorialsandoped/oped/columnists/thomaslfriedman/index.html> February 5, 2013 --=New Delhi -- It's hard to escape a visit to India without someone asking=you to compare it to China. This visit was no exception, but I think it'= more revealing to widen the aperture and compare India, China and Egypt. India has a weak central government but a =eally strong civil society, bubbling with elections and associations at ev=ry level. China has a muscular central government but a weak civil society= yet one that is clearly straining to express itself more. Egypt, alas, has a weak government and a very weak=civil society, one that was suppressed for 50 years, denied real elections=and, therefore, is easy prey to have its revolution diverted by the one gr=up that could organize, the Muslim Brotherhood, in the one free space, the mosque. But there is one thing all=three have in common: gigantic youth bulges under the age of 30, increasin=ly connected by technology but very unevenly educated. My view: Of these t=ree, the one that will thrive the most in the 21st century will be the one=that is most successful at converting its youth bulge into a "demographi= dividend" that keeps paying off every decade, as opposed to a "demographic bomb" that keeps going off every =ecade. That will be the society that provides more of its youth with the e=ucation, jobs and voice they seek to realize their full potential. 7 EFTA_R1_00133049 EFTA01796847 This race is about =93who can enable and inspire more of its youth to help build broad societa= prosperity," argues Dov Seidman, the author of "How" and C.E.O. of =RN, which has an operating center in India. "And that's all about leaders, parents and teachers creating environme=ts where young people can be on a quest, not just for a job, but for a car=er — for a better life that doesn't just surpass but far surpasses the=r parents." Countries that fail to do that will have a youth bulge that is not only unemployed, but unemployable, he =rgued. 'They will be disconnected in a connected world, despairing as th=y watch others build and realize their potential and curiosity." If your country has=either a strong government or a strong civil society, it has the ability t= rise to this challenge. If it has neither, it will have real problems, wh=ch is why Egypt is struggling. China leads in providing its youth bulge with education, infrastructure and jobs= but lags in unleashing freedom and curiosity. India is the most intriguin= case — if it can get its governance and corruption under control. The q=est for upward mobility here, especially among women and girls, is palpable. I took part in the graduation ceremony=for The Energy and Resources Institute last week. Of 12 awards for the top=students, 11 went to women. "India today has =60 million young people under the age of 25 and 225 million between the ag=s of 10 and 19," explained Shashi Tharoor, India's minister of state f=r human resource development. "So for the next 40 years we should have a youthful working-age population" at a tim= when China and the broad industrialized world is aging. According to Thar=or, the average age in China today is around 38, whereas in India it's a=ound 28. In 20 years, that gap will be much larger. So this could be a huge demographic dividend — "provid=d that we can educate our youth — offering vocational training to some a=d university to others to equip them to take advantage of what the 21st-ce=tury global economy offers," said Tharoor. "If we get it right, India becomes the workhorse of the world. If we get=it wrong, there is nothing worse than unemployable, frustrated" youth. Indeed, some of Ind=a's disaffected youth are turning to Maoism in rural areas. "We have M=oists among our tribal populations, who have not benefited from the opport=nities of modern India," Tharoor said. There have been violent Maoist incidents in 165 of India's 625 districts=in recent years, as Maoists tap into all those left out of the "Indian d=eam." So there is now a huge push here to lure poor kids into school. In=ia runs the world's biggest midday lunch program, serving 250 million free school lunches each day. It's also dou=led its number of Indian Institutes of Technology, from eight to 16, and i= planning 14 new universities for innovation and research. But this will all b= for naught without better governance, argues Gurcharan Das, the former C.=.O. of Procter & Gamble India, whose latest book is "India Grows at =ight: A Liberal Case for a Strong State." "The aspirational India has no one to vote for, because no one is talkin= the language of public goods. Why should it take us 15 years to get justi=e in the courts or 12 years to build a road? The gap between [youth] aspir=tions and government performance is huge. My thesis is that India has risen despite the state. It is a stor= of public failure and private success." That is what Das me=ns by India grows at night, when government sleeps. "But India must lear= to grow during the day," he said. "If India fixes its governance befo=e China fixes its politics that is who will win. ... You need a strong state and a strong society, so the society can =old the state accountable. India will only get a strong state when the bes= of society join the government, and China will only get a strong society =hen the best Mandarins go into the private sector." Articl= 5. 8 EFTA_R1_00133050 EFTA01796848 Foreign Policy Don't be too =ure there won't be another U.S. war in the Middle East Richard L. Russell<=span> February 5, 2013 --=Shortly before he left office in Feb. 2011, Defense Secretary Robert Gates=told West Point cadets that "in my opinion, any future defense secret=ry who advised the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa shoul= 'have his head examined,' as General MacArthur so delicately put it.&qu=t; The remark no doubt reflected Sec. Gates's fatigue and frustration from=the enormous intellectual and emotional burdens associated with overseeing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. One suspects, howev=r, that in a more reflective moment, Gates would have acknowledged that &q=ot;never say never" is a wise rule of thumb in planning for military =ontingencies, especially in the region that makes up Central Command's area-of-responsibility. Few, for example, predicted t=e 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Gates himself -- who was a senior C=A official during the covert war supporting the Afghan resistance -- surel= did not anticipate then that the United States would have to return to Afghanistan two decades later to ous= a Taliban regime that was harboring terrorists. Before 1990, moreover, no=one predicted that Iraq, having just ended a bitter eight-year war with Irrn, would swing its battered forces south to invade Kuwait. So if it's conventi=nal wisdom that the United States will not, or should not, intervene milit=rily in the Middle East or South Asia after it draws down forces in Iraq a=d Afghanistan, it's also likely dead wrong. What is true, however, is that political and military trajectories =n the Middle East and South Asia are likely to increasingly challenge U.S.=contingency access in the coming decade. The ability for the United States=to surge large-scale forces into the region, as it did in the 1990 and 2003 wars against Iraq, will grow in=reasingly circumscribed. The United States will have to adapt to this new =trategic landscape by developing more nimble, highly-mobile, stealthy, and=networked forces, and by abandoning the traditional practice of slowly and steadily building up conventional f=rces at regional logistic hubs prior to launching war. * * * Perhaps the most si=nificant factor that portends against further intervention in the Middle E=st and South Asia is increased political resistance -- and outright opposi=ion -- from the countries in the region. That resistance is likely to come from the new regimes emerging from the A=ab uprisings, as well as a number of Gulf monarchies. Indeed, the politic=l trends in the region are unlikely to conform to the rosy predictions of =emocratic peace theorists, whose musings have implicitly informed the secu=ity policies of both Republican and Democratic administrations for decades. Old authoritarian regimes seem to =e passing the way of the dodo bird, but the new regimes taking shape are h=avily influenced by militant Islamic ideology that will make them less lik=ly to engage in security or military cooperation with the United States. Democracy optimists=argue that these ideological regimes, once entrenched in power, will have =o moderate their zeal in order to govern. Pragmatism will ultimately trump=ideology. That line of reasoning, however, is based on the assumption that the policy decisions of such regimes can b= explained by rational choice economic theory. In other words, if they wan= to attract international capital and participate in the world economy, th=y are going to have to break with their ideological affinities. But that reasoning ignores a hard fact of in=ernational politics: that time and again, political and ideological prerog=tives trump economic rationality. It made little economic sense, for examp=e, for Pakistan to pursue a nuclear weapons program in the 1970s, just as it makes little economic sense for l=an to do so today. Clearly, both Pakistan and Iran made major policy decis=ons based on political-military priorities rather than economic calculatio=s. 9 EFTA_R1_00133051 EFTA01796849 As for the survivin= monarchies in the Middle East, they too will likely be less accommodating=to American military forces than they have been in the past. To be sure, m=ch of the Arab support for past American military operations -- like both Iraq wars -- was hidden from the public e.e. Arab states often loudly and publicly denounced "unilateral Americ=n" military action in the region at the same time as they supported i= in backroom dealings, quietly authorizing facilities support and air, land, and sea access. But if Arab Gulf st=tes were quietly supportive in the past, their opposition to American mili=ary force is likely to grow in the future. They read the aftermath of the =rab uprisings much differently than did American and European policymakers. The Gulf monarchies were shocked t=at the United States "abandoned" Egyptian President Hosni Mubara= in his time of need in early 2011. Their leaders expected the United Stat=s to push for Mubarak and the Egyptian military to crack down on public protests in Cairo. After all, American policymaker= during the Carter administration had at least given this policy option co=sideration during the Iranian revolution in 1979. Already, several Gu=f states have begun to translate their displeasure into policy independenc= from Washington. In 2011, for example, a coalition of Gulf states led by =audi Arabia intervened in Bahrain to quell domestic unrest in the island country. They did so under the banner =f the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which for years had been a feckless =ilitary force. Largely unnoticed in Western commentary was that the GCC, f=r the first time in its history, mounted a relatively effective military intervention. Bahrain today is fo= all intents and purposes a province of Saudi Arabia, even if it is not po=ite to say so in diplomatic circles. Since the Iranian revolution, Bahrain=-- like the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar -- has pursued close ties with the United States, in signi=icant measure to counterbalance Iran and Saudi Arabia. With Washington at =heir back, they were able to stake out security policies that were at leas= nominally independent from Saudi Arabia. When Saudi Arabia wanted American forces removed from the kingdom=for example, Qatar was eager to compensate by hosting a more robust Americ=n command presence in the region. The Arab uprisings =nd subsequent GCC intervention in Bahrain have turned the tables, making S=udi security backing a necessity for the smaller Gulf monarchies. From the=r perspective, American forces are clearly more capable than Saudi forces, but given the alignment of their i=terests, Riyadh is a more reliable security partner. Gulf leaders and mili=ary commanders in the coming decade will be focused on how to avoid follow=ng in Mubarak's footsteps. Part of minimizing that risk will involve decreasing security dependency on the=United States. Gulf leaders have to worry that if push comes to shove, the=Americans will throw them under a bus just like they did to Mubarak. If the political dy=amics in the Middle East and South Asia do not favor further American mili=ary intervention in the future, neither do the emerging military trends. T=e proliferation of supersonic cruise missiles and mines in the region will make for nasty forced entries <http://be=fercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18409/closing_time.html> into narrow maritime confines like the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf. =/span> But the likely prol=feration of nuclear weapons -- and ballistic missile delivery systems -- w=ll pose even more formidable challenges to conventional military surges in=the region. In the future, the United States will not be able to take for granted unchallenged surges of naval, =ir, and ground forces into regional theaters via logistics hubs. These hub= -- like the American naval presence in Bahrain -- are large, readily iden=ifiable, and will be increasingly vulnerable to future targeting by nuclear weaponry. Iran's nuclear weap=ns, assuming it gets them, will pose a direct threat to American military =urge capabilities. Although American policymakers and military commanders =ight feel confident that they could surge forces into the Gulf despite Iranian nuclear threats because of the =merican nuclear deterrent, Gulf security partners might be more nervous an= less willing to cooperate. As a result, they might not grant access to U.=. air, naval, and ground forces out of fear of angering Iran. 10 EFTA_R1_00133052 EFTA01796850 American observers =ho doubt that Gulf states would make such calculations should recall how K=wait responded in the lead-up to Iraq's invasion in 1990. When faced with = build-up of Iraqi forces along its border, Kuwait decided not to mobilize its military out of fear that the m=ve would provoke Saddam Hussein. The incentives for Gulf states to make si=ilar strategic calculations in the future will be greater when Iran has an=inventory of nuclear weapons to match its growing ballistic missile capabilities. The Gulf states, mo=eover, will likely reason that the U.S. capability to threaten or use fore= against a nuclear Iran will be significantly diminished. Even without nuc=ear weapons, Gulf states have seen, in their view, a long history of American reluctance to threaten or use fo=ce against Iran. For example, the United States took no direct military ac=ion against Iran after it aided and abetted Hezbollah bombings against Ame=icans in Lebanon in the 1980s, after Iran supported the bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996,=or even after Iran supported the deadly campaign of improvised explosive d=vices (IEDs) against U.S. troops in Iraq. Gulf states will no doubt judge =hat if the United States was unable and unwilling to attack Tehran under these circumstances, then it is certa=nly not going to attack Iran in the future, when it will be able to retali=te with nuclear weapons. American policymake=s may counter that Iran would never be foolish enough to threaten or use n=clear weapons against the United States, given its robust nuclear deterren=e posture. But the threat or use of nuclear weapons might not look so foolish from Iran's perspective. One of =he great strategic lessons drawn from the long history of conflict in the =iddle East is this: Do not go to war without nuclear weapons, as Saddam Hu=sein did when he invaded Kuwait. The corollary is: Do not allow the United States to methodically build-up =orces in the Gulf prior to invading, as Saddam did both in the run-up to t=e 1991 re-conquest of Kuwait and in 2003, before the drive to topple the r=gime in Baghdad. Drawing upon these =essons, Iran will likely do everything in its power to deny the United Sta=es the ability to surge conventional forces into the region -- and that mi=ht include threatening to target U.S. forces with nuclear weapons. Iran might accept the risk that preemptive us= of nuclear weapons could bring on American nuclear retaliation, because f=ilure to do so would mean certain destruction for the regime. The United S=ates would be able to build-up conventional forces in the region and oust Iran's leaders just as it did i= Baghdad. This line of strate=ic reasoning runs counter to conventional wisdom in the West, but we actua=ly know little or nothing about what Iranian decision-makers think about n=clear weapons or deterrence theory. Since the Iranian revolution in 1979, opportunities for the exchange of pr=fessional views between Western and Iranian scholars, policymakers, and mi=itary leaders on these critically important issues have been extremely lim=ted. Therefore, it's not unreasonable to assume that the Iranians, like American policymakers in the early stage= of developing their nuclear triad doctrine, will think of nuclear weapons=as merely "big artillery." Unfortunately, the United States and =ts security partners lack formal and informal exchanges with the Iranians akin to the Cold War discussions and arms cont=ol negotiations between the Americans and Soviets, which allowed both part=es to develop mutual understandings of the other's perception of nuclear w=apons. These understandings were essential for crisis management in the Cold War strategic relationship aft=r the Cuban missile crisis. Meanwhile, the Gulf=states, led by Saudi Arabia, are likely to look for their own nuclear dete=rents. Much like France wanted its own nuclear force de frappe during the =old War, the Gulf states will want their own nuclear weapons to deter Iran. Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf=states will worry that the United States would be deterred from coming to =heir defense in future regional crises by Iran's nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia and ot=er Arab states are likely to see nuclear weapons as a quick fix for all of=their security woes. Although they have been on a shopping spree in the pa=t decade, buying expensive and sophisticated Western military technology, they have had a tough time absorbing the new =echnology and fully utilizing and integrating weapons systems. To be sure=in a rough net assessment <http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-55/6.pdf> , Saudi Arabia and its allies in the Gulf=have significantly greater conventional capabilities than Iran. But if Iran goes nuclear, they will want to follow=suit. * * * 11 EFTA_R1_00133053 EFTA01796851 Americans may be we=ry of conflict in the Middle East and South Asia, but strategic prudence d=mands that we contemplate future military interventions in the Central Com=and theater. A scan of the horizon reveals that both political and military trends in the region pose formida=le obstacles to conventional force surges into the region. But there is anothe= wrinkle in this story that U.S. policymakers must contend with as they pl=n for the future. As Gulf monarchies seek to reduce their dependence on Am=rican military power, they will increasingly look to China for security assurances. China does not have a political age=da devoted to promoting democratization, and it maintains political and di=lomatic ties with both Arab states and Iran. China's military activity in =he region is modest but increasing, as evidenced by its recent peacekeeping dispatches to the region and naval=port visits in the Gulf. Beijing is likely to send more naval forces to th= Gulf to increase its presence there and enhance its ability to protect th= sea lanes which bring oil to China's thirsty economy. China is keenly aware that the United States has naval su=remacy in the Gulf, but will be working to erode that strategic edge in th= future. Faced with these re=lities, there is a need for new thinking and innovative conceptualizations=of surges into Centcom's area of responsibility. Theater campaign planners=will have to think about contingencies in which the United States cannot slowly and methodically build up forces =n the region and then kick off campaigns after most troops, arms, and equi=ment are in place. Future U.S. force build-ups in the region will be far t=o vulnerable to preemptive nuclear strikes. As a result, planners will have to devise campaign plans in which=the insertion of U.S. military forces begins with an immediate rolling and=flowing start. The United States will have to work from smaller troop foot=rints and be prepared to start fighting even as follow-on-forces are on the way. Ideally, these forces wo=Id flow from multiple staging positions to reduce vulnerability to nuclear=attack. The politics of the region, however, will work against securing a =ultitude of staging areas from which to deploy. The region under th= purview of Centcom has always been riddled with political violence that h=s posed formidable challenges to military operations. But in plotting a co=rse over the horizon, the political and military obstacles for American military surges into the region are po=sed to grow even larger. As a result, theater contingency planners will ha=e fewer good options for projecting American military power into the regio= -- and they'll have to do more with the bad and the ugly. Richard L. Russe=l is Professor of National Security Affairs at the Near East and South Asi= Center for Strategic Studies. Articl= 6. The Diplomat Getting to the Endgame Wi=h Iran <http://thediplomat.com/203.3/02/06/getting=to-the-endgame-with-iranh Robert Dreyfuss 12 EFTA_R1_00133054 EFTA01796852 February 6, 2013 --=Why did it take so long to secure a date for talks between Iran and the P5=#43;1? After all, in the w=eks before the presidential election in November, it was reported that the=United States and Iran had already tactically agreed to convene private, o=e-on-one talks. And since then the United States, the European powers, Russia, and China, all sought to arran=e another round of negotiations, first in December and then in January. It=now appears that Iran, which is about to enter its presidential election s=ason, has finally agreed to what will be the first round of negotiations with the P5+1 since the last r=und in Moscow seven months ago. On Tuesday, Tehran announced chttp://old.irna.ir/News/Politic/Next-round-of-lran-G5-1-t=lks-to-be-held-late-February/80530492> The negotiations wi=l be a serious test for the Obama administration and for John Kerry, the n=w secretary of state. Previous rounds have all faltered because neither si=e was willing to make concessions to the other, and so far there is little sign that the United States and the =5+1 have improved their offer to Iran very much. As the talks were ann=unced, the Washington Post reported <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/ira=-agrees-to-new-nuclear- talks-with-us-other-world-powers/2013/02/05/d1587d2=-6fa4-11e2-aa58-243de81040ba_story.html> : "The P5+1 powe=s have made only mild revisions to a proposal that Iran flatly rejected la=t June." Until now, the United States has been unwilling to acknowledge =ran's right to enrich uranium on its own soil and to suggest that some economic sanctions might be lifted as part o= a deal, and Iran has refused to agree even to a limited deal called "st=p, ship, and shut" — involving the suspension of its enrichment to 20 =ercent purity, shipping its existing stockpiles of 20% uranium to a third country for processing, and shutting =own its underground facility at Fordo, near Qom — without an agreement t= lift sanctions. After the reelectio= of Barack Obama in November, there were great hopes that the president wo=ld have greater political freedom of offer concessions to Iran. Yet, publ i=ly at least, the White House isn't signaling that it is ready to make a more generous offer to Iran, and in f=ct Obama in January signed into law