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Subject: March 11 update
11 March, 2012
Article 1.
The Daily Star
For Israel, it is about walls and war
Rami G. Khouri
Al Jazeera
Gauging Arab public opinion
Marwan Bishara
Asia Times
The Iranian-Turkish struggle for Syria
Sami Moubayed
The Weekly Standard
Politicizing Intelligence on Syria
Elliott Abrams
Article 5.
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NYT
German Leader and I.M.F. Chief Split Over
Debt
Nicholas Kulish and Annie Lowrey
Article 6.
The Diplomat
Why China, India Clash
Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan
Article I.
The Daily Star
For Israel, it is about walls and war
Rami G. Khouri
March 10, 2012 -- The recent visit of Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu to the United States received the lion's
share of publicity about Israel's position in the Middle East and
the world. However, the real story about the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict rests elsewhere.
The great tale that goes largely unrecognized reflects that
combination of bubbling forces around the world — grassroots,
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professional, political — that achieve two important things: to
assert that the world will not forever acquiesce in the systematic
denial of the national rights of the Palestinian people, and to
apply new forms of pressure on Israel to end its systematic
oppression of Palestinians that more and more is routinely
compared to apartheid South Africa.
Two simultaneous developments brought this to mind last week,
one in Beirut and the other in many countries. In Beirut, I was
struck by the force of a two-day conference on health conditions
of Palestinians in and outside Palestine. The conference was
organized by the AUB Faculty of Health Science, Bir Zeit
University, and The Lancet — the London-based leading
international journal on public health. The gathering of 75 or so
health researchers from around the world was impressive,
especially the opening remarks of Lancet editor Richard Horton.
Horton discussed research as a tool for social justice, equity and
as means of addressing power and inequity in Palestine, in the
refugee camps around the region, and throughout the world. He
observed that research and universities could play an active role
in promoting justice, citizenship and accountability, and could
generate knowledge in the service of "defending universal
principles of human rights and human dignity."
Specifically addressing The Lancet's interest in disseminating
research about health conditions of Palestinians living under
Israeli occupation, he described university research as a form of
peaceful resistance and nonviolent protest against forces using
health or medicines as an instrument of war. Researchers have
an obligation to analyze and expose such inhuman practices,
and, where possible, to oppose them. Researchers who do this,
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he said, should aim to report on and help bring an end to an
"epidemiology of terror."
The only thing more powerful than knowledge, I thought, is a
committed human being who uses that knowledge in the service
of justice.
At the same time, scattered developments around the world
reinforced my sense that we might see new momentum soon for
resolving the Palestine issue equitably, and working for a just
Arab-Israeli peace. More specifically, these developments
suggest that the political balance of power of the past four
decades that saw Zionism subdue and dominate Arabism in this
region and abroad may be entering a historic stage where there
will be greater equilibrium between the two.
Here are some intriguing developments that make me think this
way:
A new poll among citizens across 12 Arab countries, conducted
by the Qatar-based Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies
(reported by Marwan Bishara on Al-Jazeera's website, in
advance of the poll's full release), shows that three out of four
respondents see Israel and the United States as the two most
threatening countries. A total of 84 percent believe the
Palestinian question is the cause of all Arabs and not just that of
the Palestinians, and reject the notion of their states recognition
of Israel. Only 21 percent support, to a certain degree, the peace
agreement signed between Egypt, Jordan and the Palestine
Liberation Organization with Israel. Less than a third agree with
their government's foreign policy.
A second indicator is that several recent conferences at
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American and Canadian universities on the boycott, sanctions
and divestment strategy against Israel, and for a "one-state"
solution, giving Israelis and Palestinians equal rights in a single
country, faced stiff opposition from pro-Israeli zealots. In all
cases the conferences went ahead.
In Washington, President Barack Obama openly challenged the
Israeli desire for war on Iran now, and was widely supported by
many in American society, despite the intense efforts of the
maniacs in the pro-Israel lobbies. The power of those lobbies is
slowly being confined to members of Congress and journalists
who remain deeply vulnerable to the intimidation tools of the
lobby groups. Others in American society have learned that they
can push back and survive.
Netanyahu is increasingly seen as a thug whose heavy-
handedness in the United States and repeated references to the
Holocaust as a reminder of what he sees as threats to Israelis and
Jews today have even bothered some fellow Israelis and Jews.
His combination of insincerity, lies, exaggeration and arrogance
has brought Israel to the point where its foreign policy, sadly, is
essentially based on building walls and threatening wars.
Palestinians and fellow activists are working hard to make the
Global March to Jerusalem scheduled for March 29 the new face
of nonviolent resistance to Israeli colonial expansion and
apartheid-like Zionist ethnic privileges. The combination of
these developments mentioned above, and others, may well
comprise a historic transformation in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
We will find out in the coming months.
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Article 2.
Al Jazeera
Gauging Arab public opinion
Marwan Bishara
08 Mar 2012 -- The first of its kind - a poll conducted in 12
Arab countries, representing 84 per cent of the population of the
Arab world, in an attempt to gauge the region's political mood -
has arrived at some interesting results.
Organised by the Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies
(ACRPS), face-to-face interviews by Arab surveyors with
16,731 individuals in the first half of 2011 revealed majority
support for the goals of the Arab revolutions and notably, for a
democratic system of government.
The countries surveyed included Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Iraq,
Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Sudan, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria,
Morocco and Mauritania, with the help of local institutions and
research centres.
While people seem generally split on the question of separation
of state and religion, a majority supports the non-interference of
religious authorities in politics.
And by a 15-1 ratio, Israel and the US are seen as more
threatening than Iran. However, this ratio is lower among those
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living in proximity to Iran.
Opinions differ on certain issues from country to country and
region to region, but there's clearly a trans-national, trans-border
public consensus when it comes to questions of identity and
national priorities.
The data generated by the poll, the largest conducted so far in
the region, is a treasure trove for those looking to better
understand the political environment in the Arab world.
Main conclusions
• A majority describe themselves as religious, but they
mostly don't support the interference of religious authorities
in citizens' political choices.
• 71 per cent say they don't distinguish between religious
and non-religious people in their economic and social
relations.
• 77 per cent trust their military, half trust their police, 47
per cent trust their governments and 36 per cent trust their
local councils before the revolutions.
• A high 83 per cent believe corruption is widespread in
their countries.
• Only 19 per cent see their states implement the law
equally among its citizens.
• Three quarters of those polled believe that Arab states
should take measures to bring their nations closer. An equal
percentage believes that states should lift restrictions on free
travel and 67 per cent are not satisfied with Arab-Arab co-
operation.
• Contrary to mainstream global media coverage, 73 per
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cent of those polled see Israel and the US as the two most
threatening countries. Five per cent see Iran as the most
threatening, a percentage that varies between countries and
regions.
• A high 84 per cent believe the Palestinian question is the
cause of all Arabs and not the Palestinians only.
• A high 84 per cent reject the notion of their state's
recognition of Israel and only 21 per cent support, to a
certain degree, the peace agreement signed between Egypt,
Jordan and the PLO with Israel. Less than a third agree with
their government's foreign policy.
• When it comes to WMD, 55 per cent support a region free
of nuclear weapons and 55 per cent see Israel's possession
of nuclear weapons as justifying there possession by other
countries in the region.
Moreover, a majority of Arabs support the Tunisian and
Egyptian revolutions, and believe revolution came about
because of corruption, dictatorship and lack of justice and
equality. A majority also believe they belong to one Arab
nation.
Nuances and caveats
The majority doesn't approach democracy as merely a Western
notion. Rather, it provides a clear definition of a democratic
system that includes political plurality, freedom of expression,
rule of law, et cetera.
When it comes to specifics, a rather slim majority of 57 per cent
supports the rule of a political party they disagree with.
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While people are generally supportive of democracy, a minority
doesn't truly understand or accept its main tenets.
A relatively high 36 per cent wouldn't support those they
disagree with in their political platform to take power, a
percentage that doesn't bode well for democracy.
This shows that while there is an intention to move towards
pluralism among most people, there is resistance to pluralism
and diversity among a certain minority.
A high majority in Egypt and Tunisia are optimistic that their
countries will fare better in three years than during the rule of
Mubarak and Ben Ali.
It remains to be seen to what degree the opinions expressed in
the poll are a reflection of excitement about the revolutions, and
how far people are ready to go to establish democratic systems.
But that's precisely why an annual sequel to this poll, as
promised by ACRPS, is indispensable for better understanding
of Arab thinking beyond mood swings and abrupt changes.
Polls have originally been the tools used to gauge consumerist
tendencies, priorities in Western societies and business. They
were developed into advanced tools to monitor the public's
political mood, required for certain political confidence,
societal openness and stability.
To what degree Arab respondents express their minds freely
and without any fear remains to be seen. However, for the first
time in decades, people seem more willing and able to share
their political sentiments, thanks to the revolutions.
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The substantial size of the poll certainly helps obtain better
results. But it's not only quantitative.
The methodology used by ACPRS pollsters - a 40-minute face-
to-face interview with each respondent - allows for more
accurate results than the usual quick phone interviews.
The approach here contrasts sharply with Western-type polls in
the Arab world that project Western, not Arab, priorities, and/or
are centered around slogans and clichés.
This is not a poll that asks people whether they feel Muslim or
Arab, or whether they support the women's veil or democracy.
The poll, the first to be conducted after the Arab upheavals,
shows a people in tune with the change that swept the Arab
region.
But how does the poll square with the election results in
various Arab nations where Islamists have made serious
advances - such as Egypt, where conservative and ultra-
conservative Islamist parties won 70 per cent of the vote?
The two are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, the polls discussed
give a better and deeper explanation of the vote patterns and of
the opinions of those who thus far have remained silent.
Marwan Bishara is Al Jazeera's senior political analyst and the
author of The Invisible Arab: The promise and peril of the
Arab revolutions, now available in bookstores.
Anick 3.
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Asia Times
The Iranian-Turkish struggle for
Syria
Sami Moubayed
Mar 10, 2012 -- One of the aftershocks of the Syrian uprising is
an abrupt end to a Turkish-Iranian honeymoon, which started
shortly after the Justice and Development Party came to power
in Turkey almost 10 years ago. For many years Turkey and Iran -
heirs to two strong empires - found plenty in common thanks to
Syria. They now have a million reasons to disagree, also
because of Syria.
The countries cooperated on post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, worked
side-by-side to crush Kurdish separatists, and united efforts on
Lebanon and Gaza after the wars of 2006 and 2008
respectively.
That marriage of convenience began to fall apart - rather rapidly -
when the Syrian uprising began in March 2011. Turkish Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan took a radically anti-Damascus
stance, calling for the regime's downfall, whereas Iran stood
firmly behind its Syrian ally, with whom it has held strategic
relations since 1979. It all boils down now to a Persian-Turkish
struggle for Syria.
Historical background
According to Daphne McCurdy, a senior researcher associate
with the Project on Middle East Democracy: "Turkey has
traditionally viewed Iran, unlike how it has viewed other
Middle East countries, as a large and important nation-state that
must be managed, rather than confronted."
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Back in 1979, for example, the Turks were among the very few
regional heavyweights who did not panic when the Islamic
Revolution took place in Tehran. It also became one of the first
countries in the world to recognize the Khomeini government,
and to refuse to impose sanctions upon it, after the 1979-1981
US hostage crisis at the American Embassy in Tehran.
Turkey did this, it must be noted, despite a systematic Iranian
campaign to tarnish the image of the Turkish Republic's
founder, president Kamal Ataturk, and his strong brand of
secularism. In the 1990s, the two countries signed a US$24
billion gas deal, despite mutual accusations of backing the
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).
After the Israeli war of 2006, Prime Minister Erdogan saw to it
that $50 million worth of aid was provided for the
reconstruction of south Lebanon, a Hezbollah stronghold,
which was music to the ears of Iranian officialdom.
In June 2010, Turkey voted against a US-backed UN Security
Council resolution imposing further sanctions on Iran. Despite
the slump in political relations since mid-2011, Turkey still
relies on Iran for one-third of its oil supply.
Differences surface
One view says that Tehran and Ankara soon realized that apart
from short-term political issues, the two countries had very
little in common, thanks to Syria. Another view, of course,
speaks the exact opposite, claiming that economic interests
overshadow political differences between Ankara and Tehran.
The truth, of course, lies somewhere in-between. Turkey's AKP
was indeed a religious party that marketed a strong brand of
moderate Sunni Islam, whereas Iran was a Shi'ite theocracy
bent on marketing radical political Shi'ite Islam to the world,
automatically challenging countries like Turkey.
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Last November, Turkey agreed to host an early warning radar as
part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's missile defense
system, infuriating the Iranians, who saw it as a direct threat to
their security. The Europe Missile Shield, after all, was
originally created to intercept Iranian missiles.
Turkey of course only agreed to host the defense shield in
September 2011 after tensions had begun to mount between the
two countries over Syria. The head of the Iranian Revolutionary
Guard's aerospace division, General Amir Ali Hajizadeh,
snapped that, "should we be threatened, we will target NATO's
missile defense shield in Turkey and then hit the next targets."
Then came a statement by Ali Akbar, senior advisor to Iran's
Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who said that Turkey's model
of "secular Islam" was actually a "version of Western liberal
democracy that is unacceptable for countries going through an
Islamic awakening". In response, Turkish Deputy Prime
Minister Bulent Arinc said: "I am addressing the Islamic
Republic of Iran: I do not know if you are worthy of being
called Islamic; have you said a single thing about what is
happening in Syria?"
Iran realizes that although it has the ear of top Syrian officials,
its popularity on the Syrian street is very thin when compared
with that of Turkey.
It has tried non-stop since 1979 to boost people-to-people
relations through tourism, cultural exchange, and investment
projects in Syria. Religious tourism did indeed flourish, for
example, but it was one-sided, from Iran to Syria and not vice-
versa. Few Syrian tourists went to Tehran for sightseeing.
However, in Turkey's case, where Syrian tourists visiting Turkey
jumped from 332,847 in 2007, for example, into almost
900,000 in 2010. In Iran's case, 800,000 Iranians came to Syria
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in 2010, for example, but the Iranian Ministry of Tourism
refrained from mentioning how many Syrian tourists visit Iran
per year.
Turkish soap operas have been translated into Arabic and are
very popular in Syria, but the same cannot be said for the
numerous Iranian works translated into Arabic - and an entire
Iranian channel dedicated to broadcasting Iranian works
dubbed from Persian into Arabic. This of course is namely due
to joint Syrian-Turkish history, intermarriage, and the fact that
Turks are Muslim Sunnis while Iranians are Muslim Shi'ites,
creating an invisible religious barrier that is very difficult to
transcend.
Iran feels outsmarted by Turkey at a grassroots level, although
Tehran has been trying to win affection of the Syrian people for
over 30-years, while the Turks have been doing it only since
2003.
The Turks managed to win affection of ordinary Syrians -
regardless of politics - despite 80 years of indoctrination in
Syrian media against the Ottoman Empire and its legacy in the
Arab world. There was no such indoctrination ever against Iran -
and yet, Syrians prefer to do business with Ankara and to go
sightseeing in Turkey rather than Iran. This is noteworthy,
although Iran is a breathtaking country with magnificent
history, breathtaking tourist attractions and plenty of wealth.
The crux of the struggle today, therefore, is Syria. Relations will
continue cooperating on bilateral trade, regardless of how much
politics divides them, but Syria remains a sticking point in
Iranian-Turkish relations.
Iran is worried that regime change in Syria would give the Turks
unlimited access to Syria, excluding Tehran from all political,
military, cultural, and economic influence. The Turks after all,
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are strongly allied to the opposition Syrian National Council
(SNC), which was established in Istanbul last summer, and
currently host the Free Syrian Army (FSA).
All talk about a no-fly zone on the Syrian-Turkish border raises
red sirens in Tehran, but at the end of the day, the Iranians are
unable to go to war for Syria. If the Syrian Army ventures into
the northern Syrian city of Idlib, as it did in Horns, then this
would place it dangerously near the Turkish border, and the
Turks are ready to act, invoking Article 51 of the UN Charter,
being "self-defense".
In fact, Erdogan might even see it as a blessing in disguise,
giving him the pretext to put his loud words into action. That
explains why Iran is very worried. They realize that contrary to
what they believed, there is an entire street in Syria, being the
majority, that doesn't like them, and has little affection
anymore, for Hezbollah.
That doesn't mean the Syrian street likes Erdogan any better. On
the contrary, ordinary Syrians are beginning to view him also
with plenty of suspicion and scrutiny for saying nothing but
loud words since the Syrian uprising began in mid-2011.
Supporting the resistance in Lebanon, however, is no longer
enough for Iran to win the minds and hearts of the Syrian
people. Also, loud words in favor of the Syrian rebels are also
no longer enough for Erdogan to score points with ordinary
Syrians.
The two countries - and both Mahmud Ahmadinejad and Recep
Tayyip Erdogan - will have to do things differently from now
on to win over ordinary Syrians. Otherwise, both will be
viewed as nothing but hot air balloons. Turkey may have the
upper hand at a grassroots level, but politically speaking, both
countries are losing ground within Syria, both with ordinary
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Syrians, and against each other, rather rapidly.
Sami Moubayed is a university professor, historian, and editor-
in-chief of Forward Magazine in Damascus.
Article 4.
The Weekly Standard
Politicizing Intelligence on Syria
Elliott Abrams
March 11, 2012 -- The Obama administration is politicizing
intelligence on Syria. What does "politicizing intelligence"
mean? Using intel, or more often partial intel, to produce an
effect in line with White House policies rather than giving a full
picture of a particular situation. The most recent proof is a
story that the Associated Press carried on March 10, written by
intelligence reporter Kimberly Dozier. Dozier reported straight
what she was told—but therein lies the tale. Sometimes
reporters get a scoop or a special insight by finding one or two
members of the intel community who are willing to talk if
guaranteed anonymity. In this case, Dozier was among several
reporters briefed by three senior intelligence community
officials. That kind of organized, orchestrated briefing requires
clearance at the top. What did the senior three intel officials
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tell reporters about the military situation in Syria? That
"President Bashar Assad commands a formidable army," "has
assembled a highly professional, 330,000-man army plus
reserves that was built and trained to invade Israel," and has
"formidable" air defenses.
Now, compare what a top military analyst, Anthony Cordesman
of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, wrote
about the same Syrian military in a monograph in 2007. Here
are some of the nicer quotations:
"Manpower numbers have little meaning as a measure of
military capability or merit. ... Syria's conventional forces are
the impoverished stepchild of the region ...[and have] become
something of a military museum—a problem compounded by
poorly organized technical and maintenance support and the
failure to modify and update much of its equipment. ... Syria,
however, has compounded these problems with corruption,
nepotism, and an occupation of Lebanon that further politicized
and corrupted its forces. ... Some Special Forces and armored
units are exceptions, but promotion is highly dependent on
favoritism and nepotism. ... Syria, with the largest numbers,
has one of the least capable air forces. Certainly, it is the worst
air force per plane in service. ... Syria's [air defense] system is
generally obsolete in weapons, sensors, and command and
control capability. It also has a weak command and control
system, as well as training and readiness problems. ... Much of
Syria's conventional force posture is now obsolescent or
obsolete, and its failure to properly modernize and
`recapitalize"' its forces has reached the crisis level. ... Syria
has effectively created hollow forces. ... On paper, Syria had
one low-grade reserve armored unit with about half the
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effective strength of its active divisions, plus 31 infantry, three
artillery reserve regiments, four armored brigades. Most of
these Syrian reserve units are poorly equipped and trained..."
To be fair, those words are five years old, and Syria has
modernized its air defense systems in the interim—to some
degree at least. Certainly whatever air defenses they had in
2007 were no great problem for Israel when it destroyed Syria's
North Korean-built nuclear reactor. But Cordesman's analysis
is a reminder about spin: When the three senior intel officers
mentioned the reserves, did they tell reporters what awful shape
they are in? Did they discuss how much of the Syrian Army is a
poorly trained force of Sunni conscripts on which the regime
cannot rely? How could they possibly have described this
Syrian army as a "highly professional force of 330,000"? The
goal of the briefing seems clear: to justify doing nothing. If
Syria's forces are huge and "highly professional," the chances
that our support for the opposition will be fruitful are small. It's
basically hopeless, you see. But Cordesman's descriptions tend
to contradict that conclusion, and to suggest that a decently
organized and armed opposition might make headway against
the Syrian military, especially when the ethnic factor is
added. The opposition is primarily Sunni, and Sunnis make up
about 75 percent of Syria's population. In testimony last week,
Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and other Obama
administration officials continued to give a very gloomy view
of the opposition in Syria. "It is not clear what constitutes the
Syrian armed opposition—there has been no single unifying
military alternative that can be recognized, appointed or
contacted," Panetta said. He also said we are now—in mid
March 2012—considering non-lethal aid to that opposition.
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Consider this: Suppose the administration had not sat on its
thumbs and had started delivering non-lethal aid one or two or
six months ago. By now, we would in fact know a great deal
more about the opposition: Who is real and who has no military
capacity, who can get things into Syria and who can't, who is
corrupt and who is effective. The ignorance behind which
Panetta hides is in large part a self-inflicted wound.
Fourteen months after the rebellion in Syria began, that we
know so little about the opposition is not so much an
intelligence failure as a deliberate policy. So is the use of the
intelligence community for orchestrated briefings designed to
justify inaction by making Assad's military sound like the
Wehrmacht. That's the politicization of intelligence, and the
House and Senate Intelligence Committees would do well to
find out who ordered that briefing, and ask the Director of
Central Intelligence and the Director of National Intelligence
why they permitted it.
Anick 5
NY T
German Leader and I.M.F. Chief Split
Over Debt
Nicholas Kulish and Annie Lowrey
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March 9, 2012 — With a deal on Greek debt finally done,
Europe will shift its attention to two of its most powerful
women, friends who have dueling views about what needs to be
done to prevent future Greek-like meltdowns from spreading to
other economies.
The International Monetary Fund's managing director, Christine
Lagarde, who is French, finds herself on a collision course with
Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, posing a test for the
unusually close relationship between the two leaders. They
have opposing stances on how much money is needed to
protect vulnerable economies, and how it should be raised.
Ms. Lagarde says Europe needs at least $1 trillion in emergency
funds and is pressing for a much more robust European
contribution before the I.M.F. commits to raising more money
from its members. She has worked hard to drag along Ms.
Merkel, who is hamstrung by a domestic constituency sharply
opposed to committing more money to rescue neighbors.
In spite of the sometimes tough negotiations, colleagues and
confidants describe a warmth and chemistry between the two
leaders that transcends policy differences. They are on a first-
name basis. They frequently exchange text messages. Shortly
after Christmas, Ms. Lagarde brought Ms. Merkel a trinket
from Hermes and received a recording of the Berlin
Philharmonic playing Beethoven from Ms. Merkel, a classical
music lover.
"There are many circles and many forums where it's only the
two of us who are women," Ms. Lagarde said in an interview.
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"So there's a sense of recognition, complicity, solidarity."
Yet for all that personal solidarity, the two leaders have come to
represent competing philosophies for solving the debt crisis that
has punished European economies and threatened the financial
stability of the rest of the world.
Their opposing worldviews may well come from formative
experiences. As a high school student, Ms. Merkel traveled
from East Germany to Moscow to take part in a Russian
language competition; Ms. Lagarde attended a prominent girl's
school in suburban Washington, complete with an internship on
Capitol Hill.
Ms. Lagarde, nicknamed l'Americaine in her native France, has
been vocal in support of pro-growth policies on the part of the
richer European countries to help their more indebted
neighbors. She has pressed Europe to make its firewalls — the
pools of money available to keep borrowing rates at sustainable
levels — so enormous that they scare off would-be speculators.
Since becoming the head of the I.M.F., and in stark contrast to
her public statements in her prior job, as French finance
minister, she has repeatedly castigated Europe for doing too
little, too late, and lacking focus on spurring higher growth
rates.
Ms. Merkel, who declined to be interviewed for this article, has
argued that free-spending governments got many European
countries into trouble in the first place, and that the path to
stability runs through austerity. Large firewalls, in this view,
only give countries like Greece a false sense of security and an
excuse to ease up on the painful measures demanded of them.
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Ms. Merkel has demanded assurances that all European
countries bring their finances under strict control before the
governments of the European Union agree to free up resources
to help.
Their differences were brought into sharp relief in January when
Ms. Lagarde gave a speech at the German Council on Foreign
Relations in Berlin in which she demanded that Germany step
up its efforts to save the world from "a 1930s moment."
Switching from her fluent English to halting, phonetic German,
she concluded with a line by the German poet Goethe. "It is not
enough to know, we must apply," Ms. Lagarde told the
audience. "It is not enough to will, we must do."
The speech made headlines around the world, evidence of a
backroom dispute breaking out into the open. Yet Ms. Lagarde
had arrived in Berlin on the eve of her address with a copy of
the speech, for Ms. Merkel to read, before Ms. Lagarde
delivered it in front of the political and foreign-policy
establishment. The two women debated the crisis in private
over a dinner of veal tenderloin in the modern Chancellery's
eighth-floor dining room.
Ms. Lagarde also brought Ms. Merkel an orange-blossom-
scented candle from the French perfumer Fragonard. The
candle represented "hope," Ms. Lagarde said. "Because we had
tough discussions," she said, there "was an element of
symbolism about it."
Ms. Lagarde, 56, and Ms. Merkel, 57, appear to be opposites,
the glamorous, Chanel-clad French extrovert and the grounded
German introvert, recently spotted doing her own grocery
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shopping in the same suit jacket she had worn to sign the new
European fiscal pact in Brussels earlier that day.
"I've been in government and know what securing parliamentary
support means," Ms. Lagarde said. "And equally she
appreciates that I speak from a position where I have to think
about not only Germany but also the whole of Europe and the
stability of the international scene."
German officials are less skeptical of Ms. Lagarde, as a former
French finance minister, than they are about American officials,
who they believe are focused on President Obama's re-election.
Ms. Lagarde's close relationship with Ms. Merkel makes it
easier to bridge the gap between the United States and
Germany, making her a more effective mediator.
Ms. Lagarde is "one of those policy makers that Ms. Merkel
would listen to," said a French official who worked with her.
"There is a relationship of trust, even if there may be issues on
which their views differ."
Indeed, people close to the negotiations say that German leaders
have given tacit promises that Europeans will raise more money
for their firewall, given enough time to build consensus in
Europe. Officials also say the I.M.F. should have little trouble
raising $500 billion in lending capacity once that happens.
Analysts have noted that the austerity Ms. Merkel has pressed
on other European countries has long been the I.M.F.
prescription, while tough talk from Ms. Lagarde could help Ms.
Merkel sell unpopular measures at home. "I have a suspicion
that the two ladies are not as far apart as it appears, or is made
to appear, in public," said Stephan Richter, president of the
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Globalist Research Center in Washington.
In the years it has taken to reach consensus on how to handle the
crisis, critics say the toll to business confidence, financial
markets and economic growth has been unnecessarily high.
Hope for a long-term solution to Europe's debt crisis could well
rest on the ability of these friends to bridge differences before
Europe's chronic problems flare up again.
Though Europeans of the same generation, Ms. Merkel and Ms.
Lagarde once had lives as divided as the continent they grew up
on. Separated throughout their youths by the Iron Curtain, the
odds they would meet as politicians at the highest levels was
improbable.
Ms. Lagarde was a member of France's national team for
synchronized swimming. Ms. Merkel famously needed to spend
an entire swimming class mustering the courage to jump off the
diving board. The prospects under Communism for a pastor's
daughter like Ms. Merkel in politics were dim at best, and she
became a physicist. Ms. Lagarde became a lawyer and rose to
the top of an American corporate firm.
Once they entered politics, their climbs were similarly swift. Ms.
Merkel was head of Germany's largest party, the Christian
Democrats, just 10 years after joining in 1990. She beat out
career politicians to win the chancellorship five years later in
2005. Ms. Lagarde won the top I.M.F. post a mere six years
after joining the French government as trade minister in 2005.
The personal relationship between them was nurtured when Ms.
Lagarde became the first and only member of a foreign
government to sit in on a German cabinet meeting in March
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2010, taking her place across the Chancellery conference table
from Ms. Merkel. "It was a very moving moment, because she
made a point of inviting me and nobody else," Ms. Lagarde
said.
For Ms. Lagarde, sorting through the differences requires
patience, as well as understanding for Ms. Merkel's deeply
analytical, scientific approach. "You have to continuously
explain, rationalize, dissect the whys, the pros and the cons and
plead your case," Ms. Lagarde said. "It's the lawyer and the
physicist. I will continue to grit my teeth and smile and keep up
the work."
Nicholas Kulish reportedfrom Berlin, and Annie Lowreyfrom
Washington. Liz Alderman contributed reportingfrom Paris.
Article 6.
The Diplomat
Why China, India Clash
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Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan
March 9, 2012 -- India-China relations are often seen through
the prism of their bilateral disputes. Indeed, the border dispute
between the two is generally seen as the biggest hurdle to
improving ties. But it could be argued that disagreements such
as that over the border in Arunachal Pradesh are only a
symptom of the larger problem that exists between these two
Asian giants, namely the inevitable and increasing competition
between two rising powers.
While the simultaneous rise of powers need not always result in
a clash, the four major powers in Asia — established powers
Russia and Japan, and newly rising China and India — have had
troubled historical relations, contributing to deep-rooted
mistrust and mutual suspicion. With the exception of India-
Russia and India-Japan relations, the baggage of history is
weighing on almost all bilateral relations. It may be true that
this century will be an "Asian century," but it can't be said with
certainty that it's going to be a stable and peaceful one.
India and China have certainly gone through their share of ups
and downs in their relations over the last six decades.
Currently, their relations are probably on an upward curve, but
one based on trade and raw economics. And while their
bilateral trade has climbed to $60 billion, there has been a
simultaneous rise in tensions. Improved economic relations
don't necessarily mean better ties overall, as has been
demonstrated with U.S.-China relations, as well as those
between Japan and China and Taiwan and the mainland.
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So, if improved trade ties haven't resulted in better political and
strategic relations, what are the key issues that are holding the
two back? Historically, it used to be the border issue, China's
relationship with Pakistan and the rest of South Asia in general,
and China's policy on Jammu and Kashmir specifically. But
over the past decade, the emerging Asian strategic framework
and the global role for each of these rising powers has been an
important factor.
Sadly, this is only likely to get worse. As India's influence
increases within Asia and beyond, there are bound to be
problems between Beijing and New Delhi as the two are seen
competing for influence and resources. For instance, China is
increasingly wary of India's closer engagement with Japan,
South Korea and some Southeast Asian countries. The Chinese
leadership appears equally wary of India's "Look East" Policy
as it seems to believe that this will dilute Chinese influence in
the region. India has improved its trade ties with Japan, South
Korea and ASEAN countries, and there appears to be an
increasingly strategic component to relations.
On the other hand, India has remained concerned about China's
ever-growing reach into South Asia, particularly in Pakistan.
Of all the South Asian countries, it is Islamabad that most
closely shares China's strategic interests, and their interests vis
a vis India have been crucial in cementing relations between the
two. For Pakistan, Kashmir is an unfinished item on the agenda
of the partition of the subcontinent. India's sensitivity over
Kashmir is matched by China's worries about Tibet. China
believes that New Delhi has ulterior motives regarding Tibet,
and the very fact that the Dalai Lama and as many as 150,000
Tibetan refugees live in India continues to irk Beijing. For a
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country that's actively engaged in image building as a
responsible power, the shortcomings of China's ethnic policy
isn't something China likes to be reminded about.
Complicating India's relations with China was the fact that the
George W. Bush administration saw a greater role for India and
Japan in the emerging Asian strategic framework. The U.S.-
India Nuclear Deal in 2005 furthered China's anxieties, and the
fact that the United States took the lead in altering the global
rules so that India could engage in international nuclear
commerce wasn't well received by Beijing.
Ultimately, it's India's increasing role and influence that's the
crux of the issue. Although India and China both acknowledge
the role of the other in the emerging Asian strategic order, they
have different conceptions over how this will all pan out. India
has continued to adopt an accommodative and inclusive
approach in shaping this new architecture, while China has
followed an exclusivist approach that appears to be directed
against India, Japan and the United States.
Beijing has argued that its rise is peaceful, but as China's
military and economic strength grows, India may not be
prepared to see an Asian order dominated by any single power.
Given such trends, it's likely that competition for influence
between these new powers will be a significant feature of the
Asian century.
Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan is a seniorfellow at the Observer
Research Foundation in New Delhi.
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