📄 Extracted Text (33,632 words)
In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020)
28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020
for writ of mandamus, an argument that Crime
Victims' Rights Act (CVRA) did not apply if
955 Pad 1196
criminal proceedings had not been initiated,
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
though government did not file a cross-appeal
IN RE: Petitioner. from district court's initial determination that
CVRA was applicable, which determination had
No. 19-13843 been made before district court dismissed alleged
victim's civil action against government because
(April 14, 2020) alleged perpetrator of child sexual abuse died
while the civil action was pending; proceeding
Synopsis
initiated by alleged victim was not an "appeal,"
Background: Alleged victim of child sexual abuse brought
and while CVRA directed Court of Appeals to
civil action against federal government, alleging that apply ordinary standards of appellate review in
government violated Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA) by
a mandamus proceeding brought by a crime
failing to confer with alleged victim before entering into
victim, CVRA did not direct Court of Appeals
non-prosecution agreement (NPA) with alleged perpetrator. to employ rules of procedure for typical appeals.
Alleged perpetrator intervened. The United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida, No. 9:08-cv-80736- 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(dX3).
ICAM, Kenneth A. Marra, Senior District Judge, 359
F.Supp.3d 1201, determined that government had violated
CVRA, but after alleged perpetrator's death, alleged victim's 121 Criminal Law iihe Civil liabilities to persons
requested remedies were denied and the action was dismissed, injured; reparation
411 F.Supp.3d 1321. Alleged victim petitioned for writ of Victim rights under federal Crime Victims'
mandamus. Rights Act (CVRA), including the right to confer
with government's lawyers and the right to
be treated fairly by them, do not attach until
criminal proceedings have been initiated against
(Holding:) The Court of Appeals, Newsom, Circuit Judge, a defendant, either by complaint, information,
held that as a matter of first impression, victim rights under
CVRA, including the right to confer with government's or indictment. P 1 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(5, 8),
lawyers and the right to be treated fairly by them, do not I it
t (c)(1), (d)(3).
attach until criminal proceedings have been initiated against
a defendant.
131 Criminal Law 4" Civil liabilities to persons
injured; reparation
Petition denied.
Rights under federal Crime Victims' Rights
Tjoflat, Circuit Judge, filed a concurring opinion. Act (CVRA), including right to confer with
federal government's lawyers and right to
Hull, Senior Circuit Judge, filed a dissenting opinion. be treated fairly by them, had not attached
when government entered into non-prosecution
Procedural Posture(s): Petition for Writ of Mandamus. agreement (NPA) with alleged perpetrator of
federal crimes relating to sexual abuse of minors
and sex trafficking, where government had not
West Hcadnotes (9) filed charges or othenvise commenced criminal
proceedings against alleged perpetrator, who
Criminal Law 6•• Civil liabilities to persons pursuant to the NPA pled guilty to two state
injured; reparation prostitution offenses. 1.[ I 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)
Government did not waive, for consideration by (5, 8), (dX6).
Court of Appeals on alleged victim's petition
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In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020)
28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020
MI Statutes Construction based on multiple 181 Constitutional Law Nature and scope in
factors general
In construing a statute, the court begins with a The Executive Branch has exclusive authority
careful examination of the statutory text, looking and absolute discretion to decide whether to
to the particular statutory language at issue, as prosecute a federal criminal case, and this
well as the language and design of the statute as prosecutorial discretion flows not from a desire
a whole. to give carte blanche to law enforcement officials
but from recognition of the constitutional
principle of separation of powers.
Statutes 4- Statute as a Whole; Relation of
Parts to Whole and to One Another
Statutes 4- Design, structure, or scheme
Statutory construction is a holistic endeavor, and Attorneys and Law Firms
a statutory provision that may seem ambiguous
in isolation may be clarified by the remainder of *1198 Paul Cassell, University of Utah College of
the statutory scheme. Law, SALT LAKE CITY, UT, Bradley James Edwards,
EdwardsPottinger, LLC, FORT LAUDERDALE, FL, for
Petitioner.
161 Federal Civil Procedure 0. Motions in
Richard Christian Komando, Bradley Garrison & Komando,
General
ORANGE PARK, FL, for Amicus Curiae.
A "motion" is a request filed within the context
of an ongoing judicial proceeding, not a vehicle Nathan Parker Kitchens, Jill E. Steinberg, U.S. Attorney's
for launching a new and freestanding piece of Office, ATLANTA, GA, for Mandamus Respondent.
litigation.
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida, D.C.
Docket No. 9:08-cv-80736-KAM
171 Federal Courts 4- Mandamus
While a petition for a writ of mandamus is an Before NEWSOM, TJOFLAT, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
original application to the Court of Appeals, the
writ is not an independent grant of appellate Opinion
jurisdiction but, rather, may go only in aid
NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:
of appellate jurisdiction that exists on some
other basis; thus, the minimum condition for This case, which is before us on a petition for writ of
mandamus relief is that the case be one that may mandamus, arises out of a civil suit filed under the Crime
lie within the prospective future jurisdiction of Victims' Rights Act of 2004. Petitioner Courtney Wild
the Court of Appeals, or that has in fact come is one of more than 30 women—girls, really—who were
within its jurisdiction in the past. victimized by notorious sex trafficker and child abuser Jeffrey
Epstein. In her petition, Ms. Wild alleges that when federal
prosecutors secretly negotiated and entered into a non-
181 Criminal Law ar- Preliminary examination; prosecution agreement with Epstein in 2007, they violated her
arraignment; appearance; bail rights under the CVRA—in particular, her rights to confer
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not with the government's lawyers and to be treated fairly by
attach until, at the earliest, a suspect's initial them.
appearance before a judicial officer. U.S. Const.
Amend. 6.
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Despite our sympathy for Ms. Wild and others like her, who
suffered unspeakable horror at Epstein's hands, only to be By May 2007, government lawyers had completed both an
left in the dark—and, so it seems, affirmatively misled—by 82-page prosecution memo and a 53-page draft indictment
government lawyers, we find ourselves constrained to deny alleging that Epstein had committed numerous federal sex
her petition. We hold that at least as matters currently stand crimes. In July, Epstein's lawyers sent a detailed letter to
—which is to say at least as the CVRA is currently written— prosecutors in an effort to convince them that, in fact, Epstein
rights under the Act do not attach until criminal proceedings hadn't committed any federal offenses. By September, the
have been initiated against a defendant, either by complaint, sides had exchanged multiple drafts of what would become
information, or indictment. Because the government never an infamous non-prosecution agreement ("NPA"). Pursuant
filed charges or otherwise commenced criminal proceedings to their eventual agreement, Epstein would plead guilty
against Epstein, the CVRA was never triggered. It's not a in Florida court to two state prostitution offenses, and, in
result we like, but it's the result we think the law requires. exchange, he and any coconspirators (at least four of whom
have since been identified) would receive immunity from
federal prosecution. I In June 2008, Epstein pleaded guilty to
I the state crimes as agreed and was sentenced to 18 months'
imprisonment, 12 months' home confinement, and lifetime
The facts underlying this case, as we understand them, are sex-offender status.
beyond scandalous—they tell a tale of national disgrace.
The district court found that "[f]rom the time the FBI began
Over the course of eight years, between 1999 and 2007, investigating Epstein until September 24, 2007"—when the
well-heeled and well-connected financier Jeffrey Epstein and government formally executed the NPA with Epstein—
multiple coconspirators sexually abused more than 30 minor federal prosecutors "never conferred with the victims about
girls, including our petitioner, in Palm Beach, Florida and a[n] NPA or told the victims that such agreement was under
elsewhere in the United States and abroad. Epstein paid his consideration." Doe I v. United States, 359 F. Supp. 3d 1201,
employees to find minor girls and deliver them to him—some 1208 (S.D. Fla. 2019). Worse, it appears that prosecutors
as young as 14. Once Epstein had the girls, he either sexually worked hand-in-hand with Epstein's lawyers—or at the very
abused them himself, gave them over to be abused by others, least acceded to their requests—to keep the NPA's existence
or both. Epstein, in turn, paid bounties to some of his victims and terms hidden from victims. The NPA itself provided
to recruit other girls into his ring. that "[t]he parties anticipate that this agreement will not be
made part of any public record" and, further, that "[i]f the
Following a tip in 2005, the Palm Beach Police Department United States receives a Freedom of Information Act request
and the FBI conducted a two-year investigation of Epstein's or any compulsory process commanding the disclosure of the
conduct. After developing substantial incriminating evidence, agreement, it will provide notice to Epstein before making
the FBI referred the matter for prosecution to the United that disclosure." Moreover, at approximately the same time
States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida. that the sides concluded the NPA, they began negotiating
Beginning in January 2007, and over the course of the ensuing about what prosecutors could (and couldn't) tell victims about
eight *1199 months, Epstein's defense team engaged in the agreement. Seemingly in deference to Epstein's lawyers'
extensive negotiations with federal prosecutors in an effort repeated requests, the government held off—for nearly an
to avoid indictment. At the same time, prosecutors were entire year—on notifying Epstein's victims of the NPA's
corresponding with Epstein's known victims. As early as existence.
March 2007, they sent letters advising each one that "as a
victim and/or witness of a federal offense, you have a number And to be clear, the government's efforts seem to have
of rights." The letters, which the government distributed over graduated from passive nondisclosure to (or at least close
the course of about six months, went on to enumerate the to) active misrepresentation. In January 2008, for example,
eight CVRA rights then in force—including, as particularly approximately four months after finalizing and executing the
relevant here, "[t]he reasonable right to confer with the NPA, the government *1200 sent a letter to petitioner stating
attorney for the [Government] in the case" and "the right to be that Epstein's case was "currently under investigation,"
treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's dignity explaining that "[t]his can be a lengthy process," and
and privacy." "request[ing her] continued patience while [it] conduct[ed]
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a thorough investigation." The government sent an identical Over the course of the ensuing decade, the district court issued
letter to another victim in May 2008, some eight months after a number of significant rulings. For our purposes, three of the
inking the NPA. 2 court's orders are particularly important.
If secrecy was the goal, it appears to have been achieved Initially, in 2011 the district court "addresse[d] the threshold
—there is no indication that any of Epstein's victims were issue whether the CVRA attaches before the government
informed about the NPA or his state charges until after he brings formal charges against the defendant." Does, 817
pleaded guilty. On the day that Epstein entered his guilty plea F. Supp. 2d at 1341. The court held that "it does because
in June 2008, some (but by no means all) victims were notified the statutory language clearly contemplates pre-charge
that the federal investigation of Epstein had concluded. But proceedings." Id. As relevant here, *1201 the district court
it wasn't until July 2008—during the course of this litigation relied principally on two CVRA provisions in so holding.
—that petitioner learned of the NPA's existence, and until First, it pointed to 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(1), which the
August 2008 that she finally obtained a copy of the agreement. parties here have called the Act's "coverage" provision.
That subsection—of which much more later—states that
We are doubtlessly omitting many of the sad details of this "[o]fficers and employees of the Department of Justice and
shameful story. For our purposes, we needn't discuss the other departments and agencies of the United States engaged
particulars of Epstein's crimes, or the fact that the national in the detection, investigation, or prosecution of crime shall
media essentially ignored for nearly a decade the jailing of make their best efforts to see that crime victims are notified
a prominent financier for sex crimes against young girls. 3 of, and accorded, the rights described in subsection (a)."
Today, the public facts of the case are well known—Epstein The district court held that "[s]ubsection (c)(1 )'s requirement
was eventually indicted on federal sex-trafficking charges in that officials engaged in 'detection [or] investigation' afford
the Southern District of New York, and in August 2019, while victims the rights enumerated in subsection (a) surely
awaiting trial, he was found dead in his jail cell of an apparent contemplates pre-charge application of the CVRA." Does,
suicide. 817 F. Supp. 2d at 1342. Second, the court pointed to
subsection (d)(3), which the parties here call the "venue"
provision and which states that a crime victim seeking to
vindicate his or her rights under the CVRA must file a
11
"motion" either "in the district court in which a defendant
In July 2008, petitioner brought suit in the United States is being prosecuted or, if no prosecution is underway, in the
District Court for the Southern District of Florida, styling district court in the district in which the crime occurred."
her initial filing an "Emergency Victim's Petition for If, the district court reasoned, "the CVRA's rights may be
Enforcement of Crime Victim's Rights Act." As the district enforced before a prosecution is underway, then, to avoid a
court explained, "because no criminal case was pending" strained reading of the statute, those rights must attach before
at the time—no federal charges having been filed against a complaint or indictment formally charges the defendant with
Epstein or anyone else—petitioner "filed [her] petition as the crime." Does, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 1342. Finally, the district
a new matter ... which the Clerk of Court docketed as a court cited tt
t In re Dean, in which the Fifth Circuit had
civil action." Does v. United States, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1337, observed that "[a]t least in the posture of th[e] case" before
1341 n.4 (S.D. Fla. 2011). Petitioner alleged that she was a it—the court emphasized that it wasn't "speculat[ing] on the
"crime victim" within the meaning of the CVRA and that applicability to other situations"—the victim's right to confer
by keeping her in the dark about their dealings with Epstein,
with prosecutors applied pre-charge. f 1527 F.3d 391, 394
federal prosecutors had violated her rights under the CVRA
(5th Cir. 2008). Having "determined ... as a matter of law
—in particular, her rights "to confer with the attorney for the
[that] the CVRA can apply before formal charges are filed,"
Government in the case." 18 U.S.C. § 377I(aX5), and "to the district court here "defer[red]" ruling on the question
be treated with fairness and with respect for [her] dignity and whether federal prosecutors had violated the Act until the
privacy," t § 3771(aX8). 4 parties could conduct additional discovery. Does, 817 F. Supp.
2d at 1343.
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Following another eight years of litigation, the district court the coconspirators—as non-parties to the suit—couldn't be
issued a pair of rulings that prompted the mandamus petition estopped from asserting the NPA's validity at any future
now before us. In February 2019, the court found that the
prosecution. See id. Second, the court denied petitioner's
government had infringed petitioner's CVRA rights. See Doe
request for an injunction on the ground that she had failed
1, 359 R Supp. 3d at 1222. In particular, the court held
to show "continuing, present adverse effects" or any "real
that federal prosecutors violated the Act by "enter[ing] into
vt
a[n] NPA with Epstein without conferring with Petitioner[ ] and immediate" threat of future CVRA violations. [ Id.
during its negotiation and signing." Id. at 1219. "Had the at 1328. Third, the court rejected petitioner's requests for
Petitioner[ ] been informed about the Government's intention a victim-impact hearing and a meeting with Acosta on the
to forego federal prosecution of Epstein in deference to grounds that petitioner had already participated in an Epstein-
him pleading guilty to state charges," the district court related hearing in New York, that the Epstein prosecution
emphasized, she "could have conferred with the attorney for had concluded, and that the government had already agreed
the Government and provided input." Id. at 1218. The court to confer with victims concerning any ongoing investigation
concluded that it was precisely "this type of communication of Epstein's coconspirators. See id. at 1328-29. Fourth,
between prosecutors and victims that was intended by the the court denied petitioner's discovery requests for grand-
passage of the CVRA." Id. at 1291.
jury materials and investigative files. See c a id. at 1329-
Having found CVRA violations, the court directed the parties 40. Fifth, the court declined to order "educational remedies,"
—which by then included Epstein as an intervenor—to brief as the government had already agreed to implement CVRA
"the issue of what remedy, if any, should be applied." Id. at training for employees of the Southern District's United
1222. In response, petitioner proposed multiple remedies: (1) States Attorney's office. Id. at 1330. And finally, the
rescission of the NPA; (2) an injunction against further CVRA court rejected petitioner's request for sanctions, fees, and
violations; (3) an order scheduling a victim-impact hearing
restitution. See I id. at 1330-31.
and a meeting between victims and Alexander Acosta, the
former United States Attorney for the Southern District of
Seeking review of the district court's order refusing every
Florida; (4) discovery of certain grand-jury materials, records
remedy that she had sought, petitioner filed—as the CVRA
regarding prosecutors' decision to enter into the NPA, and
directs—a petition for writ of mandamus with this Court.
files concerning law-enforcement authorities' investigation
of Epstein; (5) mandatory CVRA training for employees See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(dX3) (stating that "[i]f the district
of the Southern District's United States Attorney's office; court denies the relief sought," a victim "may petition the
and (6) sanctions, *1202 attorneys' fees, and restitution. In court of appeals for a writ of mandamus"). The government
August 2019, while the court was considering the parties' filed a "brief in response" in which it not only opposed
briefing regarding remedies, Epstein died of an apparent petitioner's arguments on the merits, but also raised several
suicide; his death prompted another round of briefing on the threshold arguments concerning the scope of the CVRA
issue of mootness. and the circumstances in which rights under the Act are
judicially enforceable. In reply, petitioner contended (among
In September 2019, having considered the parties' briefing other things) that by failing to "cross appeal," the government
and the impact of Epstein's death, the district court dismissed had waived its arguments about the CVRA's applicability and
petitioner's suit, denying each of her requested remedies. enforceability. 5
See f Doe 1 v. United States, 411 R Supp. 3d 1321 (S.D.
sits
Fla. 2019). In its order, the district court made a number of
rulings. First, it held that Epstein's death mooted any claim
regarding the NPA's continuing validity, as he was no longer This case presents a host of issues, many of first impression.
Before jumping in, we begin with an introductory summary
subject to prosecution. See id. at 1326. Relatedly, the
of the CVRA.
court held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioner's
claim regarding the validity of the NPA as it applied to
Epstein's coconspirators; any opinion regarding that issue,
the court concluded, would be merely advisory because III
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The CVRA is a compact statute, occupying but one section a crime victim, the court shall ensure that the crime victim
(and only two pages) of the United States Code. See 18 is afforded the rights described in subsection (a)." Id.
U.S.C. § 3771. The entire Act comprises just six subsections, § 3771(b)(1). (Subsection (b)(2) pertains to habeas corpus
the pertinent portions of which we will summarize briefly. proceedings, in which crime victims enjoy a more limited set
of rights; it isn't relevant here.)
*1203 The Act opens, in subsection (a), with a catalogue of
"rights" that federal law guarantees to "crime victims." (The Subsection (c), titled "Best efforts to accord rights," imposes
Act separately defines the term "crime victim" to mean "a obligations on non judicial actors. One of its constituent
person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the clauses—which we introduced earlier as the so-called
"coverage" provision—states as follows:
commission of a Federal offense." . Id. § 3771(e)(2)(A).)
The version of the CVRA in effect during the events in
question here—between 2006 and 2008—stated as follows:
Officers and employees of the
(a) Rights of crime victims.—A crime victim has the Department of Justice and other
following rights: departments and agencies of the
United States engaged in the detection,
(1) The right to be reasonably protected from the investigation, or prosecution of crime
accused. shall make their best efforts to see
that crime victims are notified of,
(2) The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of
and accorded, the rights described in
any public court proceeding, or any parole proceeding,
subsection (a).
involving the crime or of any release or escape of the
accused.
(3) The right not to be excluded from any such public
18 U.S.C. § 3771(cX1).
court proceeding, unless the court, after receiving clear
and convincing evidence, determines that testimony by
Subsection (d) addresses "Enforcement and limitations."
the victim would be materially altered if the victim heard
Several of subsection (dX3)'s provisions are relevant
other testimony at that proceeding.
here. One—the "venue" provision—states that "[t]he rights
(4) The right to be reasonably heard at any public described in subsection (a) shall be asserted in the district
proceeding in the district court involving release, plea, court in which a defendant is being prosecuted for the crime
sentencing, or any parole proceeding. or, if no prosecution is underway, in the district court in which
the crime occurred." Another provides that "[i]f the district
(5) The reasonable right to confer with the attorney for court denies the relief sought, the movant may petition the
the Government in the case. court of appeals for a writ of mandamus"—and as amended
in 2015, and thus before petitioner sought review here, it goes
(6) The right to full and timely restitution as provided in on to clarify that in deciding any mandamus petition under the
law. CVRA, "the court of appeals shall apply ordinary standards
of appellate review." Subsection (dX6) is also relevant in two
(7) The right to proceedings free from unreasonable
respects. First, it states that "Nothing in this chapter shall
delay.
be construed to authorize a cause of action for damages."
(8) The right to be treated with fairness and with respect Second, and separately, it emphasizes that "[n]othing in
for the victim's dignity and privacy. this chapter shall be construed to impair the prosecutorial
discretion of the Attorney General or any officer under his
18 U.S.C. § 3771(a). direction."
Subsection (b), titled "Rights afforded," focuses on courts' *1204 Finally, subsection (f)—we've already introduced
responsibilities under the Act. It provides—as relevant here subsection (e), which defines the term "crime victim"—
—that "[i]n any court proceeding involving an offense against instructs the Attorney General to "promulgate regulations to
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enforce the rights of crime victims and to ensure compliance
proceedings begin. See In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 394
by responsible officials with the obligations" concerning
(5th Cir. 2008). The Sixth Circuit has deemed it "uncertain"
those victims. Id. § 3771(f)(1). whether CVRA protections apply "prior to [the] filing of ...
charges." In re Acker, 596 F.3d 370, 373 (6th Cir. 2010). The
With that primer, we proceed to address petitioner's case. district courts that have considered the question are divided.
Compare, e.g., 1' United States it Oakum, No. 3:08CR132,
2009 WL 790042, at *2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 24, 2009) (holding
IV that CVRA rights can attach prior to the commencement of
criminal proceedings), with, e.g., United States v. Daly, No.
Petitioner contends—and as already explained, the 3:11CR121 AWT, 2012 WL 315409, at *4 (D. Conn. Feb. 1,
undisputed facts show—that federal prosecutors in the 2012) (holding to the contrary).
Southern District of Florida negotiated "a secret non-
prosecution agreement" with Epstein, and that "[f]rom the As already explained, the district court here concluded that the
time that the FBI began investigating Epstein through the CVRA can apply before the initiation ofcriminal proceedings
consummation of the secret NPA, the Government never —"pre-charge," for short—and, accordingly, that petitioner
conferred with Epstein's victims about the NPA [or] even enjoyed the protections of the Act during the period that
told them that such an agreement was under consideration." preceded the execution of Epstein's NPA. In particular,
Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 4-5. By keeping her (and petitioner asserts in these proceedings that the government
others) in the dark concerning Epstein's NPA, petitioner violated her "reasonable right to confer" with the lead
asserts, the government violated the CVRA.
prosecutor, L 18 U.S.C. § 3771(aX5), and her right "to be
[II The unique circumstances of this case—and in particular, treated with fairness," id. § 3771(aX8)—neither of which,
the fact that Epstein was never charged in the Southern she says, is limited by its terms to the post-charge phase
District of Florida—tee up what the district court correctly of a criminal prosecution. 7 In support of her position that
called a "threshold" question: Does the CVRA apply in
CVRA rights can apply before criminal proceedings begin,
the period before criminal proceedings are initiated, either
by criminal complaint, information, or indictment? If it petitioner points (as did the district court) to II a § 3771(c)
does, then we must proceed to consider a cascade of (1)—which refers to federal-government agencies engaged
logically subsequent questions—among them, (1) whether in the "detection [and] investigation" of crime, in addition
the Act authorized the district court to rescind the NPA, to its "prosecution"—and to C a § 3771(d)(3) -which, in
both generally and, more specifically, as applied to Epstein's specifying the venue where a victim should seek relief under
alleged coconspirators; (2) whether petitioner was entitled the Act, refers to the eventuality that "no prosecution is
to discovery of certain grand-jury materials, DOJ records underway."
pertaining to prosecutors' decision to enter into the NPA, and
FBI files concerning the Epstein investigation; (3) whether The interpretation of the CVRA that petitioner advances, and
petitioner's participation in an Epstein-related victim-impact that the district court adopted, is not implausible; the CVRA
hearing in New York effectively moots her request for relief could be read to apply pre-charge. We conclude, though—
here; and (4) whether federal law entitles petitioner to recover reluctantly, especially given the mistreatment that petitioner
attorneys' fees. If, by contrast, the CVRA doesn't apply seems to have suffered at the hands of federal prosecutors—
before the commencement of criminal proceedings, then ow that the Act is neither best nor most naturally read that way.
inquiry is at an end. 6 For reasons that we will explain, we hold that (1) the CVRA's
text and structure, (2) the historical context in which the Act
*1205 [2] [3] Whether the CVRA applies prior to the was passed, and (3) the prosecutorial-discretion principles
initiation of criminal proceedings is not just a threshold that the Act was designed to safeguard—and which, we think,
question, but also a question of first impression in this Circuit. petitioner's interpretation would compromise—demonstrate
The Fifth Circuit has stated—albeit in dictum, without that its protections apply only after the initiation of criminal
meaningful explanation, and seemingly without the benefit of proceedings.If Congress believes that we have misinterpreted
adversarial testing—that the Act can apply before criminal the CVRA—or, for that matter, even if it believes that we have
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correctly interpreted the statute as currently written but that
the eight rights listed in § 3771(a)—all except for those
its scope should be expanded—then it should amend the Act
specified in subsections (5) and (8)—either expressly refer
to make its intent clear.
to or necessarily presuppose the existence of an ongoing
criminal proceeding. Subsections (a)(2), (3), (4), and (7) leave
no doubt whatsoever—all of them apply, by their plain terms,
A to "proceeding[s]," "public proceedings," or "public court
proceedings." Not surprisingly, there seems to be general
[4] In construing the CVRA, "we begin, as we must, with agreement that these "proceeding"-focused rights apply only
a careful examination of the statutory text," *1206 after the filing of a complaint or criminal charges. See Reply
Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., — U.S. —, in Supp. of Pet. at 17; Paul G. Cassell, et aL, Crime Picini's'
137 S. Ct. 1718, 1721, 198 L.Ed.2d 177 (2017), looking Rights During Criminal Investigations? Applying the Crime
"to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the Victims' Rights Act Before Criminal Charges Are Filed, 104
J. of Crim. L. and Criminology 59, 71 (2014).
language and design of the statute as a whole," K Mart
Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291, 108 S.Ct. 1811,
Subsections (aX I ) and (6) aren't quite as clear, but they
100 L.Ed.2d 313 (1988). On balance, we conclude that the
too are best understood as specifying rights that attach
Act's terms—including the provisions on which petitioner
only after criminal proceedings have begun. Subsection
relies—demonstrate that its protections apply only after the
(I) guarantees a crime victim's right to protection from
commencement of criminal proceedings.
"the accused." r § 3771(a)(1). Both in ordinary spoken
English and as a legal term of art, the word "accused"
refers to someone against whom criminal proceedings have
1
been commenced. See, e.g., IVebster's New International
Dictionary 17 (2d ed. 1944) (defining "accused" as "one
[51 We begin where petitioner does, with the catalogue of
"rights"—quoted in full above—that the CVRA guarantees charged with an offense; the defendant in a criminal case");
to "crime victims." (As already noted, the Act defines the see also"'Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 632,106 S.Ct.
term "crime victim"—more on that later.) Petitioner relies 1404, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986) ("[A]fler a formal accusation
has been made ... a person who had previously been just a
chiefly on § 3771(a)(5)'s guarantee of a "reasonable right
to confer with the attorney for the Government in the case," 'suspect' has become an 'accused' within the meaning of
the Sixth Amendment...:'). Subsection (aX6), *1207 which
and !' I § 3771(a)(8)'s guarantee of the "right to be treated guarantees a victim's right to "full and timely restitution,"
with fairness." She contends that by failing to inform her— likewise presupposes the initiation—and indeed perhaps the
and worse, affirmatively misleading her—about its ongoing maturation or even conclusion—of criminal proceedings.
negotiations with Epstein, the government violated both Black's, for instance, defines the term "restitution," in relevant
provisions. We will address subsections (a)(5) and (8) in part, to mean "[c]ompensation for loss; esp., full or partial
due course, but because "[s]tatutory construction ... is a compensation paid by a criminal to a victim, not awarded in
holistic endeavor," and because "[a] provision that may seem a civil trial for tort, but ordered as part of a criminal sentence
ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of or as a condition of probation." Black's Law Dictionary 1507
the statutory scheme," It a UnitedSam. Ass'n ofTex. a Timbers (10th ed. 2014).
ofInwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371, 108 S.Ct.
626, 98 L.Ed.2d 740 (1988), we first examine the balance of So, it seems to us, the rights enumerated in subsections (a)
(I), (2), (3), (4), (6), and (7) are properly understood as
[ § 3771(a). 8 applying only after the initiation of criminal proceedings. And
again, petitioner doesn't really contend otherwise. Instead,
In the main, anyway—and there isn't any real dispute about
she focuses on subsections (a)(5) and (8), which she says are
this—the CVRA's enumeration seems to focus on the post- framed broadly enough that they can be understood to apply
charge phase of a criminal prosecution, and in particular on
pre-charge. Let's take a closer look.
ensuring that crime victims have notice of(and an opportunity
to be heard in) pending criminal proceedings. Indeed, six of
WESTLAW © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 8
EFTA00073500
In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (2020)
28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1020
Subsection (a)(5) guarantees a crime victim the "reasonable subsection (aX5) was intended to apply pre-charge, during
right to confer with the attorney for the Government in the investigation phase, it makes little sense that Congress
the case." Petitioner and her lead counsel (in his academic would have tethered the conferral right to a single government
writings) emphasize that this provision refers to the attorney lawyer.
handling "the case" rather than "the charges," Reply in Supp.
of Pet. at 17, and they assert that the term "case" can "refer On balance, therefore—and particularly in the light of
both to a judicial case before a court and an investigative subsections (a)(I), (2), (3), (4), (6), and (7), all of which
case pursued by a law enforcement officer," Cassell et al., clearly apply only after the initiation of criminal proceedings
supra, at 72 (emphasis added).9 Although it's true, at least —we conclude that § 3771(a)(5)'s conferral right does
in the abstract, that the term "case" can mean either thing, not attach during the pre-charge, investigatory phase. Rather,
in legal parlance the judicial-case connotation is undoubtedly subsection (a)(5) is best understood as guaranteeing a crime
primary. See, e.g., Black's, supra, at 258-59 (defining "case" victim's right to consult with the lead prosecutor—i.e., "the
first as "[a] civil or criminal proceeding, action, suit or attorney for the Government"—in a pending prosecution
controversy at law or in equity" and only second as "[a]
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