Search / DataSet-10 / EFTA00225044.pdf

EFTA00225044.pdf

Dataset DataSet-10
File Type Unknown
Pages 58
Words 33,387
STATEMENT OF IN RESPONSE TO
APRIL 2, 2019 LETTER FROM JEFFREY R. RAGSDALE


To the extent possible, I have provided all information relevant to your inquiry, including
applicable documents. Due to the passage of time, updates to various software and hardware, and
the crash of my work laptop several years ago, I no longer have every piece of relevant material
and my memory may be imperfect.' I have organized the response to conform with the April 2,
2019 letter from Jeffrey R. Ragsdale to Jonathan Biran. Please note that there were numerous oral
and written communications between others at the U.S. Attorney's Office and the Justice
Department with counsel for Mr. Epstein. While in some cases I was told of the communications
or cc'ed on emails or letters summarizing the communications, for many conversations, meetings,
and emails, I do not have knowledge of what occurred.
Introduction
The investigation of Jeffrey Epstein and I series of co-conspirators, named "Operation
Leap Year," officially began in May 2006. In theory, it was supposed to conclude on September
24, 2007 with the signing of I "Non-Prosecution Agreement" ("NPA").2 As will be discussed
below, the investigation presented several issues of first impression and challenges related to
obtaining evidence and securing the coo eration of witnesses. Nonetheless, I felt certain that the
agents, my co-counsel, and I had built ve strop case against Mr. Epstein and three of his
rsonal assistants — and

The case was presented for federal investigation by the Palm Beach Police Department
after they felt that Jeffrey Epstein's legal team had put inappropriate pressure on the Palm Beach
County State Attorney's Office to file only misdemeanor charges. Allegations of misconduct had
been leveled against the local detective and the Police Chief and they reported being followed and
harassed. As described below, the defense attorneys employed the same tactics at the federal level
against myself and the FBI.



With regard to the exhibits, whenever possible, I have used copies of original documents
or "scanned" originals that were made at the time. In some cases, all that I have are the electronic
documents (i.e., the Word Perfect letter that was printed, signed, and mailed or faxed). Because
our computers no longer have Word Perfect, I have used "Quick Print" which has distorted the
formatting. If I am providing something that I know is I "draft," I note that either in the text or in
the exhibit list. The fact that something does not contain I signature does not mean that it is
draft, it just means that it was printed from the electronic version and I no longer have (or never
had) copy of the original. For example, I often drafted letters for the signatures of
Jeff , and Alex Acosta. Their assistants would have maintained the signed
originals. In some cases, I would be provided with copies and sometimes I would not. I would
usually notate my electronic files with "final" to know which was the final version, or the last-
modified version.
2 For reasons set forth below, the investigation continued due to Epstein's post-NPA
conduct.

Page 1of 58




EFTA00225044
Once the USAO opened the file, Epstein took the same approach that had been used with
the State — at each level of review, he hired an attorney with I personal connection to the
MUSA/13OJ Attorney who was conducting the review. The attorneys raised I series of
challenges to the veracity of the victims and the veracity of the state investigators, as well as quasi-
Petite-policy arguments. When those failed, more formal legal analysis and federalism policy
arguments were presented.
Throughout this process, I wanted to keep my investigation as confidential as possible. For
example, I did not see the benefit of telling Epstein's counsel that we had uncovered additional
victims, that we had been able to corroborate victims' accounts, or the legal theories that we were
pursuing. My objections to malS these disclosures were all overruled. Also, unbeknownst to
me, at least one supervisory was engaging in plea discussions with counsel for Epstein
without consulting with me, the agents, or the victims. These discussions led to the creation of the
NPA — an agreement that allowed Epstein to plead guilty to state charges in exchange for immunity
for federal prosecution by the USAO for the Southern District of Florida.
After the NPA was signed on September 24, 2007, when I attempted to notify the victims
and enforce the agreement, the attacks became more personal. Epstein's attorneys raised the same
policy arguments — which could have been raised prior to signing the NPA — as high as the DAG's
Office, and coupled them with claims of prosecutorial misconduct. As these attacks occurred, the
USAO — U.S. Attorney Alex Acosta and later First Assistant U.S. Attorney Jeff offered
Epstein the option of simply "unwinding"3 the NPA — after all, he had never performed any part
of it. In my mind it was unfathomable that Epstein would be allowed to spend months attacking
not just the validity of our investigation and the validity of the NPA, but also making false
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct against myself and FAUSA and still be allowed
the benefit of what was, in my opinion, an unreasonably favorable agreement. Since everyone
from the U.S. Attorney down to me agreed that the case was headed for I trial, the investigation
continued, including identifying additional victims, conducting interviews, issuing grand jury
subpoenas, drafting revised indictment packages, and presenting testimony to the grand jury.
Epstein's clear intent to go to trial was on display during this period as he deposed victims
identified only through the federal investigation in the guise of taking discovery in the state case.
On June 23, 2008, en the DAG's Office issued his letter denying Epstein's final
appeal. While USA Acosta allowed Epstein the benefit of the NPA, Epstein still tried to avoid
several key parts of the NPA's terms, and would have escaped them but for my insistence.
On June 30, 2008, Epstein entered his guilty plea in state court and was sentenced to 18
months' in the county jail in accordance with the terms of his state plea agreement and the NPA.
Not long thereafter, I learned that Epstein had applied for work release and the Palm Beach County
Sheriff's Office had granted the application. Prior to Epstein's guilty plea, the issue of work
release had been specifically discussed with Epstein's counsel and they informed us that Epstein
would not seek work release. The agents and I also met with the Sheriffs Office in advance of
the plea and had been told that Epstein would not be eligible for work release. Accordingly, I
provided my Notice of Breach, but was told by defense attorney Roy Black that, despite those
specific conversations, USA Acosta himself agreed that Epstein would be eligible for any program

3 "Unwinding" was USA Acosta's term for mutual rescission — the USAO could file its
charges and Epstein would have no obligations to plead guilty in state or federal court.

Page 2 of 58




EFTA00225045
that the state offered, including work release. Because of this, I had to withdraw the Notice of
Breach and could only write I letter to the Sheriff's Office pointing out all of the false statements
contained in Epstein's application for work release and letters to the victims informing them that
Epstein was in work release status. The Sheriff's Office never responded to or acknowledged my
letter.
On June 9, 2009, I prepared what I believe was the last Memorandum requesting
authorization to issue I Notice of Breach and to indict Epstein. The Office authorized issuance of
the Notice of Breach, and the Indictment Packages was re-reviewed, a roved, and signed, with
arrest warrants for Jeffrey Epstein, and . The Notice of Breach
was served on June 12, 2009 at I hearing on Epstein's Motion to Dismiss one of the civil suits
filed by one of the victims identified during the federal investigation. Once again, Epstein was
allowed to "cure" his breach, and we were not allowed to file the indictment.
There were strong internal disagreements on I number of subjects, including: the handling
of the meetings with Epstein's counsel; plea negotiations; the NPA generally; the failure to consult
with the victims; continuing plea negotiations in the face of Epstein's clear bad faith; the refusal
to defend me against personal attacks from Epstein's attorneys; the agreement to put off seeking
Epstein's computer equipment; the consultations with Epstein's attorneys regarding victim
notifications; the handling of the "appeals" to Washington; allowing delays during those "appeals,"
while Epstein's attorneys were harassing the victims and their family members; attempts by
Epstein to renegotiate the term of imprisonment; attempts by Epstein to renegotiate the payment
of damages to the victims and attorneys' fees to their attorney representative; allowing Epstein to
participate in the work release program after specifically discussing it during plea negotiations;
and repeatedly allowing Epstein to "cure" intentional breaches of the NPA. These were kept
internal as I tried to deal professionally with opposing counsel.
In the midst of all of the post-NPA back-and-forth with Epstein, was the Jane Doe. United
States litigation.4 Despite the Office's request to be recused from the case, the Justice Department
decided that there was no conflict of interest and I was tasked with serving as co-counsel. The
Office asserted attorney-client, executive, work product, and deliberative process privileges, so all
of the internal disagreements, pros memos, and indictments were not disclosed while all of my
communications with opposing counsel (often at the behest of supervisors) were disclosed. After
an initial flurry of filings, Brad Edwards, as counsel for the named plaintiffs, stated on the record
that he believed that setting aside the NPA would not benefit his clients, and he sued Epstein on
behalf of I number of victims under the NPA. I did what I could to assist Mr. Edwards, other
attorneys, including Mr. Josefsberg, the attorney selected by the Special Master, and the Court, to
locate victims, provide signed copies of the NPA, and answer questions. After all of the civil suits
between Epstein and the victims were settled through the spectre of breaching the NPA, Mr.
Edwards re-initiated the Jane Doe United States litigation, asserting that his clients wanted to



4 1 few days after Jeffrey Epstein entered his guilty plea in state court, attorney Brad
Edwards filed suit on behalf of one of the victims identified in the federal investigation (later
expanded to include I second victim who had been identified in the state investigation), alleging
violations of the Crime Victims' Rights Act. The suit, which is still pending, is captioned Jane
Doe 1 and Jane Doe 21 United States, 08-80736-CV-KAM.

Page 3 of 58




EFTA00225046
set aside the NPA and see Mr. Epstein federally charged due to violations of the Crime Victims'
Rights Act.
In response to your questions, I have attempted to distill the past 13 years of emails, letters,
research, pleadings, and conversations into I coherent document and attach the most relevant
items. Given the sheer volume of materials involved here and the passage of time, while I have
worked diligently to answer your questions as fully as possible, I certainly could have missed
something amongst the thousands of pages of emails, drafts, and hard copy and electronic
documents. If there are additional items or topics that need further explanation or more
documentation, I can delve further.
The Non-Prosecution Agreement

1. Describe the circumstances under which the investigation of Jeffrey Epstein
was referred to the USAO, including when, why, how, and by whom the
referral was made. Explain why the USAO decided to initiate I federal grand
jury investigation into this matter, including what federal interests were
perceived to be involved, and identify the individuals participating in the
decision.

Some time in early 2006, FBI Special Agent E. approached me about
an investigation being conducted b the Town of Palm Beach Police Department ("PBPD"). I do
not know how or when A was first contacted about the matter.
The first mentions of the investigation were just jpassing comments during meetings on
other matters. and I were working on I number of different child exploitation
matters at the time, along with ICE Special Agent David Malone. I remember generally that SA
mentioned an investigation of I wealthy man who lived on Palm Beach and recruited
minors for sexual activity. During these casual conversations, I do not believe that Mr. Epstein's
name was mentioned. If it was mentioned, it held no significance for me. I recall that Si
mentioned that PBPD had reached out to her because the Palm Beach County State
Attorney's Office was leaning towards not charging the case at all or letting the defendant lead
to I misdemeanor charge of solicitation of prostitution. At some point I told that,
if PBPD wanted to look into federal charges, I would need more information about the allegations
and I encouraged her to set up I meeting. I recall Si telling me that PBPD wanted
to give the State Attorney's Office the opportunity to properly charge the case before presenting it
for federal investigation and prosecution.
In May 2006, I met with Si and PBPD Detective Joe in the 4th Floor
Conference Room at the U.S. Attor Office in West Palm Beach. I do not recall whether Si
Malone was present. Detective summarized the investigation into state criminal sexual
conduct involving Epstein and his personal assistants. Briefly, Epstein, through his personal
assistants, recruited girls and young women — mainly from I local high school — to travel to his
residence on Palm Beach to perform erotic massages. Although they had no massage training, the

5 I use these terms deliberately. "Girls" refers to females under the age of 18 and "young
women" refers to females over the age of 18. When I refer to both groups jointly, I will use the
term "females."

Page 4 of 58




EFTA00225047
girls and young women were coached to massage Mr. Epstein in various states of undress. The
sexual activity varied and included: Mr. Epstein masturbating himself at the end of the massage;
having the females masturbate him; Mr. Epstein fondling the females' breasts and genitalia; using
sex toys on the females; digital penetration of the females; sexual intercourse with Mr. Epstein;
and Mr. Epstein observing while one of the girls had sex with one of his assistants. At the end of
each "massage" session, Mr. Epstein or one of his assistants would pay the female involved. If
the female involved in the massage was brought to Mr. Epstein's residence by I "recruiter," then
the "recruiter" also would be paid.
Detective did not have any information regarding an of the females traveling
interstate or internationally to engage in sexual activity, but Det. reported that Mr. Epstein
and his assistants traveled in and out of the Palm Beach International Airport on Epstein's private
airplane. Det. stated that flight logs he had seen sometimes referred to passengers as
"females," without names or ages, so it was possible that could have been on board, but Det.
had not been able to confirm that. Det. stated that I search warrant had been
executed on Mr. Epstein's residence and evidence had been seized, including message pads
showing calls from females confirming that they would be coming to "work," which was the
euphemism used for iving I "massage" — another euphemism for engaging in sexual activity for
money. Det. also reported that it had appeared that Mr. Epstein had been "tipped off'
about the coming search warrant because all of the computer CPUs had been removed from the
residence — the keyboards and screens were still in place, just the CPUs had been taken. Det.
also reported that some surveillance cameras were in place but they had only recovered I
limited amount of surveillance video. Det. stated that between 20 and 30 females had
been identified [NB: I believe that he told me the exact number, I just don't recall that number
now].
and Det. asked me whether there were federal criminal charges
that could be pursued. I remember getting up from the conference room, walking to my office,
and getting my code book and walking back. I looked through 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422 (enticement of
minors into prostitution/illegal sexual activity) and 2423 (travel for purposes of engaging in illegal
sexual conduct).6 We talked through those statutes and the additional investigation that would be
required to prove that they had been violated, but I told them that, if the evidence was there, it was
I case that could be prosecuted federally.
Det. then told me that his boss - PBPD Chief Michael — was still pressing
the State Attorney's Office to arrest Epstein. Det. had prepared series of probable cause
affidavits for the arrests of Jeffrey Epstein, and Haley Robson, charging I large
number of state criminal violations. Chief had asked the Palm Beach County State Attorney,
Barry to authorize the arrests and he had refused. According to Det. MI pressure
had been brought to bear on SA bilg es attorneys, who included Gu Fronstin and
Jack Goldberger twopersonal friends of ), and Alan Dershowitz. Det. stated
that he and Chief were concerned that Epstein would be charged only with misdemeanor
or perhaps would not be charged at all.



6 As the investigation progressed, I looked into other federal crimes, but at that fi rst
meeting, I only remember looking at §§ 2422 and 2423.

Page 5 of 58




EFTA00225048
I recommended that we begin the rocess of investigatin er there was I
jurisdictional basis for federal charges, and Si and Det. concurred. Det.
asked that Chief be given an additional opportunity to convince the State Attorney
to charge Epstein.? I explained that opening I case file and beginning I federal investigation would
not preclude the State Attorney from charging Epstein.
I then prepared the paperwork to open I file. The investigation was dubbed "Operation
Leap Year" because there were approximately 29 young women and girls who had been identified
through the State investigation.
There were several aspects of the case that involved federal interests. First, as to the
substantive crimes that Epstein was accused of committing, they involved the victimization of
minor females through the use of facilities of interstate commerce (telephones and airports); and
Epstein was traveling interstate and internationally to come to the Southern District of Florida to
commit those offenses. During the course of the investigation, I often said that, if there were
trial, I would tell the jury that Jeffrey Epstein traveled to Florida to use Royal Palm Beach High
School as his personal brothel. Second, the removal of the computer equipment from Epstein's
home prior to the execution of the search warrant suggested possible public corruption at the Palm
Beach County courthouse (where the search warrant application was signed) and also raised the
possibility that Epstein may have been involved in the manufacture and/or possession of child
pornography. Eradication of child pornography was I particular focus of Project Safe Childhood;
its production and storage on computer equipment involved the use of items produced in interstate
and foreign commerce; and child pornc ty was often distributed through facilities of interstate
and foreign commerce. Third, Det. was suggesting that political or other pressure was
being placed on an elected official (the State Attorney) to avoid or minimize criminal exposure for
person who committed numerous state crimes related to the exploitation of girls and young
women. Setting aside the issue of prostitution, the sexual activity involving girls under the age of
16 could be charged as sex battery in the state. Ignoring those crimes suggested possible public
corruption or, at the least] miscarriage of justice.
With regard to the logistics of opening the case file, the opening of files in West Palm
Beach is relatively informal. In instances where an agent approaches line directly (either
because it is duty matter or because the investigation is within the area of expertise),
the line will give his or her assistant the details of the case for the LIONS file-opening
paperwork and then give I brief oral explanation of the case to his/her supervisor along with the
paperwork. If the supervisor agrees that I file shouldal ;vned, he or she will normally sign the
LIONS form on the spot and hand the file back to the In this case, I prepared I file jacket;
my assistant did the LIONS paperwork; I signed the conflict form; briefed my supervisor,
; and she signed the LIONS paperwork assigning the case to me. This all occurred either
on the day of the meeting with Detective and SI or within I few days
thereafter. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is the file opening paperwork and file jacket showing that
the case was opened in LIONS on May 23, 2006.
I do recall that at some time relatively soon after the file was opened, I did something that
I had never done before or since. I initiated I meeting with the U.S. Attorney and the First

7 .1111 I did not know it at the time, on May I, 2006, Chief sent I letter to State
Attorney asking to consider recusing himself from the case. (Exhibit 1.)

Page 6 of 58




EFTA00225049
Assistant, Alex Acosta and Jeff where I traveled to Miami and told them about the case.
I recall that I explained the case and how the PBPD believed that Epstein had used political or
other pressure to avoid serious punishment in Palm Beach County state court. That possibility
troubled me greatly; hence, my request to meet with executive mans ement. Messrs. Acosta and
had the same reaction that I had the first time tha told me about Mr. Epstein
— if I have never heard of him, how much influence could this person have? I remember
specifically saying to them that I expected the case would be time and resource-intensive and I did
not want to invest the time and the FBI's resources if the Office would just back down to pressure
at the end. Messrs. Acosta and assured me that, if there was sufficient evidence to support
the case, Mr. Epstein would be charged appropriately.8
2. Describe in detail your role, and the role of each other person in the USAO, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and elsewhere within the Department
of Justice — collectively herein "the government" — who was involved in the
assessment of the viability and strength of the federal case against Mr. Epstein
and in the decision to negotiate I pre-indictment resolution of the case.
My Role
I was the line assigned to the case. In conjunction with the case agents, I handled
all aspects of the grand jury investigation — deciding what subpoenas to issue; whom to interview;
whom to call to testify before the grand jury; what lines of inquiry to pursue to support various
legal theories; I conducted legal research to support charges; I reached out to others throughout
the Department and the federal government for information on previous investigations of Mr.
Epstein, and for legal guidance on various aspects of the case (e.g., OEO, CEOS, SEC, SDNY,
and AFMLS); along with the FBI agents and the FBI Victim-Witness Coordinator, I had direct
contact with victims via interviews, meetings, and consultations regarding safety/privacy/mental
health concerns; and I handled all court proceedings related to the investigation. When I felt that
sufficient evidence had been collected to prove Mr. Epstein's guilt beyond I reasonable doubt, I
drafted I prosecution memorandum, indictment, and related documents. I revised those documents
in response to comments from those in the supervisory chain of command and, as explained below,
after additional evidence was secured. I participated in some (but not all) of the meetings between
members of the USAO and counsel for Jeffrey Epstein. I prepared briefing materials for
management in preparation for those meetings and in response to issues raised during those
meetings.
Normally the assigned line handles plea negotiations, and I recommended that I
enter into negotiations that would result in joint federal and state resolution (i.e.,I plea to federal
charges in federal court and I plea to state charges in state court). I was reprimanded for doing so.

8 I do not have I contemporaneous memorandum and cannot find the date of the meeting.
In I July 13, 2007 email exchange between myself and Criminal Chief I describe
=
the meeting as follows: "I summarized the case and the State Attorney's Office's handling of it.
I acknowledged that we needed to do work to collect the evidence establishing I federal nexus,
and I noted the time and money that would be required for an investigation. I said that I was
willing to invest that time and the FBI was willing to invest the money, but I didn't want to get to
the end and then have the Office be intimidated by the high-powered lawyers. I was assured that
that would not happen." (See Exhibit 3.)

Page 7 of 58




EFTA00225050
Thus, as will be discussed in more detail below, I played no role in the decision to enter into I
Non-Prosecution Agreement in exchange for Jeffrey Epstein's entry of I guilty plea to I state
charge requiring I sentence of 18 months' imprisonment or Epstein's plea to federal charges
resulting in I maximum sentence of 18 months' imprisonment (as will be explained below,
Epstein's counsel repeatedly changed their minds about whether to take the federal route or the
state route). Although I was tasked with drafting the agreements and Information, all of the
documents were repeatedly and substantively revised by various supervisors, and I was responsible
for incorporating those edits. I also was asked to sign the Non-Prosecution Agreement.
When Epstein sought to have the Non-Prosecution Agreement set aside by "appealing" the
matter to CEOS, the AAG, and the DAG, I handled the continued investigation of Epstein,
including working with the FBI to identify additional victims, issue additional grand jury
subpoenas, and prepare an updated indictment package. At the request of the U.S. Attorney, I also
responded to inquiries from CEOS, the AAG, and the DAG's Office and drafted submissions on
behalf of the USAO in response to arguments raised by Epstein's attorneys.
I believe that I prepared I first draft of the Addendum to the Non-Prosecution Agreement,
but others took the laboring oar on that document. I drafted numerous victim notification letters
and responded to defense objections to those letters. I drafted the letter to the Special Master with
the USAO's recommendations for the qualities to look for in the attorney representative for the
victims. I monitored Epstein's compliance with the Non-Prosecution Agreement and served
several breach notices.
U.S. Attorney's Office Personnel
(now retired): was my direct supervisor. She
reviewed indictment packages and other court-related matters and provided guidance and
served as I "sounding board" for many of my concerns. As will be explained below,
did not participate in many of the meetings between the USAO and Epstein's
counsel because Epstein's counsel "skipped her" in the chain of command, directing their
communications to MAUSA9 , Criminal Chief First
Assistant Jeff and U.S. Attorney Alex Acosta. did participate in
meetings with the Palm Beach Sheriff's Office about Epstein's work release and several
conference calls with defendant attorney Roy Black and others about Epstein's breaches of
the Non-Prosecution Agreement.

MAUSA (now in private practice): MAUSA was my second-
line supervisor and head of the West Palm Beach office. Over the objection of myself and
my co-counsel, he granted the request of Epstein's attorneys to meet to allow Epstein's
attorneys to argue that the USAO should decline the matter. That began the series of
meetings between all levels of the USAO and Epstein's counsel. MAUSA reviewed
my work; asked me to conduct some specific research; and reviewed drafts of our responses
to legal arguments raised by Epstein's counsel. MAUSA also participated in


9 The Managing Assistant U.S. Attorney ("MAUSA") is the head of the West Palm Beach
Office.

Page 8 of 58




EFTA00225051
conversations with the State Attorney, and directly participated in negotiations of the
language to be used in the Non-Prosecution Agreement, federal Plea Agreement, and
Information. He had numerous conversations with counsel for Epstein outside of my
presence when they objected to my refusal to agree with their changes. MAUSA
also communicated with the U.S. Attorney about the negotiations. He would then
communicate changes from the defense and the U.S. Attorney to me to incorporate. Later,
when E stein's attorneys appealed to AAa., Mr. was on detail as AAG
Chief of Staff and facilitated the meeting between Epstein's counsel and the AAG.
AAG Fisher's written response was issued while MAUSA was still her Chief of
Staff. I do not know who drafted the written response.

Acting MAUSA (still with the USAO): When MAUSA was on
detail with AAG Fisher's Office, was named the Acting MAUSA. He
participated in at least one meeting with Epstein's attorneys and the State Attorney. Mr.
also was involved in some of the negotiations regarding the language of the Non-
Prosecution Agreement. He later reviewed at least one of the iterations of the indictment
package and signed the indictment that was supposed to be presented to the grand July in
June 2009.

Criminal Chief Matthew (now in private practice): Criminal Chief -
was the third line supervisor of the matter. Generally, West Palm Beach indictments are
reviewed and approved by the MAUSA and are not reviewed by Miami. However, unusual
or especially significant indictments are reviewed by the Criminal Chief. Criminal Chief
reviewed and commented on the first proposed indictment package. His
comments were incorporated into I revised indictment, and he possibly reviewed those
changes. Criminal Chief participated in numerous meetings on the case, and had
private conversations regarding resolution of the matter with Lilly counsel
to Mr. Epstein. Ms. had formerly served as Deputy Chief in the Major Crimes
Section at the USAO while Mr. was Chief of Major Crimes. As discussed below,
on July 26, 2007, Criminal Chief announced to the investigative team that U.S.
Attorney Acosta had decided to offer I two-year plea to Mr. Epstein. On August 3, 2007,
Mr. sent I letter to Ms. regarding that plea offer. Mr. left the
U.S. Attorney's Office on that date to become partner at Kobre & Kim in New York.

First Assistant Jeffrey (now in private practice): FAUSA (later U.S.
Attorney was involved in telephone calls and meetings with counsel for Mr.
Epstein; when Epstein's attorneys were dissatisfied with my proposed language for the
Non-Prosecution Agreement, victim notification letters, letters to the Special Master, etc.,
they would frequently contact FAUSA directly to complain. FAUSA
handled the bulk of the negotiations of the Addendum to the NPA. Epstein's attorneys
later complained that FAUSA was biased because his daughter had been the victim
of I crime. One of Epstein's attorneys also falsely accused FAUSA (and me) of
promising money to l victim in exchange for her willingness to accuse Epstein.

Page 9 of 58




EFTA00225052
U.S. Attorney R. Alexander Acosta (now Secretary of the U.S. Department of Labor):
USA Acosta served as the head of the U.S. Attorney's Office throughout the investigation
of Jeffrey Epstein, including the decision to enter into I Non-Prosecution Agreement,
negotiation of its terms, and attempts to enforce its terms. When Epstein's attorneys were
dissatisfied with answers they received from me, MAUSA M, and FAUSA
they would frequently contact USA Acosta directly. USA Acosta was directly involved in
reviewing and revising the documents, including sending exact wording that he wanted
incorporated into the agreement. There were some communications between USA Acosta
and counsel for Epstein that I was not aware of at the time. For example, I did not know,
until after I had sent I breach notice, that USA Acosta agreed that Epstein could be
considered for work release. At some point after the NPA was signed, USA Acosta was
recused from the Epstein matter.

(still at USAO): Early in the investigation, I asked
if he would serve as co-counsel on the case. Before I joined the West Palm
Beach Office, had handled the bulk of the child exploitation cases in
West Palm Beach. He and I discussed how to structure the investigation and he joined me
in opposing meeting with Epstein's attorneys prior to the completion of the investigation.
He attended some of the meetings with Epstein's attorneys. When the Office overruled
our positions and when it appeared that the case was not going to be charged,
decided that he should focus on other cases.

(now U.S. Magistrate Judge): as my office
neighbor and colleague. At one point early in the investigation (I be ievebefore I asked
to serve as co-counsel), I sought counsel on strategies
for how to handle Epstein's personal assistants — whether they should be charged or if we
should seek immunity for them. Not long thereafter, came to me and said
that he was best friends with one of Epstein's attorneys, Jack Goldberger, and accordingly
could not discuss the Epstein case with me any further. left the U.S.
Attorney's Office for private practice and later represented one of Epstein's assistants in
the civil suits filed by Epstein's victims.

ow retired): Asset Forfeiture assigned to the Epstein case.
I had I ewbrief meetings with to talk about the asset forfeiture aspects of
the case. We discussed the char es under consideration and Epstein's assets that could be
subject to forfeiture. ad direct contact with the agents and the FBI's asset
forfeiture coordinator about information/evidence that she needed to pursue forfeiture.
provided the asset forfeiture language in the proposed indictments.

ill at USAO): SLC was not directly involved in the Epstein
investigation or negotiation of the NPA, but he has been lead counsel in the Jane Doe I
United States litigation. SLC IN had contact with USA Acosta regarding his recusal, and

Page 10 of 58




EFTA00225053
with FAUSA and myself regarding self-reports to OPR about accusations of
misconduct raised by Epstein's counsel. I also had contact with SLC regarding
Florida Bar Complaint filed by I civil attorney for some of the victims who complained
that my victim notification letters amounted to inappropriate business referrals to the
attorney selected by the Special Master. lo

Appellate SLC (still at USAO): SLC was not directly
involved in the Epstein investigation or negotiation of the NPA. It is my understanding
that USA Acosta asked SLC to check my legal analysis. I also understand that
Criminal Chief contacted SLC about moving me to Appeals after I
pointed out actions that I considered to be in violation of the Ashcroft memo and victims'
rights legislation. I also understand that SLC ma have knowled e of USA Acosta
providing my prosecution memorandum to Main
Justice.

(still at USAO): My legal assistant during most of the Epstein investigation
and its aftermath. She assisted with preparing indictment packages, victim notification
letters, grand jury subpoenas, travel, expert witness contracts, and other items.

la still at USAO): Executive assistants to
Acosta and FAUSA . They compiled correspondence between the USAO and
counsel for Epstein; scheduled meetings; and dealt with inquiries from the press and DOJ.
They may have information related to correspondence or communications between the
Executive Division and Epstein's counsel that I am unaware of.

FBI Personnel

(retired from FBI): Lead case agent on Operation Leap Year.
She presented the case to the USAO, handled the bulk of the interviews, served subpoenas,
and testified before the grand jury. She communicated directly with victims and hand-
delivered the original victim notification letters. SI also participated in
meetings with some of the members of the USAO and counsel for Epstein.

SI Jason (still at FBI): Co-case agent with . Became lead
case agent during the post-guilty plea period (i.e., the interview of
responding to FOIA requests, etc.). He conducted interviews, prepared reports, analyzed



1° The Florida Bar determined that my victim notification letters, which are included in the
exhibits and advised the victims that they had the absolute right to select another attorney if they
so desired, were not inappropriate solicitations and did not violate the Florida Bar Rules. The
attorney who filed the complaint, Jeff Herman, later resigned from the Florida Bar due to
disciplinary action taken against him.

Page 11 of 58




EFTA00225054
records, and communicated directly with victims. Si also participated in
meetings with some of the members of the USAO and counsel for Epstein.

ill at FBI): Co-case agent with SI until he was
transferred to DC. He conducted interviews, including the original telephone interview
with where she asked that the FBI have no further contact with her. He


S/As
andliiiso He also participated in meetings with some of the
members of the USAO and counsel for Epstein.

She attended
the July 26, 2007 meeting where Criminal Chief announced the two-year plea
offer.

SI Christina : participated in the interview of in
Australia.

Sr't (still at FBI): =imbiner was the case agent on Operation
Stolen Globe, which involved the investigation of Alfredo Rodriguez (Jeffrey Epstein's
butler), who tried to sell evidence to Brad Edwards.

Supervisor etired from FBI): replaced GS
s hea ng the post-guilty plea period. He supervised
S/As

Victim-Witness Coordinator : Ms. sent letters to victims, met with
them in person, and assisted in finding counseling and other services for them.

Justice Department Personnel

CEOS Deputy Chief Alexandra (still at DOJ): Ms. was part of the team
that reviewed the case and the NPA when Epstein "appealed" to DOJ. Ms. also is
familiar with my work from I prior case that she and I worked on together as well as other
PSC cases where I have consulted with her.

CEOS Chief Drew (now private in-house counsel): Mr.
reviewed and opined on the case and the NPA when Epstein "appealed" to DOJ. He also
attended meetings in the SDFL with myself, the case agents, USAO supervisory staff, and
counsel for Epstein. I conferred with Mr. about charging, staffing, and victim-
related issues.


Page 12 of 58




EFTA00225055
CEOS Trial Attorney (now at I non-profit): I first had contact with
Ms. when conducting research regarding some of the legal issues raised by the case
(she was the CEOS Duty Attorney on the day that I called). After left
the case, I contacted Mr. about having I CEOS Trial Attorney co-chair the case
and asked if Ms. was available. She participated in interviews, discussed case
strategy, and reviewed pros memos and indictments.

Millina
that USA Acosta provided my pros memo to Chiel
At various times, I have heard
and asked her to review my
legal analysis. I have never asked Chief whether this actually occurred. SLC
may know whether this occurred.

ERMINIIIPINit (now in private practice): After CEOS rejected the "appeal" from
Mr. Epstein's attorneys, they asked for further review by She met with the
attorneys and prepared I written opinion rejecting Epstein's arguments.

Associate De utv Attorney General Snow private in-house counsel):
Following Epstein's attorneys asked for review by the DAG. I do
not know whether Epstein's counsel met with the DAG, but they did present arguments to
Mr. Roth, who was Chief of Staff/Sr. Associate Deputy Attorney General. It vrote
letter rejecting Epstein's arguments.

(now in private practice): -was the
Deputy Attorney General to whom Mr. Epstein's arguments were addressed. As noted
above, I do not know if met with Epstein's counsel, or if the meetings were only
held with Mr. Roth.

Others Whose Counsel I Sought During the Case:

till in Seattle): was not
an
involved in the Epstein investigation. During the pendency of the Epstein investigation,
she began investigating David Copperfield, who was I friend of Epstein, and we conferred
with each other about strategy. I informed linof the difficulties in convincing the
Office to prosecute Epstein.

is I friend from my days at
orseyWhitney. e join e usticeDepartment e ore I did and we have stayed in
contact over the years. She had experience with USA Acosta when he was the head of the
Civil Rights Section at Main Justice so I turned to her for advice in handling the Epstein
situation.

Assistant U.S. Attorney S. (still at DOJ): Mr. and I were dating at the time
of the Epstein investigation. (We are now married.) He was I more who

Page 13 of 58




EFTA00225056
was familiar with some of Epstein's counsel. I sought his advice on some of the issues —
legal and non-legal — that arose during the case.

Assistant U.S. Attorney (still at the USAO): Ms. and I
are friends from my time in Miami. She was' supervisor in Miami although not in my
chain of command. I would often speak or email with her just for advice.

3. Explain fully the process and circumstances leading to the decision to resolve
the case through I non-prosecution a reement
(sometimes referred to by
defense counsel and the government as I deferred prosecution agreement, but
described herein as the non-prosecution agreement). Ex lain why the
government initially prepared to resolve the case through federal plea
agreement, but ultimately did not require Mr. Epstein to enter plea in federal
court. The explanation should identify the parties involved in the decision, the
individual(s) responsible for all final decisions regarding the non-prosecution
agreement and its terms, and the basis for the decision to resolve the case
through non-prosecution agreement.
I
Let me preface with some background on how I normally handle investigations and
prosecutions. When undertaking investigations, my normal practice is to meet with agents, confer
with them about an investigative plan, and work together until the case is ready for indictment. I
update my supervisors along the way, seek advice or guidance from supervisors and colleagues if
an issue is especially complex or novel, and get approval for actions as required by the USAM,
but I have always focused on learning as much as possible about the subject area, the defendant,
and the facts related to the alleged crime — I want to be the subject matter expert in the courtroom.
Then, once all of those items are completed, I prepare I comprehensive prosecution memo and
proposed indictment, which are submitted for review.
I believe strongly that investigations — especially child exploitation investigations - should
be conducted as covertly as possible in order to protect the victims' privacy; to avoid harm to the
accused's reputation if the accusation is determined to be false; and to maintain the sanctity of the
investigation. In Mr. Epstein's case, these concerns were heightened for several reasons. First,
victims identified during the state investigation had expressed fears of Epstein and building trust
with them would require assurances that Epstein would not find out that they were talking with
federal investigators. Second, the victims were between the ages of approximately 15 and 20" --
ages when women and girls might minimize or deny sexual abuse to avoid being labeled as "skits."
Third, Epstein had made allegations in the state case that the victims were only after money and
that investigators were only after fame. Maintaining the investigation's confidentiality would
delegitimiz