EFTA00230208.pdf

. (USAFLS) From: (USAFLS) Sent: 2007 3:11 P To: AFLS) (USAFLS) Cc: . (USAFLS) Subject: FW: Jeffrey Epstein Attachments: 2007-05-22 letter to AUSe Gentlemen, and I have already met with Lefcourt, which is really the meeting I promised him. I spoke to him last week and he la said he had more information they wanted to present. I told him he could make an appointment to come in again if he wanted to and that we would meet with him again, but I did not promise that we would wait to give him a meeting "before" we charged. So, I think he is really ready for the next level rather than a second meeting with me. Mike Tein also mentioned to me at some point that they wanted to make a presentation on the law and I suggested to him that he contact Matt without telling him exactly what stage of review we were at. I don't know if Tein and Lefcourt have crossed wires or not. In any event, I am forwarding this letter to you. I am going to suggest to Lefcourt the same thing that I suggested to Tein. I assume you would grant his attorneys a chance to make whatever presentation they desire. It would probably be helpful to us in any event to hear their legal arguments in case we have missed something. Whether Alex would be present or grant them another meeting after that is his call. From: Gerald Lefcourt Emailt Sen y 22, 2007 2:05 PM To: LS) Cc: . (USAFLS); Subject: Jeffrey Epstein attached is a letter seeking meetings, as discussed with you, but with others if it is not resolved. Thanks for your attention. Could you email back so that I know you have received this letter? Gerald B. Lefcourt Gerald B I Afrat , P.C. Ne rk 10021 Tel. 1 Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-013303 EFTA00230208  cp /2.54 LekotAyf-to No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-013304 EFTA00230209  LAW OFFICES OF Gmateam B. Drecotrin, P.G. A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION IPS EAST 70' STREET NEW YORE, NEW YORIELOOEI GERALD B. LEFCOURT ASS SHERYL E. REICH FAITH A. FRIEDMAN June 25, 2007 BY HAND DELIVERY Esq., First Assistant United States Attorney Esq., Chief, Criminal Division The United States Attorney's Office Southern District of Florida 99 NE 4th Street Miami, Florida 33132 Deputy Chief, Northern Region Assistant United States Attorney The United States Attorney's Office Southern District of Florida 500 South Australian Avenue, Suite 400 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Re: Jeffrey E Epstein Dear and and MIS As you are aware, we represent Jeffrey E. Epstein in connection with your ongoing investigation. We write to you in advance of our June 26, 2007, meeting to address some of the concerns that have been raised during our recent conversations. Although not exhaustive of all the issues we wish to discuss, or points we intend to raise, we believe this submission will facilitate a more productive meeting by giving you an overview of our position and the materials we plan to present in order to demonstrate that none of the statutes identified by you can rightly be applied to the conduct at issue here. We are prepared to discuss the issues raised herein further at tomorrow's meeting as well as to discuss additional concerns you may voice, all for the purpose of demonstrating why no federal prosecution should lie. The Federal Criminal Statutes Identified Should Not Be Applied Here It is clear from both the fundamental principles of federal criminal law and the specific statutes in question that federal law is not intended to prohibit, nor does it prohibit, all "wrongful" sexual activity. Indeed, there is no federal crime of sex with an underage person — Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-013305 EFTA00230210  LAW OFFICES OE GERS.T.D B. LE:POI:MEM, P.G. Esq. Esq. q. Esq. Office of t e lilted States Attorney Southern District of Florida June 25, 2007 Page 2 even assuming such an act took place in this case — nor could there be such a crime under the United States Constitution.' By and large, the delineation of such conduct (that is, determining what conduct is wrongful), and the prosecution for such conduct, have been delegated to the states. Such conduct is punishable under state laws, under which the age of consent varies from 14 to 18 with many states making sex with a 16 year old completely lawful regardless of the age of the other person.2 In short, the role of federal law in this area is carefully circumscribed. The legislative history of the federal "sex" statutes at issue evinces no federal concern with the prevalent local phenomenon of young adults — 16 or 17 years of age — voluntarily choosing to engage in sexual contact with anyone they desire. This is strictly a state concern, which some states have chosen to criminalize, while others have not, and some local prosecutors have chosen to prosecute, while others have not. It is not an accident that, as far as we have been able to determine, there is no federal case involving a defendant who maintains a reasonable mistake of fact defense, where that defendant reasonably belie-WU-11c other person was 18 years of age. The federal statutes were not meant to apply in those circumstances as such conduct is a matter of state law. The federal statutes were intended to address those cases involving sexual activity with children. Indeed, the federal concerns intended to be redressed by these statutes, as evidenced by the legislative history; the advisory titles of the statutes; and even their sometimes broad language, arc: the use of coercion and violence to lead children into a life of prostitution (12, l3, or 14 years old, or younger); sex trafficking and slavery of children; interstate or foreign travel to have sex with children (or engage in other illegal sexual activity); and trolling for children on the intemet in order to have sex with them. None of these concerns is present here.3 These constitute the paradigmatic federal concerns, mainly because the states are ill prepared to deal effectively with interstate and international trafficking of children. On the other hand, the states are fully capable of deciding how to deal with entirely local matters relating to men who allegedly have inappropriate sexual contact with local young women. To disregard these concerns, to ignore congressional purpose, and attempt to give the federal statutes their broadest possible interpretation would cause the undesired result of criminalizing federally virtually all acts of prostitution or sexual misconduct — a result not intended by Congress and I UnitedStates v. Lopez. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 2 Notably, Chapter 109A statutes, e.g., §§ 2241.2245, to which § 2423(b) inherently refers, each deal in terms of vice force and/or age. A review of these statues demonstrates that in each instance unless force is involved, the must be under 16 years old for a prosecution to lie. 3 We understand the Office has taken the view that Mr. Epstein targeted underage high school students. This vra no absolutely not the case and we will be prepared to discuss at our meeting the objective evidence demonstrating such targeting occurred. Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-013306 EFTA00230211  LAW OFFICES OF GERALD B. LatecouRT, P.G. q A. EsEs illafatta Esq .q. Esq. Office of the United States Attorney Southern District of Florida June 25, 2007 Page 3 unlikely to be sanctioned by the courts." To stretch the statutes in the unprecedented way it appears is contemplated would do just that. Although in this memo we have focused primarily on the federal sex statutes, in the same way that those statutes cannot logically be expanded to cover the conduct at issue, neither can the statutes governing monetary transactions. These latter statutes, designed to curb the use of what would appear to be otherwise innocent financial transactions to disguise proceeds of unlawful activity and avoid Internal Revenue Code requirements, have no place in this case. The ills sought to be remedied by these statutes are far removed from the conduct in which Mr. Epstein purportedly engaged. We address each statute in turn, starting with those regulating monetary transactions. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3) - The Money Laundering Statute - Does Not Apply to Mr. Epstein's Alleged Misconduct No reasonable reading of the money laundering statute can countenance such a charge against Mr. Epstein, for the statute on its face, or as even applied by the courts, has absolutely no application to the alleged misconduct. Under the facts of this case, to charge Mr. Epstein with violating the money laundering statute would be both unprecedented and inappropriate. The money laundering statute was designed to be used and has been construed as a "concealment" statute, not a spending statute. See United States v. Shepard, 396 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1110 (2005); United States v. Ilan, 434 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2006) (money laundering statute does not criminalize the mere spending or investing of illegally obtained assets. Instead, at least one purpose for the expenditure must be to conceal or disguise the assets). The Eleventh Circuit has held that "[t]o prove money laundering under § 1956(a)(3), the government must show that the defendant (1) conducted or attempted to conduct a financial transaction (2) involving property represented to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, (3) with the intent (a) 'to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity,' (b) `to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of property believed to be the regulation). 4"Section 1591 does not criminalize all acts of prostitution (a vice traditionally governed by state children or is accomplished by force, fraud, or coercion". Rather, its reach is limited to sex trafficking that involves n. 1 (1 Cir. 2007). Nor, has the Department of Justice deemed it United States v. Evans, 476 F.ad 1176, 1179 I th United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division Anti-Traffick ing News Bulletin, appropriate. See, e.g. prostitution the federal August/September 2004, Vol. I, Nos. 8 and 9, at 2 (in order to address the demand for government must work with the state, as it is state law that controls). Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-013307 EFTA00230212  LAW OFFICES OF GERALD 13. burcOURT, , Esq. Esq. Office of the United States Attorney Southern District of Florida June 25, 2007 Page 4 transaction reporting requirement proceeds of specified unlawful activity,' or (c) `to avoid a F.3d 1137 (11th Cir. 2003);5 see also under State or Federal law'. United States v. Puche, 350 , cert. denied 506 U.S. 998 (1992), United States v. Arditti, 955 F.2d 331 (5'h Cir.), reh'g denied ) (undercover agent's representation cert. denied 506 U.S. 1054, reh'g denied 507 U.S. 967 (1993 00 were the proceeds of a collection that he was in the cocaine business and that the initial $15,0 ring "sting" operations that satisfied requirement for establishing basis for money launde transaction was the "proceeds of government agent represent that property involved in the or facilitate specified unlawful activity"). specified unlawful activity, or property used to conduct itly requires (a) the use of Thus, it is clear that the statute unquestionably and explic or was represented to be the product proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or (b) cash which is in the case. That this was how the oif riiirawfill activity, with neither paradigm being applicable r evidenced by section 9-105 of the statute was intended to be used and is understood is furthe United States Attorney's Manual, which states: ed in Sections 1956 and 1957 both require that the property involv ds of specif ied the money laundering transaction be the procee The statute unlawful activity at the time that the transaction occurs. the context dots not define when property becomes "proceeds," but an already implies that the property will have been derived from offense, completed offense, or a completed phase of an ongoing before it is laundered. Therefore, as a genera l rule, neithe r § 1956 ial transa ction nor § 1957 should be used where the same financ of the represents both the money laundering offense and a part specified unlawful activity generating the proce eds being laundered. laundering charge. Any The allegations of this case simply do not support a money e overreaching and would stretch the attempt to make such a charge would constitute inappropriat laundering case, Mr. Epstein did statute beyond its intended purpose. Unlike the typical money he then used in a financial not receive money or fundsfrom any criminal conduct which (9th Cir. 2001) (defendant charged transaction. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 239 F. 3d 994 from that business to pay credit cards with running an illegal escort service and using proceeds which states that the defendant can be found guilty of § s Instructive is Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 70.4 al transaction; (2) thqjranitantion involved property 1956(a)(3)(A) only if (I) he knowingly conducted a financi activity or that was use4 to conduct or facilitate specified represented to be the proceeds of specified unlawful tion with the intent to promote the carrying on of unlawfuLactivity and (3) the defendant engaged in the transac specified unlawful activity. Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA I -U1330 EFTA00230213  LAM OFFICES Or GraitALD B. LIWCOURT, M sg. , Esq. , Esq. Office of the United States Attorney Southern District of Florida June 25, 2007 Page 5 used to purchase airline tickets to fly prostitutes to Las Vegas). Nor did Mr. Epstein use money he knew otherwise to be unlawfully tainted in a financial transaction designed to facilitate, conduct, or promote prostitution or other criminal conduct. Rather, to the extent the evidence may show that Mr. Epstein paid for sexual services, he most certainly did so with untainted, legitimately earned funds. In addition, unlike the typical "sting" case, which 1956(a)(3) was enacted to address, there is no evidence that Mr. Epstein was aware, or that government or law enforcement personnel made him aware of circumstances from which he could reasonably have inferred that unintended the funds were from specified unlawful activity. This is not a case where large amounts of cash of questionable origin were repeatedly delivered to Mr. Epstein in small denominations in duffel bags and boxes. See, e.g., Puche, supra, 350 F. 3d 1137; see also United States v. Rahseparian, 231 F. 3d 1257 (10th Cir. 2000) (government failed to prove that defendant knew that money was obtained by mail fraud, the unlawful activity underlying money laundering count). To proceed under a view that the statute covers such behavior would lead to the result of making use of a credit card or wire transfer to pay for sexual services provided by a prostitute money laundering. That was surely not what Congress intended, how the courts have interpreted the language of the statute, or even how it is viewed by the Department of Justice. 18 U.S.C. § 1960 - Prohibition of Unlicensed Money Transmitting Business Does Not Apply to Mr. Epstein's Alleged Misconduct Likewise, a prosecution under § 1960 cannot lie. 18 U.S.C. § 1960 is a regulatory statute that was enacted in order to combat the growing use of money transmitting businesses for the purpose of transferring large sums of illegally obtained monies and to avoid the strictures of the Internal Revenue Code, as well to fund terrorism. The type of business contemplated by Congress is one which, for a fee, accepts funds for transfer within or outside the United States. See United States v. Talebnejad, 460 F.3d 563, 565 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Velastegui, 199 F.3d 590 (2d Cir. 1999). Once the money transmitter receives the fee and the money from the customer, a third party at the recipient location then pays the money to the designee or the transmitter wires the money directly to the recipient. These formal and informal businesses are often operated for the purpose of sending money to an individual's home country from the United States. See, e.g., Talebnejad, supra, 460 Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-013309 EFTA00230214  LAW OPTICES Or GERALD B. Darr, P.C. Esq. Esq. A. • q. Office of the United States Attorney Southern District of Florida June 25, 2007 Page 6 F.3d at 567 (Iranian immigrants operated money transmitting business in Maryland); Velastegui, 199 F.3d at 593 (money transferred to Mexico by unlicensed agent); United States v. Bah, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25274 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (defendant operated restaurant in New York which also transmitted cash overseas); United States v. Abdullah, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47493 (W.D.Va. 2006) (Iraqi defendant charged customers a fee for transferring money from the United States to Middle Eastern countries). However, as noted, in many instances, due to the lack of uniform regulation, these businesses have served to transfer funds which were the proceeds of illegal activity. See United States v. Valdes, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12432 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (defendants transmitted proceeds of drug trafficking to Colombia); see also P.L. 103-325, Title IV, § 408, 108 Stat. 2252. In response to the growing concern about this improper use of these businesses, Congress enacted § 1960, in conjunction with § 5330, establishing a regulatory scheme to assist in the effective enforcement of criminal, tax, and other laws and prevent such businesses from participating in any illegal enterprises. Id. It is clear that § 1960 does not apply, and was never intended to apply, to Mr. Epstein's purported misconduct. Mr. Epstein did not own or operate a "money transmitting business" as defined in § 5330. Nor was he in the money transmitting business. Mr. Epstein was not providing check cashing, currency exchange, or money transmitting or remittance services. Nor was he issuing or redeeming money orders, travelers' checks, or other similar instruments, or acting as a person engaged as a business in the transmission of funds. Indeed, he was not carrying on a business at all through these transfers. The term "business" is defined as an "activity or enterprise for gain, benefit, advantage or livelihood" (Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed. 2007)) or as "a usually commercial or mercantile activity engaged in as a means of livelihood". Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary. The only funds transferred were Mr. Epstein's personal monies, monies he lawfully earned. He did not profit from the transmission of this money. Nor was the act of transmitting the money a means of his livelihood. Ile simply took legitimate money and used it to meet his financial obligations. At best, the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Epstein transmitted funds from personal accounts in New York to accounts in Florida in order to pay for personal expenses — food, flowers, household upkeep, etc. This cannot be viewed as anything different from giving cash to a family member, or transferring money from a savings or brokerage account to a checking account, in order to pay bills and expenses. Under no reading of the facts can Mr. Epstein's conduct in transferring money between his accounts constitute a "business", much less a money transmitting business. As such, a prosecution wider the statute should not lie. Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-013310 EFTA00230215  LAW OIFICCS of Graner.n B. D4 • UftT, P.C. 111 , Esq. , Esq. A. Villafaila, Esq. Office of the United States Attorney Southern District of Florida June 25, 2007 Page 7 18 U.S.C. § 1591 — The Misconduct Alleged Does Not Fall Within the Ambit of the Statute 18 U.S.C. § 1591 - "Sex Trafficking of Children or by Force, Fraud, or Coercion" — was passed as part of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act ("TVPA") to address a problem far removed from the present set of circumstances: human trafficking, in general, and human sex trafficking, in particular, involving both a commercial and coercive component. The statutory scheme was designed to prevent the organized exploitation of women and children for profit and was not intended to address the conduct alleged here: The central principle behind the l'rafficking Victims Protection Act is that criminals who knowingly operate enterprises that profit from sex acts involving persons who have been brought across international boundaries for such purposes by force or fraud, or who force human beings into slavery, should receive punishment commensurate with the penalties for kidnapping and forcible rape. 147 Cong. Rec. E2179-02; see also United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division Anti-Trafficking News Bulletin, April 2005, Vo. 2, No. I at 1; July 2004, Vol. 1, No 7. at 6; and January 2004, Vol. I, No. 1, at 1, 3 (reflecting the positions of President Bush, Attorney General Gonzalez, former Attorney General Ashcroft, and fonner Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division Acosta that human trafficking involves force, fraud and coercion, and is a form of modern day slavery). The behavior and actions of Mr. Epstein are far removed from the human trafficking concerns addressed by Congress in enacting § 1591. Any attempt to prosecute him under this section would be unprecedented and highly irregular. Not surprisingly, the case law does not support any such prosecution. Nationwide there are relatively few appellate decisions dealing with prosecutions under § 1591. In the Eleventh Circuit, there are only a handful, several of which are unpublished. A review of these cases reveals that the paradigmatic case for enforcement falls into one of two categories.6 The first involves defendants who have engaged in a highly predatory sort of business — prostituting underage persons, either by force, fraud, or coercion. These cases bear no relationship to the circumstance at issue here. See, e.g., United States v. Norris, 188 Fed. Appx. 822 (I 1 Cir. 2006) (unpublished)(prosecution of several men for conspiracy to hold young women in peonage, and to traffic them for commercial sex acts, involving force and threats; bail issue); United States v. 6A review of the United States Deparnnent of Justice Civil Rights Division Anti-Trafficking News Bulletins meeting confirms that this same pattern exists nationwide. We will be prepared to discuss these cases further at our and will supply details about the cases upon request. Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-013311 EFTA00230216  LAW orreccs OF GERALD B. lanrcouarr, sq. , Esq. A Esq. Office of the United Stales Attorney Southern District of Florida June 25, 2007 Page 8 Sims, 161 Fed. Appx. 849, 2006 WL 14581 (11th Cir. 2006) (unpublished). See also Evans, supra, 476 F.3d 1176. The second involves sex tourism sting operations where the defendants signed up for a "Taboo Vacation," usually to go to Costa Rica to have sex with children. In these cases the state interest is relatively minimal and United States treaty obligations have made federal intervention a high priority. See, e.g., United States v. Clarke, 159 Fed. Appx. 128, 2005 WL 3438434 (11th Cir. 2005)(unpublished); United States v. Strevell, 185 Fed. Appx. 841, 2005 WI, 1697529 (11th Cir. 2006)(unpublished), cert. denied, 127 U.S. 692 (2006). No such federal interest is implicated in the purely local case of Mr. Epstein. Here, there was no trafficking — no "force, fraud or coercion"; no threats; no sexual servitude; no financial venture; no profit from a financial venture; no forced work in the commercial sex industry; and no transporting of children from underdeveloped countries to the United States or even across state lines. Nor was there any conduct which can be considered so extremely abusive or violent, that an expansion of the statutes beyond their intended purpose would be warranted. 18 U.S.C. § 2421 — Mann Act — The Statute Was Not Intended To Address The Misconduct Alleged Here Any attempt to charge Mr. Epstein under 18 U.S.C. § 2421 would violate both the spirit and purpose of the statute. Section 2421 was first enacted by Congress in 1910 to prevent the use of interstate commerce to facilitate prostitution, concubinage, or other fonns of immorality. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913); Wilson v. United States, 232 U.S. 563 (1914); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917). The statute's primary purpose was to address the so-called commercial case of transporting females for immoral purposes. Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946) (even though the Act includes some non-commercial cases within its scope, its primary focus is commercial sexual activity); United States v fatnerson, 60 F Supp 281 (D.C. Iowa 1944). However, it has also served to protect women against conduct, whether commercial or not, that involves transportation and is exploitive or violent. See, e.g., De Vault v. United States, 338 F.2d 179, 180 (10th Cir. 1964) (applying the Act to protect girl who was raped). The Mann Act is a relatively antiquated morality statute that, despite its overly broad....1 language, is wisely used only sparingly. Notably, the most recent reported decision in the Il th Circuit involving the Mann Act was decided in 1984. United States v. Phelps, 733 F.2d 1464 (11th Cir. 1984). Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-013312 EFTA00230217  IAVI OFFICF-1 OF GERALD B. larccran, P.C. Esq. A. Villafafia, Esq. Office of the United States Attorney Southern District of Florida June 25, 2007 Page 9 Indeed, a nationwide search of reported prosecutions and convictions under the Act reveals that the statute has primarily been limited to cases involving prostitution rings/businesses and their owners. United States v. Holland 381 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 2004) (woman running prostitution business convicted for recruiting and transport of prostitutes under § 2421); United States v. Footman, 215 F.3d 145 (1th Cir. 2000) (pimp who ran a prostitution ring convicted of violating § 2421). Likewise, in keeping with its purpose and title, the statute has been used in sex trafficking cases involving the exploitation of the poor and disadvantaged from foreign countries. See, e.g., United States v. Julian, 427 F.3d 471 (7i6 Cir. 2005) (sex tourism operator in Mexico facilitating travel of poor Mexican boy for sexual relationship in the United States violated § 2421). On the other hand, other cases which have targeted non-owners of prostitution rings, have further limited § 2421 prosecutions to circumstances involving egregious conduct, such as the use of force or kidnapping. See, e.g United States v. Lowe, 145 F.3d 45 (1th Cir. 1998) (defendant transported woman across state lines against her will and then raped her). See also Poindexter v United States, 139 F.2d 158 (8th Cir. 1943) (transportation by defendant of woman across state line with purpose of raping her violated 18 U.S.C. § 2421 since statute covers interstate transportation of woman without pecuniary motive where intent is to have illicit relations with her by force or otherwise); Brown v United States, 237 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1956) (the defendant violated the Act when he tricked woman into his car and drove her across state lines where he threatened, choked, struck and raped her, and then drove her back to the bus depot where he had picked her up). As we have previously pointed out, the allegations being levied against Mr. Epstein involve no such misconduct. We have found no reported decision in the past 20 years in which an individual was prosecuted under the Mann Act for simply traveling across state lines with a woman whom he paid for sexual services — even assuming the evidence shows this to be the case here. To use the Act to prosecute Mr. Epstein, where he was neither the owner nor operator of a prostitution ring, and where there are no allegations of kidnapping, force, or violence, would be unprecedented and would stretch the statute beyond what all understand is its modern day intended purpose. 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) — The Misconduct Alleged Does Not Fall Within the Ambit of the Statute In enacting th(mtemebrolling statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), Congressional concerns were focused on a very specific and recent phenomenon: young people using the Internet in ever-increasing numbers, and attracting sexual predators out of the woodwork. Disturbingly, computers and the intemet made it frighteningly easy for sexual predators to enter into the homes of families, undetected by parents, and prey on these children in cyberspace. As Congress recognized, with so many children online, the internet provided predators a new place - Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-013313 EFTA00230218  LAW OFFICES OF GurtALD 13. Incomtx, P.C. Esq. Esq. sq. A. afia, Esq. O ice of the United States Attorney Southern District of Florida June 25, 2007 Page 10 cyberspace - to target children for criminal acts. Congress enacted the interne( trolling statute to combat the alarming increase in Internet predators, who were able to maintain their anonymity, while making unwanted sexual solicitations of vulnerable youngsters. The statutory language and reported decisions confirm the statute's important, but narrow, focus. Section 2422(b) does not establish any federal sex crimes with a minor, which remain a matter of state, not federal, concern. Instead, as the reported cases reveal, it defines a crime of communication, not of sexual contact. Indeed, what all of the cases have in common is that the defendant used th o communicate with a child or purported child (or a person with influence over such a child or purported child), and with the intent to arrange a sexual tryst with the child, with both the beliefthat the person was a child and withfull knowledge that sexual activity with an individual ofthat age was illegal — precisely the situation the statute was designed to reach. Mr. Epstein's case lies far outside those parameters, and far outside the language and intended reach of the statute. In Mr. Epstein's case, even if there were inappropriate sexual contact with one or more 16 or I 7 year olds, there was no use of the Internet to lure young victims, and no danger presented by Internet predation. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) — No Travel For The Purpose of Engaging In Illicit Sexual Conduct, As Required By The Statute The linchpin of a prosecution under § 2423(b) is "travel for the purpose ofengaging in . . . illicit sexual conduct". The evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that no case can be made that Mr. Epstein ever traveled to Florida in order to engage in illicit sexual conduct. Elimination of the "purpose" requirement of the statute would undermine congressional intent, as recently expressed and re-affirmed in the Trafficking Act of 2002 and PROTECT Act of 2003.7 Unlike subsections (a) and (b), § 2423(c), makes it unlawful to travel in foreign commerce and engage in illicit sexual conduct, without any proof of intent or purpose. It was enacted in response to the extraordinary difficulties the Department of Justice had faced in proving a defendant's intent or purpose in traveling when prosecuting foreign travel cases. Significantly, Congress did not amend § 2423(b), which continues to require purpose where the travel is interstate. Thus, Congress recognized the state's primary interest in proscribing illicit sexual conduct occurring within the state, unless one traveled to the state for that purpose. No. 108- 7Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. 21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003). See generally United States v. Clark, 435 F.3 1100 (91° Cir. 2006). Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-013314 EFTA00230219  LAW OFIICES or Orman) B. LEPretrwr, P.C. Esq. , Esq. ESQ. A. Esq. Office of the Unite d States Attorney Southern District of Florid a June 25, 2007 Page 11 mined if interstate travel with only Legislative intent, and concepts of federalism, would be under incidental sexual conduct were prosecuted. not support the conclusion The nature and scope of Mr. Epstein's activities in Florida do "purpose of the travel, a significant that any purported illicit sexual conduct was an "important" incidental. See United States v. motivating factor", or in other words, more than merely d). Horschauer, 2007 WL 979931 (1 e h Cir. 2007) (unpublishe she believes that Mr. Epstein We understand from conversations with Ms. Villafaiia that homes were trips "away from was and is a resident of New York, and that all trips to other purpose. The evidence clearly does home," undertaken for a limited period and with a specific not support this view.8 1990 - longer than any other Mr. Epstein has owned a home in Florida since September, El Brillo Way. Ile spent residence he has owned — when he purchased the property on improve and to maintain this home. substantial amounts of money during the relevant period to relevant period Mr. Epstein both spent In addition, his travel records demonstrate that during the Although he left Florida for the majority of his weekends, and additional time in Florida. Florida, weekend after weekend, year business and other projects, he consistently returned to period 2003 - 2005 (through after year. Specifically, the flight logs establish that for the at least one long weekend in Florida, to September) , there is no month when he did not spend half of all weekends in Florida. including in the summer months, and that he spent well over with various family members and Upon returning to Florida, Mr. Epstein routinely visited saw his primary care physician for close friends, all of whom reside or have homes in Florida, rs and comedy clubs. Notably, during checkups and prescribed tests, and frequented movie theate was often hospitalized, and the relevant period, Mr. Epstein's mother took seriously ill, for Mr. Epstein's travels to convalesced in Florida until she died in 2004. A principal reason not conclusive on the question of where one in fact Although the locus of one's residency for tax purposes is authori ties ofNew York State have determined that esides, on a number of occasions since 1995 the taxing considered a resident of New York for tax purposes. stein did not spend sufficient time in New York to be a domiciliary of the United States Virgin Islands 999, Mr. Epstein has qualified under the applicable test as there afford herefore entitled to the tax advantages being a domiciliary Mr. Epstein stopped traveling to Florida beginning in October, 2005. of were for multi-day weekends; in 2104, 37m In 2003, there were 31 multi-day trips to Florida, 29 which and in 2005 (nine months), 24 multi-day trips to Florida, 2 trips to Florida, 36 of which were multi-day weekends; of which were multi-day weekends. Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-013315 EFTA00230220  LAW O1/,et! or GERALD B. LErootorr, P.G Esq. Esq. A. Esq.