EFTA01954567.pdf

From: Office of Terje Rod-Larsen Sent: Wed 10/2/2013 2:30:59 PM Subject: October 2 update 2 October, 2013 Article 1. NYT Netanyahu Pushes Back on Iran Editorial Article 2 The Washington Institute Trust, but Clarify Dennis Ross and David Makovsky Article 3. Center for Strategic and International Studies Negotiating with Iran Anthony H. Cordesman Article 4 Agence Global A Critical Moment in Israeli-American Relations Rami G. Khouri Foreign Affairs Bibi the Bad Cop - Can Israel Prevent a Deal With Iran? Elliott Abrams Article 6. Foreign Affairs How Israel Can Help the U.S. Strike a Deal With Iran EFTA_R1_00424129 EFTA01954567  Trita Parsi ArtIcle 7 TheNational (UAE) Gaza suffers as Hamas fights for survival on several fronts Jonathan Cook Article 8. The National Interest The Old Turkey-Israel Relationship Isn't Coming Back Omer Zarpli NY I Netan ahu Pushes Back on Iran Editorial October 1, 2013 -- During an aggressive speech at the United Nations on Tuesday, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel used sarcasm and combative words to portray Iran's new president, Hassan Rouhani, as a smooth-talking charlatan, one who is determined to continue building a nuclear weapons arsenal. Mr. Netanyahu called Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the previous EFTA_R1_00424130 EFTA01954568 Iranian president, "a wolf in wolf s clothing" and Mr. Rouhani "a wolf in sheep's clothing." Mr. Netanyahu has legitimate reasons to be wary of any Iranian overtures, as do the United States and the four other major powers involved in negotiations over Iran's nuclear program. But it could be disastrous if Mr. Netanyahu and his supporters in Congress were so blinded by distrust of Iran that they exaggerate the threat, block President Obama from taking advantage of new diplomatic openings and sabotage the best chance to establish a new relationship since the 1979 Iranian revolution sent American-Iranian relations into the deep freeze. Mr. Rouhani and the Iranian foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, have insisted repeatedly that Iran wants only to develop nuclear energy and that obtaining a nuclear weapon would harm the country's security. Even so, Iran hid its nuclear program from United Nations inspectors for nearly 20 years, and the country is enriching uranium to a level that would make it possible to produce bomb- grade nuclear material more quickly. It has also pursued other activities, like developing high-voltage detonators and building missiles that experts believe could only have nuclear weapons- related uses. These facts make it hard not to view the upcoming American- brokered negotiations skeptically. But Mr. Netanyahu has hinted so often of taking military action to keep Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon that he seems eager for a fight. He did it again at the United Nations on Tuesday, warning that Israel reserved the right to strike Iran's nuclear facilities if it deemed that Iran was EFTA_R1_00424131 EFTA01954569 close to producing nuclear weapons. "Against such a threat, Israel will have no choice but to defend itself," he said. The Iranians were so angered by what they called Mr. Netanyahu's "inflammatory" speech that they issued a rebuttal and spoke of the need to "sustain the current positive atmosphere" so that diplomacy could be successful. Similarly, they were not happy that Mr. Obama, meeting Mr. Netanyahu at the White House on Monday, took a harsher tone toward Iran than he did when he spoke by phone with Mr. Rouhani last week. Both Mr. Obama and Mr. Rouhani have hard-line domestic audiences and allies that they will need to consider and cajole as they undertake this effort to resolve the nuclear dispute and develop a new relationship. For Mr. Obama, that means working closely with Israel and helping Mr. Netanyahu see that sabotaging diplomacy, especially before Iran is tested, only makes having to use force more likely. That would be the worst result of all. Anicic 2 The Washington Institute Trust, but Clarify Dennis Ross and David Makovsky EFTA_R1_00424132 EFTA01954570 October 1 - In relations between states, symbols can be a sign of change -- but they can sometimes create false impressions. A handshake between President Barack Obama and Iranian President Hasan Rouhani at the U.N. General Assembly would have fallen into the latter category: those who are ready to anoint Rouhani as an Iranian Gorbachev would have seized on it as a sign of Iranian openness and readiness to break down barriers. Meanwhile, those who are convinced that Rouhani is just a savvier opponent than his in-your-face predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, would have decried our readiness to be played by the Iranians. The phone call that eventually occurred between the two leaders is a significant step, but does not offer the visual image of change. Moreover, the call likely emerged from the private discussion between Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, and each must have felt there was value in having it. Those wary of the Iranians will undoubtedly worry that the United States is effectively endorsing the symbols of change on the Iranian side without demanding requisite demonstrations of a change in policy. However, rather than trying to read too much into the meaning of a symbolic encounter -- whether a phone call or handshake -- Washington should focus instead on the reality of what Rouhani represents and shape its approach accordingly. Unlike Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, the Iranian president is not the decision-maker in Iran. However, during his campaign, he ran against Iranian policies that produced the Islamic Republic's international isolation and resulted in severe economic sanctions being imposed on it. Most significantly, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the key decision-maker in Iran, allowed Rouhani to win the election and, at least at this point, EFTA_R1_00424133 EFTA01954571 appears to be backing his efforts at diplomacy. Now, the Obama administration must clarify for itself and others the concrete policy changes that will be necessary for Rouhani to achieve the detente he apparently seeks -- and what advances in Iran's nuclear program would represent an intolerable threat to the United States. Rouhani has been clear about the high cost of the international sanctions and the need to get them lifted or relaxed. Upon assuming office, he declared that the economy was in even worse shape than he thought -- a fact that came as no surprise to the Iranian public. Economic pressures have given Tehran an incentive to resolve the international impasse over its nuclear program. But it cannot gain the economic relief it seeks unless it is willing to take meaningful steps to prove to the international community that its sole aim is the production of civilian nuclear power. Soothing words and smiles will not provide such reassurance; only tangible steps that remove Iran's break-out capability -- a verifiable method that guarantees early detection of any effort to move from reactor-grade to weapons-grade enriched uranium -- can do so. This is almost certainly the position taken by both Obama and Congress. Rouhani's own speech at the United Nations emphasized Iran's right to enrichment and gave little indication that Iran is prepared to alter its nuclear program. The Iranian president did, however, respond to Obama's remarks by saying that "we can arrive at a framework to manage our differences." There is only one way to know if that is true, of course, and that is to test it. EFTA_R1_00424134 EFTA01954572 Once talks get under way -- whether in the P5+1 format or in a bilateral setting -- the United States will be able to probe to see if Iran is prepared for tangible or cosmetic change. The Obama administration should not rule out the possibility that there may be a potential convergence between its interest in stopping the Iranian nuclear program and Tehran's sense of urgency in lifting the most hard-hitting economic sanctions. If so, this argues for an end-game nuclear deal, not a more limited agreement. Rouhani clearly needs to have the sanctions removed as quickly as possible, and a limited deal won't accomplish that. In his meeting with the P5+1 ministers, Zarif spoke about an agreement that would be fully implemented within one year, meaning he clearly wants the sanctions to be lifted in that time. Only a more comprehensive understanding could lead to major sanctions relief and provide the administration with what it requires -- a roll back of the Iranian nuclear program that provides the United States with a high degree of confidence that the Iranians cannot cheat and produce a break-out capability at a time of their choosing.To produce such a deal, the United States will need to be clearer with the Iranians about the threshold that it will not let their nuclear program cross. Obama has repeatedly said that an Iranian nuclear weapon threatens vital U.S. interests, as it could spur a regional nuclear arms race in the Middle East and threaten the fabric of the international non-proliferation regime. But he needs to make sure that his repeated public commitment to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear bomb does not lose its meaning. The pace and scope of Iran's nuclear program -- with the installation of a new generation of centrifuges and ever more accumulated enriched uranium -- creates precisely such a risk in the coming months. It is not EFTA_R1_00424135 EFTA01954573 enough for the United States to say that this line is an Iranian nuclear weapon, since this would enable Iran to develop a threshold nuclear capability that is just a few turns-of-the-screw away from a weapon. Providing greater clarity of the point at which Iran's nuclear infrastructure would begin to threaten America's ability to fulfill its objective of prevention is important in ensuring that neither Iran nor others misjudge what would trigger an American strike. Interestingly, Iran has already shown it is not oblivious to thresholds. It has avoided surpassing the threshold of 240 kilograms of 20 percent enriched uranium that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu explicitly drew in his U.N. General Assembly speech last year. That said, the American threshold does not need to be defined publicly. The United States should not needlessly back the Iranians or itself into a corner. However, the Iranians, the Israelis, and the other members of the P5+1 should know with greater specificity the limits of what the Obama administration will tolerate with Iran's nuclear program. As Obama just said at the United Nations in the context of the Syrian crisis, only the credible threat of force has given diplomacy a chance for success. Moreover, the Iran issue is being viewed through the lens of the ongoing Syria crisis. Amid doubts that the U.S.-Russian deal will truly lead Damascus to completely turn over its chemical weapon stockpiles, observers in Israel and elsewhere in the Middle East have interpreted the initiative as evidence that the American public is too war-fatigued to be counted on to back a U.S. strike against Iran's nuclear program should diplomacy fail. EFTA_R1_00424136 EFTA01954574 And as long as confidence in the United States is flagging and Israel feels it is on its own, the chances of an Israeli strike increase. Clearly, everyone should prefer a diplomatic solution with Iran. Obama's best chance to obtain that diplomatic breakthrough is through clarity -- by demonstrating to Rouhani what he can live with and what he cannot abide. Clarity will also help dispel misconceptions in the Middle East about America's resolve.The United States should not be afraid to lift the requisite economic sanctions, if Iran comes through with its part of the bargain. The Iranian position in the talks will make it clear soon enough whether it is sincere about reaching a deal, or whether Iran is only willing to make cosmetic adjustments. But in the bid to divine Rouhani's mind, we first have to know our own. Ambassador Dennis Ross is counselor at The Washington Institute andformer special assistant to President Obama. David Makovsky is the Ziegler Distinguished Fellow and director of the Project on the Middle East Peace Process at the Institute. Amick 3. Center for Strategic and International Studies Negotiating with Iran: Meeting the Necessary Requirements EFTA_R1_00424137 EFTA01954575 Anthony H. Cordesman October 1 - Those who oppose U.S. and Iranian negotiations need to realize that this is almost certainly the last chance for a real solution before Iran moves to the point of no return both politically and in terms of nuclear capability. Iranian politics virtually ensure that if this President's first attempt to negotiate fails, there will not be a second. They also virtually ensure Iran's Supreme Leader will not show the same tentative flexibility. It is the last chance before Israel must choose between preventive attacks and upgrading its nuclear strike capability to ensure it can achieve decisive nuclear superiority or at least mutually assured destruction. It is the last chance for the United States to choose between far larger preventive strikes and a far stronger form of containment, making good on Secretary Clinton's offer of "extended deterrence." It is the last chance between the Arab Gulf states not only to work with the United States to ensure containment but to consider their own nuclear options. Anyone who opposes such talks or negotiations needs to consider both the timing and the consequences of not pursuing this last option. The alternatives are either a war of preventive strikes that may prove all too difficult to control, or a nuclear arms race in the Gulf that is almost certain to go far beyond a limited Iranian breakout capability. At the same time, there is no more room for good intentions, open-ended negotiations, and letting rhetoric take the place of reality. The First Requirement: Dealing with Our Allies and the World The first requirement has nothing to do with Iran. The initial EFTA_R1_00424138 EFTA01954576 U.S. steps in talking to Iran have fueled virtually every fear and conspiracy theory in the region at a time when U.S. credibility had been severely weakened by the way the United States has dealt with Egypt, Syria, and Bahrain. It also has all too clearly reopened all of the Israeli concerns over U.S. actions, and potentially created a climate that could undermine European, Russian, Chinese, and UN support for a strong stand on sanctions and efforts to put pressure on Iran long before it takes real steps to limit its nuclear programs. The United States needs to act immediately to restore trust in the region. It needs to make it clear to Israel, the Arab states, and Turkey that the United States is not letting hope triumph over experience, turning away from its security partnerships in the region, or making some kind of strange devil's bargain to replace its current allies with Iran. The United States needs to make it absolutely clear to everyone — including Iran — that it will only ease its own sanctions if progress is real and that it will work closely with the 5+1, EU, and regional states and demand that they be equally realistic. The need to make it clear that its military options are still being kept active and the threat of preventive strikes continues. It must make it clear that it will continue to work with regional powers to improve their capability to contain every aspect of Iran's military forces and that if Iran does not act it will faces both the silent threat of steadily improving Israeli nuclear strike capability and a United States willing to make good on guarantees of extended deterrence; actions that will confront Iran with the reality that any Iranian nuclear program will face far more severe retaliatory capability regardless of whether preventive strikes take place or are effective. EFTA_R1_00424139 EFTA01954577 The Need for Carefully Phased Incentives Tied to Clearly Defined Iranian Actions At the same time, the United States needs to make it clear to Iran that there will be major incentives as well. The United States should not seek to "win" the negotiations, but rather to create a structure of negotiations where Iran sees the United States and its allies give it a matching incentive for every action it takes, and that the nuclear negotiations can be the prelude to a much broader pattern of security. The United States will have to make it clear that it will continue to seek Iranian reform, but not regime change. It must make it clear to Iran that its military presence in the region will guarantee the security of its allies, but not pose a threat to an Iran that seeks stable and friendly relations with its neighbors. The United States will need to define what level of Iranian enrichment activity it can accept and set real world conditions that Iran can live with. At the same time, the United States is going to have to work with the 5+1 and UN to negotiate a verifiable schedule for Iranian actions that achieve real results. It is going to need to build EU, 5+1, and UN support for a program that is based on reality and not hope or good intentions. Changes to Iran's Nuclear Programs Iran will have to give up the most provocative short-term aspects of its nuclear program, and make it clear it will not use nuclear technology to create a far more advance breakout capability in the future. Short Term Goals EFTA_R1_00424140 EFTA01954578 This does not have to mean a total end to Iran's enrichment activities — or nuclear power programs regardless of their dubious safety and cost-effectiveness — but it does mean at least some mix of the following Iranian actions: Closing Fordow under international inspection so there is no active Iranian nuclear site whose sole purpose is to provide enrichment that can ride out any mix of preventive strikes.Either dismantling or making major changes in the 40 megawatt heavy water reactor Iran is building at Arak so it cannot be used to produce weapons grade Plutonium, demonstrating it is not creating any hot cell facilities for Plutonium production, and demonstrating there is no Plutonium production related technology at the heavy water production facility at Khondab. Full UN inspection of the reactor at Bushehr and arrangements for specially tailored inspection of the fuel cycle to ensure no material is used for weapons design. Similar International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection of all activity at Natanz under an agreement to limit its output and level of enrichment to a verified nuclear power plant demand cycle. Clearly verified storage and handling of all existing enriched material, limits to all production to match the demand of existing power reactors, and disposal of all stocks of 20% enriched material. Immediate IAEA access to challenge inspections of declared and suspect facilities and activities. Detailed quarterly UN/IAEA progress reports. EFTA_R1_00424141 EFTA01954579 Longer Term Goals Arms control experts rightly focus on Iran's progress in creating its first nuclear device. This, however, is only the beginning. Iran must make it clear it will not continue to move forward in dual use technology and does not have covert programs that are far easier to conceal and can still advance its way towards nuclear weapons. This will be far more difficult than it sounds. Iran can always find a reason to seek dual-use technology and imports that it can use for a weapons program. There are many areas of research that it can support as civil programs where being sure they have no impact on weapons design capability is difficult or nearly impossible. Missile and bomb programs can test non-fissile uranium weapons designs. Every advance in centrifuge design — in terms of efficiency, power requirements, or reducing the requirements for imports of material and technology —gives Iran the ability to produce new disperse nuclear production sites and another kind of break out capability. There are no perfect ways to avoid these risks but some key steps are: Either halting centrifuge development or creating a mixture of declared Iranian plans and inspection efforts that clearly show centrifuge development and production is limited to activities where every aspect of Iranian activity is declared and subject to inspection. A broadly based Iranian declaration of nuclear research activity subject to IAEA review and challenge inspection. EFTA_R1_00424142 EFTA01954580 Full Iranian disclosure of the activity at the now destroyed facility at Parchin, and controls on any research and development that would carry explosive tests that could simulate a non-weapons grade test of a weapons design, including challenge inspection of weapons sites and reported explosions. Iranian willingness to provide enough telemetry and other data on missile warhead tests to show they were conventional and not simulated nuclear warhead tests. These are areas where the U.S. nuclear labs need to be involved with the expertise of real weapons designers rather than relying on arms control experts and design data and concepts that were declassified for arms control planning in the past. Incentives to I ran Iran should get compensation. This could include a return to the cheap fuel, processing, and Russian offers of the past. It could also include collative nuclear research and development in areas clearly unrelated to nuclear weapons that would give Iran a serious role in nuclear research and the access to technology and prestige that a truly peaceful program can offer. While any effort involving Israel would require years of effort to show Iran had ceased to be a potential threat, creating a broad Middle East inspection and control effort where other regional Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) states made it clear that they would accept many of the same constraints and IAEA inspection efforts as Iran would give Iran guarantees against any local power acquiring nuclear weapons. In the real world, Iran could benefit further in two ways. First, this would remove any Israeli incentive to increase its nuclear strike capabilities against Iran, plans for preventive strikes or launch on warning, and efforts to single out Iran as a threat. EFTA_R1_00424143 EFTA01954581 Second, it would allow Iran to quietly move away from the problem it created by singling out Israel as a threat or target of Iranian action — activities which stemmed at least as much from Iranian efforts to cover up its real intentions in acquiring leverage over its Arab neighbors and the ability to deter the United States from any military action against Iran — as any real concern with Israel. The United States could also make it clear that it would not offer its regional allies any form of extended deterrence if Iran put an end to its weapons —related activities. Moving Towards Regional Security Finally, if progress can be made on the nuclear issue, the United States and Iran should expand their dialogue to determine the steps to that would allow them to create a climate of mutual trust that would ease the other divisions between them — and between Iran and most of the other states in the region. These issues include the build up of Iran's asymmetric forces in the Gulf; Iran's role in Iraq' Syria, and Lebanon; and the role Iran's Al Quds Force and other elements of Iran's security forces play in threatening or destabilizing other regional states. The United States — and especially Israel — needs to remember that any U.S. negotiations and rapprochement with Iran involves far more than any future nuclear threat to Israel. It must tie the negotiations over Iran's nuclear programs to easing the overall tensions and risks that exist because of the confrontation between Iran and the United States and its Arab allies. These efforts also require transparency. A negotiation that the Arab states, Turkey, or Afghanistan see as a threat is not going to bring stability and security to the other countries in the region, will further EFTA_R1_00424144 EFTA01954582 undercut eroding confidence in the United States as a security partner, and do nothing to ease the confrontations in the region that threaten the flow of world oil exports and the growing confrontation between Sunni and Shi'ite. In contrast, any negotiations that ease tensions in the Gulf and the region reduce the tensions between Iran and moderate Sunni regimes, that allow all states to cooperate in reducing the threat of religious hatred and extremism, and free resources to aid civil development serve the common interest. Any such efforts must probably follow successful nuclear negotiations and require a far more open and realistic dialogue between Iran and its neighbors — as well as with the United States over its presence in the region. They also may well take at least half a decade of cautious effort before major progress can occur. The fact remains, however, that the threat of extremism, tensions between states and problems in development are ultimately at least as threatening to both Iran and its neighbors as the present confrontation over Iran's nuclear programs. Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Centerfor Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.0 Agence Global EFTA_R1_00424145 EFTA01954583 A Critical Moment in Israeli- American Relations Rami G. Khouri 02 October 2013 -- The visit by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu this week to the United States and the United Nations General Assembly signals a critical moment in diplomatic developments in the Middle East, including potentially a decisive reckoning in Israeli-American relations. This is because on the important issue of how the United States and the West deal with Iran's nuclear industry, the trends of both public opinion and leadership sentiments in Israel and the United States are moving in opposite directions. This occurs at a decisive moment in the region when many countries are in turmoil (Syria, Iraq), some are severely pressured by the turmoil (Lebanon, Jordan), others are in the process of reconfiguring their political systems (Egypt, Tunisia, Libya), Iran is redefining its relations with local and foreign powers, Russia is seeking a larger role in the area, and the United States seeks a lower profile and footprint in the region. Rarely have so many assumptions about how countries and regimes behave across the Middle East been subjected simultaneously to new doubts and great uncertainties. The policies of Iran and Israel vis-A-vis the United States have been two anchors of these assumptions for decades -- the United States-Israel bond seemingly made of steel, and American- Iranian hostility seemingly embedded permanently in each country's political chromosomes. Those two critical EFTA_R1_00424146 EFTA01954584 relationships may be changing, largely due to the Iran factor, and the initial indicators are that this may be putting American- Israeli relations to their most serious test in many decades. Approximately three-quarters of Americans support President Barack Obama's diplomatic overtures to Iran that aim to find a peaceful political resolution to the issues that divide the two countries. These include, from the American perspective, Iran's nuclear capabilities and its intentions in the Middle East, and, from Tehran's perspective, American- and Israeli-led sanctions that aim to cripple Iran, double standards in applying existing international regulations on the peaceful use of nuclear power, and alleged plans to change the regime in Tehran. Approximately the same percentage of Israelis doubt the sincerity of the overtures and statements by newly elected Iranian President Hassan Rouhani to the effect that Iran does not want to make a nuclear bomb and is willing to have its nuclear industry placed under strict international supervision. In return, Iran expects sanctions to be lifted, along with an end to foreign attempts to remove the regime from power. Rarely have American and Israeli public opinion diverged so significantly on such critical issues to both people. On other issues in recent years when the two countries disagreed -- such as Israeli settlements or the pre-1967 borders forming the basis for negotiations -- the Israeli view almost always prevailed, as American officials proved unwilling or unable to budge a determined Israeli leadership. One reason for that is that American public opinion tended to view the American-Israeli dynamics as spectator sport that they watched on television but did not get involved with personally or emotionally. This time the situation is different, as a large majority of Americans understands that a negotiated and fair agreement with Iran on EFTA_R1_00424147 EFTA01954585 the issues that matter to both countries is a win-win situation. Such agreement would help the United States avoid getting into another war or unleashing major attacks on Syria or Iran, and would allow Iran to play a stabilizing role in the region. Israelis mostly do not share this view and mistrust Iranian statements as a ruse to remove sanctions and provide Tehran with new opportunities to dominate the region. It is hard to know ahead of time how Obama will behave, knowing that he has strong public support for his overtures to Iran. The strategic advantages to the United States of a fair deal with Iran are so immense that Obama may well oppose and stare down Netanyahu in a manner that he would not have attempted in other situations, given Netanyahu's proven ability to manipulate so many members of Congress against the American president. The Israeli prime minister presumably understands that he is dealing with an American president who enjoys a much stronger hand than was the case when these two men disagreed several times in recent years. The American public also seems in no mood to have a foreign zealot manipulate the domestic political system in Washington at a time when that system is in serious disarray over the dysfunctional relationship between the president and the Congress. This is a rare moment when the issue at hand is not only the fate of Iranian nuclear technology or the strategic interests of the United States. We are perhaps witnessing in the coming months a recalibration of power relationships between the United States and Israel, with Washington for a change pursuing policies in the Middle East that are determined by the national interest of the United States, rather than by the dictates and fears of Israel and its many apologists and lobbyists in Washington, D.C. That would be the EFTA_R1_00424148 EFTA01954586 kind of birth of a new Middle East that should be welcomed by all, including Israelis. Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institutefor Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon. Article 5. Foreign Affairs Bibi the Bad Cop - Can Israel Prevent a Deal With Iran? Elliott Abrams October 1, 2013 -- Most of the world is applauding the thaw between the United States and Iran. Then there are the Arabs and Israelis. Their reaction is dread, and with good reason: neither trusts U.S. President Barack Obama to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon or from at least acquiring the capability to produce one. Israel, which has a wide base of political support in the United States, will try to stymie any nuclear deal it sees as too lenient -- but that won't be easy. In his speech to the UN General Assembly on Tuesday, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivered messages that few wanted to hear. He reminded the world that the Iranians EFTA_R1_00424149 EFTA01954587 have lied before, warned that they may well be lying still, and claimed that they have done nothing to earn credibility. He said that Iran should first be made to comply with the International Atomic Energy Agency and UN resolutions, which it has defied for decades -- most notably by developing clandestine, unsafeguarded sites and by continuing the enrichment of uranium. Netanyahu is setting forth standards for a nuclear agreement that are far tougher than the Obama administration believes can be negotiated and, as a result, are not even being sought. The hard part for Israel comes next, when the world's leaders have returned home. The recent debate over Syria -- when the administration backed away from using force, Congress seemed on the verge of voting against the use of force, and opinion polls showed the public against any military involvement -- has seriously undermined the credibility of the U.S. military option. What will Israel's approach be in the coming months, when Washington's position -- whatever its rhetoric -- has moved from "all options are on the table" to a blind pursuit of diplomacy? The first thing the Israelis will do is repeat, over and over again, their arguments against trusting Iranian President Hassan Rouhani. They will remind U.S. and EU officials, journalists, and anyone who will listen that he is not a reformer but a regime stalwart who, as secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, had the job of buying time for the nuclear weapons program. Second, they will make the case that any deal should have very tough standards. In this sense, Israel will be forced to be the bad EFTA_R1_00424150 EFTA01954588 cop, and to enlist other bad cops in Europe and in the U.S. Congress. If Israel had its way, Iran would have to fully account for its past (secret) work on a warhead, stop its centrifuges, stop enriching uranium and ship its existing stockpiles out of the country, prove it has no alternate route to nuclear weapons through plutonium work at the Arak facility, dismantle the underground site at Fordow, and cease the conversion of first- generation centrifuges to more efficient second-generation ones. It seems very unlikely that the United States and the other P5+1 countries will, for one thing, demand an end to all enrichment inside Iran; on all these conditions, in fact, compromise is more likely than the fulfillment of Israel's demand that all nuclear activities stop. If a full stop to the Iranian program is judged by Washington to be unattainable, Netanyahu will argue that Iran should be held to its own claim that it needs nuclear technology for nuclear power; in that case, it would need only uranium enriched to about 3.5 percent, very few centrifuges (and those in one location that is declared and inspected), and only a tiny stock of enriched uranium. Third, Israel will ask that sanctions be strengthened, and that the Obama administration not be allowed so many waivers to permit other countries to flout the sanctions regime, until Iran actually changes its conduct -- not just promises to change it. That is, sanctions should be reduced in the coming months only in exchange for Iran's exporting enriched uranium, warehousing centrifuges, and providing truthful information about the military aspects of its nuclear program. Finally, Netanyahu will ask that the military option be strengthened, not weakened. Here, Washington's rhetoric matters, but it could do far more to bolster the now-diminished EFTA_R1_00424151 EFTA01954589 credibility of its threat to use force by carefully leaking information about U.S. military preparations or by positioning forces so that they could strike Iran should it be necessary. But the Israelis may guess that they won't get much here, so a more promising line may be to ask Washington to help them enhance their own capabilities -- by providing more bunker-buster bombs and more air refueling tankers. The idea would be to demonstrate that, at least for Israel, all options are in fact on the table, and that the Americans like it that way. The first three steps could be taken without the approval of the Obama administration -- in fact, they are steps meant to limit U.S. flexibility. The fourth step would require the Obama administration's approval and action. If Israel plays its cards right, it might be able to convince Washington to help with the fourth step by promising to refrain from the first three. That is, Israel could say it can live with the possibility of Iranian cheating and moving closer to a bomb only if its own military option grows stronger. Israel does retain one option for stymying the negotiations if they appear to be heading for what Israelis would view as a bad deal, one that would allow Iran to escape sanctions and creep closer to a bomb. That is for Israel to attack Iranian nuclear sites. Its ability to do so is already being narrowed considerably by the diplomatic thaw, because it is one thing to bomb Iran when it appears hopelessly recalcitrant and isolated and quite another to bomb it when much of the world -- especially the United States -- is optimistic about the prospect of talks. A window for an Israeli attack might open up if the talks bogged down and Western negotiators suggested that the Iranians were refusing to compromise, perhaps speculating that the Supreme Leader and EFTA_R1_00424152 EFTA01954590 the Revolutionary Guards did not want a deal after all. But Rouhani and his foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, are probably too smart to allow such pessimism to creep into Western ranks. In short, the Israelis find themselves in a far worse position now than they have been for several years. There was no way for them to avoid this situation other than attacking last year; bombing Iran when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was president would have been more defensible in the court of global public opinion. Now they must fix bleak smiles to their lips and say that they hope for the best -- all the while wringing their hands about the likely terms of the deal. Given that Israel may have little ability to persuade the Western negotiators to be tough, its best path for now is to appeal to Americans, especially in Congress, to refuse to lift sanctions until Iran makes significant concessions. Here, the Syria episode might actually help Israel, since it increased mistrust about the Obama administration's handling of foreign policy, even among Democrats. Refusing to lift sanctions and adopting tougher rhetoric toward Iran would not be partisan issues. Plenty of Democrats think that those actions are both good politics and good policy. The Israelis have a difficult task ahead. They do not wish to play the bad cop role in an American game with Iran -- and, in fact, the metaphor is misleading. In the good cop/bad cop routine, both officers are on the same team and are carefully coordinating their approaches. In this case, the Israelis fear, the bad cop wants to see the criminals jailed, and the good cop is open to a sweet plea bargain. If that's what the Iranians get, they will sit back EFTA_R1_00424153 EFTA01954591 and smile while the United States and Israel end up in a bitter argument. ELLIOTT ABRAMS is Senior Fellowfor Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser. Article 6. Foreign Affairs How Israel Can Help the United States Strike a Deal With Iran -- And Why It Should Trita Parsi October 1, 2013 -- The moment that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hoped he could avoid is fast approaching: high-level negotiations between the United States and Iran that could lead to a deal that ends the decade-long standoff over Tehran's nuclear program. As Obama has welcomed the new approach of Iran's new president, Hassan Rouhani, and taken concrete steps to test Tehran's sincerity, Netanyahu has been quick to dismiss Rouhani and call for more sanctions. It is increasingly clear that Netanyahu ultimately fears the success of diplomacy, not its failure. But Israel, and its national security establishment, should not see a diplomatic resolution to the Iranian nuclear standoff as a threat. EFTA_R1_00424154 EFTA01954592 Contrary to Israel's public line, Netanyahu's worry is not that the Iranians would cheat on any agreement, or that Rouhani would prove to be a "wolf in sheep's clothing." Rather, Netanyahu and much of Israel's security establishment view the status quo -- ever-increasing sanctions that cripple Iran's economy, combined with the ever-present threat of war -- as preferable to any realistic diplomatic deal. As Israelis well know, a compromise would probably allow for limited enrichment on Iranian soil under strict verification, and the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions. Although Iran would technically remain a non—nuclear weapons state, it would be considered a virtual nuclear power. And that, Netanyahu calculates, is sufficient to shift the balance of power in the region to Israel's detriment, reducing the Jewish state's maneuverability and the usefulness of its own deterrent. There is reason to believe, then, that Israel's insistence on zero enrichment is aimed to ensure that no deal is struck at all. Israel also understands that a resolution to the nuclear standoff would significantly reduce U.S.-Iranian tensions and open up opportunities for collaboration between the two former allies. Since U.S.-Iranian fellow feeling will not be accompanied by a proportionate reduction in Iranian-Israeli hostilities, Israel will be left in a relatively worse position. This is what Israelis refer to as the fear of abandonment -- that, once the nuclear issue is resolved or contained, Washington will shift its focus to other matters while Israel will be stuck in the region facing a hostile Iran, without the United States by its side. These fears have been the basis of Israel's uncompromising position for the past several years. But Netanyahu has been EFTA_R1_00424155 EFTA01954593 particularly inflexible, breaking even past precedents of nimbleness. Israel generally opposes and seeks to prevent U.S.- Iranian talks whenever possible, but swiftly shifts to a neutral position once talks are deemed unstoppable. That way, it can still influence the agenda. For instance, in 1999, the Clinton administration was intrigued -- according to some Israelis, "infatuated" -- with the election of reformist President Mohammad Khatami, who spoke of his desire to break the "wall of mistrust" with the United States. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak wanted neither to be locked out of a potential dialogue nor to come across as beating the war drum when the Clinton administration seemed intent on dialogue. To signal his government's shift, Barak altered the status of Iran from enemy to threat, indicating, as Israeli diplomats argued, that the current Israeli position holds that Israel does not have a conflict with the Iranian people, the state of Iran, or with Islam [1]. Moreover, Israel unofficially condemned a terrorist attack targeting a member of Khatami's government. Barak enjoyed this flexibility because he had consistently rejected the idea -- and continues to do so today -- that Iran constitutes an existential threat to Israel. Netanyahu, on the other hand, has come to personify the argument that he made in a 2006 address to delegates at the United Jewish Communities General Assembly: "It's 1938 and Iran is Germany." Netanyahu has painted himself -- and Israel -- into a corner. And rather than trying to get out, he has, at every turn, doubled down on the strategy of intransigence. Israel needs to show nimbleness now more that ever. With EFTA_R1_00424156 EFTA01954594 Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Syria all in various states of chaos, Iran appears to be the most resolvable challenge that the United States faces in the Middle East, and Obama seems to know it. By personally taking ownership of reaching out to Iran by seeking a meeting with Rouhani and later calling him, he has demonstrated the political will to move things forward. And Rouhani seems ready to meet the challenge. By contrast, Netanyahu's knee-jerk rejection feeds the perception that Israel -- not Iran -- is the chief stumbling block. Ultimately, even short of a nuclear agreement, that impression can help Iran break out of its isolation and delegitimize the sanctions regime suffocating its economy. Beyond the perception of it, Israel has much to gain from shifting its stance on negotiations. In private conversations last year after the successful round of talks in Istanbul, Israeli strategists revealed that Israel's central concern was not enrichment but, rather, that any U.S. deal with Iran entail a "sweeping attitude change" in Tehran vis-a-vis Israel. In short, Israel did not want Washington to resolve its issues with Iran unless Iran was forced to address Israel's concerns as well -- first and foremost, an Iranian de facto acceptance of Israel's right to exist. This is precisely why diplomacy serves Israel better than Netanyahu's naysaying: Iran's position on Israel is far more likely to change in the direction Israel desires if U.S.-Iranian relations improve and the first tangible steps are taken to rehabilitate Iran into the region's political and economic structures. Since its inception, the Iranian theocracy has adopted harsh and EFTA_R1_00424157 EFTA01954595 venomous rhetoric about Israel to boost Tehran's credibility on the Arab street and to bridge the region's Arab-Persian and Sunni-Shia divide. But Tehran's ideological impulses have not always driven policy. When ideology and geostrategic goals don't match up, Iran favors the latter. During the I