EFTA02722137.pdf

To: [email protected]] From: Office of Terje Rod-Larsen Sent: Thur 1/23/2014 12:02:48 PM Subject: January 22 update 22 January, 2014 Article 1. NYT Another Syria Peace Conference Editorial I NYT WikiLeaks, Drought and Syria Thomas L. Friedman Article 3. The Washington Institute Avoiding Assad's Forced Solution to the Syria Crisis Andrew J. Tabler Article 4. Now Lebanon Does the US seek an Arab-Iranian "equilibrium?" Hussein Ibish Articles. The Christian Science Monitor As Egypt squeezes Gaza, Hamas looks increasingly cornered Christa Case Bryant, Ahmed Aldabba Article 6. The Daily Beast At Davos 2014, the Gods Of Mischief Rule EFTA_R1_02206833 EFTA02722137  Christopher Dickey Article 7 New York Review of Books Iran: A Good Deal Now in Danger Jessica T. Mat Another Syria Peace Conference Editorial JAN. 21, 2014 -- Few peace conferences have been set up amid the unrelenting pessimism that surrounds the talks involving Syria that open Wednesday in Switzerland. But while a peace agreement is unlikely to be reached anytime soon, the meeting can still produce useful results. That has to be the approach of the conveners, including the United States, Russia and the United Nations. Crucial early goals should include a cease-fire and the delivery of humanitarian assistance to millions of desperate civilians. There were some shaky moments before the conference, which has taken months to arrange, even got started, not least when the United Nations secretary general, Ban Ki-moon, issued a last- minute invitation for Iran to attend, then rescinded it after strong EFTA_R1_02206834 EFTA02722138 objections from America; from Saudi Arabia, Iran's regional rival; and from the Syrian opposition. The United States has said that Iran could not participate without publicly accepting a 2012 communiqué that is the basis of the conference and stipulates that the goal is a transitional administration by "mutual consent" of the Assad government and the opposition. In the view of the United States, this means that President Bashar al-Assad would be replaced, although Assad government officials and his Alawite sect could be part of the new structure. Iran has refused to accept any preconditions. Just how the invitation from the United Nations was fumbled is unclear, but it is unfortunate that some diplomatic solution could not have been found to include Iran, which along with Russia is Syria's main ally, providing President Assad with arms and other military support. In an interview with The New York Times and Time magazine last month, the Iranian foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, said Iran would not be an impediment to a political settlement. "We have every interest in helping the process in a peaceful direction," he said. "We are satisfied, totally satisfied, convinced that there is no military solution in Syria and that there is a need to find a political solution in Syria." The deaths of thousands of civilians have not persuaded Russia and Iran to break with Mr. Assad or at least pressure him to end the slaughter and cruelty against civilians. Iran might have ensured itself a seat at the peace conference if it had promised to suspend arms deliveries while negotiations were underway or persuaded Mr. Assad to call a cease-fire. And there are good reasons for Russia and Iran to play a constructive role. The civil EFTA_R1_02206835 EFTA02722139 war has drawn affiliates of Al Qaeda and other Sunni extremists to the Syrian battlefield, and these could eventually be a threat to Shiite-led Iran as well as Russia, which is fighting extremists in the Caucasus and worrying about attacks during the Winter Olympics in Sochi next month. Mr. Zarif acknowledged this problem generally, asserting that "the continuation of this tragedy in Syria can only provide the best breeding ground for extremists who use this basically as a justification, as a recruiting climate, in order to wage the same type of activity in other parts of this region." The peace conference is already providing a service by refocusing attention on the savagery of the war, now in its third year. On Monday, a team of legal and forensic experts commissioned by the government of Qatar, a main sponsor of the Syrian opposition, said that thousands of photographs — apparently smuggled out of Syria by a defecting military police photographer — showed scarred, emaciated corpses that offered "direct evidence" of mass torture by Syrian government forces. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have also accused opposition forces, as well as the government, of human rights abuses. In all, more than 100,000 Syrians are believed to have been killed in the war, many by government forces that have bombed cities and deprived civilians of food and other essential needs. It is well past time to say "enough" to more civilian deaths — and exactly the right time for a cease-fire and secure deliveries of humanitarian supplies. At 2. EFTA_R1_02206836 EFTA02722140 NYT WikiLeaks, Drought and Syria Thomas L. Friedman JAN. 21, 2014 -- In the 1970s, I got both my bachelor's and master's degrees in modern Middle East studies, and I can assure you that at no time did environmental or climate issues appear anywhere in the syllabi of my courses. Today, you can't understand the Arab awakenings — or their solutions — without considering climate, environment and population stresses. I've been reporting on the connection between the Syrian drought and the uprising there for a Showtime documentary that will air in April, but recently our researchers came across a WikiLeaks cable that brilliantly foreshadowed how environmental stresses would fuel the uprising. Sent on Nov. 8, 2008, from the U.S. Embassy in Damascus to the State Department, the cable details how, in light of what was a devastating Syrian drought — it lasted from 2006-10 — Syria's U.N. food and agriculture representative, Abdullah bin Yehia, was seeking drought assistance from the U.N. and wanted the U.S. to contribute. Here are some key lines: ■ "The U.N. Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs launched an appeal on September 29 requesting roughly $20.23 million to assist an estimated one million people impacted by what the U.N. describes as the country's worst drought in four EFTA_R1_02206837 EFTA02722141 decades." ■ "Yehia proposes to use money from the appeal to provide seed and technical assistance to 15,000 small-holding farmers in northeast Syria in an effort to preserve the social and economic fabric of this rural, agricultural community. If UNFAO efforts fail, Yehia predicts mass migration from the northeast, which could act as a multiplier on social and economic pressures already at play and undermine stability." ■ "Yehia does not believe that the [government of Bashar al- Assad] will allow any Syrian citizen to starve. ... However, Yehia told us that the Syrian minister of agriculture ... stated publicly that economic and social fallout from the drought was `beyond our capacity as a country to deal with.' What the U.N. is trying to combat through this appeal, Yehia says, is the potential for `social destruction' that would accompany erosion of the agricultural industry in rural Syria. This social destruction would lead to political instability." ■ "Without direct assistance, Yehia predicts that most of these 15,000 small-holding farmers would be forced to depart Al Hasakah Province to seek work in larger cities in western Syria. Approximately 100,000 dependents — women, children and the elderly or infirm — would be left behind to live in poverty, he said. Children would be likely to be pulled from school, he warned, in order to seek a source of income for families left behind. In addition, the migration of 15,000 unskilled laborers would add to the social and economic pressures presently at play in major Syrian cities. A system already burdened by a large Iraqi refugee population may not be able to absorb another influx of displaced persons, Yehia explained, particularly at this EFTA_R1_02206838 EFTA02722142 time of rising costs, growing dissatisfaction of the middle class, and a perceived weakening of the social fabric and security structures that Syrians have come to expect and — in some cases — rely on." Yehia was prophetic. By 2010, roughly one million Syrian farmers, herders and their families were forced off the land into already overpopulated and underserved cities. These climate refugees were crowded together with one million Iraqi war refugees. The Assad regime failed to effectively help any of them, so when the Arab awakenings erupted in Tunisia and Egypt, Syrian democrats followed suit and quickly found many willing recruits from all those dislocated by the drought. But also consider this: Last May 9, The Times of Israel quoted Israeli geographer Arnon Soffer as observing that in the past 60 years, the population in the Middle East has twice doubled. "There is no example of this anywhere else on earth." And this: Last March, the International Journal of Climatology published a study, "Changes in extreme temperature and precipitation in the Arab region," that found "consistent warming trends since the middle of the 20th century across the region," manifested in "increasing frequencies of warm nights, fewer cool days and cool nights." And then consider this: Syria's government couldn't respond to a prolonged drought when there was a Syrian government. So imagine what could happen if Syria is faced by another drought after much of its infrastructure has been ravaged by civil war. And, finally, consider this: "In the future, who will help a country like Syria when it gets devastated by its next drought if EFTA_R1_02206839 EFTA02722143 we are in a world where everyone is dealing with something like a Superstorm Sandy," which alone cost the U.S. $60 billion to clean up? asks Joe Romm, founder of ClimateProgress.org. So to Iran and Saudi Arabia, who are funding the proxy war in Syria between Sunnis and Shiites/Alawites, all I can say is that you're fighting for control of a potential human/ecological disaster zone. You need to be working together to rebuild Syria's resiliency, and its commons, not destroying it. I know that in saying this I am shouting into a dust storm. But there is nothing else worth saying. The Washington Institute Avoiding Assad's Forced Solution to the Syria Crisis Andrew J. Tabler January 21, 2014 -- The UN retraction of Iran's invitation to this week's Syria peace talks in Montreux, Switzerland, does little if anything to change the Assad regime's approach to those talks. President Bashar al-Assad's statements in recent days indicate that he and his backers are attempting to pressure the United States and the rest of the "London 11" countries supporting the opposition at the conference -- Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United EFTA_R1_02206840 EFTA02722144 Arab Emirates. In particular, Damascus hopes to change the framework of the talks from arranging a genuine transition to accepting a forced settlement centered on Assad's upcoming "reelection" for a third seven-year term, which will not take place for at least four months (his current term ends on July 7). Since little is likely to be accomplished at this week's talks, Washington should concentrate on steps the United States and its allies can take regardless of how the talks go, especially in terms of delivering humanitarian assistance to besieged areas and strengthening the moderate Syrian opposition through promotion of local elections. ASSAD'S REMARKS INDICATE FORCED SOLUTION In remarks made over the past few days -- first during a meeting with Russian politicians visiting Damascus, and then in an interview with Agence France Press (AFP) -- Assad reiterated the regime's longstanding mantra that it is fighting an international conspiracy waged by terrorist factions against Syria. More important, he outlined how the political mechanism for settling the crisis centers on his reelection. On January 19, Russia's Interfax news agency reported that Assad had told a delegation of visiting Russian parliamentarians that the issue of him giving up power is "not up for discussion." Although the statement was later denied by Syrian state television, Assad told AFP the following day that the "chances of my [presidential] candidacy are significant," and "I must be at the forefront of those defending this country." He also noted that the process of measuring public opinion on his leadership would commence in "four months' time," when the election date will be announced. Under the Assad family, Syrian elections have been regarded as among the most manipulated in the Arab world. During the last EFTA_R1_02206841 EFTA02722145 election in 2007, the Baath-dominated parliament rubberstamped Bashar's nomination as the sole candidate, and in the subsequent public referendum to confirm whether he should be president, he received a laughable 97.62 percent of the vote. In order to show devotion to Assad, many voters were forced to mark the "yes" column by pricking their finger and voting in blood. Following changes to the constitution approved by referendum in February 2012, presidential elections in Syria must now be multicandidate, multiparty contests. Although this may sound like progress, the changes mean little for this year's election. For one thing, candidates must first be approved by the Supreme Constitutional Court, which is appointed by Assad. This fact, coupled with the ongoing state of war, the vast number of displaced citizens, and the heavy role of regime security services in regime-controlled areas, means that the chances of anyone other than Assad winning the next election are zero. As for which factions Assad would be willing to work with in the future, he told AFP that he would only accept parties with a "national agenda" to help "govern the Syrian state," dismissing those in the Syrian National Coalition (SNC) and other opposition groups as proxies of regional and Western states participating in the plot against Syria. In his view, anything decided as part of the Geneva process or his own coalition- building efforts would also need to be confirmed by a national referendum run by the regime. Overall, Assad's account of how the next president will be selected and which "opposition parties" will be included is the basis of a forced solution to the Syria crisis masquerading as a democratic process. LOOPHOLES IN GENEVA 1 COMMUNIQUE EFTA_R1_02206842 EFTA02722146 The United States has insisted that Iran cannot attend this week's Syria talks until it accepts a central tenet of the Geneva Communique negotiated between Russian and American officials in June 2012. Section II, paragraph two of the communique states that a "key step" to "any settlement" of the Syria crisis is the formation of a "transitional governing body" (TGB) with "full executive powers" that will create a "neutral environment in which a transition can take place." Yet Assad and his backers have interpreted this nominally tough provision in a way that guts it of any meaning, emphasizing the portion of Section II that reads, "[The TGB] could include members of the present government and the opposition and other groups...formed on the basis of mutual consent." This loophole has allowed Russia to permit, and the United States to resist, Assad's inclusion in the TGB while remaining committed to the Geneva Communique. Although Moscow and Washington have held up the mutual-consent clause as guaranteeing each side's "veto" over a settlement, the lack of specific wording as to which party represents the opposition means that the "present government" (i.e., the Assad regime) need only ally with part of the opposition to move toward a negotiated solution. Given how these loopholes tactically and strategically benefit the Syrian regime and its supporters in Moscow and Beijing, it remains unclear why Iran backtracked on Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarifs verbal commitments to UN Secretary- General Ban Ki-moon in support of the Geneva Communique as a basis for settlement. Perhaps Tehran is concerned that if it accepts the communique, Washington would then highlight the other reason why Iran's presence at the Syria talks is inappropriate -- namely, that it is the only country in the region to have deployed forces on the ground in Syria, most notably EFTA_R1_02206843 EFTA02722147 personnel from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' elite Qods Force, who have been advising and supporting the Assad regime. Zarif and Syrian foreign minister Walid Mouallem's recent collective visits to Moscow indicate that Tehran's diplomatic maneuver was a coordinated attempt to change the framework of the Geneva Communique and test American mettle regarding a forced settlement. Whatever the case, the attempt to include Iran in the talks should come as no surprise -- for months, UN Special Representative for Syria Lakhdar Brahimi has privately and publicly lobbied Western and Arab countries to allow Iran into the Geneva process. While Secretary of State John Kerry has said that Tehran could play some role in settling the Syria crisis, it is unrealistic to expect Iran's leaders to be a positive force when they refuse to acknowledge the international responsibility to help with transition. Tehran has instead clung to the fiction that such decisions are best left to the Syrian people, even as it dispatches Iranian forces to Syria, sends arms to the Assad regime in violation of UN Security Council resolutions, and orchestrates the presence of thousands of pro-regime fighters in Syria. AVOIDING TRAPS ON THE LONG DIPLOMATIC ROAD AHEAD The mechanism for channeling the Syrian people's aspirations toward a settlement that ends the war will not be an election under Assad's rule. Washington and its allies must not indulge Assad's fantasy that his phony election process can yield a "political solution" that will reunite Syria and avoid protracted partition and likely spillover that would threaten regional EFTA_R1_02206844 EFTA02722148 stability. If the regime and its backers continue to insist on that as the only path, the United States should focus on a mix of short- and long-term tactical and strategic steps -- both at the negotiating table and after -- to improve the chances of a workable settlement. At the Montreux talks, Washington should emphasize unconditional limited ceasefires for the provision of humanitarian aid to besieged areas. Thus far, the regime has proposed that rebels evacuate areas where aid is to be distributed and hand them over to regime control -- in other words, if the opposition chooses to give up, the regime will graciously accept the offer. A strong U.S. stance calling not for surrender, but for true ceasefires that allow the provision of aid, would strengthen the opposition factions attending Geneva II in the eyes of fellow Syrians desperate for food and medical care. This should be accompanied by increased U.S. humanitarian support for opposition-controlled areas via nonregime channels; to date, the vast bulk of U.S. aid has gone through regime-linked institutions. Washington should also encourage local elections in rebel-controlled areas to help the opposition choose a clear set of leaders and consolidate its ranks. As outlined above, the loopholes inherent in the Geneva Communique give Assad room to force a political settlement on his terms. The only way for the opposition to avoid that trap is to make sure the party sitting across the negotiating table from the regime is authoritative, insofar as it represents a majority of those opposed to Assad. Andrew J. Tabler is a seniorfellow at The Washington Institute and author of In the Lion's Den: An Eyewitness Account of Washington's Battle with Syria. EFTA_R1_02206845 EFTA02722149 Article 4. Now Lebanon Does the US seek an Arab-Iranian "equilibrium?" Hussein Ibis!) January 21, 2014 -- American policy in the Middle East has plainly been evolving, but in what direction has been less clear. Analysts have therefore been dutifully reading between the lines of what the risk-averse Obama administration has been doing and saying to try to tease out the new American strategic vision for the region. Both the administration and the country at large seem ready to reduce the American footprint in the Middle East in favor of other priorities. However, the extent of that drawdown and, more importantly, what is intended to replace it, have been entirely unclear. These questions became pressing following the American disengagement with Syrian rebels and embrace of the chemical weapons elimination program. When the US led the international community into an interim agreement with Iran on its nuclear program, they became even more so. Yet these moves only hinted at where American strategy might be headed, and raised more questions than they answered. President Barack Obama, in his own words, has begun to EFTA_R1_02206846 EFTA02722150 explain what his administration sees as new American strategic policy goals and postures. And they will not please everyone. In a sweeping overview of the current state of the Obama presidency, David Remnick has provided one of the first pieces of clear explication of where US grand strategy in the region may be headed, or at least where the administration wants to go. Remnick quotes Obama as saying, bluntly, "If we were able to get Iran to operate in a responsible fashion... you could see an equilibrium developing between Sunni, or predominantly Sunni, Gulf states and Iran in which there's competition, perhaps suspicion, but not an active or proxy warfare." This vision isn't going to mollify the suspicions of those concerned about Arab Gulf security. In December, I speculated that a "plausible, but still from an Arab point of view alarming, scenario is that the US is seeking to create a balance of power between what amount to Sunni and Shiite regional alliances. Such an equilibrium, this logic holds, would allow the US to start to draw down its own posture in the region and concentrate on the long-ballyhooed 'pivot to Asia." Some have suggested that the US is toying with a "concert of powers" to ensure Gulf security. Others have speculated that without a major American force in the Gulf region, for the meanwhile only Iran can protect vital shipping lanes and this explains the potential Washington-Tehran rapprochement. Obama's emphasis, however, on a regional "equilibrium" — precisely the term I employed to describe a potential formula through which the US might seek to pull back its own role while avoiding broader chaos — is highly suggestive. Obama doesn't directly say the US is seeking such an equilibrium, but could be seen as implying it. Moreover, Obama's notion that the goal is to get Iran "to operate EFTA_R1_02206847 EFTA02722151 in a responsible fashion" suggests not only an end to bad behavior by Tehran, but also that Iran could then potentially be entrusted with key responsibilities. This doesn't mean that the United States sees Iran as a potential ally or a new partner as some have predicted. But it does seem to suggest that if Iran were to modify its behavior regarding nuclear weapons and funding terrorist organizations it could, and perhaps even should, be regarded as a legitimate regional actor with a major role to play in security based on a Sunni- Shiite "equilibrium." It's hard not to extrapolate from this a vision of an Iranian foreign policy that is at ease, rather than at odds, with the regional status quo. And for that, Tehran would surely require its own tacitly-recognized sphere of influence: a so-called "Shiite crescent" beginning in southern Afghanistan and sweeping all the way through to southern Lebanon. And, of course, the centerpiece of such an axis would be Syria, if not under precisely the present regime, at least under a general Iranian hegemony. Hence, the idea of not only a rapprochement with Iran, but also the development of a regional sectarian "equilibrium," might also help to explain an otherwise increasingly passive and self-contradictory American approach to Syria. Those of us who have worried that US policymakers have come to see Syria-related issues as a subset of the Iran file will be concerned by the potential implications of Obama's comments to Remnick. But none of this should be overstated. Obama's comments may have been off-the-cuff or taken out of context, and are so brief and cursory as to be easily open to misinterpretation. But since this is the first serious attempt that I am aware of by a EFTA_R1_02206848 EFTA02722152 senior administration official to explain, in public, what the emerging US vision of a new regional order in the Middle East might be, some additional clarification and reassurances would be both wise and welcome. Hussein Ibish is a columnist at NOW and The National (UAE). He is also a seniorfellow at the American Task Force on Palestine. Article 5. The Christian Science Monitor As Egypt squeezes Gaza, Hamas looks increasingly cornered Christa Case Bryant, Ahmed Aldabba January 21, 2014 -- Gazan Adnan Abu Dalal, a father of seven, spent years dependent on aid after losing his job in Israel when the second intifada broke out. He finally found work with a local construction company, but he was left jobless again this summer when Egypt cracked down on the smuggling tunnels along Gaza's southern border. The tunnels secured nearly 70 percent of Gazans' commercial needs, including construction materials, as well as cheap Egyptian fuel EFTA_R1_02206849 EFTA02722153 that powered everything from generators to wastewater treatment plants. While life here has been hard for years, there has been a distinct deterioration in recent months. Electricity is down to eight hours a day or less; prices have spiked; the streets have been flooded with sewage on multiple occasions; and unemployment has shot up to 43 percent, up from 23 percent in the first half of 2013. "I believe pet animals abroad have better lives than ours. I don't care if Hamas or Fatah rule, what I need is a bright future for my children," says Mr. Abu Dalal, who says he is embarrassed that they have to wear last year's school uniforms because he couldn't afford new ones. "The government is careless and the other Arab and foreign countries are doing nothing to end our suffering." The deterioration comes as Hamas finds itself increasingly squeezed between Israel and Egypt, both of which have been hit hard by terrorist groups operating in the Sinai peninsula and in recent months have improved military cooperation to tackle the mutual threat. As both countries crack down on terrorist links between Hamas-run Gaza and Sinai, frustration with the increasingly poor conditions in this crowded coastal territory could boil over, presenting an additional threat both to Hamas and its neighbors. "It's probably the Egyptians to blame, but Israel cannot bury its head in the sand because it does have consequences for Israel as well — there may be spillover from growing frustration of Palestinians," says leading Israeli defense reporter Amos Harel. Over the past week, there has been an escalation of rocket fire EFTA_R1_02206850 EFTA02722154 between Gaza and Israel, with a Katyusha attack on the southern Israeli city of Ashkelon last week prompting an Israeli strike on Islamic Jihad operative Ahmad Saad. Hamas is reportedly deploying troops to the Israel-Gaza border to prevent rocket attacks by other factions in the Strip, but that may not be enough to cork the bottled-up frustration. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned llamas today that Israel would respond forcefully if the spate of rocket attacks did not cease. "Will [the situation] blow up?" asks Harel. "I think we already see the signs that this is where it's heading. It's no longer a drizzle of one rocket per day." It's not just causing tensions with Israel, though. It is also putting significant pressure on the Hamas government. Seven years after violently ousting its secular Fatah rivals from the Gaza Strip, Hamas is finding itself in a much weaker position in reconciliation talks. "Anger with llamas is boiling, which is basically causing Hamas to rethink its current policy toward Palestinians," says Mukhaimer Abu Saada, professor of political science at Gaza's Al Azhar University. Pushed toward reconciliation Last week, Hamas released seven Fatah activists from prison in an effort, leaders said, to create a better atmosphere for reconciliation. Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh also announced that his government would allow Fatah members to return to Gaza. "Such steps are good and welcomed, but we have an agreement EFTA_R1_02206851 EFTA02722155 that we both accepted and signed, so I invite Hamas to start implementing them," says Faisal Abu Shalha, a Fatah legislator in Gaza. Those agreements include recognizing Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas as interim prime minister of a unity government that would prepare for presidential and parliamentary elections within 90 days of its formation. "In the past, Hamas had the strength to maneuver and imply its conditions to reach a reconciliation deal," says Prof. Abu Saada. "But now Hamas will have to accept any proposal and give concessions that the movement considered red lines in the past." The timing of Hamas's outreach may have something to do with the US-led peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, says Talal Okal, a political analyst in Gaza. If a peace agreement is reached when Hamas and Fatah are cooperating, Hamas is more likely to share the political gains and gain international acceptance. It could also partake in the windfall that donors have promised the Palestinian Authority if it signs a peace agreement. Hamas may also feel less popular pressure to campaign for one of its founding principles: the liberation of Palestine from Israeli occupation, which many Gazans have stopped talking about. Their conversations now are all about the shortages; shortages of food, gas, electricity, freedom of movement, and human dignity — demonstrating that it's not just economic troubles that weigh on Gazans' minds. "Money has never been a problem for me, but what would money do for me at war times?" asks Khaled, a young EFTA_R1_02206852 EFTA02722156 accountant with a BMW and a villa who is thinking of taking a job in Qatar, even though the salary is much lower. "What would money do when I can't go out of Gaza whenever I need to? You may buy a car, an apartment or modern clothes with money, but you can't buy freedom with money." Changing regional dynamic In 2011, Hamas abandoned its longtime allies Syria and Hezbollah, thinking that Egypt's ascendant Muslim Brotherhood and its Islamist allies such as Turkey and Qatar would provide badly needed aid and help bolster its legitimacy. But after the Egyptian coup this summer, Cairo has openly said it is cracking down not only on the Brotherhood, but Hamas as well. In addition to destroying tunnels, Egypt has also severely limited Gazans' ability to exit at Rafah, Gaza's main access to the outside world. Israel responded by easing restrictions on people and goods moving through the two crossings it controls, Erez and Kerem Shalom, though with minimal impact. In August, for example, Israel allowed 24 percent more entries through Erez, but that compensated for only 6.5 percent of the Rafah decrease, according to Gisha, an Israeli NGO focusing on Palestinian freedom of movement. Many Gazans still blame Israel for what they see as a policy of collective punishment carried out in concert with Egypt. "The people are the ones who really suffer. They have been penalized for doing nothing. By doing this, Israel is not only harming Hamas, but also the common people who are being EFTA_R1_02206853 EFTA02722157 impoverished by the blockade," says Jamal Khodaty, an independent legislator in Gaza. "The closure has caused social, economic, psychological, and ecology disasters to Gaza. The international should stop speaking about the blockade and start working to lift it, actions speak louder than words." Anicic 6. The Daily Beast At Davos 2014, the Gods Of Mischief Rule Christopher Dickey January 21-- Even the high and mighty assembling at the Swiss resort recognize, now, that grotesque inequality is the greatest threat to world peace. Their answer: Party on! Not so long ago and not so very far away, there were people who thought they were masters of the universe. They were very powerful and very rich (and very often both), and each year they got together on a mountaintop in Switzerland to congratulate themselves, network with each other and confer about how best to bring order and prosperity to humankind. From afar, the confab known as the World Economic Forum in Davos looked a little like Asgard, the mythical home of the Norse gods. Up close, slipping along the icy sidewalks with EFTA_R1_02206854 EFTA02722158 people partying all night in a hodgepodge of hotels, it looked like Loki, the god of mischief, was running the show. For decades after the forum was founded in 1971, Davos often appeared a model of disorganization, a 30-ring-circus of panels and plenary sessions, even as the world, with or without its help, looked to be in more or less good order. The Cold War ended; Communism died; technology was spreading opportunities; global trade supposedly was pulling people out of poverty. Even the problems of terrorism and a very shaky euro, while they were disconcerting, seemed manageable. But tonight as the little resort town begins to welcome 2,500 participants, including more than 40 heads of state, the forum itself is better organized than ever—it's the rest of the world that's not. Nobody at Davos claims to be a master of the universe anymore. Hell, nobody would dare. There's a sudden shocked revelation on the mountaintop that from the cauldrons of the Middle East to the restive billions in slums around the globe, who have ever less money and ever fewer hopes of change, the politics and the economy of the world as the forum sees it really look very scary indeed. The group's own publication, Global Risks 2014, concludes that "the chronic gap between the incomes of the richest and poorest citizens" is the greatest threat to stability that looms in the next decade. The charitable organization Oxfam issued a report, largely based on statistics compiled by Credit Suisse, that showed it's not just the infamous "one percent" who own most of the world's wealth, it's an even more minuscule fraction: "The bottom half EFTA_R1_02206855 EFTA02722159 of the world's population owns the same as the richest 85 people in the world." If I read my calculator right, that would be 0.000001 per cent. No wonder populists and revolutionaries are raising hell, from neo-Nazis in Greece to jihadists in Nigeria. Martin Wolf of the Financial Times, a Davos stalwart, likens the situation today to the eve of World War I, exactly a century ago, when the world's rich and its rulers stumbled toward the most horrific conflagration in history. "Complex societies rely on their elites to get things, if not right, at least not grotesquely wrong," wrote Wolf, and today, "the elites need to do better. If they do not, rage may overwhelm us all." Nowhere is the sense of impending doom stronger than in the Middle East, and much of the thunder in the first two days of Davos is likely to be consumed by another conference at the far end of a lake in another corner of Switzerland. Several countries (but not Iran are getting together in Montreux with representatives of the Assad regime and some of its fractious opponents to try to begin talking about how they might begin thinking about having a transitional government that could maybe bring an end to the gruesome civil war in Syria. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry is supposed to arrive in Davos on Friday to brief the high and mighty gathered there, but hopes are not high, and expectations are even lower. In the meantime, both Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani will make appearances. In years past, the threat of war with Iran started by Israel and waged by the United States to stall the mullahs' nuclear program loomed very large. Less so this year, thanks to EFTA_R1_02206856 EFTA02722160 the interim deal struck between Iran, the United States and other powers in Geneva a couple of months ago, which went into effect this week. But while Netanyahu argues that the world must continue to impose ever stronger sanctions on Tehran until it gives up any and all potential for weapons development, Rouhani will be courting investors with the notion that sanctions are loosening and if they get in on the ground floor with investments today, when sanctions are lifted (or crumble), they will make their large fortunes even larger. On the Asian front, growth is slowing in China while military tensions with Japan are intensifying—a subject on which Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe may shed some light at Davos, without, most likely, offering any solution. Africa, from an economic point of view, holds great potential. Paul Kagame of Rwanda and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia will be on the mountaintop to encourage investment in their countries still recovering from genocide and crimes against humanity. But across the continent new wars keep getting in the way. This week Europe decided to back France's intervention in the failed state known as the Central African Republic, but nobody expects the French-led fighting there or in al-Qaeda-plagued Mali to end soon. A bloody conflict in South Sudan is really just beginning. Libya is coming apart at its many seams. Egypt is, well, a very big question mark. In Latin America, Brazil once looked like it would be a huge engine of growth. Remember the BRICs—those developing economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China—that were EFTA_R1_02206857 EFTA02722161 supposed to be the powerhouses of the 21st century? The conventional wisdom around Davos is that they are, if not the has-beens, then at least the disappointment of the decade. The forum sees many other threats on the horizon: The possibility of "Cybergeddon in the online world," which would mean paralysis for the global neural network. The huge challenge of climate change and the related phenomenon of "extreme weather events" like hurricanes, floods and droughts. And while the fiscal and economic crisis that erupted in 2008 has been contained, everyone knows the world really ain't the same anymore. Jobs are not being created. And the wealth indicated by rising stock markets is weighing down the pockets of the far-less-than-one percent. In fact, when one looks at the question of global inequality, the numbers just keep pointing back at the United States as the place where, worldwide, the very greatest amount of resources are owned by the very fewest people. That fact challenges the fundamental assumptions not only of democracy but of a truly open market with equitable opportunities. It's not what most of us used to think of as "truth, justice, and the American way." And while these radical imbalances may not bring on another world war, they certainly contribute to the ongoing chaos. The Oxfam report, trying to be nice to the powers that be at Davos, notes that the "dangerous trend" of inequality "can be reversed." "The U.S. and Europe in the three decades after World War II reduced inequality while growing prosperous." But in those same decades, the top individual tax rate in the United States was consistently higher than 90 percent (as you can see on this handy infographic from Turbotax. The current EFTA_R1_02206858 EFTA02722162 rate is in the neighborhood of 35 percent and a lot of Americans are convinced, as if it were a religious principle, that even that is too high. So, forget world leaders—are American leaders ready to fight for better income distribution? Certainly not this week in Asgard, er, Davos. And, sadly, certainly, not at home either. On the mountain, as on the planet, the god of mischief will continue to rule. Article 7. New York Review of Books Iran: A Good Deal Now in Danger Jessica T. Mathews January 21, 2014 -- In recent weeks, Iran and the United States, for the first time, have broken through more than a decade of impasse over Iran's nuclear program. Significant differences remain, but at long last, both governments appear ready to work their way toward a resolution. Yet the US Congress, acting reflexively against Iran, and under intense pressure from Israel, seems ready to shatter the agreement with a bill that takes no account of Iranian political developments, misunderstands proliferation realities, and ignores the dire national security consequences for the United States. By November 2013, when Iran and the P5+1 group (the United EFTA_R1_02206859 EFTA02722163 States, Russia, China, Britain, France, and Germany) announced that they had arrived at an interim deal on Iran's nuclear program, it had been thirty-three fractious years since Washington and Tehran had reached any kind of formal agreement. During that long hiatus, the American enmity and distrust of Iran that stemmed from the 1979 hostage-taking had hardened into a one-dimensional view of the Islamic Republic as wholly malign. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's Holocaust denial and vicious rants against the existence of Israel confirmed Americans' worst fears. On the Iranian side, the list of real and perceived injustices was much longer, beginning with the US-backed overthrow of Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadegh in 1953, US support for Saddam Hussein during the 1980s Iran-Iraq War, in which as many as one million Iranians may have died, and the destruction of an Iranian civilian airliner and its passengers in 1988. Iranians called the US the Great Satan. The US named Iran as part of the Axis of Evil. For most of these decades, even a handshake between officials was taboo and an Iranian who advocated improving the relationship could find himself in Evin prison. The greatest single cause of friction was the growing evidence that in spite of having signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, Iran was in fact pursuing nuclear weapons. For more than fifteen years, intelligence and on-the-ground inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) revealed nuclear facilities, imports of nuclear technology, and research that had no civilian use. The scale of Iran's programs EFTA_R1_02206860 EFTA02722164 that could have both peaceful and military uses, notably uranium enrichment, was wholly out of proportion to any reasonable civilian need. The IAEA tried for years without success to get answers to a growing list of questions about the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program. Europeans tried repeatedly to negotiate a solution. In the end, their efforts went nowhere. There were mistakes on the Western side, especially the coupling of extreme demands with minimal incentives for the Iranians. But it also became clear that the Iranian side was not negotiating in good faith. It was simply using the enormous time consumed in fruitless talks to advance its nuclear program. Through these years American sanctions did slow Iran's progress. During the Bush years the sanctions were largely unilateral because most countries held the view that the US was unreasonably trying to block Iran from nuclear activities that were within the limits of the NPT. Not until President Obama made it plain, beginning in 2009, that the US was willing to enter a serious dialogue with Iran and that it was the mullahs who could not "unclench their fist" did the weight of international opinion swing against the Iranian government. Since then, the United States has led the imposition of broad international sanctions of unprecedented severity. These have slashed Iran's oil exports by nearly two thirds and imposed bans on Iran's banking sector that cut off the country financially. The Iranian rial lost 80 percent of its value. Inflation and unemployment soared. Thus, the sanctions drastically raised the cost to Iran of seeking nuclear weapons in violation of its treaty commitment. In EFTA_R1_02206861 EFTA02722165 addition to the sanctions, cyberattacks on Iranian nuclear facilities, such as the malware program Stuxnet, assassinations of Iranian scientists, and other covert action also slowed the program's progress. But sanctions were not able to stop Iran from steadily increasing its enrichment of uranium toward the threshold level to fuel a weapon. Iran had about two hundred centrifuges for enriching uranium operating in 2003. When President Bush left office it had seven thousand. Today it has nine thousand first-generation centrifuges spinning, eight thousand installed and ready to go, and one thousand much more capable second-generation units. Its stockpile of low- enriched uranium—suitable for use both as reactor fuel and for further enrichment—has grown to more than ten thousand kilograms, a tenfold increase since Obama took office. And Iran now has roughly two hundred kilograms of uranium enriched to 20 percent. If that amount were further enriched to the 90 percent level required for a nuclear weapon, it would be close to, but still short of, one bomb's worth. Exactly how long it would take for Iran to make a dash for a nuclear weapon is unknown. Generally, the