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From: Office of Terje Rod-Larsen Subject: May 21 update Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 14:14:32 +0000 21 May, 2012 Article,. NYT Egypt's March Toward Democracy Ahmed Zewail Article 2. New York Post After the Arab spring Judith Miller Article 3. Al-Ahram Weekly In pursuit of the president Ahmed El-Tonsi Article 4. Chicago Tribune Navigating the future of NATO Madeleine K. Albright Article 5. The Daily Beast The NATO Summit: What Happened to Obama's Pivot From Europe to Asia? Leslie H. Gelb Article 6. NYT Do You Want the Good News First? Thomas L. Friedman Anicic I. NYT Egypt's March Toward Democracy Ahmed Zewail May 20, 2012 -- CAIRO - A few days ago, I watched a debate between Amr Moussa and Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, two of the leading EFTA00935598 candidates among the 13 running for president of Egypt. This stunning debate went on for more than four hours and was watched by millions of Egyptians and other Arabs. Contrary to the perception around the world that Egypt is inexorably sinking into chaos and intolerance, this debate in many ways reflects the hope for a new Egypt following last year's revolution. From the time of Ramses II, the strong pharaoh who ruled Egypt thousands of years ago, until last year when Hosni Mubarak's reign ended, Egyptians were never able to witness a debate over who should take over the democratic reins in the highest office of the land. Our new culture of debate, together with the election of the Parliament last December, are milestones in the history of the nation, paving a new, but rocky, path toward democracy. Unlike in nearby Syria or earlier in Libya, the Egyptian Army has taken the high road and protected the revolution in its infancy. And it has been the guardian of these unprecedented transparent elections. The challenges facing the country, of course, are still monumental. Among the most serious problems are economic hardship, the uncertainty of the political climate and the deterioration of security — a feature that Egyptian society faces anew. These problems have been compounded over the past 15 months as each of the three main constituencies involved in the revolution — the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which is in charge of the transition period; the politically liberal as well as Islamic- oriented parties; and the youth who triggered the uprising — have stumbled in one way or another. Even some of the people most thirsty for transforming Mubarak's stagnant nation from a democracy-deficient to a democracy-rich society have, in despair, been yearning for the old stability. True, there are chaotic symptoms - such as the conflicts among the different political parties and the occasional clashes between the SCAF, the Parliament and the government — but this is a form of the "creative chaos," in the words of Condoleezza Rice, that is a consequence of revolutionary changes that ultimately will lead to a stable democracy. The recent French election is a lesson for us in the peaceful, civilized transfer of power. Looking back, we know the French Revolution some two centuries ago, through a liberation movement not unlike ours, was EFTA00935599 accompanied by widespread bloodshed and ugly political conflicts for many years. It is a hopeful sign indeed that we Egyptians are still marching forward toward democracy with relatively little bloodshed. All signs indicate that a counterrevolution is not in store for Egypt. We will not turn back to a totalitarian governing system. Perhaps the most encouraging of all is the confidence of Egyptians in their future. The governor of the central bank of Egypt, Farouk Al-Okda, recently informed me that the hard-currency revenues coming from expatriates are the highest ever. Even the many strikes for betterment of education, improvement of health care and increase in salaries can be read as acts of high expectations for the future. A rise in violence between some Muslims and Christians is cause for concern. But its origin and intensity are exaggerated in the media. Egypt's Christian history is part of the fabric of the society. Egypt does not have a ghetto for its minority population nor segregation of students at schools, but indeed has some solvable problems to address, including those of civic society issues and representation in governance. Growing up in Egypt, I witnessed the harmony between the peoples of the two of faiths. Together we celebrated Eid al-Fitr, Easter and Christmas, and together we lived in the same buildings and went to the same schools. The late Pope Shenouda III used to say: "We do not live in Egypt, but Egypt lives within us." The current grand imam and sheikh of Al-Azhar, Ahmed el-Tayeb, has signed on a new constitutional paper demanding unity and human rights for all Egyptians. In the post-revolution period, some bad actors, including those from the previous regime, seek to fan inter-religious violence in order to destabilize our infant democracy. The fact that it hasn't taken a deep hold is yet another sign of hope. Naturally, the role of religion in politics is now being debated, and in fact the recent debate is telling of this change. Dr. Aboul Fotouh was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood group that was established in 1928, and suffered from political persecution. He calls himself a liberal Islamist. EFTA00935600 Mr. Moussa, on the other hand, who was a foreign minister and secretary general of the Arab League during the Mubarak era, stresses his experience and paints his opponents as religious extremists. The open debate between the secular and religious orientations of politics was unthinkable over the past 60 years. This new openness means the Egyptian body politic is maturing. Citizens are taking responsibility for their own fate by insisting that diverse visions and ideologies compete. In the end, Egyptians know that, for the first time, they can choose their future. It won't be dictated or imposed by anyone. From my involvement in Egypt, I am confident that the SCAF will hand over the power to the elected president. I, however, believe that the SCAF wishes to have a "respectable exit" and some guarantees regarding the status of the army in the constitution of the new Egypt. My message to the Egyptian people, and especially to the politicians, is simple: For the sake of Egypt, unite together to complete the passage from fallen dictatorship to emergent democracy by focusing on charting the new constitution. No matter who comes to power, the constitution will protect citizens against abuse of authority either by the legislative and executive branches. Luckily, Egypt still has a respected and robust judiciary system to complete the triad of democracy. My concern is that the practice in Mubarak's era of "conflicts of trivialities" can cause the nation to drift away from the central issues of the constitution and economic productivity. The more effective this unproductive course, the longer the transition time to democracy. It is imperative that we do not give up hope. The world must support a democracy that has passed its pregnancy stage and is now in the gestation period, ready for a new birth. Ahmed Zewail was awarded the 1999 Nobel Prize in Chemistry. He is a professor of chemistry and physics at the California Institute of Technology and is playing an active role in Egypt's transformation to democracy. EFTA00935601 Arttcic 2. New York Post After the Arab spring Judith Miller May 19, 2012 -- CAIRO — When Egyptians go to the polls Wednesday and Thursday, they will be choosing not only Egypt's first democratically elected president, but also the future identity and political direction of their country. In selecting among the 13 candidates, Egyptians will be deciding whether they want their ancient nation to be secular or Islamic, but also whether it will be governed by "revolutionary" or "feloul" policies and values. "Feloul," one of those memorable Egyptian-Arabic words, translates as "remnants" — like the scraps left on your dinner plate — or what Egyptians now call those connected with the despised Hosni Mubarak regime. Despite their insistence on labeling the political uprisings of January 2011 that ousted Mubarak's regime in just 18 days a "revolution," many Egyptians doubt that the election will shift all political power from military to civilian rule. Fifteen months after Egyptians toppled Mubarak's 30-year rule, the euphoria surrounding the dramatic uprisings in Tahrir Square has largely evaporated. Tourism, along with foreign exchange reserves and other crucial economic indices, has plunged. While many Egyptians have relished political debate that was unimaginable in Mubarak's day, others told me they would not bother to vote because the military-led transitional government and Islamist-dominate parliament had failed to improve their lives or Egypt's prospects. Disruptions from street protests and strikes have become routine. Street crime, still low by western standards, is rising. The political winds in the most populous, strategically vital of Arab nations are shifting daily, even hourly. While there are few scientifically based polls, most analysts predict that the race will come down to a choice between Abdel Moneim Abou el-Fatouh, 60, the Islamist who broke away from the Muslim Brotherhood and has struggled to portray himself as a "moderate" alternative; non-Islamist candidate Ahmed Shafiq, an ex-Air Force chief who revived Egypt Air and EFTA00935602 was Mubarak's last lackluster prime minister; or Amr Moussa, 75, a former Arab League president and foreign minister under Mubarak who is perceived by Egyptians as embracing more "secular" values. But experts may be underestimating the mobilization capacity of the Muslim Brotherhood, whose delivery of vital goods and services to Egypt's poor has given the 84-year-old organization discipline and staying power. Though the Brotherhood's nominee, Mohammad Morsi, is a fall-back candidate devoid of charisma, he should not be written off. In interviews last week, candidates and party leaders seemed to find vagueness a virtue. Few of them had concrete, realistic proposals for addressing Egypt's staggering debt or reviving its moribund economy. Several vowed to solve Egypt's projected $11 billion budget gap in the next 18 months by "ending corruption" and seizing assets of wealthy investors who allegedly benefited from proximity to Mubarak and his sons. Khairat al-Shater, an imposing self-made businessman who is the Brotherhood's de facto leader and might well have been elected president had Egypt's judiciary not barred him from running, acknowledged that Egypt faces economic crisis. But he said Egypt's woes could be resolved by "exporting workers" to other Arab states, "enhancing the private sector," "strengthening tourism services and marketing" and transforming Egypt from an "exporter of raw materials to processed goods." The country's innumerable political parties make predicting the outcome of the first round of voting perilous. A second round will ensue in June if, as anticipated, none of the 13 contenders receives a majority of the popular vote. But even some liberal secularists told me they were supporting Fatouh, the independent Islamist, because he had championed the revolution and favored "revolutionary" policies to advance "social justice" — that is, an even greater role for the top-heavy Egyptian state in creating and distributing wealth. Conversely, some Islamists who embrace favor stability have crossed religious-political lines to support ex-minister Moussa, whom critics deride as "feloul." To their supporters, however, "feloul" candidates like Moussa and the military's current favorite, Shafiq, represent stability — a return to law-and-order predictability. EFTA00935603 "But their `good ol' days' are not the economic reformist 1990s when Egypt liberalized political life, privatized the economy and loosened trade restrictions," warned Amr Bargisi, the head of an Egyptian group that promotes civil society. "Many in this crowd favor a return to the 1980s, when Egypt's jails were full and the economy was a largely state-run preserve." Many Egyptians warned me that Fatouh, the alternative Islamist, was no moderate. Though he split from the Brotherhood when it initially refused to field a candidate for president and claims to represent a more enlightened Islam, he has been endorsed by some of the ultra-conservative "Salafists" who won a shocking 27% of the parliament's seats last year. While Fatouh has espoused many liberal positions — he says, for instance, that a Christian can be president — his ultimate goal remains the peaceful transformation of Egypt into an Islamic state. One of Egypt's few unifying memes, meanwhile, is opposition to Israel. Last year, even some liberal, secular parties sent supporters to surround the Pyramids to protect them from an ostensible Zionist "plot" to levitate and destroy the ancient tombs through incantation. But no leading candidate favors abandoning Egypt's peace treaty obligations. What makes the presidential contest semi-surreal is its lack of definition. Egypt has not re-written its constitution or decided whether the new leader will head a presidential or parliamentary system. Nor has the interim government defined the chief executive's powers. For months, the military-dominated executive has warred with the Islamist, Brotherhood-led parliament, often producing stalemate. Some of its actions have compounded Egypt's woes. Despite a soaring budget deficit, it increased wages for government employees and expanded its inefficient, 6- million strong public sector by close to a million people. A witch hunt against economic reformers and private investors — accused in mock military trials of being part of Mubarak's "corrupt" coterie — has depressed foreign investment, down from $13 billion in 2008 to $200 million in late 2011. Some doubt that the military will let the Islamists take total power. Behind closed doors, the military has been demanding a continued say in key national security decisions, immunity from prosecution for alleged crimes committed during Mubarak's rule and the protection of its considerable EFTA00935604 economic stake — estimates range from 15% to 40% of the GDP. Almost all political parties seem ready to meet those terms, analysts say, even the Brotherhood. Al-Shater claims to have rejected a deal. So has Fatouh. But Shater predicted that the military would do whatever it could to prevent the Brotherhood from gaining power. "They will cancel the elections if they think that Morsi will win," he told me. That is unlikely. But much depends on whether Egypt's politically disengaged masses — the so-called "revolution of the couch"— plus those dependent on tourism, families of the army and security services, Christians and others who crave a return to stability — turn out to vote. A low-turnout almost guarantees a Muslim Brotherhood or Islamist victory. "For 80 years we've been here, supporting the poor with free schools, food and low-cost hospitals," Shater says. "Their trust is only logical." Judith Miller is a Manhattan Institute adjunctfellow and Fox News commentator. Artick 3. Al-Ahram Weekly In pursuit of the president Ahmed El-Tonsi 17 - 23 May 2012 -- That the forthcoming presidential elections represent the peak of the political careers of all the candidates in them is a fact that has its origin in the nature of the Egyptian political system, with its legacy of the paramount importance of the head of state. For decades, if not centuries, Egyptians have shown reverence towards their rulers, and many historical and cultural ingredients have added more momentum to the eminence of the ruler. In other words, there have been multiple factors that have lain behind the unjustifiable dominance of the presidential office. US political scientist Amos Perlumtter once claimed that Mohamed Ali's foundation of the modern Egyptian state in the early 19th century was an example of Weber's definition of the patrimonial state. According to this definition, the "prince", or ruler, organises the use of political power over EFTA00935605 the citizens in the same manner as he does his authority over his household. Some commentators, such as Khalil El-Anani, have highlighted the disintegrative impact of the 25 January Revolution in Egypt on the patrimonial relationship between the state, as represented by the president, and society, arguing that this has cast shadows on the submission of civil society institutions to the hegemonic power of the state. However, the dissolution of such patrimonial relationships has not been a systematic process, and it will not reach its fully-fledged state until after the current generation of revolutionaries assumes full responsibility over both state and society. THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS CANDIDATES: Many of the candidates in the forthcoming presidential elections have challenged the patrimonial character of the institution at certain points in their political careers. These points or moments have represented the debut, or sometimes the main part, of the respective candidates' roles in the political landscape. The confrontations between former president Anwar El-Sadat and both Hamdeen Sabahi and Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh, for example, illustrated their first real appearances on the political scene at a national level. Moreover, these introductory events to some extent shaped the images of many of the candidates within the collective consciousness of their followers and supporters. Abul-Ezz El-Hariri's famous demonstration in 1978 against Sadat's policies, which resulted in his expulsion from the People's Assembly, for example, was a major event in shaping his popular image as an obdurate opponent of Sadat's policies. Even beyond the personal image that such critical moments have contributed to, for some candidates at least they have been illustrations of the disillusionment or grievances of at least a sector of the generation of Egyptians from which the candidates come. For instance, Khaled Ali's struggle to take privatised industries back into public ownership has explicitly manifested the alienation of the large section of Egyptian youth who later formed the vanguard of the Egyptian revolution. Put differently, such stands by some of the candidates have coincided with the emergence of new or evolving patterns in Egypt's social and political development over the last few decades. Accordingly, many of the candidates have represented the aspirations, many times dashed, of a proportion of a generation, or even of many EFTA00935606 generations, of Egyptians at various points in Egypt's contemporary history. However, there are also candidates who have become a challenge to the regime as a result of their increasing popularity, notwithstanding their explicit opposition to the regime. Amr Moussa is unique among the candidates in that his popularity, founded on strong criticism of both Israel and the US, rendered him distant from ousted former president Hosni Mubarak. Yet, he never explicitly challenged Mubarak or his regime, though he always appeared as a viable alternative for sections of Egyptians. For Mubarak, Moussa remained a dormant threat that had to be contained rather than eliminated, while Moussa himself acted as a representative of Arab nationalists who were frustrated with the Arab regimes' apparently unconditional rush to reach a peaceful compromise with Israel even at the cost of Arab strategic interests and long-held patriotic values. There are also the Muslim Brotherhood candidates, who on an individual basis never constituted a direct challenge to the Mubarak regime, even though the Brotherhood was the only force to be considered a threat. As a result, the Mubarak regime resorted to traditional means of coercion, though it also occasionally allowed the Association to run in parliamentary elections. Throughout its 80-year history, the Brotherhood periodically challenged successive regimes in Egypt, particularly in the two confrontations it had with former president Gamal Abdel-Nasser. Under Sadat, the re-establishment of the organisation paved the way to a new generation of members among university students who contributed to a new wave of Political Islam in the aftermath of the 1967 setback. This new generation has now contributed the Brotherhood candidates in the presidential elections, first Khairat El-Shater and now Mohamed Mursi. Abul-Fotouh, though a dissident from the organisation, also belongs to the new recruits that joined it in the 1970s. It can therefore be argued that the current presidential candidates reflect Egypt's socio-political development, its shifting ideologies, and the ever- changing power base of its regime. They can be categorised into three groups depending on their ages, these reflecting the prevalent political atmosphere and related personal and ideological expectations. Such expectations have sometimes been dashed by the ruling presidential institution, as well as by the grim political realities that have betrayed the EFTA00935607 candidates' personal and ideological preferences. Like geological eras, each of the three generations has enjoyed common characteristics, while at the same time exhibiting idiosyncratic differences, even among candidates belonging to the same generation. The January Revolution with its promises represents a new landscape for all the candidates, regardless of their political generation and ideological inclination. The history of the various candidates was crucial to their participation in the revolution and to their nomination as candidates in the presidential elections, though they differ in terms of their revolutionary credentials. THE FIRST-GENERATION CANDIDATES: The first generation of candidates, represented by Amr Moussa, Mohamed Selim El-Awwa and even Mohamed El-Baradei, who declined to stand, is a typical product of the middle class of the 1930s and 40s, whose members pursued the legal profession as the path for social and political mobility. It was during these decades that the legal profession in Egypt reached its zenith, with the vast majority of political leaders belonging to the profession. Moussa, El-Awwa and El-Baradei all became law students. However, the 1952 Revolution altered the fortunes of many professions in Egypt, and, instead of relying on lawyers to supply politicians, Nasser started to diversify to include technocrats and the military, having only limited resort to the old elites with their characteristic legal background. Moreover, the social transformation of the elite was combined with Nasser's frequent resort to notions of revolutionary legitimacy, alienating the legal profession that had been raised under the liberal trend of respect for the rule of law. Many law school graduates started to feel the gap between their expectations, both personal and ideological, and the new realities. Yet, despite this gap, Moussa, El-Baradei and El-Awwa opted to work for the government. Until the 1970s, public posts remained the preferred, if not the sole, employment opportunity. It is fair to say that Moussa was the real pioneer among the three in identifying the unfulfilled promises of the legal profession, a fact reflecting his analytical mind, courage and ambitions. Joining Egypt's diplomatic service instead of following a legal career was for Moussa a bold decision that identified him as an aspirant politician who would always follow his own ambitions even within a changing EFTA00935608 environment. Moussa seems not to have been involved in political activities at university, and, whatever the real reason for his not becoming politically active during his student years, he always chose to play it safe, a feature that added much to his surviving successive ruling regimes with their contradictory political orientations. In the 1960s, it was said that Moussa was a member of the regime's Vanguard Organisation in the ministry of foreign affairs, this showing that he sought to remain politically active even within the narrow window offered by this organisation inside the Arab Socialist Union of the time. Moussa's later distancing himself from Mubarak was forced upon him, as the latter's pursuit of maintaining power pushed the politically ambitious Moussa into the shade and made him secretary-general of the Arab League. On a local level, this move earned Moussa tremendous popularity, making him almost a figure from popular folklore. A cunning politician, Moussa was able to maintain a delicate balance between his popular image, his relationship with Mubarak, and his duties in his new position. In his job at the Arab League, Moussa's popularity remained relatively unscathed despite the setbacks that impacted on nearly all the Arab States in the turbulent regional and global politics that were characteristic of the first decade of the third millennium. Within the same context, Egypt's politics also became more turbulent in the last years of Mubarak's rule, partly as a result of his endeavours to push his son forward as his heir apparent, and partly because of other events happening in Egypt. Moussa was cautious in expressing his ambitions, and despite the challenges that confronted him he survived in his role in the Arab League, even "participating" in the Arab Spring. In sum, Moussa has remained a viable presidential candidate for many diverse sectors of society in Egypt, and he is also a favourite among some regional and global foreign actors. The fact that he has become a leading candidate is not only because of his undisputed charisma or his mastery of politics. It is also because he was able to change his pre-arranged failure as secretary- general of the Arab League into a new start that could push him forward in his political career. The response of El-Awwa to the declining prestige of the legal profession was different to that of Moussa. Al-Awwa focussed instead on adding more local and international legal education/development to his CV, and he achieved a success that reflected his position as an Islamist thinker and EFTA00935609 reformer. Save for a brief period of arrest in 1965, allegedly as a member of the then banned Muslim Brotherhood, El-Awwa has smoothly pursued his legal career. It seems that his candidacy for president represents a form of self-actualisation, rather than the peak of a totally different academic career in which he had previously established himself. Though not a member of the legal profession, Ahmed Shafik is also among the first-generation candidates. Born in 1941, almost a decade before the 1952 Revolution, Shafik alone of all the first- generation candidates opted for a different career. Influenced by the prospects of the military as a career in the aftermath of the July Revolution, Shafik joined the Air Force Academy, which seemed to match the ambitions of many young Egyptians at the time. A military career was attractive to many young men as it offered a guaranteed path of social mobility, while the military establishment itself was reaching its zenith in the 1960s. Shafik was one young man who set out on such a career with its apparently endless opportunities. His prospects were further enhanced by his marriage to one of the daughters of one of the Free Officers who led the revolution. Shafik became a prototype for what could be called one of the "promising" or "promised" candidates, having a bright future in the military and then in the civilian sector after his retirement. In effect, Shafik enjoyed the best of both worlds, since he reached the peak of the military when he was appointed commander of the Air Force and he later reached the peak of a civilian career when he was made Mubarak's last prime minister. Shafik's military and civilian careers have been exceptionally successful, the only parallel example being those of late prime minister Kamal Hassan Ali. The most important event in Shafik's career was his assumption of the title of prime minister in the last days of Mubarak, though as it turned out this event was also the first scene in a new play with different actors. THE SECOND-GENERATION CANDIDATES: The second-generation candidates are Abul- Fotouh, Sabahi, Mursi, Hisham El-Bastawisi and El- Hariri. Ideologically, they are heterogeneous and cover almost the whole of the political spectrum from extreme right, like Abul-Fotouh, to far left represented by El-Hariri. Yet, with the exception of El-Bastawisi and Mursi, the second-generation candidates started their political careers during the 1970s when they EFTA00935610 became known as ardent opponents of Sadat's regime and policies. For strictly job-related reasons as an eminent judge, El-Bastawisi was a latecomer to the political arena, in which he has been able to provide a synthesis of political liberalism and a deep commitment to social justice, both characteristic of the major leftist party that has endorsed his candidacy. In contrast, El-Hariri has been in the opposition since the late 1970s, and he is an example of an uncompromising leftist candidate who will not abandon his early convictions in order to achieve political office. The fact that these five candidates belong to five different professions and come from various social backgrounds reflects the major social transformations that were characteristic of Egypt in the 1950s and 60s. Social mobility was unprecedented during these decades, and the gates of education were opened to many, allowing the middle as well as the lower social classes the opportunity to exploit education as a major tool of social mobility. Many of the second-generation candidates are among the beneficiaries of Nasser's free education policies, which were part of the transformational experience under his rule. However, the 1967 setback represented a major blow to Nasserism, halting its development while at the same time exposing the regime's inadequacies. Many commentators have highlighted the impact of the 1967 setback on the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism. Abul-Fotouh and even the disqualified El-Shater endorse this notion, since they both joined the resurgent Islamist trend in the aftermath of the 1967 setback. During these early years of Islamist revivalism, there is almost no mention of Mohamed Mursi, at the time at the Faculty of Engineering at Cairo University, which was known for its student activism. Mursi was not part of the student protests that took place against Sadat for continuing the situation of no war-no peace that prevailed from August 1970 until October 1973. Abul-Fotouh emerged as a leading political figure within the Islamist trend inside the universities during the 1970s. Moreover, his joining the re- established Muslim Brotherhood added more momentum to his career, as well as giving him visibility on the political scene, rather than seeing him fade away after the end of the university protests, a fate that many of the 1970s student movement leaders unfortunately suffered. The other trends of the time, mostly Nasserite and leftist, did not have the Islamists' organisation, and they were not able to nurture the newly emergent cadres EFTA00935611 who had been fighting individually against Sadat's policies to reshape the Egyptian economy and society. The late 1970s also saw an escalation in Sadat's coercive measures against the Nasserite trend and the whole Egyptian left. In contrast, the Muslim Brotherhood enjoyed considerable freedom under the Sadat regime, allowing its newly released leaders and those returning from exile to resume their activities. Thus, the fortunes of the two leading candidates belonging to the second generation, Abul-Fotouh and Sabahi, are very different. Sabahi, a charismatic revolutionary leader with solid ideological convictions, was barred from meaningful political participation during his best years as a promising popular leader, these coinciding with Mubarak's long years in office, even as the rest of the landscape was full of poor quality leaders and politicians. To his credit, Sabahi never espoused grandiloquent Nasserite principles, and in his famous debate with Sadat he argued for very nearly the same principles that he has been elaborating on in his recent electoral platform. Abul-Fotouh has a different profile that sometimes looks ill-defined. He has been one of the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, and he contributed to its re-establishment in the 1970s. Ideologically, he has been a devout member, though he has been officially declared a dissident. Enjoying the support of a large section of Salafi voters may compensate for the absence, if not counter-mobilisation, of his former organisation. On the youth side, the situation has been uncertain because of the volatility of this bloc, particularly as a result of Abul-Fotouh's increasing visibility as a Salafi nominee, though this has also shown his political cunning and his ability to amass political support from everywhere. Mursi has been in a difficult situation as the Brotherhood's nominee, since he entered the arena at the last minute while the popularity of the organisation was on the decline. Mursi's fortunes are a function of the organisation's popularity, and he can do little to restore it to its heyday. Apart from that link, Mursi has been a typical party nominee who has lacked the credentials, as well as the history of political activism, of his fellows among the second-generation candidates. THE THIRD-GENERATION CANDIDATES: The third-generation candidates are Khaled Ali and Hazem Abu Ismail. The last two terms of Mubarak's reign, characterised by political stagnation, the elimination of EFTA00935612 any potential successor, and endeavours to groom Mubarak's son as his heir apparent, explain the relatively small number of presidential candidates from this generation, as well as their limited ideological options. The Mubarak era saw the development of a political arena and environment that was counter- productive to the evolution of either new visions or new leaders. This drastically impacted many aspects of Egypt's society, culture, and people, and it damaged their long-held values. As a result, it should not be surprising that the revolutionaries have not been able to put forward a single candidate, even though they were in the vanguard of the revolution, or that they have not been able to frame a well- articulated ideology. Mubarak's era was the real incubator of candidates like the disqualified Abu Ismail and Ali, the only representative of the Generation Y that led the revolution. A human rights activist who spent years fighting the ousted regime in the courts, Ali was a genuine participant in the events of the revolution and in the various protests that characterised the last years of Mubarak's rule. He represents the new generation of revolutionaries who irreversibly toppled the ancien regime, while not being able, or not wanting, to seize power themselves to complete the mission of the revolution. Herein lies the relevance of Ali's candidacy as the only genuine revolutionary who opted to complete the revolution. Astonishingly, many of his comrades have been supporting the other candidates. Ali's leanings to the left may have distanced him from the majority of the revolutionaries, whose interpretation of social justice has been rather sketchy and ill- defined. Yet, it is strange that the 6 April Movement has not endorsed Ali, and it is even stranger that the National Front for Change has supported Abul-Fotouh. The forthcoming presidential elections will witness a competition among three generations, as well as between many candidates. The personalities of the latter and their popular images will be major factors in determining the voting behaviour of the vast majority of Egyptians. Two ill-defined forces will have a major impact on the selection of the next president: the youth forming more than 60 percent of the voters and those voters casting protest ballots against the candidates of Political Islam. EFTA00935613 Such forces will be important in deciding who from among the three generations will win. In the same way that it was not possible to predict the January Revolution, it is impossible to anticipate who will be the next president. The writer is a political analyst. Anicle 4. Chicago Tribune Navigating the future of NATO Madeleine K. Albright May 20, 2012 -- This weekend, Chicago plays host to the leaders of NATO, the world's strongest and most successful alliance. During the summit, the first held in the United States outside of Washington, President Barack Obama and his counterparts from Canada and 26 European nations will discuss a range of urgent security challenges. These include the dangers posed by an increasingly desperate al-Qaida, violent extremism based in Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan, Iran's nuclear program, turbulence in the Middle East and the rising threat of cybersabotage. Although founded in 1949 to confront Soviet totalitarianism, the alliance has always been defined more by what it defends — democracy, security and the rule of law — than by what it is against. Geopolitical and technological changes continue to push countries from across the globe closer together, making NATO even more essential, as evidenced most recently in Libya and on a daily basis in Central Asia. Today, as during the Cold War, there is no substitute for NATO. Like other institutions, however, the alliance cannot afford to stand still. In 2009 and 2010, I was privileged to chair a high-level experts group that recommended principles for upgrading NATO's strategic doctrine. Many of those principles were adopted, prompting a further shift in planning toward new threats, an emphasis on partnerships with non-NATO countries, and an open but clear-eyed approach to Vladimir Putin's Russia. Since then, for several reasons, some have called into question the future of the alliance. Although successful, NATO's humanitarian mission in Libya EFTA00935614 did expose splits in the organization's leadership, with Germany deciding not to participate. Meanwhile, the air operations conducted over Libya, as with NATO's intervention in Kosovo more than a decade earlier, illustrated a continuing imbalance between American and European military capabilities. Even more seriously, NATO's secretary-general and American military planners have long urged European governments to heighten their commitment to defense. The continent's debt and financial crisis has now made it more difficult for them to do so. To aggravate matters further, the rising U.S. budget deficit, coupled with political gridlock, seems sure to affect the Pentagon's own spending plans. All this heightens the significance of the discussions that President Obama and other NATO leaders will conduct in Chicago. Together, they must send a unified message to Americans that the alliance remains a critical contributor to our security and to Europeans that U.S. security assistance cannot be taken for granted. While it is true that circumstances change with each passing year, what must not change is the trans-Atlantic partnership's unbreakable bond. Since its founding, NATO has been important not only for what it does, but for what it represents. In the aftermath of Hitler and in opposition to Stalin and his successors, the alliance was both the symbol and the substance of Western democratic resolve. Although in hindsight, this period may be thought of in glowing terms, in fact the members of the organization engaged in continuous debates about tactics, mission and burden sharing. NATO today is not explicitly aligned against any country, but it does remain the best prepared and most potent group opposed to terrorism, international aggression, and mass violations of human rights. This does not mean that NATO will act in every crisis, but its potential to do so when called upon is an indispensable and unique international asset. NATO provides an anchor of stability that is underappreciated on both sides of the Atlantic perhaps because it has been with us for so long. The alliance is a tangible demonstration of America's commitment to European security and of a determination by European leaders to avoid the kind of internal divisions that produced two world wars. NATO enlargement has given East and Central Europe a powerful incentive to embrace democracy and to respect ethnic minorities. NATO's breadth has provided a vital link EFTA00935615 to Turkey, one of Europe's rising powers, and a country of influence in the volatile but strategic Middle East. NATO operations have caused it to form unprecedented partnerships with governments outside its own region. Finally, NATO's democratic values remain the most effective engine of social and political progress on the face of the globe. When traveling around our country, I am often asked whether I am an optimist or a pessimist; I reply that I am an optimist who worries a lot. That is how I feel about the future of NATO. This weekend, alliance leaders will face a challenge with dimensions that cannot be resolved overnight. It is too much to expect that they will achieve perfect unity or cause funding issues to vanish. It is fair to hope, however, that they will reaffirm their sense of common purpose, vow to complete missions currently under way and take every step they can to prepare for future contingencies. That is less than we might desire in a perfect world, but given the imperfect times in which we live, it is cause for gratitude — and for the city that hosts such a gathering, considerable reason for pride. Madeleine K. Albright is former U.S. secretary ofstate and co-chair of the Chicago NATO host committee. Her latest book is "Prague Winter: A Personal Story of Remembrance and War, 1937-1948." The Daily Beast The NATO Summit: What Happened to Obama's Pivot From Europe to Asia? Leslie H. Gelb May 20, 2012 -- There is a foreign-policy god. And it is she who must deserve thanks for halting the Obama administration's incantations about "pivoting" from Europe to Asia. The recent silence on this shift came about not just because the G8 meeting of major economic powers was scheduled for last week at Camp David, and that most of the eight were European. It wasn't that the NATO summit was set for Chicago for Saturday and Sunday, and that most alliance members were also European. Nor has the EFTA00935616 Obama team altered its plans to move some U.S. security resources from an unthreatened Europe to an uncertain Asia; of course that has to be done. Enlightenment was advanced when administration leaders realized they had gratuitously offended European allies and gratuitously provided Beijing's hawks with ammunition to argue that America was formally and openly instituting a policy of containing China. The Obama team's minds were surely jolted when so many privately expressed unhappiness about the provocative public pivot. Beyond all these considerations, like to believe there was a deeper reason for silencing the idea.. like to believe that the recently and now oft proclaimed geniuses of administration foreign policy saw the light: Europe Plus, i.e., Europe along with Japan, Australia, Canada, and Israel, should—on the merits—remain the rock of U.S. national-security strategy. To me, it is plain common sense to see that Europe Plus (the bulk of G8 and NATO members) is the group of nations that most closely share U.S. values and interests. It doesn't take a genius to see that these values and interests are not widely shared elsewhere—or at least that other nations are not nearly as ready as the Europe Plus group to act on those interests and values. If the United States were to be in trouble or require help, it is unimaginable that India, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Turkey, or whatever country would actively back Washington with money and arms. The U.S. can count on only the Europe Plus group. When America needs military help abroad, it comes essentially from European NATO countries, Canada, and Australia. When it comes to providing economic aid to poor and needy nations, Europeans and Japan almost always are our principal partners. Never to be forgotten: the great bulk of U.S. trade and investments comes to and from Europe and Canada, to say nothing of Japan. For all the economic difficulties of Europe and Japan, America's economic fate over the next decade and beyond is still tied more with these nations than to China or the other emerging powers like India, Brazil, and Turkey. My concern here is not really with the future of the G8. That group and its larger G20 brother will survive one way or another. The members find it convenient to use these forums to talk economic policy. And at Camp David, they also mused about energy and food aid. To be sure, they also discussed economic sanctions against Iran, but this matter really belongs to EFTA00935617 a much smaller group of permanent M. Security Council members plus Germany. G8 leaders, from front to back European Council President Herman van Rompuy, Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti, British Prime Minister David Cameron, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, US President Barack Obama, French President Francois Hollande, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiro Noda, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev and European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso arrive to pose for a photo during the G8 summit at Camp David. (Nicholas Kamm / AFP-Getty Images) It is NATO's future that is a worry. Most Americans will barely take notice of or care about the NATO meeting underway in the Windy City. It's even hard for most Americans to remember why the NATO thing was created in the first place. Oh, yes, to deter and defeat an attack by the Soviet Union on Western Europe. But that effort was launched more than 60 years ago, and the Soviet Union no longer exists. And only those on political meds like Mitt Romney worry about Russia as a threat to the United States in today's world. (He called it America's No. 1 geopolitical foe.) So, NATO members and a large gaggle of other nations now gathered in Chicago will be discussing a war many of them have been fighting for 10 years in Afghanistan, a war that virtually all the attendees would prefer to escape as soon as possible or sooner, a war they are fighting out of loyalty to America. And in Chicago, the attendees will listen to President Obama, the alliance's leader, implore them to keep their troops in Afghanistan and fighting until the end of 2014. The new French president has now reiterated his campaign pledge to clear out this December. And America's allies will find themselves under relentless pressure from Obama to contribute vast sums they can ill afford to keep the Afghan government and security forces afloat. Washington estimates the bill will total $4.1 billion a year for three years after NATO combat forces depart in 2014. The United States is expected to cover about two thirds of the $4.1 billion and is urging NATO partners to contribute $1.3 billion a year after 2014. In the days leading up to the Chicago summit, the only nations that pledged were Germany at $193 million a year, Britain at $110 million a year, and non-NATO member Australia at $100 million a year. India, Japan, Russia, and the Gulf states EFTA00935618 have yet to offer any funding. Nor has China offered a penny, despite its already considerable and mounting economic interests in Afghanistan's oil and copper industries. The sense of common security interests remains in NATO and Europe Plus. They still see threats in similar ways. They still all realize that either they act together or no one acts. But almost all are falling and failing economically. The U.S. contingent in Chicago will also be imploring NATO partners to join in "smart defense," meaning getting them to spend more on their armed forces. Washington's share of the joint defense burden has increased from 50 percent to more than 75 percent over the last decade. That ratio is unsustainable, but it's not likely to change much. Also look for the U.S. contingent in Chicag