EFTA01756049.pdf

From: Office of Terje Rod -Larsen < Sent: Tuesday, November 5, 2013 11:23 AM Subject: November S update 5 November, 2013 Article 1. =he National Interest Diplomacy Redux: Kerry's Opportunity, Obama's Test Lincoln P. Bloomfield Jr. <http://nationalinterest.org/profile/linco=n-p-bloomfield-jr> =a href="#b">Article 2. =loomberg Israel Pushed Iran to the Table, Says Hagel =effrey Goldberg Article 3. =YT Mr. Kerry Fumbles in Egypt The Editor=al Board <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/opinio=/editorialboard.html> =a href="#d">Article 4. =he Washington Post Saudi Arabia's Prince Turki: 'American policy has been wrong'</=pan> =ally Weymouth Article 5. =all Street Journal Making the Most of the U.S. Energy Boom =eorge P. Shultz and Frederick W. Smith &n=sp; EFTA_R1_00057206 EFTA01756049 Arti=le 1. The National Intere=t Diplomacy Red=x: Kerry's Opportunity, Obama's Test Linc=ln P. Bloomfield Jr. chttplinationalinterest.org/profile/linco=n-p-bloomfield-jr> November 5, 2013 --=Since he succeeded Hillary Clinton last February as the country's sixty-=ighth secretary of state, John Kerry has quickly built on relationships fo=ged with foreign leaders during his Senate years to position diplomacy as the principal tool in addressing some of th= most consequential international security challenges currently facing the=United States. It is a big change.=While Mrs. Clinton earned plaudits for her tireless travels, the sixty-sev=nth secretary will be remembered more for talking about diplomacy's impo=tance than for actually using it to great effect. By contrast Mr. Kerry's legacy as Secretary of State is already =ure to be defined by the success or failure of major U.S. diplomatic initi=tives to secure compromises from parties to the Middle East's most deep-=ooted conflicts. Three simultaneous =egotiations now offer the prospect of achieving strategically important ob=ectives: one to produce an Israeli-Palestinian two-state solution; another=to rid Syria of its chemical-weapons arsenal; and the third to achieve an accord with Iran under which Tehran w=uld forego developing nuclear weapons. If Diplomacy Succee=s The opportunity is =ard to overstate. Officially ending sixty-five years of Palestinian grieva=ce while according Israel universally-recognized borders—issues which, w=atever one's views, have soured Arab attitudes toward the US and complicated US-Israel relations for generation=—would fulfill the declared but unmet policy aspiration of every America= president since Truman. Eliminating a large chemical-weapons arsenal that=has been used repeatedly despite international prohibitions would restore the crucial deterrent effect of t=e Chemical Weapons Convention, undermined by the Syrian regime's lethal ch=mical munitions attacks on its own civilian neighborhoods. Above all, reliably=halting Iran's nuclear weapons quest without resort to military force world not only make good on the 'reddest' of President Obama's much-rem=rked 'red lines,' it would forestall a Persian-Arab nuclear arms race astride the oil-rich Persian Gulf, a scenario made all t=e more combustible by Sunni-Shia sectarian strife and Israel's unpredict=ble response to proliferating nuclear threats in its midst. President Obama has=much riding on the outcome of these negotiations. Not only has he staked t=e credibility of his office on redressing the nuclear and chemical weapons=threats posed by Iran and Syria, respectively, but he has courted increased strategic risk in precipitously withdrawing f=rces from Iraq and (soon) Afghanistan and exhibiting only perfunctory conc=rn over large defense sector cutbacks imposed by sequestration. Achieving =ignificant security benefits through negotiation, while not necessarily compensating for these risks, would enh=nce U.S. influence at a time when <http://nationalinterest=org/commentary/Americas-loosening-global-grip-9302> m=ny in the world are questioning <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/Americas-loose=ing-global-grip-9302> Ameri=a's political and economic vitality <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/Americas-loosening=global-grip-9302> and its appetite for continued global leadership. One could envision =he President, with Middle East successes in hand, making high diplomacy a =ore meaningful dimension of the Asia "pivot," seeking to defuse escala=ing tensions between China and its neighbors by mediating 2 EFTA_R1_00057207 EFTA01756050 conflicting territorial claims—as Secretary Kerry proposed =n his recent Asia travels—and probing North Korea's Kim Jong-Un for mo=e reliable undertakings than his father and grandfather ever produced. Recognition is wide=pread that the U.S. has over-relied on 'hard power' in recent years, a=d civilian policy tools—not having demonstrated comparable potency since=perhaps the 1995 Dayton Agreement that ended hostilities in Bosnia — have lost stature and credibility compared to the =ilitary. Congressional funding has reflected the belief that DoD, alone am=ng cabinet departments, has the wherewithal to generate game-changing impa=t on security challenges overseas. A demonstration that geopolitical dealmaking is not a lost art in Washingt=n would be salutary on many levels. Is the US Up to the=Challenge? To say that success=could bring great benefits is not to predict it. Two impediments that Secr=tary Kerry has—justifiably, in the author's view—chosen to disregard=are, first, the perennial penchant of White House advisors to shield the President from political exposure to high-pro=ile endeavors carrying the risk of failure, and second, the potential that=congressional partisanship—ignoring the old 'water's edge' boundar=—could impede US negotiators' ability to deliver on a major agreement. The stakes in all t=ree of these arenas justify taking political risk, but as in military ende=vors, clarity about the long-term stakes for all concerned parties, and th= breadth of planning in support of negotiations, directly affect the prospects for success or failure. Here i= where doubts arise about the Administration's readiness to deliver on t=e promise of the diplomatic tracks it has so vigorously embraced.c/=> While each of these=negotiations is underway without undue controversy, questions are already =rising in the Syria and Iran tracks as to whether the US may be aiming too=low, preemptively limiting its objectives to what it believes could be agreed upon most easily, quickly and with the=least resistance from interested parties, including Congress. The benefits of nar=owly crafted agreements resulting in the dismantling of Syria's chemical=weapons and a monitored pullback of Iran's nuclear enrichment activities=would be deemed by many in the US as preferable to no agreement with a corresponding increased likelihood of resort to mil=tary force. For Syria, Russia and Iran, modest concessions would represent=a price worth paying if this meant the US would refrain from challenging t=eir larger, more strategic and longer-term objectives in the region. US negotiators, the=efore, could encounter surprisingly little pushback from Syria and Iran, r=spectively, and have Moscow's support, if the goals pursued are tightly =rawn and do not entail much if any political discomfiture for those parties. The one mystery emerging from this diploma=ic blitz is the Administration's own view of long-term US national inter=sts in the Middle East, and whether the current negotiations are aligned w=th a coherent strategy to pursue them. Israeli-Palestinian=Talks on Course, but what about the spoiler? Start with the trac= that is best-positioned: the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. US negotia=or Martin Indyk brings the expertise and the diplomatic and bureaucratic c=edentials necessary to hold his own in a negotiation where required compromises can be brokered only by mainta=ning the complete trust of the parties. Ambassador Indyk has assembled a q=ality team and kept a low media profile —all steps consistent with a prod=ctive negotiating approach. Unfortunately, neit=er party to the talks—Israeli or Palestinian Authority representatives=97has the capacity to address what has in recent years become the greatest=(if not the sole) source of insecurity in their midst, namely heavily armed nonstate actors equipped and funded by I=an. The range, accuracy and quantity of rocket and missile threats against=population centers in Israel from Hizballah across the Lebanese border and=Hamas in Gaza have steadily increased. Any confusion about=Israel's overriding security preoccupation should have been dispelled by=Prime Minister Netanyahu's October 1 address to the UN General Assembly.=While pledging his readiness to make "an historic 3 EFTA_R1_00057208 EFTA01756051 compromise with our Palestinian neighbors," Mr. Netanyahu spent=the majority of his speech articulating a detailed warning about the dange=s posed by Iran's fundamentalist regime. Notwithstanding Ambassador Indy.'s wide policy mandate, it very likely does not extend to US policy on Iran. Syria—Understanda=le Reluctance but Troubling Missteps The Syria crisis—=dmittedly a dauntingly violent and complicated conflict where American int=rests are less than obvious to the public—has revealed the Administratio= to have a penchant for reacting to rather than shaping events. Much has been said about the sudden lurches in the Pr=sident's approach. He postured to use force and then paused, belatedly s=bmitting the issue for congressional authorization, only to pull back in t=e face of insufficient support. Secretary Kerry's=seemingly spontaneous response to a London press query about conditions un=er which the US might refrain from attacking Syria prompted a stunningly q=ick Russian initiative to negotiate the removal of Syria's chemical weapons, challenging Washington to take 'y=s' for an answer—which it did. While officials tout President Obama'= effective threat of force in compelling Syria to forfeit its chemical wea=ons, the UN Security Council resolution adopted with US support would require a second resolution before punitive action u=der Chapter VII is authorized—a precedent the George W. Bush administrat=on famously resisted on Iraq. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Secr=tary Kerry so readily welcomed Russia's offer of a negotiated dismantlement of Syria's chemical arsenal precisel= because of Mr. Obama's unreadiness to authorize military action.=/p> Even assuming that =he Syria chemical weapons disarmament process fully succeeds, major questi=ns remain. Yes, Mr. Obama will have recouped a measure of presidential cre=ibility by backing up his declared 'red line' on Syria's use of chemical weapons, albeit months after t=eir use had been confirmed by intelligence. But what of the President's =ther Syria 'marker —his August 18, 2011 declaration that "the time=has come for President Assad to step aside"? That declaration, although <http://thehill.com/blogs/global-aff=irs/middle-east-north-africa/328313-kerry-doubles-down-on- demand-that-assa=-must-go> repeated <http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/middle-east-n=rth-africa/3283B-kerry- doubles-down-on-demand-that-assad-must-go> as recently as October 14 by Secretary Kerry, shows no sign of being pursued, much less fulfilled= notwithstanding administration pronouncements that the eleven-country "=eneva process" will effect a governmental transition in Damascus.=/p> The Atlantic Counci='s Fred Hof has posed a <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/=logs/menasource/syria-getting-past-the- chemicals> question <http://www.atlanticcouncilorg/blogs/menasource/syria=getting-past-the-chemicals> that many Syrians=are surely asking as well: has the US made Bashar al-Assad "an irreplaceable party to a long-term contract" to fu=fill its chemical weapons agreement? President Obama appears as indifferen= about whether his demand to rid Syria of its homicidal dictatorship will =ver be carried out as he is ardent about having his red line restored on chemical weapons. Having gained this =eprieve, President Assad can be forgiven for doubting that the threat of U= military force remains a realistic danger to his regime's survival, or =o his armed forces' freedom of action against the domestic opposition. It is Mr. Assad's good fortune that, wi=h the military strikes options pulled back from the brink, the Obama natio=al-security team left itself with no other levers of influence at hand to =ontain the spreading Syria crisis. When President Obam= initially solicited options to exert leverage on Syria in this crisis, hi= national-security staff turned straight to the Pentagon, which dutifully =enerated kinetic strike packages and target sets. Nowhere did that process <http://www.whitehou=e.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf> reflect the Administration's forward-looking doctrinal approa=h to international-security challenges <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_vie=er/national_security_strategy.pdf> ying success to the integration of "all of the tools of American powe=" in a whole-of-government operation. The President also ignored the =ounsel of his top military advisor, General Martin Dempsey, who had public=y cautioned that in Syria "you need a strategy to tie military options with other instruments of power." 4 EFTA_R1_00057209 EFTA01756052 It is a rare specta=le to find the Arab League Foreign Ministers formallycal=ing for war crimes prosecutions against a fellow Arab leader and his inner cir=le, yet even more striking that US government—which sports a full Office=of Global Criminal Justice led by an Ambassador-at-Large, solely for this =urpose—apparently has not seen fit to lead on this issue or even consider the threat of war crimes prosecutio= as a potential tool of leverage on Mr. Assad's regime. While Hezbollah and=lran's Revolutionary Guards have invested heavily in television and othe= media outlets as a means of shaping public opinion to their advantage, th= administration apparently sees no opportunity in the Arab world's information domain to expose the cynical and illegit=mate misdeeds of those directly responsible for this crisis. And while Pre=ident Obama's June decision to arm and train the Syrian opposition has t=anslated into what the Washington Post <http://articles.wa=hingtonpost.com/2013-10-02/world/42616148_1_u-s-intelligence-analysts- trai=ing-program-rebel> describes chttp://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-10-02/world/4=616148_1_u-s- intelligence-analysts-training-program-rebel> as a "minuscule" clandestine program, Moscow and Tehran continue a robust flow of heavy arms, fighters =nd funds into Syria to sustain the Assad regime. In sum, Washington =howl no evidence of mustering either military or nonmilitary tools of infl=ence that would offer a credible prospect of rescuing what remains of Syri='s largely defenseless population from the ravages of Bashar al- Assad's conventional forces. With well over 110=000 killed and an estimated seven million displaced, one third of them ove=flowing refugee camps in neighboring countries, one finds no inclination w=thin the Administration to invoke—as it had in Libya —the humanitarian intervention doctrine known as Responsi=ility to Protect. Indeed, the US-Russia-Syria chemical weapons disarmament=project has become, pace the Nobel Committee, the ethical antithesis of Re=ponsibility to Protect, veritably a License to Ignore. These policy foible= obscure the larger strategic landscape at play in Syria's conflict. Rus=ia's opportunism in seizing upon Secretary Kerry's press remark to off=r full partnership in eliminating Syrian chemical weapons was clearly motivated less by the fear of civilian casual=ies from "one stiff breeze" of toxic vapors than by its interest in ke=ping the Assad regime in power. Having no other major clients for its arms=export industry since the fall of Muammar Qadhafi, no other port of access for its navy in the Levant, and an affini=y for a secular regime—however brutal—that bills itself as a bulwark a=ainst Sunni Arab religious extremism, Russia has deftly kept America from =etting in the way of its core interests in the region. If the Administrati=n sees advantage in giving Moscow a pass over its weapons being used by th= Syrian military to lay waste to populated cities and towns, its passivity=toward Iran's regional activities demands explanation. Iran and its proxy force Hezbollah have massively supported t=e Assad regime, revealing an historically rare condition of vulnerability =o prospective regime change in Damascus. Hezbollah, which ha= the blood of US Marines on its hands and has become so heavily armed that=it sustained hostilities with Israel for several days in 2006, is now poli=ically exposed back home in Lebanon and throughout the Arab world for fighting and killing fellow Muslims in a=neighboring Arab country on behalf of a secular dictatorship. Its operatio=s, today as thirty years ago, are wholly dependent on continued support fr=m Tehran. The Iranian cleric =eading an organization charged with countering the "soft war" against =he fundamentalist regime in Tehran, Hojjat al-Islam Mehdi Taeb, explained <http://iranpulse.al-monitor.com/index.php/2013/02/134=/head-of- ammar-strategic-base-syria-is-irans-35th-province-if-we-lose-syri=-we-cannot-keep-tehrank the vital importance of Syria to the survival of the mullahs' regime, in=remarks to student loyalists in February: ""Syria is the 3=th province [of Iran] and a strategic province for us. If the enemy attack= us and wants to appropriate either Syria or Khuzestan [in southern Iran],=the priority is that we keep Syria....lf we keep Syria, we can get Khuzestan back too, but if we lose Syria we cann=t keep Tehran."•• As with the Israel-=alestinian negotiations, a proper US understanding of Syria's crisis mus= factor in an Iranian role animated by nothing short of a belief that pres=rving the Assad regime is an imperative, linked to the fundamentalists' own survival in power in Tehran. And yet,=the Obama Administration appears strangely indifferent to the parlous 5 EFTA_R1_00057210 EFTA01756053 circ=mstances of perhaps the most anti-American regime in the world for the pas= 35 years, and uninterested in the leverage on Iran now potentially within Washington's grasp after decades=of enduring terrorist, nuclear and missile threats from Tehran's securit= services. The willful avertin= by the Administration of its gaze from these and other core dynamics at p=ay in and around Syria is certain to shape regional perceptions of America= power for years to come. Funding copious humanitarian assistance, already $1.3 billion and counting, for the fleein= victims of Russian-armed Syrian forces or Iranian-armed fighters, worthy =s that is, will not indemnify the US against the erosion of its superpower=reputation. Negotiations with I=an—How to Avert War and Build American Influence American politician=, including President Obama, have been justified in pledging to do whateve= it takes to keep Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Cold War notions of='containment' may offer no assurance of stability in the volatile Middle East, where in contrast to Kremlin lea=ers during the Cold War, surviving a nuclear exchange may not be a priorit= for many extremist aggressors. As recently as September 30, the State Dep=rtment <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2013/09/214962.h=m> reiterated <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2013/09/214962.htm> the official US view that "We're not go=ng to allow Iran to create a nuclear weapon." The carefully engin=ered June election of Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran, and this regime=stalwart's genial pursuit of détente with the US and normalized foreig= relations with others, have challenged Washington to respond with comparable tactical skill and strategic purpose= Some observers—press photographers, at the very least—were disappoint=d when President Obama's opportunity to greet President Rouhani personal=y at the UN in September did not materialize. Mr. Obama's telephone call to Mr. Rouhani as the latter headed for the a=rport to return to Iran was a hospitable gesture regardless of one's pol=cy view of Iran, a privilege US presidents can exercise as a consequence o= hosting the United Nations on American soil. Yet the ensuing pre=s statements by White House aides promoted the disturbing theme that, just=as Secretary Kerry had met with Iranian foreign minister Zarif in New York= President Obama had made a connection with his own "counterpart," talking 'president to president' with =assan Rouhani. President Obama would have been well advised to initiate a =all the next morning to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Not only would that h=ve tested the sincerity of Tehran's apparent warming to the United States, it would have dispelled the damaging misimpr=ssion that an unelected religious autocrat holds a superior protocol rank =o the president of the United States. That Mr. Obama, in =is September 24 speech to the UN General Assembly and subsequently, cited = fatwa by the Supreme Leader without irony or caveat, as though this carri=d some recognized legal effect, only underscored the uncertainty about the new Iranian President's own author=ty to set national policy on the very matter to be negotiated. US and European dip=omats emerged from the initial mid-October nuclear talks in Geneva remarki=g on the change in Iran's posture from previous negotiations. Foreign Mi=ister Zarif reportedly engaged in detailed, substantive discussions about the nuclear program, and told the press afte=ward that "serious give-and-take has taken place." It is a welcome cha=ge, and administration officials are now seized with two entirely predicta=le tasks: eliciting from the Iranian side a set of commitments that the US and allies persuasively believe will=prevent a future nuclear weapons "breakout;" and offering Iran in retu=n a commitment to deliver an agreed level of sanctions relief. Lead US negotiator =endy Sherman, in congressional hearings before the initial Geneva session,=assured legislators that the President is pursuing a comprehensive agreeme=t, not interim steps wherein a partial lifting of sanctions could deflate international solidarity to pressure Ir=n economically before a satisfactory nuclear deal is reached. It is the co=rect approach. Yet the Administration now, predictably, finds itself caugh= in a two-front negotiation, needing to overcome deep skepticism and a backdrop of troubled relations not only =ith Tehran but with Capitol Hill. 6 EFTA_R1_00057211 EFTA01756054 As Congress plays i=s customary 'bad cop' role in support of a satisfactory nuclear deal b= <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/sites/republicans.foreig=affairs.house.gov/files/Iran%2010%2014%2013%20Royce%20t o%20POTUS%20renewed=20nuclear%20diplomacy%20issues.pdf> proposing <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/sites/republicans.for=ignaffairs.house.gov/files/Iran%2010%2014%2013%20Royce%20t o%20POTUS%20rene=ed%20nuclear%20diplomacy%20issues.pdf> still tighter sanctions—the one factor Washington experts seem to agree =as prompted Tehran's conciliatory turn—it is unclear how the US negoti=tors can elicit from Mr. Zarif and his masters a sufficient Iranian compro=ise that will not look to all the world like a capitulation. And if the US side cannot bring to the table assuranc=s of sanctions relief sufficient to seal an acceptable deal, its predicame=t may induce paralyzing caution on other policy fronts deemed important to=Tehran, lest the collaborative spirit at the nuclear talks be spoiled. All three negotiati=ns underway, regarding Israel-Palestine, Syria, and Iran's nuclear progr=m, are inescapably attached to larger region-wide dynamics that will frust=ate American objectives if not addressed by US foreign policy. President Obama needs a strategy. American Interests,=American Principles, American Influence—an American Strategy Policy veterans in =ashington cannot point to any prior case where economic sanctions have "=icked in" strongly enough to produce the desired result—until now. San=tions against the regimes led by Slobodan Milosevic, Saddam Hussein and Bashar al-Assad produced scarcity and hardsh=p for the poorest of their citizens but enriched the leadership circle, wh= exacted higher rents on the basic commodities they alone could smuggle in= Kudos to the US Tre=sury Department for locating and constricting the key transactional nodes =hrough which Iran's economy connects to the world. Yet the tool of econo=ic sanctions against Iran, while more potent than any previous instance, should be troubling to US policymakers.=With the exception of the clerical regime, Iran's 79 million people ough= to be the target of American goodwill, not collective punishment for the =cts of their dictators. Sustaining the US economy as the world's strongest depends on free trade; a latter-=ay 'blockade' of any country by the United States should be a rare exc=ption, for policy and moral reasons. One consequence of =he Iran sanctions that mirrors past cases, <http://article=.washingtonpost.com/2013-09- 2S/opinions/42392666_1_nuclear-issue-revolutio=ary-guard-corps-iranophobia> as Fareed Zakaria has pointed out=/span> <http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-09-25/opinion=/42392666_1_nuclear-issue-revolutionary-guard- corps-iranophobia> , is that Iran's Revolutionary Guards "profit from the sanctions because=their businesses have become the only path for trade and smuggling." For these reasons, =resident Obama should strengthen his negotiating hand with Iran by collaborating with Congress to make clear, not just what further economic pain and=isolation will result from Tehran's refusal to accept a verifiable end to its nuclear weapons program, but the=relief and rewards that a comprehensive nuclear concession by Iran's lea=ers will produce. Every citizen of Iran should become aware that the US is=offering an end to those sanctions that were created for the purpose of pressuring Iran on the nuclear issue=97whether via executive order or legislation. The Congress could also indi=ate its readiness in principle to support the lifting of UN Security Counc=l sanctions relating to the nuclear issue. This step would pla=e the onus for compromise back on the Iranian side of the negotiating tabl=, forcing the regime to explain to its people why it would not accept a de=I codifying what it has already said is its policy, namely that it does not seek to build nuclear weapons that =t wants sanctions relief in order to secure an immediate upsurge in the en=ire country's standard of living. Assuming Iran can say yes to comprehen=ive nuclear restraints for comprehensive sanctions relief, the Revolutionary Guards' lucrative smuggling business=would be over. More importantly, the terrible choice between war with Iran=or a regional nuclear arms race would be averted. Reciprocating Presi=ent Rouhani's expressed desire for improved relations, the Congress and =dministration should even consider fattening Iran's 'prize' for an a=ceptable nuclear deal with a package of increased student visas, cultural and 7 EFTA_R1_00057212 EFTA01756055 sporting exchanges and the like. Steps to empo=er Iranian civil society economically, counter internal censorship and pro=aganda, and spread goodwill between the two countries' populations are a=l consistent with US security interests once the nuclear weapons threat is reliably controlled. What President Obam= should avoid, however, is encumbering the nuclear negotiation with other =ssues complicating US-Iran relations. "We are not seeking regime change,=94 Mr. Obama declared at the UN in September. This statement cleverly spoke to two audiences—the clerics in Tehran who=e singular priority is remaining in power; and the president's domestic =olitical allies who associate 'regime change' with neoconservative att=tudes favored in the previous administration. A more appropriate =ormulation in the President's speech would have made clear that if his A=ministration does not seek regime change, it carries no particular brief t= maintain this regime in power either. The principle of popular sovereignty should be at the heart of US policy, =nd given the storied history of US meddling in Iranian politics, Iranian l=aders would be hard-pressed to complain if an American president said that=the Iranian people should have the ultimate say in how they are governed. The fact is that Ha=san Rouhani and the Iranian Foreign Ministry do not represent the Islamic =epublic on some major issues relevant to negotiations in the Middle East. =he commander of the elite Qods Force atop the Revolutionary Guards organization, Qassem Suleimani, is leading t=e effort in Syria to train and resupply Lebanese Hezbollah fighters in def=nse of the Assad regime—a vital interest to the Tehran regime, as noted.=Suleimani also appears to run the "Iraq" account for Tehran, coordinating with Prime Minister Maliki in =upport of extralegal killings of defenseless Iranian dissidents inside Ira= by a special unit of Iraqi forces attached to the Prime Minister's offi=e. The paramilitary ca=paigns supported by Iran's Revolutionary Guards in Syria and Iraq are no= unconnected to American interests. In Iraq, five armed attacks since mid-=009 by Iraqi military units, or by Iranian-supplied militias passing through their lines, against more than 3,000 unarmed Iran=an dissidents place the United States in breach of its obligations under t=e Fourth Geneva Convention. A promise of protection, formally given by the=US to every one of these individuals in 2004, remains an American duty today because the Iraqi government has r=peatedly violated its 2009 commitment to provide protection for these peop=e, engaging instead in lethal attacks against them in coordination with Te=ran. The US understandab=y wants a robust and lasting security assistance relationship with Iraq'= armed forces after so much sacrifice by American forces in Iraq. Yet it i= compromised by its failure to live up to not only international humanitarian law, but Section 3 of the Arms Expo=t Control Act prohibiting arms transfers to militaries that misuse them, a=d the so-called Leahy Human Rights laws prohibiting training for any milit=ry units implicated in gross human rights violations. The latest assault,=the September 1 execution of 52 defenseless Iranian exiles by Iraqi specia= forces using handcuffs and silencers, and the abduction of seven others w=o are still missing, occurred five days after Qassem Suleimani met with Prime Minister Maliki and his aides t= plan the operation, according to the exiled group, the MEK. The massacre =ent largely unreported in the American media, the story overshadowed by th= September 2 announcement in Tehran of President Rouhani's plans to travel to the United States. America's policy =apses in both Syria and Iraq, the portfolio directly overseen by Qassim Su=eimani on Iran's behalf, come as well at the expense of Iran's regiona= strategic rival: the Sunni Arab world and Saudi Arabia in particular. Writes veter=n international correspondent Arnaud de Borchgrave chttp://www.upi.com/Top_Newshnalysiside- Borchgrave/2013/10/15/Commentary-Geopolitical-amnesia/UPI-68501=81836239/> , "The longer t=e fighting in Syria, the more the situation in Iraq deteriorates and the c=oser Iran's military Imullahocracy' comes to dominating the entire r=gion." 8 EFTA_R1_00057213 EFTA01756056 The Administration=92s recent move restricting Egypt's military assistance pipeline—a cor=erstone of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty that has kept Israel's southern=flank quiet for 34 years—only adds to the insecurity felt by America's longstanding Arab allies as well as Israel. President Obama mus= separate these wider complications of US-Iran relations from the nuclear =egotiations, but without disregarding them. Although Mr. Obama expressed t=e hope at the UN that a nuclear agreement with Iran can "help serve as a foundation for a broader peace," it sho=ld be clear that Tehran's Revolutionary Guards have every intention to c=ntinue prosecuting their campaigns, working through extremist non-state ac=ors, to destabilize rival societies to the west. Until the day comes=when no more Iranian arms, money, explosives and training are flowing to c=ient militias, Ambassador Indyk is going to need to point to a regional Am=rican security posture that Israelis and Palestinians can believe in should they be otherwise prepared to bring=forth an historic final-status settlement. If at the same time Egypt's m=litary is casting about for alternative strategic partnerships, Mr. Indyk=92s task will be that much more daunting. The US has every ri=ht, and every interest, in pursuing its own interests throughout the Middl= East. If success in effecting a transition in Syria to a more acceptable =uccessor government is taken as a setback in Tehran, that should not deter Washington. Nor should the US hesitate an= longer to impose a principled, legally correct line with Iraqi Prime Mini=ter Maliki in order that US-Iraq military relations will not be further ta=nted by dishonor or moral compromise. Should the Obama team see fit to reaffirm its commitment to the security o= Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab states, and to Egypt's military, this re=uilding of confidence with the Sunni Arab world should neither surprise Ir=n nor perturb the nuclear negotiations. 'Peace through strength' has always entailed much more than combat pow=r alone. Conclusion—Discre=e Deal with Iran, Invest in Syria's Outcome, Restore Regional Confidence= Enable Israeli-Palestinian Settlement With congressional =upport, the president should seize the initiative and give his negotiators=the requisite leverage to secure, as soon as practicable, a comprehensive =ut discrete nuclear-for-sanctions agreement with Iran. Isolating that issue will guard against policy paralysis in oth=r areas deemed to be sensitive for Iran, and empower the Administration to=go to work repairing its frayed standing in the Arab world. The dismantlement o= Syria's chemical arsenal will be of little benefit if, thanks to US ina=tion, Hezbollah emerges strengthened and emboldened, Syria's Kurds break=away, and the Sunni majority embraces the only 'help' currently on offer —from radical Sunni religious extremis=s drawn to the sectarian fight from all over the region. What began as an =dealistic 'Arab spring' moment is deteriorating into another potential=Afghanistan, placing enormous new security and economic burdens on Jordan, Lebanon <http://www- wds.worldbank=org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/09/24/000333037_2013092=111238/Rendere d/PDF/810980LBObox379831B00P14754500PUBLICO.pdf> 1151, Turkey, Iraq and, by extension, Israel. Rather than letting 1161 extremists maintain the initiative, the President should challenge his national-security team =o devise a whole-of-government strategy worthy of the name for Syria <http://nationali=terest.org/commentary/plan-syria-8924> [=7), one that does not place US forces on Syrian territory or pilots in Syr=an airspace. These regional circ=mstances will inevitably affect Ambassador Indyk's prospects of success =s well. Israel's leaders will be less likely to trust in a settlement wi=h the Palestinians if the surrounding Arab countries are engulfed in crisis. Israeli citizens will find it harder to =erceive a peace benefit if they remain in the crosshairs of not only nucle=r threats but also ever more deadly mortars, rockets and missiles smuggled=to local extremists by Iran's Revolutionary Guards. With so much invest=d and so much at stake in the Middle East, it is never too late to step up=efforts to advance American interests. The credibility of presidential red=lines matters, but only by exercising leadership in taming the dangers clouding the region's future will the U= preserve its influence and reputation, which are foundations of American =ower. 9 EFTA_R1_00057214 EFTA01756057 Secretary Kerry's=big bet on Middle East diplomacy can pay big dividends if backed by a forc=ful presidential commitment, a coherent strategic vision, integrated lines=of policy, and an active array of interagency tools of influence. The keys to success or failure now rest largely in Pre=ident Obama's hands. Ambassador Bloom=ield is a former US Special Envoy, Assistant Secretary of State for Politi=al Military Affairs and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affair=. He is Chairman of the Stimson Center. =1span> Arti=le 2. Bloomberg Israel Pushed=lran to the Table, Says Hagel Jeffrey Goldberg Nov 4, 2013 -- Last=week, Secretary of State John Kerry, the Obama administration's most fer=ent supporter of nuclear negotiations with Iran, by the conservative wing of the pro-Israel camp as a danger to the Jewish state, portrayed as someone who is soft on =ran and naive about the Palestinians and their intentions. <http://www.voanews.com/content/iran-world-powers-meet-nuc=ear-issues/1782679.html> These accusations a=e now mainly forgotten. Hagel has worked assiduously to ensure that Israel=maintains its so-called qualitative military edge over its foes; he has de=eloped close working ties with Israel's defense minister and its top generals; and Jewish groups, once wary, have =mbraced him. Last week, he spoke to a national meeting of the Anti- Defamat=on League, and publicly confirmed that the Pentagon has fast-tracked the d=livery of six V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor airplanes to Israel. "They're going to the head of the line," he sai=. These are aircraft that could be used to stealthily insert commandos int= such hostile and distant locales as ... Iran. Still, Israel isn't getti=g all it wants from the U.S. -- specifically, the sort of munitions that could blast through the reinforced roofs of Ira=ian nuclear facilities. "I suspect the Is=aelis would like an inventory of everything, but certain things we do keep=as proprietary, and they know that," Hagel said. "On the standoff weap=ns piece, that's right on track -- the Israelis are signed off on that," he said, referring to weapons that can be fired=at targets from far distances. In a 75-minute conv=rsation, Hagel gave me his version of the Middle East crisis tour. Talking=with him, I found, was not like talking to Donald Rumsfeld. Interviewing R=msfeld at this table was like interviewing a razor blade; one wrong move and you'd get cut. Hagel, on the other han=, is tranquil, conversational, and very, very discursive. I found it diffi=ult, at certain moments in the conversation, to make out any obvious theme= in the Obama administration's approach to the region. This might not be Hagel's fault, of course. The administr=tion's current approach is, to borrow from Churchill, a kind of themeles= pudding. Circumstances have =onspired to curse Hagel with a challenging diplomatic portfolio, even as h= is forced to spend much of his time wrestling the Pentagon budget to the =round. It is well known that he is the main point of American contact for General Abdelfatah al-Seesi, the le=der of the Egyptian military junta; the two men have spoken more than 25 t=mes since the July couplike event that deposed the elected president, the =uslim Brotherhood's Mohamed Mursi. But Hagel 10 EFTA_R1_00057215 EFTA01756058 has also been holding the hands of other Arab leaders of the (re=atively speaking) moderate camp, who are uniformly worried that the U.S. i= withdrawing from the Middle East. These figures include Mohammed bin Zaye= Al Nahyan, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, and the most important defense figure in the United Arab Emirat=s. MBZ, as he is known, is one of the many Arab leaders who fear (as Israe=ls leaders do) that any vacuum created by the departure of the U.S. from=the Middle East will be filled by Iran. In my next post, 1=9211 discuss Hagel's argument that, despite the creation of a "new wor=d order" in which power is rapidly diffusing, there is no plausible subs=itute for the U.S., and also why, despite his obvious pro-Israel record as defense secretary, he is still married to a s=t of ideas about Middle East peace that may no longer be operative. Jeffrey Goldberg=is a Bloomberg View columnist. =/span> Arti=le 3. NYT Mr. Kerry Fum=les in Egypt The Editorial Board chttp://www.nytimes.com/interactive/opinio=/editorialboard.html> November 4, 2013 --=Secretary of State John Kerry's trip to Egypt chttp://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/04/world/middleeast/kerry-=gypt-visit.html?ref=middleeast> for murder in a politically motivated case (now postponed until Jan. 8) that had the whole country on =dge. Mr. Morsi has been held incommunicado and charged, along with other d=fendants allied with the Muslim Brotherhood, with inciting violence in the=deaths of about a dozen people in clashes last December outside the presidential palace after he took nea=- dictatorial powers. Whatever validity t=e charges contain, there is little doubt that the case is part of an attem=t by the military to crush the Muslim Brotherhood and other opponents. It =s also hypocritical, since crackdowns engineered by the generals themselves have killed hundreds of people and l=d to the arrests and imprisonment of thousands more. Mr. Kerry also misf=red on the tone and content of his talks with Gen. Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi, t=e country's strongman and ringleader of the coup. The Morsi trial never =ame up. And they undercut whatever cautionary message President Obama had hoped to send last month when he suspended the=delivery of major weapons systems to Egypt and withheld $260 million in ai=. "It is not a punishment," Mr. Kerry said. He appeared to acce=t the notion that the generals and the civilian government they installed =re on a path to real democracy. "The road map is being carried out to th= best of our perception," he said cryptically, referring to plans for a referendum on an amended Constitution and promise= to hold parliamentary and presidential elections by next spring. But the Constitutio= is still a work in progress, and the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood =oes not bode well for an inclusive political system. Moreover, General Sis= made no pledge to lift the hated state of emergency when it expires later this month. 11 EFTA_R1_00057216 EFTA01756059 The United States a=d Egypt share many important interests, including peace with Israel, secur=ty in Sinai, the free flow of traffic through the Suez Canal and cooperati=n against terrorism. It is important for both nations to keep trying to work together. But they also need to be=clear about their differences, especially on what the word democracy means= Mr. Kerry has muddied the waters. =/span> Arti=le 4. The Washington Post= Saudi Arabia=92s Prince Turki: 'American policy has been wrong' Lally Weymouth Nov. 4, 2013 -- The=Post's Lally Weymouth spoke this week with Saudi Arabia's Prince Turki= former chief of intelligence and brother of the foreign minister. Excerpt=: Q. Who made the =ecision to turn down the U.N. Security Council seat? A. It is always in =he end the king [King Abdullahj who makes the decision. But it wasn't a =himsical decision. Nor was it, as some newspapers here have described it, =one in a fit of pique. It was a studied and considered decision. The kingdom cond=cted a very high-level campaign for the seat, and many people were surpris=d by the decision to turn it down. Some governments ta=e decisions that not everybody knows about it. My understanding is that [t=e decision was based on] the situation in the Security Council chttp://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2013/1418/why- did-saudi-arabia-reject-a-un-security-council-seatk , particularly on the Syrian issue, but not just on that. You had also the i=sue of nuclear non-proliferation . . . and then you have the i=sue of Palestine, which has been with us since 1947. These three issues cu=minated in the decision where the kingdom felt that, by not taking the seat, it would make the point to the Security Coun=il that there is a need to fix it. Do you think the=decision was building for a long time? Were President Obama's decision n=t to act on Syria and the United Nations Security Council's decision to =ass a weak resolution on Syria the last straws? It was based on U.N= Security Council decisions, especially the one on the issue of [Syrian] chemical weapons removal <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/un-=pproval-near-on-syrian-chemical- arms/2013/09/27/da007544-27aa-11e3-9372-92=06241ae9c_story.html> The fact that it=had no enforcement powers? Not only that — t=e fact that even if it had enforcement powers, it would only remove the ch=mical weapons. But [Syrian President] Bashar al-Assad can continue to kill=his people using aircraft, artillery, Scud missiles and other lethal means. This also followed the Chinese and R=ssian veto of the resolution that would have put in place an interim 12 EFTA_R1_00057217 EFTA01756060 gover=ment composed of all the factions in Syria — that was put in front of th= Security Council a year and a half ago by the Arab League. What do you and =our country think is the best outcome in Syria? The best outcome is=to stop the killing. How?<=pan style="font-size:18.0pt"> We had a proposal, =ut forth by our foreign minister, that you have to level the playing field= And that means Bashar's military superiority has to be checked by givin= the opposition the means to defend themselves <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/sei=ed-weapons-caches-boost-rebel-hopes-after-weeks-of- setbacks/2013/08/20/88e=e6fc-09d1-11e3-8974-f97ab3b3c677_story.html> = You're not talking about sending troops on the ground. Over the p=st 2% years, if anti-tank, anti-aircraft defensive weapons <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/syr=as-rebel-leadership-makes-new-pleas-to- washington/2013/06/10/d743ebf0-d201=11e2-8cbe-lbcbee0618f8_story.html> had been dis=ributed to the opposition — and not all the opposition, [but] the opposi=ion that is for an inclusive Syria — then they would have been able to c=eckmate the military superiority of Bashar al-Assad and force him to come to the negotiating table. Unfortunately, th=t did not happen. Europe and America continued to deny the opposition the =eans to defend against Bashar's lethal weapons, the Russians <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/all=sides-hedging-