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From: Office of Terje Rod-Larsen ‹ > Subject: September 23 update Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2013 22:46:15 +0000 23 September, 2013 Article 1. NYT Short of a Deal, Containing Iran Is the Best Option Kenneth M. Pollack Article 2. The Wall Street Journal Russia's Anti-American Foreign Policy David Satter Article 3. The Wall Street Journal Iran's mullahs see a U.S. President eager for a nuclear deal Editorial Article 4. Los Angeles Times A mathematical approach to Syria K.C. Cole Article 5. Project Syndicate Jimmy Carter Obama Dominique Moisi Article 6. The New Yorker syria's Shadow Commander Dexter Filkins NYT Short of a Deal, Containing Iran Is the Best OpAion Kenneth M. Pollack September 22, 2013 -- THIS week, Iran's new president, Hassan Rouhani, will address the United Nations General Assembly. His message is likely to EFTA00872400 be a sharp change from the adolescent belligerence of his hard-line predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Mr. Rouhani is a genuine reformer — but his desire to move Iran in a new direction should not blind the United States to the difficulties of achieving a diplomatic solution. Mr. Rouhani has hinted that he is willing to compromise on aspects of Iran's nuclear program for the sake of repairing relations with the rest of the world and having economic sanctions on Iran removed. But he has also warned that he cannot hold off his hard-line rivals forever, and it is unclear whether the Iranians will be willing to make the kind of concessions that America and its allies want. Ultimately, it is the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, not Mr. Rouhani, who would make the final decision on a deal. He has shown little inclination for one, although recent statements from the leadership offer hope that their position may be softening. If it cannot reach a diplomatic deal, America will face a choice between two alternatives: using force to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear arsenal or containing a nuclear Iran until its regime collapses from its own dysfunction. It is going to be a difficult choice. For that reason, we need to start thinking about it now. We cannot afford to have our diplomatic efforts collapse suddenly and, as in Syria, be forced to lunge forward unprepared. Sizing up the two alternatives, I favor containment over military operations. I say that, however, understanding that each option has more drawbacks than advantages, that there are circumstances when a military strike would be preferable, and that those who advocate the military option merit a hearing. This may seem incongruous, coming from me. I supported an invasion of Iraq 10 years ago in principle, but not the Bush administration's handling of it. I was moved by the plight of Iraqis under Saddam Hussein's horrific "republic of fear," as the writer Kanan Makiya called it; by the widespread belief that he was reconstituting his nuclear program; and by his long pattern of reckless, even suicidal, aggression. Unpleasant as Tehran has been over the years, it has not demonstrated anything like Mr. Hussein's recklessness. And unlike in 2003, very few Americans would support a full-scale invasion. Therefore the military option against Iran would have to stop with air power. But there is a EFTA00872401 considerable risk that airstrikes alone would not be enough to strip Iran of its nuclear program. Even after a devastating American military strike, I fear the Iranians would pick themselves up and rebuild — and would withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, evict any remaining nuclear inspectors and deploy an actual arsenal to deter a future American strike. Mr. Hussein offers a sobering precedent. He tried to rebuild his nuclear program twice: successfully after Israel obliterated it in 1981 and again (at least initially) after the United States demolished part of it in 1991. We may not know where all of Iran's nuclear facilities are, and some are so heavily defended that we may not fully destroy them. In the 1990s, American intelligence officials believed that they had a good handle on Iraq's nuclear facilities, only to find out that they were wrong. A second concern is that the Iranians almost certainly would retaliate. They might fire missiles at American bases in the Middle East, or persuade allies like Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad to fire rockets at Israel. But my biggest fear is that they would embark on a prolonged terrorist campaign against Americans, including attacks on the homeland. The Iranians have said as much, and the United States intelligence community believes that they have expanded their capacity to do so since their failed attempt to kill the Saudi ambassador to the United States in 2011. These problems suggest that an American air campaign to destroy Iran's nuclear facilities would be just the beginning, not the end, of a war with Iran. If Iran were to rebuild, the president of the United States would not be able to just shrug his shoulders. If Iran retaliated, and killed Americans, the president would almost certainly have to respond, if not escalate. I fear that if we started using force in the belief that we could keep it limited, we would either fail and find ourselves facing an enraged, nuclear Iran, or be dragged into another large-scale, protracted war in the Middle East. Containment is hardly a perfect policy, but I see the costs and risks as more easily mitigated than those of war. Containment is not appeasement. It would not mean simply letting the Iranians do what they wanted. That is not how we contained the Soviet EFTA00872402 Union — or Cuba, or North Korea or even Iran in the decades since the 1979 revolution. Properly understood, containment would put pressure on Iran in various ways, to keep it on the defensive and to encourage the end of the regime. It would hold in place painful sanctions. It would include covert assistance to the Iranian opposition, cyberwarfare in response to Iran's support for terrorism, and continued diplomatic isolation. A bugbear raised by some is the notion that if Iran acquired nuclear weapons it would use them unprovoked or give them to terrorists. This is extremely unlikely. Over the years, the Iranian regime has shown itself to be vicious, murderous, anti-Semitic and anti-American. At times it has taken some real risks. But it has never shown itself to be irrational, reckless or suicidal. It has repeatedly shown great respect for American (and Israeli) military power and demonstrated a willingness to back down in the face of military retaliation. The Iranians have supported terrorism since 1979 and possessed weapons of mass destruction since 1989, but have never mixed the two for fear of retribution. In the cold war, the United States and the Soviet Union spent untold billions trying to guard against a surprise nuclear attack by the other — an attack that neither seriously contemplated. Indeed, historical research in the last two decades has shown that both sides actually made themselves less secure by obsessing about this worst-case phantom, exacerbating and even causing crises that could have ended in disaster. Nevertheless, there are real issues with containment. Three of the most important are the dangers of crisis management with a nuclear Iran, the risk of additional proliferation and the likelihood that Iran will become more aggressive in promoting instability, insurgency and terrorism. None of these should be dismissed — but none should be seen as deal breakers, either. America's massive military superiority over Iran constitutes a huge advantage. In the case of proliferation, the central problem is Saudi Arabia (and possibly the United Arab Emirates), not Egypt or Turkey, and persuading the Saudis not to seek nuclear weapons should not be assumed to be impossible. And there are ways to fight state-sanctioned subversion and terrorism. Despite efforts since 1979, the Iranians have never managed EFTA00872403 to overthrow a foreign government or start an insurgency or a civil war. At most, they made bad situations (like Iraq) worse. Diplomacy has not yet run its course with Iran. Let's hope that it triumphs. If it does not, we will have a terrible choice to make. To me, containment seems the least-bad option. But the worst choice would be to refuse to decide and instead have a strategy forced on us. Kenneth M Pollack, a former Central Intelligence Agency analyst and National Security Council official, is a seniorfellow at the Brookings Institution and the author, most recently, of "Unthinkable: Iran, the Bomb and American Strategy." The Wall Street Journal R i ' Anti-American Foreign Policy David Satter September 22, 2013 -- Moscow -- Despite optimism in the United States that the Russian peace initiative may offer a way out of the Syrian crisis, the pattern of Russian foreign policy shows that Russia can envisage nothing better for itself than the role of world-wide antagonist of the U.S. The difference in values between the U.S. and Russia—and the subordination of Russian foreign policy to the personal interests of the members of a corrupt regime—should have been obvious to the Obama administration from the beginning. But it did nothing to forestall the policy of "reset." At the 2009 Moscow Summit, Mr. Obama praised the "extraordinary work" that Vladimir Putin, who was then officially the prime minister, had done for Russia. Mr. Obama described Mr. Putin as "sincere, just and deeply interested in the welfare of the Russian people." The praise was never reciprocated, in part because Russian leaders fear and distrust their own population, and they understand that Western advocacy of the rule of law and human rights is a potential threat to their rule. In recent years, U.S. officials have often said that it is difficult to solve the world's problems without Russia. Unfortunately, it is often even harder to solve them with it. The U.S. needs three things from Russia: understanding EFTA00872404 in defense matters, assistance in the war on terror, and help in curbing the ambitions of rogue states. In each case, the record of the Putin regime is one of relentless obstruction. One source of conflict has been Russian objections to U.S. plans to construct an antimissile shield in Europe to protect U.S. allies against an attack from Iran. Russia has treated the shield as a threat to its nuclear deterrent, despite the opinion of Russia's own experts that the missiles pose no threat to the Russian ICBM force and are intended for a completely different purpose. In 2009, Mr. Obama canceled plans for antimissile installations in Poland and the Czech Republic, in part to improve U.S.-Russian relations. But the U.S. is now preparing to station interceptors in Romania. In response, Russia is demanding legal guarantees that the missiles will not be used against Russia and is threatening to target U.S. missile-defense sites if there is no agreement. NATO Secretary- General Anders Fogh Rasmussen described the Russian position as "crazy." "You can't in any rational way think that NATO constitutes a threat against Russia," he told the AP in February 2012. "It's a complete waste of money to deploy offensive weapons and capabilities against NATO territory." Russia has also undermined U.S. efforts to combat terror. Two striking recent examples are the cases of the Boston Marathon bomber, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, and the NSA leaker, Edward Snowden. Tsarnaev spent six months in the Dagestan region of Russia in 2012 before the attack on April 15. Two of his contacts, Mahmud Nigal, a suspected link with the Islamist underground, and William Plotnikov, a Russian- Canadian Islamic radical, were killed by Russian forces while he was there. Yet the Russians insist that Tsarnaev was not under surveillance in Dagestan and never questioned. If this is true, it is in complete contradiction to all known Russian practice. Tsarnaev left Russia freely through Moscow's Sheremetevo Airport and the Federal Security Service never warned the U.S. about his contacts in Dagestan. Russia also showed little concern for efforts to protect U.S. civilians in its decision to shelter Edward Snowden. In light of the quantity and quality of what Mr. Snowden stole, an adequate damage assessment depends on getting him back to the U.S. Until that happens, the efforts of the NSA and other agencies to defend the U.S. against terror are going to be crippled. Aware of this, Mr. Putin seems to be mainly concerned with subjecting the U.S. to ridicule. The Russian media have published articles about Mr. Snowden's "new EFTA00872405 life," "proposals of marriage" and a future career defending human rights. At the same time, although Mr. Putin said that a condition of Mr. Snowden's asylum was that he "stop harming our American partners," the leaks of NSA information have continued. Russian obstruction of the U.S. has had its gravest consequences, however, in interstate relations. Russia has defended Iran against Western economic sanctions, arguing that they are "a violation of international law." Moscow also has been unswervin. in its support for Bashar Assad in Syria, from voting to block three M. Security Council resolutions on sanctions against Syria to insisting that the chemical-weapons attack on Aug. 21 that killed more than 1,400 Syrians was carried out by the rebels. The U.S. will now try to enforce a U.S.-Russian agreement on the elimination of Syria's chemical weapons under conditions in which Russia and Syria can use delay, obfuscation and disinformation to string out the process indefinitely. Meanwhile, the Syrian opposition, which has endured chemical-weapons attacks without seeing a serious response from the civilized world, is likely to continue to radicalize. Russian anti-Americanism is likely to intensify. Unlike the Soviet Union, Russia has no universal ideology capable of inspiring loyalties that transcend national boundaries. Anti-Americanism is a kind of substitute. It allows Russia to carve out a prominent role for itself in world affairs that it could never have if it were concerned only with acting positively. At the same time, and probably more important, anti-Americanism can be used to distract Russians from the corruption of the Putin regime and the pillaging of the country. Mr. Putin and his associates stand at the apex of a corrupt system and, according to some estimates, control 15% of the national wealth. During protest demonstrations last year over the falsification of elections, Mr. Putin was openly referred to as a "thief," a serious development in a society where the charge is widely believed but usually not made publicly. At the same time, the regime is threatened by a deteriorating economy. In the second quarter of this year, growth fell to 1.2%. During the 2000s, the rate was 7.2%. Because of its immense corruption, Russia is critically dependent on high oil prices, and these are supported by Middle East instability. EFTA00872406 Under such circumstances, the U.S. is not only a helpful distraction but a convenient scapegoat. Mr. Putin is losing support in Moscow, but his defense of the Assad regime evokes nostalgia for the Soviet empire and strengthens his support among the conservative and provincial part of the population. As Mr. Putin's political position weakens further, his antagonism toward the U.S. will almost certainly increase. In the wake of the Russian initiative over Syria, the U.S. is now much more reliant on Russia than it should ever have permitted itself to be. In our fixation with "deliverables," we forgot that what really matters in relations between states are intangibles, such as good faith. That's something Mr. Putin has not shown toward America in the past, and U.S. policy makers would be unwise to rely on it in the future. Mr. Satter is affiliated with the Hudson Institute, Johns Hopkins University and the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia. He is the author, most recently, of "It Was a Long Time Ago and It Never Happened Anyway: Russia and the Communist Past" (Yale, 2011). The Wall Street Journal Iran's mullahs see a U.S. President eager for a nuclear deal Editorial September 22, 2013 -- The ruling clerics in Tehran haven't survived in power for 34 years without cunning. Fresh from their ally Bashar Assad's diplomatic victory in Damascus, they now see an opening to liberate themselves from Western pressure too. They're hoping an eager President Obama will ease sanctions in return for another promise of WMD disarmament. That's the prudent way to read Iran's recent interest in Mr. Obama's entreaties after five years of rude dismissals. No doubt the mullahs are feeling international economic pressure, especially from financial sanctions through the world banking system. But they have shown for years that they don't mind imposing pain on their own people. EFTA00872407 New President Hassan Rouhani sounds less strident notes than his predecessor, but the regime has rolled out other presidents who turned out either to have no power or to be false fronts to beguile the West. The real power, as ever, resides with the clerics and especially Ayatollah Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guard Corps. Mr. Rouhani was their nuclear envoy in the mid-2000s when Iran accelerated its nuclear-weapons program. It's doubtful they've had a come-to-Allah moment on nukes. The likely reason they've finally decided to answer Mr. Obama's overtures is because they see an America in retreat and eager for a nuclear deal. In Syria, they saw Mr. Obama leap at Russia's diplomatic offer rather than follow through on his threat of a U.S. military strike if Assad used chemical weapons. Assad is now safe from Western intervention and he can dissemble and delay on disarming his chemical stockpiles. The mullahs can also see how eager Mr. Obama is for a second-term deal with Iran that validates his campaign claim that "the tide of war is receding." The President has never taken no for an answer from Tehran. Despite being rebuffed for five years, he sent another entreaty after Mr. Rouhani's election in June. Mr. Obama's letter invited Mr. Rouhani to "cooperate with the international community, keep your commitments and remove ambiguities" about the atomic program in exchange for sanctions relief, according to a senior Iranian official quoted in Thursday's New York Times. The letter hasn't been released, but Mr. Rouhani called it "positive and constructive" in an interview with NBC Wednesday. The mullahs also learned from the Syrian fiasco that Mr. Obama wasn't able to sway Americans to support even what John Kerry called an "unbelievable small" military strike. They can see as well that even many Republican leaders now want the U.S. to withdraw from world leadership. As in the 1920s and 1970s, most American elites are eager for a diplomatic deal of just about any kind rather than run the risk of a military strike. The White House is already signaling its first concession by suggestin that Mr. Obama might meet Mr. Rouhani in New York at this week's . General Assembly. That would be the first such presidential meeting since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and it would give the dictatorship new international prestige at zero cost. Iran continues to support U.S. enemies EFTA00872408 in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza and Afghanistan, and it continues to crush its political opposition at home. Iran's diplomatic goals are obvious: Break its international isolation and lift the sanctions in exchange for a promise not to build a nuclear weapon even as it retains its ability to build one at a moment's notice. The Rouhani aide said last week that Tehran was particularly eager to lift the ban on Iranian money transfers through the Swift interbank system, and it will press for that as an initial concession before it dismantles a single nuclear centrifuge. The danger for world order is that Iran is already close to a nuclear breakout capacity when it will be able to finish a device in a matter of weeks, without technically testing or possessing a bomb. The mullahs could also easily pull the North Korean trick of dismantling one facility while secretly running another one. They have systematically lied about their nuclear program for years. All of which bodes ill for any genuine nuclear breakthrough. If true global security is Mr. Obama's goal, then at a bare minimum any deal would have to halt Iran's enrichment of uranium, remove the already enriched uranium from the country, close all nuclear sites and provide for robust monitoring anytime and anywhere. Anything less would be a mirage. Anything less would force Israel in particular to recalculate the risks of a pre-emptive attack compared to the risks of future nuclear destruction. Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran's other Middle East rivals will also be looking closely at the fine print of any deal. A negotiation that dismantles Iran's nuclear program would be a great step forward, but a deal that promises peace while letting Iran stay poised on the edge of becoming a nuclear power would endanger the world. Anicic i. Los Angeles Times A mathematical approach to Syria K.C. Cole September 23, 2013 -- A mathematical solution in Syria? That's not as crazy as it sounds. In fact, the working compromise is a classic case of the power of game theory, a branch of mathematics that analyzes the best EFTA00872409 possible outcomes in conflicts where neither side knows what the other will do. It's not about winning as much as it is finding the least worst option, which is precisely what Presidents Obama, Vladimir Putin, Bashar Assad and company have done. No one gets exactly what he wants. But no one loses everything either. In its simplest form, the Syrian standoff was a classic game of "chicken," the game played by James Dean in "Rebel Without a Cause" when he was challenged by a bully named Buzz to race stolen cars to the edge of a cliff. Whoever bails first becomes the "chickie" and loses face. Dean's character, Jim, jumps at the last minute, but Buzz's jacket gets snagged on the door and he plunges to his death. Game over. The least worst solution would have been for both players to swallow their pride and jump early. The winner gets to gloat. But even the loser gets to play another day. Over the long term, a willingness to take less than everything is a winning strategy. One reason is that winner-take-all (a zero-sum game) results in unstable situations, dangerous even for the winner. The losing side has little reason to cooperate and every reason to retaliate in kind, or worse. (In "Rebel," Buzz's gang blames Jim for their buddy's death and hound him until a predictably tragic ending is the only one possible.) Lasting solutions require coming to an equilibrium in which all players feel they did well enough, given the circumstances. And game theory is all about finding equilibriums. Such calculations apply to much more than Syria. We do the same sort of mental math when we stop at red lights instead of barreling through at our pleasure (road rage is the primitive brain's business). Whether we're paying taxes or tipping waiters, we often do things that are not, from a selfish point of view, ideal — but that we know are necessary to keep society going. In other words, the least worst option. When we insist on winner-take-all, nobody wins in the end. If the big fish gobble up all the little fish, even the big guys starve. It's the argument I most often hear from the business community for economic policies that promote an equitable distribution of wealth. It doesn't take a lot of calculation to see that when most people don't have enough money to buy products, profits eventually dry up. EFTA00872410 Stability requires not just a measure of fairness but also the perception of fairness. Even a monkey will turn down a treat if it sees its neighbor get something far more delicious. (In fact, the monkey feeling cheated will throw the second-rate treat back in the experimenter's face.) When people feel their society doesn't distribute treats equally — be they tax breaks, voting rights or political power — the resulting instability threatens everyone. Attaining a least worst solution, in other words, requires that both sides be prepared to live with less than they ideally want; if one side feels it's getting both the least and the worst, there's no point in even playing. Any monkey could tell us that. The situation in Syria, of course, is horrendously complicated, with multiple players with unknown aims and abilities, and multiple options and possible outcomes. Whether or not turning over Syria's chemical weapons to the United Nations works, the present pause in the stalemate gives everyone time to think things through. Losing some face is worth it if you can return to play another day — perhaps at a game that plays more to your strengths. K.C. Cole, a journalism professor at USC and a former science writer for The Times, is the author of "Something Incredibly Wonderful Happens: Frank Oppenheimer and His Astonishing Exploratorium." AnicI, 5. Project Syndicate Jimmy Carter Obama Dominique Moisi 22 September 2013 -- "How many divisions does the Pope have?" Joseph Stalin famously quipped when told to be mindful of the Vatican. In an updated lesson in realpolitik, Russian President Vladimir Putin recently was happy to count Pope Francis as an ally in opposing American military intervention in Syria. Presenting himself as the last pillar of respect for international law, Putin offered ethics lessons to the United States — and specifically to President Barack Obama. EFTA00872411 With the US-Russian agreement, signed in Geneva on September 14, to place Syria's chemical weapons under international control, Russia has returned to the global scene — and not only because of its nuisance value. Could Putin one day receive, like Obama before him, a Nobel Peace Prize? Has not Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who proposed the deal, already entered the pantheon of great Russian diplomats, as the successor of Karl Nesselrode, the Russian envoy to the 1814-1815 Congress of Vienna and to the Congress of Paris in 1856? Of course, Russian diplomacy has performed extremely well recently, but it does not stand on its own merits alone. Russia's diplomats would have gained little without America's foreign-policy malaise — a victim of Obama's vacillation and of Americans' hostility to any new military adventure, however limited its scope — and Europe's deep internal divisions. Yes, Russia is emerging from its humiliation following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Heir to an imperial tradition that has shaped its national identity, Russia is resuming in the Middle East a role and status more in tune with the one it had from the Czarist era to Soviet times. But Russia is no match for the US militarily and no match for China economically, and its soft power is virtually non-existent. If Russia can provoke America — whether by granting political asylum to the "traitor" Edward Snowden, for example, or by resisting Western diplomacy in the Middle East — it is not because it has become a great power once again, but simply because America is no longer the great power that it once was. The Syrian crisis has made that plain. Recent US diplomacy has seemed amateurish and naive. Obama's handling of the Syrian crisis increasingly evokes Jimmy Carter's handling of the Iranian hostage crisis 33 years ago, particularly the failed operation in 1980 to rescue the Americans abducted following the takeover of the US embassy in November 1979. Then, too, hesitation seemed to prevail over determination, contributing to the failure of the mission. Carter was a somewhat bland engineer, whereas Obama is a charismatic lawyer. Yet they seem to share a fundamental indecisiveness in their approach to world affairs. Carter had difficulty choosing between the muscular line of his national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and the more moderate approach of his secretary of state, Cyrus Vance. EFTA00872412 By contrast, there are no fundamental disagreements among Obama's closest foreign-policy advisers — Susan Rice, the national security adviser, Samantha Power, who succeeded Rice as US Ambassador to the United Nations, and Secretary of State John Kerry. Instead, it is Obama himself who seems to be constantly hesitating. The divisions are not among his advisers, but within his own mind. As a good lawyer, Obama weighs the pros and cons, aware that it is impossible to do nothing in the Syrian crisis but remaining viscerally disinclined to leap into any foreign entanglement that would distract attention from his agenda of domestic reform. More important, he seems to lack a coherent long-term strategic vision of America's role in the world. Neither the currently fashionable "Asian pivot" nor the "Russian reset" four years ago constitute the beginning of a grand plan. In such a context, the return of global realpolitik can only benefit Russia and harm the US, despite America's many advantages in terms of hard and soft power. The agreement on Syria's chemical weapons struck by Russia and the US could one day be remembered as a spectacular breakthrough in the field of arms control. But it is more likely to be perceived as a grand deception — remembered not for helping Syria's people, but mainly as a sign of America's growing international weakness. In that case, the agreement will not only damage America's reputation, but will also undermine global stability. Weakness is weakness, whether one is in Moscow, Beijing, Tehran, or Pyongyang. Dominique Moisi is Senior Adviser at The French Institute or International Affairs (IFRI) and a professor at L7nstitut politiques de Paris (Sciences Po). He is the author of The Geopolitics of Emotion: How Cultures of Fear Humiliation, and Hope are Reshaping the World. Anecic 6. The New Yorker Syria's Shadow Commander Dexter Filkins EFTA00872413 September 30, 2013 -- Last February, some of Iran's most influential leaders gathered at the Amir al-Momenin Mosque, in northeast Tehran, inside a gated community reserved for officers of the Revolutionary Guard. They had come to pay their last respects to a fallen comrade. Hassan Shateri, a veteran of Iran's covert wars throughout the Middle East and South Asia, was a senior commander in a powerful, elite branch of the Revolutionary Guard called the Quds Force. The force is the sharp instrument of Iranian foreign policy, roughly analogous to a combined C.I.A. and Special Forces; its name comes from the Persian word for Jerusalem, which its fighters have promised to liberate. Since 1979, its goal has been to subvert Iran's enemies and extend the country's influence across the Middle East. Shateri had spent much of his career abroad, first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq, where the Quds Force helped Shiite militias kill American soldiers. Shateri had been killed two days before, on the road that runs between Damascus and Beirut. He had gone to Syria, along with thousands of other members of the Quds Force, to rescue the country's besieged President, Bashar al-Assad, a crucial ally of Iran. In the past few years, Shateri had worked under an alias as the Quds Force's chief in Lebanon; there he had helped sustain the armed group Hezbollah, which at the time of the funeral had begun to pour men into Syria to fight for the regime. The circumstances of his death were unclear: one Iranian official said that Shateri had been "directly targeted" by "the Zionist regime," as Iranians habitually refer to Israel. At the funeral, the mourners sobbed, and some beat their chests in the Shiite way. Shateri's casket was wrapped in an Iranian flag, and gathered around it were the commander of the Revolutionary Guard, dressed in green fatigues; a member of the plot to murder four exiled opposition leaders in a Berlin restaurant in 1992; and the father of Imad Mughniyeh, the Hezbollah commander believed to be responsible for the bombings that killed more than two hundred and fifty Americans in Beirut in 1983. Mughniyeh was assassinated in 2008, purportedly by Israeli agents. In the ethos of the Iranian revolution, to die was to serve. Before Shateri's funeral, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the country's Supreme Leader, released a note of praise: "In the end, he drank the sweet syrup of martyrdom." EFTA00872414 Kneeling in the second row on the mosque's carpeted floor was Major General Qassem Suleimani, the Quds Force's leader: a small man of fifty- six, with silver hair, a close-cropped beard, and a look of intense self- containment. It was Suleimani who had sent Shateri, an old and trusted friend, to his death. As Revolutionary Guard commanders, he and Shateri belonged to a small fraternity formed during the Sacred Defense, the name given to the Iran-Iraq War, which lasted from 1980 to 1988 and left as many as a million people dead. It was a catastrophic fight, but for Iran it was the beginning of a three-decade project to build a Shiite sphere of influence, stretching across Iraq and Syria to the Mediterranean. Along with its allies in Syria and Lebanon, Iran forms an Axis of Resistance, arrayed against the region's dominant Sunni powers and the West. In Syria, the project hung in the balance, and Suleimani was mounting a desperate fight, even if the price of victory was a sectarian conflict that engulfed the region for years. Suleimani took command of the Quds Force fifteen years ago, and in that time he has sought to reshape the Middle East in Iran's favor, working as a power broker and as a military force: assassinating rivals, arming allies, and, for most of a decade, directing a network of militant groups that killed hundreds of Americans in Iraq. The U.S. Department of the Treasury has sanctioned Suleimani for his role in supporting the Assad regime, and for abetting terrorism. And yet he has remained mostly invisible to the outside world, even as he runs agents and directs operations. "Suleimani is the single most powerful operative in the Middle East today," John Maguire, a former C.I.A. officer in Iraq, told me, "and no one's ever heard of him." When Suleimani appears in public—often to speak at veterans' events or to meet with Khamenei—he carries himself inconspicuously and rarely raises his voice, exhibiting a trait that Arabs call khilib, or understated charisma. "He is so short, but he has this presence," a former senior Iraqi official told me. "There will be ten people in a room, and when Suleimani walks in he doesn't come and sit with you. He sits over there on the other side of room, by himself, in a very quiet way. Doesn't speak, doesn't comment, just sits and listens. And so of course everyone is thinking only about him." At the funeral, Suleimani was dressed in a black jacket and a black shirt with no tie, in the Iranian style; his long, angular face and his arched eyebrows were twisted with pain. The Quds Force had never lost such a EFTA00872415 high-ranking officer abroad. The day before the funeral, Suleimani had travelled to Shateri's home to offer condolences to his family. He has a fierce attachment to martyred soldiers, and often visits their families; in a recent interview with Iranian media, he said, "When I see the children of the martyrs, I want to smell their scent, and I lose myself." As the funeral continued, he and the other mourners bent forward to pray, pressing their foreheads to the carpet. "One of the rarest people, who brought the revolution and the whole world to you, is gone," Alireza Panahian, the imam, told the mourners. Suleimani cradled his head in his palm and began to weep. The early months of 2013, around the time of Shateri's death, marked a low point for the Iranian intervention in Syria. Assad was steadily losing ground to the rebels, who are dominated by Sunnis, Iran's rivals. If Assad fell, the Iranian regime would lose its link to Hezbollah, its forward base against Israel. In a speech, one Iranian cleric said, "If we lose Syria, we cannot keep Tehran." Although the Iranians were severely strained by American sanctions, imposed to stop the regime from developing a nuclear weapon, they were unstinting in their efforts to save Assad. Among other things, they extended a seven-billion-dollar loan to shore up the Syrian economy. "I don't think the Iranians are calculating this in terms of dollars," a Middle Eastern security official told me. "They regard the loss of Assad as an existential threat." For Suleimani, saving Assad seemed a matter of pride, especially if it meant distinguishing himself from the Americans. "Suleimani told us the Iranians would do whatever was necessary," a former Iraqi leader told me. "He said, `We're not like the Americans. We don't abandon our friends." Last year, Suleimani asked Kurdish leaders in Iraq to allow him to open a supply route across northern Iraq and into Syria. For years, he had bullied and bribed the Kurds into cooperating with his plans, but this time they rebuffed him. Worse, Assad's soldiers wouldn't fight—or, when they did, they mostly butchered civilians, driving the populace to the rebels. "The Syrian Army is useless!" Suleimani told an Iraqi politician. He longed for the Basij, the Iranian militia whose fighters crushed the popular uprisings against the regime in 2009. "Give me one brigade of the Basij, and I could conquer the whole country," he said. In August, 2012, anti-Assad rebels captured forty-eight Iranians inside Syria. Iranian leaders protested that EFTA00872416 they were pilgrims, come to pray at a holy Shiite shrine, but the rebels, as well as Western intelligence agencies, said that they were members of the Quds Force. In any case, they were valuable enough so that Assad agreed to release more than two thousand captured rebels to have them freed. And then Shateri was killed. Finally, Suleimani began flying into Damascus frequently so that he could assume personal control of the Iranian intervention. "He's running the war himself," an American defense official told me. In Damascus, he is said to work out of a heavily fortified command post in a nondescript building, where he has installed a multinational array of officers: the heads of the Syrian military, a Hezbollah commander, and a coordinator of Iraqi Shiite militias, which Suleimani mobilized and brought to the fight. If Suleimani couldn't have the Basij, he settled for the next best thing: Brigadier General Hossein Hamedani, the Basij's former deputy commander. Hamedani, another comrade from the Iran-Iraq War, was experienced in running the kind of irregular militias that the Iranians were assembling, in order to keep on fighting if Assad fell. Late last year, Western officials began to notice a sharp increase in Iranian supply flights into the Damascus airport. Instead of a handful a week, planes were coming every day, carrying weapons and ammunition—"tons of it," the Middle Eastern security official told me—along with officers from the Quds Force. According to American officials, the officers coordinated attacks, trained militias, and set up an elaborate system to monitor rebel communications. They also forced the various branches of Assad's security services—designed to spy on one another—to work together. The Middle Eastern security official said that the number of Quds Force operatives, along with the Iraqi Shiite militiamen they brought with them, reached into the thousands. "They're spread out across the entire country," he told me. A turning point came in April, after rebels captured the Syrian town of Qusayr, near the Lebanese border. To retake the town, Suleimani called on Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah's leader, to send in more than two thousand fighters. It wasn't a difficult sell. Qusayr sits at the entrance to the Bekaa Valley, the main conduit for missiles and other materiel to Hezbollah; if it was closed, Hezbollah would find it difficult to survive. Suleimani and Nasrallah are old friends, having cooperated for years in Lebanon and in EFTA00872417 the many places around the world where Hezbollah operatives have performed terrorist missions at the Iranians' behest. According to Will Fulton, an Iran expert at the American Enterprise Institute, Hezbollah fighters encircled Qusayr, cutting off the roads, then moved in. Dozens of them were killed, as were at least eight Iranian officers. On June 5th, the town fell. "The whole operation was orchestrated by Suleimani," Maguire, who is still active in the region, said. "It was a great victory for him." Despite all of Suleimani's rough work, his image among Iran's faithful is that of an irreproachable war hero—a decorated veteran of the Iran-Iraq War, in which he became a division commander while still in his twenties. In public, he is almost theatrically modest. During a recent appearance, he described himself as "the smallest soldier," and, according to the Iranian press, rebuffed members of the audience who tried to kiss his hand. His power comes mostly from his close relationship with Khamenei, who provides the guiding vision for Iranian society. The Supreme Leader, who usually reserves his highest praise for fallen soldiers, has referred to Suleimani as "a living martyr of the revolution." Suleimani is a hard-line supporter of Iran's authoritarian system. In July, 1999, at the height of student protests, he signed, with other Revolutionary Guard commanders, a letter warning the reformist President Mohammad Khatami that if he didn't put down the revolt the military would—perhaps deposing Khatami in the process. "Our patience has run out," the generals wrote. The police crushed the demonstrators, as they did again, a decade later. Iran's government is intensely fractious, and there are many figures around Khamenei who help shape foreign policy, including Revolutionary Guard commanders, senior clerics, and Foreign Ministry officials. But Suleimani has been given a remarkably free hand in implementing Khamenei's vision. "He has ties to every corner of the system," Meir Dagan, the former head of Mossad, told me. "He is what I call politically clever. He has a relationship with everyone." Officials describe him as a believer in Islam and in the revolution; while many senior figures in the Revolutionary Guard have grown wealthy through the Guard's control over key Iranian industries, Suleimani has been endowed with a personal fortune by the Supreme Leader. "He's well taken care of," Maguire said. Suleimani lives in Tehran, and appears to lead the home life of a bureaucrat in middle age. "He gets up at four every morning, and he's in bed by nine- EFTA00872418 thirty every night," the Iraqi politician, who has known him for many years, told me, shaking his head in disbelief. Suleimani has a bad prostate and recurring back pain. He's "respectful of his wife," the Middle Eastern security official told me, sometimes taking her along on trips. He has three sons and two daughters, and is evidently a strict but loving father. He is said to be especially worried about his daughter Nargis, who lives in Malaysia. "She is deviating from the ways of Islam," the Middle Eastern official said. Maguire told me, "Suleimani is a far more polished guy than most. He can move in political circles, but he's also got the substance to be intimidating." Although he is widlead, his aesthetic tastes appear to be strictly traditional. "I don't think listen to classical music," the Middle Eastern official told me. "The European thing—I don't think that's his vibe, basically." Suleimani has little formal education, but, the former senior Iraqi official told me, "he is a very shrewd, frighteningly intelligent strategist." His tools include payoffs for politicians across the Middle East, intimidation when it is needed, and murder as a last resort. Over the years, the Quds Force has built an international network of assets, some of them drawn from the Iranian diaspora, who can be called on to support missions. "They're everywhere," a second Middle Eastern security official said. In 2010, according to Western officials, the Quds Force and Hezbollah launched a new campaign against American and Israeli targets—in apparent retaliation for the covert effort to slow down the Iranian nuclear program, which has included cyber attacks and assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists. Since then, Suleimani has orchestrated attacks in places as far flung as Thailand, New Delhi, Lagos, and Nairobi—at least thirty attempts in the past two years alone. The most notorious was a scheme, in 2011, to hire a Mexican drug cartel to blow up the Saudi Ambassador to the United States as he sat down to eat at a restaurant a few miles from the White House. The cartel member approached by Suleimani's agent turned out to be an informant for the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. (The Quds Force appears to be more effective close to home, and a number of the remote plans have gone awry.) Still, after the plot collapsed, two former American officials told a congressional committee that Suleimani should be assassinated. "Suleimani travels a lot," one said. "He is all over the place. EFTA00872419 Go get him. Either try to capture him or kill him." In Iran, more than two hundred dignitaries signed an outraged letter in his defense; a social-media campaign proclaimed, "We are all Qassem Suleimani." Several Middle Eastern officials, some of whom I have known for a decade, stopped talking the moment I brought up Suleimani. "We don't want to have any part of this," a Kurdish official in Iraq said. Among spies in the West, he appears to exist in a special category, an enemy both hated and admired: a Middle Eastern equivalent of Karla, the elusive Soviet master spy in John le Carre's novels. When I called Dagan, the former Mossad chief, and mentioned Suleimani's name, there was a long pause on the line. "Ah," he said, in a tone of weary irony, "a very good friend." In March, 2009, on the eve of the Iranian New Year, Suleimani led a group of Iran-Iraq War veterans to the Paa-Alam Heights, a barren, rocky promontory on the Iraqi border. In 1986, Paa-Alam was the scene of one of the terrible battles over the Faw Peninsula, where tens of thousands of men died while hardly advancing a step. A video recording from the visit shows Suleimani standing on a mountaintop, recounting the battle to his old comrades. In a gentle voice, he speaks over a soundtrack of music and prayers. "This is the Dasht-e-Abbas Road," Suleimani says, pointing into the valley below. "This area stood between us and the enemy." Later, Suleimani and the group stand on the banks of a creek, where he reads aloud the names of fallen Iranian soldiers, his voice trembling with emotion. During a break, he speaks with an interviewer, and describes the fighting in near-mystical terms. "The battlefield is mankind's lost paradise—the paradise in which morality and human conduct are at their highest," he says. "One type of paradise that men imagine is about streams, beautiful maidens, and lush landscape. But there is another kind of paradise—the battlefield." Suleimani was born in Rabor, an impoverished mountain village in eastern Iran. When he was a boy, his father, like many other farmers, took out an agricultural loan from the government of the Shah. He owed nine hundred toman—about a hundred dollars at the time—and couldn't pay it back. In a brief memoir, Suleimani wrote of leaving home with a young relative named Ahmad Suleimani, who was in a similar situation. "At night, we couldn't fall asleep with the sadness of thinking that government agents were coming to arrest our fathers," he wrote. Together, they travelled to EFTA00872420 Kerman, the nearest city, to try to clear their family's debt. The place was unwelcoming. "We were only thirteen, and our bodies were so tiny, wherever we went, they wouldn't hire us," he wrote. "Until one day, when we were hired as laborers at a school construction site on Khajoo Street, which was where the city ended. They paid us two toman per day." After eight months, they had saved enough money to bring home, but the winter snow was too deep. They were told to seek out a local driver named