EFTA01769578.pdf

From: Office of Terje Rod-Larsen Sent: Monday, April 23, 2012 9:26 PM Subject: April 23 update Articl= 2. <https://mail.google.com/mail/./0/html/compose/static_files/blank_quirks.html#b> The National Interest The Fantasy of Zero Nukes</=> Amitai Etzioni <http://nationalinterest.org/p=ofile/amitai-etzioni> Articl= 4. <https://mailgoogle.com/mail/a10/html/compose/static_files/blank_quirks.htmItld> The Washington Post Fears of extremism taking hold in =yria as violence continues Liz Sly <http://www.washingtonpost.com=liz-sly/2011/03/02/ABXzymP_page.html> =/p> Articl= 6. <https://mail.google.com/mailh/0/html/compose/static_files/blank_quirks.htmlitf> H0rriyet Daily News Turkey blocks Israel from NATO sum=it Serkan Demirtas Ar=icle 1. The Washington Post=/span> Nuclear weapo= reductions must be part of strategic analysis Henry A. Kissinger =nd Brent Scowcroft EFTA_R1_00080324 EFTA01769578 April 23 -- A =a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/21/=R2010122104371.html" target="_blank"> New START treaty reestablishing the process of nuclear arms control has=recently taken effect. Combined with reductions in the U.S. defense budget= this will bring the number of nuclear weapons in the United States to the=lowest overall level since the 1950s. The Obama administration is said to be considering negotiations for=a new round of nuclear reductions <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/white-h=use-weighs- nuclear-arms-cuts-but-will-wait-for-more-talks-with-russia/2012=02/14/gIQAfdDgER_story.html> to bring about ceilings as low as 300 w=rheads. Before momentum builds on that basis, we feel obliged to stress ou= conviction that the goal of future negotiations should be strategic stabi=ity and that lower numbers of weapons should be a consequence of strategic analysis, not an abstract preconceive= determination. Regardless of one=92s vision of the ultimate future of nuclear weapons, the overarching goal=of contemporary U.S. nuclear policy must be to ensure that nuclear weapons=are never used. Strategic stability is not inherent with low numbers of weapons; indeed, excessively low numbers =ould lead to a situation in which surprise attacks are conceivable. We supported ratifi=ation of the START treaty. We favor verification of agreed reductions and =rocedures that enhance predictability and transparency. One of us (Kissing=r) has supported working toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, albeit with the proviso that a series of v=rifiable intermediate steps that maintain stability precede such an end po=nt and that every stage of the process be fully transparent and verifiable= The precondition of=the next phase of U.S. nuclear weapons policy must be to enhance and enshr=ne the strategic stability that has preserved global peace and prevented t=e use of nuclear weapons for two generations. Eight key facts sho=ld govern such a policy: First, strategic st=bility requires maintaining strategic forces of sufficient size <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-anno=nces-new-military- approach/2012/01/05/gIQAFWcmcP_story.html> and composition that a first strike=cannot reduce retaliation to a level acceptable to the aggressor. Second, in assessin= the level of unacceptable damage, the United States cannot assume that a =otential enemy will adhere to values or calculations identical to our own.=We need a sufficient number of weapons to pose a threat to what potential aggressors value under every conceivabl= circumstance. We should avoid strategic analysis by mirror-imaging. Third, the composit=on of our strategic forces cannot be defined by numbers alone. It also dep=nds on the type of delivery vehicles and their mix. If the composition of =he U.S. deterrent force is modified as a result of reduction, agreement or for other reasons, a sufficient var=ety must be retained, together with a robust supporting command and contro= system, so as to guarantee that a preemptive attack cannot succeed. Fourth, in deciding=on force levels and lower numbers, verification is crucial. Particularly i=portant is a determination of what level of uncertainty threatens the calc=lation of stability. At present, that level is well within the capabilities of the existing verification systems= We must be certain that projected levels maintain — and when possible, =einforce — that confidence. Fifth, the global n=nproliferation regime has been weakened to a point where some of the proli=erating countries are reported to have arsenals of more than 100 weapons. =nd these arsenals are growing. At what lower U.S. levels could these arsenals constitute a strategic threat? What=will be their strategic impact if deterrence breaks down in the overall st=ategic relationship? Does this prospect open up the risk of hostile allian=es between countries whose forces individually are not adequate to challenge strategic stability but that co=bined might overthrow the nuclear equation? 2 EFTA_R1_00080325 EFTA01769579 Sixth, this suggest= that, below a level yet to be established, nuclear reductions cannot be c=nfined to Russia and the United States. As the countries with the two larg=st nuclear arsenals, Russia and the United States have a special responsibility. But other countries need to b= brought into the discussion when substantial reductions from existing STA=T levels are on the international agenda. Seventh, strategic =tability will be affected by other factors, such as missile defenses chttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/17/=R2009091700639.html> and the roles and numbers of tactical nuclear weapons,=which are not now subject to agreed limitations. Precision-guided large co=ventional warheads on long-range delivery vehicles provide another challen=e to stability. The interrelationship <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2009/09/18/=R2009091800847.html?sid=ST2009091701841> among these elements must be taken into account in future negotiations. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/worldieurope/medvedev-calls-missile- =efense-a-threat-to-russia/2012/03/23/gloA9Id2VS_story.html> Eighth, we must see=to it that countries that have relied on American nuclear protection maint=in their confidence in the U.S. capability for deterrence. If that confide=ce falters, they may be tempted by accommodation to their adversaries or independent nuclear capabilities. Nuclear weapons wil= continue to influence the international landscape as part of strategy and=an aspect of negotiation. The lessons learned throughout seven decades nee= to continue to govern the future. Articl= 2. The National Intere=t The Fantasy o= Zero Nukes Amitai Etzion= <http://n=tionalinterest.org/profile/amitai-etzioni> April 23, 2012 -- N=where is President Obama's tendency to confuse speech making with policy=making more evident than in his treatment of nuclear weapons, the greatest=threat to both U.S. security and world peace. The main hot spots =re well known: North Korea, Iran and Pakistan. Instead, the president has =ocused for the last three years on Russia. President Obama believes that t=e best way to deal with WMD is to lead by example. He holds that, as the United States and Russia recommit themse=ves to nuclear disarmament, other nations will be inspired to either give =p their nuclear arms or refrain from acquiring any. It is a policy Keith lit= Payne fairly labeled "nuclear utopianism." The strategy that c=lls for the United States and Russia to lead the parade to nuclear disarma=ent was formed by four highly regarded statesmen: the quad of two Republic=ns, Henry Kissinger and George Schultz, as well as two Democrats, Sam Nunn and William Perry. All four are very se=ior veterans of the Cold War. Their strategy relies on reductions in the 3 EFTA_R1_00080326 EFTA01769580 n=mber of warheads loaded on the two powers' strategic bombers and missile=, a major threat before 1990 but not a hot issue today. The quad's positi=n is best understood in the context of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treat= (NPT) that took effect in 1970, which created two groups of nations: thos= that had nuclear weapons and agreed to give them up, and those that did not have them and promised not to seek=them. Many of the nuclear have-not class of countries lived up to th=ir NPT obligations and ended their nascent military nuclear programs in th= years that followed, including South Africa, Argentina, Brazil and Egypt. But the members of the "nuclear clu="—China, Russia, the UK, France and the United States—failed to hono= their commitments. These failures are often cited by nations such as Iran=when they vent their outrage at being pressured by the United States and other nuclear "haves" to not acquire nuclear =eapons. During his first ma=or speech about nuclear arms, in Prague in 2009, President Obama promised =o make amends by moving toward the promised land of zero nukes. In the fol=owing months, his administration invested much energy in fashioning a treaty with Russia that did reduce the nuclear=weapons of the old Cold War adversaries. But the treaty had no effect on t=e main sources of current threats: terrorists acquiring nukes in Pakistan =r North Korea and mounting them on long-range missiles, or Iran employing them to threaten Saudi Arabia an= Israel. Moreover, zero is a=dangerous notion. If either Russia or the U.S. concealed ten weapons more =han the levels currently permitted by the treaty, it would matter little, =ince both countries have hundreds of them. However, if one of the superpowers indeed gave up its entire nuclear=arsenal and the other then pulled ten out of a hiding place, it would pose=a major threat. Moreover, even if both Russia and the United States move t= a true and verified zero, any other nation that did not could blackmail one or both superpowers and the =est of the world merely by threatening to use its nuclear weapons.<=p> A world of zero nuk=s may be merely a vision President Obama projected to inspire other nation= to give up their nuclear ambitions, but he has failed to inspire any nati=n to give up its bombs or to stop making more. Consider the reason= nations develop a nuclear arsenal. Whatever Russia and the United States =o will not stop them. For example, Pakistan is retaining its weapons stock=ile because India has a much bigger population and can sustain a much larger conventional army than Pakistan. = nuclear capability thus serves, from the viewpoint of Islamabad, as the m=in deterrent against being overrun—Pakistan would maintain its arsenal e=en if the US. and Russia dismantled their last nukes. Iran seeks a nuclea= weapon to deter attacks by the United States and its allies, as a source =f prestige and possibly as the means needed to wipe out Israel. North Kore= claims to need nuclear weapons to deter the United States, Japan and South Korea from what it sees as their =ggressive tendencies—and views them as a major source of prestige as wel=. None of these reasons are much affected by whatever deals Moscow and Was=ington are making. Chasing the mirage =f a world without nukes distracts attention and uses up political capital =adly needed for addressing urgent problems concerning these arms. Top amon= these—if one is to focus on Russia—are not strategic arms but the tactical nuclear bombs and fissile materials te=rorists seek. Russia has an estimated arsenal of tactical nukes between fi=e thousand and fourteen thousand, while the United States has about one th=usand. However, New START does not cover tactical weapons. It deals exclusively with strategic weapons, w=ich terrorists are extremely unlikely to be able to handle. The nuclear arsenal= of rogue states and failing states are not being ignored by the Obama adm=nistration. It is trying diplomacy, engagement and even some sanctions in =ealing with Iran, and it is desperately seeking ways to deal with Pakistan and North Korea. But these discussions =re on a different track, where zero is not so much as mentioned. Thus, we see anothe= example in which Obama's speeches—which presumably set the direction of=US. foreign policy and are intended to inspire other nations—are out of =ync with the small efforts his administration is making in handling 4 EFTA_R1_00080327 EFTA01769581 the nuclear hot spots. Anyway you look at it, the rh=toric about zero nukes is completely disconnected from the international r=ality. Amitai Etzioni's=book The Hot Spots <http://www.transactionpub.comititle/Hot-Spots-978-1-4128-4=63-0.html> will be published by Transaction in 2012. Article 3.<=p> The Weekly Standard= Negotiations =hat Matter Reuel Marc Gerecht<=span> April 30, 2012 -- S=nce we don't know what Saeed Jalili, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, =aid at the recent confab in Istanbul, we can't be sure that Israeli prim= minister Bibi Netanyahu was right to dismiss the powwow as a "freebie" for Tehran. Also, the Islamic Republic =s a theocracy: The most senior officials need to report face-to-face to th=ir master. Jalili, an ill-tempered, narrow-minded, one-legged veteran of t=e Iran-Iraq war, lost face after a disastrous meeting in Geneva in October 2009, when he tentatively agreed to a nuclear=fuel swap, only to see the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, bat the deal down=from Tehran. So no matter how well rehearsed, Jalili would need time for h=s boss to digest what was demanded and offered. In any case, as long as the Iranians were polite, we were goi=g to have two meetings. And so there is another get-together scheduled for=May 23 in Baghdad. The odds are high, =owever, that the next session will lead to no diplomatic yellow-brick road= Round two could be a success, and lead to a round three, if Khamenei agre=d to do five things: (1) Stop all uranium enrichment to 20 percent purity, which is near bomb-grade; (2) ship abroad=the entire stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium; (3) close the Fordow =nrichment facility, which is buried under a mountain near the clerical cit= of Qom; (4) allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency immediate and unfettered access to =ny suspected nuclear site; and (5) permit the IAEA to install devices on c=ntrifuges for monitoring uranium-enrichment levels. Khamenei is, to say th= least, unlikely to agree to this. It's worth stress=ng that it is a serious mistake to allow Khamenei and his Revolutionary Gu=rds, who oversee terrorist operations and the nuclear program, any domesti= enrichment capacity. This was the position of the Obama administration and our Western European allies. Now that cons=nsus has apparently collapsed because Iranian agreement seems impossible. =hamenei's determination to keep advancing uranium enrichment despite inc=easingly severe sanctions has paid off. Tehran has enough low-grade, 3.5 percent enriched uranium stockpiled =o produce at least one, soon two, nuclear weapons. It also has a 163-pound=stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium. As Oli Heinonen, the former depu=y director general of the IAEA, has pointed out, mastering 3.5 percent enrichment is 70 percent of the way=to mastering the fuel cycle for an atomic weapon. Twenty percent enrichmen= is 90 percent of the process. As of February, Ira=ian centrifuges were producing 256 pounds per month of 3.5 percent enriche= uranium and 15 pounds per month of 20 percent enriched uranium (the Fordo= facility accounted for 9.5 pounds of this total). The Iranian regime had 8,800 centrifuges spinning at Natan= and 696 at Fordow. Once the Islamic Republic can produce 44 pounds of hig=ly enriched uranium per month, which is not that far off given the increas=ng rate of production, the supreme leader and his guards can have a nuclear weapon in their hands in as littl= as 43 days, provided Iran's nuclear scientists have mastered the manufa=ture of a nuclear trigger (technically much less difficult than enrichment=. Per the IAEA's most recent report, "information indicates that Iran has carried out activities relevant to =he development of a 5 EFTA_R1_00080328 EFTA01769582 nuclear explosive device." In other words, Khamenei =ill win his race for a nuclear weapon unless something dramatic intervenes=to stop him. The best that can b= hoped from another round of negotiations with Tehran is that Khamenei is =ooked into a process that enfeebles him. The cleric has consistently avoid=d any meaningful embrace of the negotiating process because he sees it as dangerous, a slippery slope where the Americ=ns and Europeans dictate limitations on his nuclear program. Many American=critics of negotiations have seen this process as the reverse, a slippery =lope that has Western diplomacy enabling the Islamic Republic's nuclear ambitions. Khamenei may have the=stronger argument. But he shows no sign of yielding to pressure. There is certainly = risk that continuing these negotiations puts Israeli prime minister Bibi =etanyahu and defense minister Ehud Barak into a real pickle, since it's =ore difficult for the Israelis to make the case for bombing Iran's nuclear sites while the negotiations are goi=g on. Nonetheless, the Israelis need to decide whether a preventive attack=on the Islamic Republic can work. Their internal deliberations should not re constrained by a false promise of a diplomatic solution. Moving forward with negotiations now is actually=more likely to free the Israelis to act in the summer, if they choose to, =han to entrap them. Americans, too, nee= to have an honest debate about whether they are willing to permit Khamene= and the Revolutionary Guards—the principal state sponsors of terrorism =n the Middle East, whom the Obama administration has increasingly nailed for their operational relationship with al Qaeda=97to develop atomic weapons. It would be healthy for Democrats and Re=ublicans to debate the Iranian conundrum, which is not going to happen as =ong as sanctions-backed diplomacy seems viable. We are fortunate that the nuclear timeline overlaps well with the =012 presidential campaign: It's the ideal moment for a ripping discussio= about probably the most momentous foreign-policy question before us. The above five requ=rements—nearly identical to the reported minimum requirements of the Whi=e House—ought to clarify where we are on May 23. These conditions w=II be extremely difficult for Khamenei to accept because they are so humbling. Shuttering the Fordow facility, which Iran=92s state-controlled press has reported on with pride, would be gut-wrench=ng for the supreme leader. It's likely that Khamenei wants to build more=Fordow-like facilities—bomb- resistant sites that signal spiritual resistance to the West. President Mahmoud Ahma=inejad's boast that Iran intends to open 10 more enrichment facilities n= doubt was hyperbolic, but the sentiments clearly reflect Khamenei's dis=osition. Closing Fordow would offend the supreme leader's identity as the anti-American Islamic paladin. = Even more galling a=d dangerous, U.N. inspectors under this agreement would have the right to =an out across the country hunting for suspicious nuclear activity. The IAE='s Additional Protocols, to which Khamenei would have to assent, are intrusive and would allow inspectors access to Iranian military and Revolutionary Guard bases. No doubt, the supreme leader=and his guards could still cheat (they have lied about the nuclear program=from the beginning). Iran is a big country. Satellites and other technical means of observation can only =o so much. The regime is surely working clandestinely to perfect more adva=ced centrifuges that could be hidden in smaller buildings and underground =acilities. Nevertheless, the o=ds are decent that these inspectors would catch the regime in its big lie =bout the "peaceful" intent of the program. Nuclear experts have some i=ea where the Iranians have been militarizing their nuclear "research." Even so, an astonishing number of intelligen= people in America and Europe appear to believe that Khamenei's fatwa ab=ut the "sinfulness" of nuclear weapons is significant, that it isn't=just ketman, deception deployed against a stronger enemy. Exposing Khamenei's flagrant mendacity, for both Iranians and for=igners, is not without value and would again refocus the discussion on the=real question: Is it acceptable for Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards =o have nuclear weapons? But what if the Ira=ians accept all of the demands? Could we still be staring at an Iranian nu=e, just delivered at a slower pace? It's possible. If Ali Akbar Hashemi =afsanjani, the former major-domo of Iranian clerical politics and the true father of the Islamic Republic's nuclear-=eapons program, were still in charge, we'd likely be enmeshed in the rop=-a-dope tactics that he successfully used against the trade-happy European= in the 1990s. Rafsanjani has always advocated the 6 EFTA_R1_00080329 EFTA01769583 go-slow nuclear approach. He has even broached the idea of d=rect talks with Washington. But we're not confronting Rafsanjani, who war purged after the crackdown on the Green Movement in 2009. Moving forward =ith one more round of negotiations now is much more likely to expose the supreme leader's intransigence tha= entangle America (and Israel) in a pointless, lengthy diplomatic dance.</=pan> Senior officials in=the Obama administration probably have few illusions about Iranian mendaci=y. The last three years have been an education: Candidate Obama and lots o= Democrats believed that President Obama could transform American-Iranian relations. But Ali Khamenei has tri=d hard to show that George W. Bush was not the problem. Although it's da=gerous to suggest that diplomacy with the Islamic Republic has just about =un its course (for die-hard diplomats, the process never ends), it's going to be challenging for the administra=ion to pretend that sanctions-backed diplomacy can work given the increasi=g enrichment at Natanz and Fordow. If the Israelis decide to strike, the president will be hard pressed not to back them, as he promised to do in his speech to the American Israel Pu=lic Affairs Committee. The collapse of the negotiating process in May most=likely will not provoke the White House to do anything more bellicose, but=it will at least get us talking seriously, at last, about the nature of the Iranian regime and how best to=deal with it—and how to help Israel deal with it, if Israel feels it mus= act. That would be an enormous step forward. Reuel Marc Gerec=t is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foundation_for_Defense_of_Democraci=s> , focusing primarily on the Middle=East, Islamic militancy, counterterrorism, and intelligence. Mr. Gerecht s=rved as a case officer at the <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CIA> Articl= 4. The Washington Post=/span> Fears of extr=mism taking hold in Syria as violence continues Liz Sly <http://www.washingtonpost.com/liz-sly/201=/03/02/ABXzvmP_page.html> April 23 -- BE=RUT — As Syria's revolution drags into its second year amid few signs =hat a U.N.-mandated cease-fire plan will end the violence, evidence is mounting that Islamist extremists are seeking to commandeer what began as a non-ideological uprising aimed at securing grea=er political freedom. Activists and rebel=soldiers based inside Syria say a small but growing number of Islamist rad=cals affiliated with global jihadi movements have been arriving in opposit=on strongholds in recent weeks and attempting to rally support among disaffected residents. Western diplomats s=y they have tracked a steady trickle of jihadists flowing into Syria from =raq, and Jordan's government last week detained at least four alleged Jordanian militants accused of trying to sneak into Syria to join the revolutionaries. A previously unknow= group calling itself the al-Nusra Front has asserted responsibi=ity chttp://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/03/21/202177.h=ml> for bombings in the cities=of Damascus and Aleppo using language and imagery reminiscent of the statements and videos put out by al-Qaeda-affil=ated organizations in Iraq, although no evidence of the group's existenc= has surfaced other than the videos and statements it has posted on the In=ernet. 7 EFTA_R1_00080330 EFTA01769584 Syrian activists an= Western officials say the militants appear to be making little headway in=recruiting supporters within the ranks of the still largely secular protest movement= <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/fears-of- extremism-ta=ing-hold-in-syria-as-violence-continues/2012/04/22/gIOA8ClnaT_print.html> whose unifying goal is the ouster of the regime led by President Bashar al=Assad. But if the United N=tions' peace plan fails to end the government's bloody crackdown <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/scores-killed-in-syri=n-offensive/2011/07/31/gIOAaGuhll_gallery.html> and promises of Western and Ara= help for the rebel Free Syrian Army do not materialize, activists and ana=ysts say, there is a real risk that frustrated members of the opposition w=ll be driven toward extremism, adding a dangerous dimension to a revolt that is threatening to destabilize a wid= arc of territory across the Middle East. "The world doing =othing opens the door for jihadis," said Lt. Abdullah al-Awdi, a Free Sy=ian Army commander who defected from the regular army in the summer and wa= interviewed during a visit he made to Turkey. He says that he has rebuffed several offers of help from militant =roups in the form of arms and money and that he fears the extremists' in=luence will grow. "This is not a re=son for the international community to be silent about Syria. It should be=a reason for them to do something," Awdi said. Flow of jihadis rep=rted U.S. officials and =estern diplomats in the region, who spoke on the condition of anonymity be=ause of the sensitivity of the subject, say they have seen several indicat=ons that al•Qaeda-like groups are trying to inject themselves into the Syrian revolution, although they stress that=the Islamist radicals' impact has been limited. AI-Qaeda leader Ayman al=Zawahiri called on "mujaheddin" to head to Syria in support of the reb=ls earlier this year, and Western diplomats are convinced that operatives affiliated with al-Qaeda carried out a strin= of bombings in Damascus and Aleppo between December and March. The diplomats say d=zens of jihadis have been detected crossing the border from Iraq into Syri=, some of them Syrians who had previously volunteered to fight in Iraq and=others Iraqi. There may also be other foreign nationals among them, reversing the journey they took into Iraq ye=rs ago when jihadis flowed across the border to fight the now- departed Ame=icans. The Syrian governme=t facilitated the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq for many years, and t=ere are widespread suspicions that it may be covertly reactivating some of=those networks to discredit the revolutionaries, deter international support for the opposition and create conditions under=which the harsh crackdown by authorities will appear justified. The regime portraye= the uprising as the work of radical Islamists in its earliest days, and t=e reports that extremists are surfacing in Syria only play into the offici=l narrative, said Salman Shaikh, director of the Brookings Doha Center in Qatar. "This drip, drip,=drip of extremists across the border . <=pan style="font-size:18.0pr>. . there are signs the regime is aiding and abetting it," Shaikh said. "A=d it will become a self-fulfilling prophecy." It is also plausibl= that these groups, adherents of a radicalized form of Sunni Islam, have t=rned against their former benefactors and are making their way back to Syr=a motivated by religious and sectarian zeal. Although many Syrian opposition activists insist that their revoluti=n is not sectarian, a majority of Syrians are Sunnis, while Assad, along w=th most leading figures in the regime and in the security forces, belongs =o the Shiite-affiliated Alawite minority, lending a sectarian dimension to the populist revolt. 8 EFTA_R1_00080331 EFTA01769585 Syrian activists an= rebels insist that the extremists are not welcome in communities that hav= long prided themselves on their tolerance of the religious minorities in =heir midst, including Christians, Alawites, Druze, Kurds and Ismaili Shiites. A rebel leader in n=rthern Syria who asked to be identified by his nom de guerre, Abu Mustafa,=described how he and his men drove out a group of about 15 radicals, all o= them Syrian but none of them local, who arrived in a northern village in January. Led by a commander who ident=fied himself as Abu Sulaiman, the group tried to recruit supporters for an=assault on the nearby town of Jisr al-Shughour. Abu Sulaiman "had=money, he had weapons, and he sent a guy to negotiate with me, but I refus=d," Abu Mustafa recalled in an interview in Turkey. "We asked him to l=ave, but he didn't, so we attacked him. We killed two of them, and one of our men was injured. Then he left, but I do='t know where he went." "The good thing i= that Syrians are against giving our country to radicals," Abu Mustafa a=ded. "But these groups have supporters who are very rich, and if our rev=lution continues like this, without hope and without result, they will gain influence on the ground." A largely secular r=volt There is a distinct=on between the naturally conservative religiosity of Syrians who come from=traditional communities and the radicalism of those associated with the gl=bal jihadi movement, said Joseph Holliday, who is researching the Free Syrian Army <http://www.understandingwar.orerepor=hyrias-armed-opposition> at the =nstitute for the Study of War in Washington and believes extremists are a small minority. "While there are =lements (in the opposition] that are very conservative, they are not the d=iving force," he said. "There is definitely an argument to be made tha= this will increase over time, because insurgencies often become more extremist over time, but for now the driving force behin= this revolution is secular." Adherents of the st=ict Salafi school of Islam have emerged in many Syrian communities and are=playing a role in the opposition, but they, too, are to be distinguished f=om the jihadis, said -Yezid Sayigh <http://carnegie- mec.org/publications/?fa=47877> of the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut. "People who are l=cal and pious and moving in an Islamist direction and are taking up guns d=n't have the same organization and are not necessarily the same thing as=jihadists, who are not necessarily al-Qaeda," he said. - There's a range of different directions and trends." Many activists fear= however, that the influence of the extremists is growing as Syrian rebels=who have for months appealed in vain for Western military intervention loo= for help elsewhere. "Of course it is =rowing, because no one is doing anything to stop it," said a Syrian acti=ist who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he fears retribution f=om some of the radicals he has encountered while attempting to organize the opposition in many northern communities. =/span> "They have rules,=94 he said. "They say: If we give you money, you have to obey our orders=and accept our leadership. Some of my friends drink alcohol, and they aren=92t like this. But when they find no other way to cover their expenses, they join these groups and then they follow t=em." 9 EFTA_R1_00080332 EFTA01769586 Articl= 5. Asharq Al-Awsat interview: The PLO's Ahmad Quray Kifah Zaboun</=> 22 April 2012 -- The following is the full text of the interview: [Asharq Al-Awsat] I would like to start with the two-state solution, which =ou said this week is dead. Can it be resurrected? [Quray] I have said that the two-state solution has been exposed to lethal =lows. I am convinced that Israel talks about the two•state project, while =t is carrying out its assassination. There can never be a Palestinian Stat= without Jerusalem. If the state project is a living body, then Jerusalem is its head, and if the head is s=vered, the body cannot live. Secondly, pay attention to the settlement blocs. Everybody ought to know wh=re their borders are. I will start from the north, Ariel Settlement (near =abulus) extends for 24 km from west to east into the belly of the West Ban=, and they will add to it Shilo Settlement, which will expand by some 500 housing units; all of it will be=transformed into a single bloc that will reach the Jordan River Ghawr, and=splits the West Bank. In the middle there is Givat Zeev, which puts an end=to the connectivity of Ramallah, and extends to South Jerusalem and to the west until Bayt Sira, and then M=ale Adumim is added to it in the east, and hence it will reach Al-Khan al-=hmar (on the road to Jericho). This is without even mentioning the "E= plan," which if built would seal Jerusalem from the east, and there would be no scope for visiting it except from the=west, or by permission from the Israeli controller. As for the Jerusalem s=ttlements, there is no need to talk about them. I do not believe that it is possible to deal with such blocs in the project=of a solution for a Palestinian State. Israel has built the wall, and draw= up the settlement blocs, and I am afraid that it might say: This is your =tate until God changes the situation. This will be the end of it, without Jerusalem, without refugees, and with =he Jordan River Ghawr staying as a security space. We want the two-state solution. However, if Israel is not committed to the =wo-state solution on the basis of international legitimacy, international =aw, and the authority related to the peace process, the talk about the two=state solution will become mere intellectual exercise, and will not lead to any results. [Asharq Al-Awsat] What do you think is a satisfactory solution? [Quray] A two-state solution that is based on a Palestinian State on the li=es of 4 June 1967 with exchanges in borders equivalent in value and simila= to each other, but not in the settlements. [Asharq Al-Awsat] Is what the Israelis doing today going to be fate? [Quray] I do not say that what the occupation plans is going to be fate, bu= what the occupation plans if the situation stays as it is, the occupation=will have the opportunity to impose on the ground. The Palestinian interna= state is not healthy, and the Arab state is not healthy, as it has become neutral. I do not want a state=ent from the Arab summit, I want real Arab participation. This is Palestin=, and it is the center of the region that separates the octopus from the A=ab world. The Palestinian cause needs a different Arab stance. What are they offering to Jerusalem? What t=e Arabs offer is nothing worth mentioning. [Jerusalem Mayor] Nir Barkat (c=airman of the Jerusalem Jewish Municipal Council) has a budget bigger than=all the Arab countries offer. 10 EFTA_R1_00080333 EFTA01769587 [Asharq Al-Awsat] But they have allocated large funds to Jerusalem, the las= of which at the Baghdad summit. Have these funds arrived? [Quray] No, no they have not. None of the countries has paid, except Saudi =rabia. [Asharq Al-Awsat] Then, in the light of this diagnosis, what is the necessa=y next step at the Palestinian level? [Quray] In order to be objective, we should know clearly the magnitude of o=r strength, and our stance now. The Palestinian stance to some extent is n=t bad. Second, we need an Arab stance. If the Arab stance is not serious a=out making the Palestinian cause one of its priorities, this will be a point of weakness. Unfortunately, we=no longer are one of the priorities of the Arab stance, neither are we one=of the priorities of the international stance. The United States is turnin= toward East Asia; this is not a secret; Hillary Clinton wrote about that. There is a transformation that=might create a vacuum. [Asharq Al-Awsat] You have said that the Palestinian stance toward the nego=iations is not bad. Are you really satisfied with it? [Quray] The Palestinian stance still is experimenting, and the policy of ex=erimenting sometimes leads to mistakes. I am not against the negotiations,=but the negotiations with the mechanisms to which we are used no longer le=d to any results, and will not lead to any result. The mechanism of the bilateral meetings that are publi=hed in the newspapers before they start is no longer beneficial; this is f=rst. Second, there are issues that the Palestinian side cannot decide alone. Let=me give you an example; the issue of the refugees, you cannot decide this =ssue without Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt. These are the rights of ci=izens, the rights of peoples, and the right of the host country. Therefore, you need these sides. Also some =nternational sides ought to be informed step by step as we proceed. This also applies to the issue of Jerusalem in which we need indirect parti=ipation by the Arab and Muslim countries. The same applies to security. Israel talks everyday about security, and has=transformed it into a condition for negotiations. There ought to be an und=rstanding of the issue of security at the regional level. I do not call for partnership at the negotiations table, but there has to b= participation and a change of mechanism. [Asharq Al-Awsat] But you are talking about the most important sovereignty =ssues in the negotiations? [Quray] Yes, (the decision) is ours, but we cannot contract it on our own. =e want Arab, regional, and international sides to be present with us. We o=ght to depart from the logic of bilateral negotiations. This is no longer =eneficial, and for this reason these bilateral negotiations one time are transformed into overview negoti=tions, and another time are exploratory negotiations. If there are negotia=ions, let them be through the new mechanisms. [Asharq Al-Awsat] Had you been still the chairman of the negotiating team o= had you had the power to decide, how would you act now? [Quray] I am not saying that our stance is correct. The condition of haltin= the settlement activities is right and correct. However, it is important =o say that I will not under any circumstances recognize any settlement blo= that has been built on the 1967 territories, and I will never accept it. Syria has not said stop the settl=ment activities, but it said no settlements after the agreement. Egypt did=not say, for instance, stop the building activities in Yamit (settlement i= Sinai), but when the situation was resolved the settlement was demolished. In Gaza, have they [the Israel=s] not left it? Therefore, our stance ought to be clear, but without makin= it understood that the required amendments are in exchange for the settle=ents. [Asharq Al-Awsat] But the Israelis say that you have agreed that the settle=ents can stay in exchange for land? [Quray] The PA has not agreed to this not even once. [Asharq Al-Awsat] Have they not agreed even that principal settlements can =tay? [Quray] No, no, in Camp David we said there can be amendments to the border=. Let me be frank, neither Abu-Ammar (Yasser Arafat), nor Abu-Mazin (Mahmu= Abbas) agreed that settlements could stay. [Asharq Al-Awsat] Then, you are in favor of announcing a categorical stance=toward the settlements and going to the negotiations? [Quray] Of course, if there are clear mechanisms I am not against the negot=ations. [Asharq Al-Awsat] But is this not a new experiment? [Quray] No, no, the international community will be present, the Internatioral Quartet and Arab and regional sides, and also there will be a time limi=. [Asharq Al-Awsat] But rather than doing this, the PA has addressed a letter=to Israeli Prime Minister Binjamin Netanyahu. Have you seen it? [Quray] Not at all, I heard about it the same as you have. 11 EFTA_R1_00080334 EFTA01769588 [Asharq Al-Awsat] Are you in favor of sending it? [Quray] God willing, it will lead to a result. Our stance is known, and Net=nyahu's stance has become known. [Asharq Al-Awsat] Netanyahu has said that he will reply with a letter. In y=ur opinion, will this lead to negotiations through letters? [Quray] I do not know how that will be. However, he answered in advance say=ng no to the return of the refugees, no to Jerusalem, and that the settlem=nt blocs will stay. Therefore, he has answered. [Asharq Al-Awsat] Do you mean that the step is futile? [Quray] God willing, it will be useful. [Asharq Al-Awsat] Do you have other options that could have been activated =ather than, for instance, the letter? [Quray] Of course we have options. We have a cause and we do not lack optio=s. [Asharq Al-Awsat] What are the options that you consider that they have not=been used? [Quray] Popular resistance, for instance, is an important option. Consolida=ing the Palestinian presence, providing its requirements, and strengthenin= it, is also an important option. Also the option of a state for two peopl=s, a single democratic state is also an option. Our options exist as long as our national rights are not f=lfilled. [Asharq Al-AwsatJ You talk about the one-state solution; do you consider it=possible to apply? [Quray] This has been a Fatah project since 1967, a secular democratic stat= in which the Muslim, the Christian, and the Jew coexist. This originally =s a Fatah option, but it was amended in 1974 when it started to talk about=the establishment of a state on any part from which the occupation withdraws, and hence the National Counc=l adopted its resolution in 1988 to establish a Palestinian St ate. Later =n, the negotiations started on the basis of the National Council resolutio=. However, I say if this vision is not achieved, what can we do? We can activate our other options, includ=ng the one-state option. We - this generation - might not be able to fulfi= the aspirations of the people, but we should not squander them. The optio=s ought to remain open to the people. [Asharq Al-Awsat] But these options have been proposed by the PA every now =nd then, which has made them lose their seriousness? [Quray] They should not be brandished for the sake of threatening; these ar= strategic options of a people and a cause. [Asharq Al-Awsat] Do you agree with those who say that the two-state soluti=n is dead, and the option now is the one- state solution? [Quray] No, I say that Israel is killing the two-state solution, and I look=up to the international community to tell Israel to stop, and also to say =hat the requirements of the two-state solution are the following. [Asharq Al-Awsat] And then we start waiting again? [Quray] Our issue is not a picnic; it is an issue of a people, a homeland, =nd international and regional equations. [Asharq Al-Awsat] Some people consider that there is the option of dissolvi=g the PA rather than all this? [Quray] No, this is as if we are in the middle of a race an then we shoot o=rselves in the foot. The PA is an achievement, and one of the signposts of=the Palestinian national struggle. It was not achieved free of charge; it =as achieved through long struggle and a great uprising. This is a temporary transitional authority for a tra=sitional stage during which the Palestinians hold the reins of their affai=s until the occupation ends. It is forbidden that a Palestinian should say=that he wants to dissolve the PA; this is despite the fact that Israel indeed has taken away much of the pow=rs of the PA when it returned to Ramallah and put Arafat under siege; neve=theless we ought to preserve the PA. [Asharq Al-Awsat] There are those who call for thinking about the job of th= PA and its relationship with Israel, and redrafting all this? [Quray] I do not negotiate over the PA rather than negotiating over the per=anent solution. For instance, some people say that the economic agreement =s unfair; this is true, but I do not negotiate over the economic agreement= I do not want to improve the conditions of the transitional solution; this is not what we want. We want an agreeme=t over the permanent solution; this is what will give us complete sovereig=ty. [Asharq Al-Awsat] The PA has tried to obtain sovereignty through going to t=e United Nations. In your opinion, was this step correct? [Quray] This is a correct, good, and required step. [Asharq Al-Awsat] Does it contradict the negotiations? [Quray] No, no, this is our right. I am in favor of any step that brings us=closer to our right. (Asharq Al-Awsat] Are you also in favor of going back again to the United N=tions? [Quray] I believe that obtaining the status of non-member state is an impor=ant achievement. This will enable us to participate in many organizations =nd bodies along the way to the UN Security Council. 12 EFTA_R1_00080335 EFTA01769589 [Asharq Al-Awsat] But it has been raised that a non-member state might canc=l the legitimate representation of the PLO? [Quray] A non-member state means that the PLO exists as a sole legitimate r=presentative until the independent state is established. [Asharq Al-Awsat] Some people link the failure of the UN Security Council s=ep and the divisions. Do you think that there is a link? [Quray] The divisions are one of the factors of the erosion of the Palestin=an status. This is a small country, and we have a cause, and we are under =ccupation. This situation should not continue; cohesion must be restored t= the people. These divisions most certainly weaken us in front of Israel, and in front of the world. The int=rnal situation cannot continue like this, and I fear that the divisions co=ld turn into a fait accompli with which everybody deals. The two sides, wi=tingly or unwittingly, are dividing the country; there are many examples on this that arouse concern. The divi=ions are a national issue that ought to end. [Asharq Al-Awsat] Then, what do you think is the way out after all the prev=ous agreements have failed? [Quray] I do not believe that the Doha agreement has failed. There is a pos=ibility. We should not allow the divisions to remain. I went to China and =ietnam earlier, and they were saying to us: Comrades, make it your priorit= to consolidate your national unity, because it is the guarantee of your victory. [Asharq Al-Awsat] You are a member of the PLO; are you satisfied with the w=rk, role, and status of the PLO? [Quray] I wish the work of the PLO to be institutionalized, and that the re=olutions are adopted through a great deal of serious consultations, becaus= this is a difficult stage. The PLO needs activation in all its department=, which need care, attention, a