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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
EASTERN DIVISION
RONNIE LEROY SNYDER,
Movant, No. C09-2028-LRR
No. CR04-2008-LRR
vs.
ORDER
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
This matter appears before the court on Ronnie Leroy Snyder's motion to vacate,
set aside or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (civil docket no. 1). Ronnie
Leroy Snyder ("the movant") filed such motion on June 16, 2009. On June 22, 2010, the
court directed the parties to brief the claims that the movant included in his motion
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (civil docket no. 5). On July 21, 2010, the movant filed a
supplement (civil docket no. 7) and a brief (civil docket no. 8). On July 26, 2010, the
movant again filed a supplement (civil docket no. 12). On August 20, 2010, the
government filed a responsive brief (civil docket no. 13). On September 20, 2010, the
movant filed a reply (civil docket no. 16). The court now turns to consider the movant's
motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
A district court is given discretion in determining whether to hold an evidentiary
hearing on a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See United States v. Oldham, 787 F.2d 454,
457 (8th Cir. 1986). In exercising that discretion, the district court must determine
whether the alleged facts, if true, entitle the movant to relief. See Payne v. United States,
78 F.3d 343, 347 (8th Cir. 1996). "Accordingly, [a district court may summarily dismiss
a motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 without an evidentiary hearing] if (1) the . . .
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allegations, accepted as true, would not entitle the [movant] to relief, or (2) the allegations
cannot be accepted as true because they are contradicted by the record, inherently
incredible, or conclusions rather than statements of fact." Engelen v. United States, 68
F.3d 238, 240-41 (8th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted); see also Delgado v. United States,
162 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary
where allegations, even if true, do not warrant relief or allegations cannot be accepted as
true because they are contradicted by the record or lack factual evidence and rely on
conclusive statements); United States v. Hester, 489 F.2d 48, 50 (8th Cir. 1973) (stating
that no evidentiary hearing is necessary where the files and records of the case demonstrate
that relief is unavailable or where the motion is based on a question of law). Stated
differently, a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion can be dismissed without a hearing where "the files
and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief." 28
U.S.C. § 2255; see also Standing Bear v. United States, 68 F.3d 271, 272 (8th Cir. 1995)
(per curiam).
The court concludes that it is able to resolve the movant's claims from the record.
See Rogers v. United States, 1 F.3d 697, 699 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding "[a]ll of the
information that the court needed to make its decision with regard to [the movant's] claims
was included in the record . . . ." and, therefore, the court "was not required to hold an
evidentiary hearing") (citing Rule Governing Section 2255 Proceedings 8(a) and United
States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 674, 100 S. Ct. 2406, 65 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1980)). The
evidence of record conclusively demonstrates that the movant is not entitled to the relief
sought. Specifically, the record indicates that the movant's allegations are disingenuous
and/or inherently incredible. As such, the court fords that there is no need for an
evidentiary hearing.
With respect to the merits of the movant's claims, the court deems it appropriate to
deny the movant's 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion for the reasons stated in the government's
resistance. The government's brief adequately sets forth the law that is applicable to the
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facts in the movant's case. Specifically, the government correctly concluded that defense
counsel provided professional and effective assistance to the movant and the movant
suffered no prejudice as a result of counsel's actions. It also correctly concluded that there
is absolutely no basis to vacate, set aside or correct the movant's sentence.
Moreover, the court thoroughly reviewed the record and finds that the denial of the
movant's 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion comports with the Constitution, results in no
"miscarriage of justice" and is consistent with the "rudimentary demands of fair
procedure." Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428, 82 S. Ct. 468, 7 L. Ed. 2d 417
(1962); see also United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1076 (8th Cir. 1996) ("Relief under
28 U.S.C. § 2255 is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for a narrow
range of injuries that could not have been raised for the first time on direct appeal and, if
uncorrected, would result in a complete miscarriage of justice." (citing Poor Thunder v.
United States, 810 F.2d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 1987))). The court concludes that no due
process violation occurred, no Fourth Amendment violation occurred and no Brady
violation occurred. In addition, the court fmds that the movant knowingly and voluntarily
entered a valid guilty plea pursuant to an agreement that he entered into with the
government. The movant's current suggestion that he is actually innocent because he was
actually trying to repair a vehicle with the items he purchased at the store is belied by the
record. And, the movant's preposterous statements as to his mental health or an insanity
defense do not warrant relief. Moreover, the court concludes that the conduct of counsel
fell within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance, Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), and counsel's performance
did not prejudice the movant's defense, id. at 692-94. Defense counsel fully litigated
suppression issues and wisely advised the movant with respect to his career offender status.
The movant's reliance on 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to blame his former attorney for not doing
more with respect to several previously litigated issues is not appropriate. The movant's
picking apart of the search warrant, challenge to the arrest warrants and criticism of other
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minor issues do not establish that counsel performed in a deficient manner. The record
indicates that the movant benefitted tremendously from decisions that he and defense
counsel made. Nothing the movant states in support of his request for relief leads the court
to conclude that a violation of the Sixth Amendment or Fifth Amendment occurred. Had
the movant or defense counsel attempted to pursue the frivolous matters that he now raises,
it is likely that the movant would be serving a significantly longer sentence. Lastly, the
court concludes that the movant is not entitled to relief based on Begay because both of the
movant's prior convictions for burglary of a commercial building qualify as predicate
offenses. See United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 769 (8th Cir. 2009). Even if he
did not qualify as a career offender, the record makes clear that the court would have
departed or varied upward in light of the movant's significant criminal history, and,
consequently, it would have arrived at the same sentence.
In sum, the alleged errors that are asserted by the movant do not warrant relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The movant's claims are meritless and/or frivolous. Based on
the foregoing, the movant's 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion shall be denied.
In a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding before a district judge, the final order is subject
to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is
held. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a). Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of
appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals. See 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(1)(A). A district court possesses the authority to issue certificates of appealability
under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) and Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). See Tiedeman v. Benson, 122 F.3d
518, 522 (8th Cir. 1997). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), a certificate of appealability
may issue only if a movant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1039, 154 L.
Ed. 2d 931 (2003); Garrett v. United States, 211 F.3d 1075, 1076-77 (8th Cir. 2000);
Carter v. Hopkins, 151 F.3d 872, 873-74 (8th Cir. 1998); Cox v. Norris, 133 F.3d 565,
569 (8th Cir. 1997); Tiedeman, 122 F.3d at 523. To make such a showing, the issues
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must be debatable among reasonable jurists, a court could resolve the issues differently,
or the issues deserve further proceedings. Cox, 133 F.3d at 569 (citing Flieger v. Delo,
16 F.3d 878, 882-83 (8th Cir. 1994)); see also Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 335-36 (reiterating
standard).
Courts reject constitutional claims either on the merits or on procedural grounds.
"[W]here a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing
required to satisfy [28 U.S.C.] § 2253(c) is straightforward: the [movant] must
demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong.'" Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338 (quoting Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 146 L. Ed. 2d 542 (2000)). When a
federal habeas petition is dismissed on procedural grounds without reaching the underlying
constitutional claim, "the [movant must show], at least, that jurists of reason would find
it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right
and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in
its procedural ruling." See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.
Having thoroughly reviewed the record in this case, the court finds that the movant
failed to make the requisite "substantial showing" with respect to the claims that he raised
in his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b).
Because he does not present a question of substance for appellate review, there is no
reason to grant a certificate of appealability. Accordingly, a certificate of appealability
shall be denied. If he desires further review of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, the movant
may request issuance of the certificate of appealability by a circuit judge of the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals in accordance with Tiedeman, 122 F.3d at 520-22.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) The movant's 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion (docket no. 1) is denied.
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2) A certificate of appealability is denied.
DATED this 4th day of June, 2012.
C.) )
LINDA R. READE
CHIEF JUDGE, U.S. DIST COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
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