📄 Extracted Text (5,749 words)
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 15TH
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR
PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA
COMPLEX LITIGATION FLAR.CIV. P. 1201
CASE NO. 50 2009CA 040800X3COCMB AG
JEFFREY EPSTEIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
SCOTT ROTHSTEIN, individually,
BRADLEY J. EDWARDS, individually, and
individually,
Defendants.
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT
EDWARDS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO STRIKE SUPPORTING EXHIBITS AND ATTACHMENTS WITH
INTEGRATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW
Plaintiff, Jeffrey Epstein ("Plaintiff') opposes the Motion for Summary Judgment of
Defendant Bradley J. Edwards ("Edwards'), filed pursuant to Rule 1.510 of the Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure, and moves to strike the =sworn and otherwise unauthenticated 'Exhibits" and
"Attachments" to the allegedly "Undisputed Statement of Facts" upon which Edwards relies to
support the Motion for the following reasons:
I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
References to pleadings in Jeffrey Epstein v Scott Rothstein, individually and Bradley J
Edwards, Palm Beach Circuit Court Case No. 50 2009 CA 040800XXXMBAG shall be (Plaintiff
). References to pleadings in the In re: Rothstein Rosenfeldt Adler, in the United
States Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of Florida, Case No. 09-34791-RBR — Chapter 11,
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Epstein's Response in Opposition to Edwards' MSJ and Epstein's M/Strike
shall be (RRA ). References to depositions will be (Deponent's Name: p. ).
References to the exhibits in Plaintiffs accompanying appendix to this Response will be (A:
). Unless otherwise noted, Plaintiff has supplied all emphasis in this Response.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Epstein v. Edwards
On December 7, 2009, Jeffrey Epstein filed his Complaint against Bradley J. Edwards
and Scott Rothstein, seeking damages based on a scheme involving marketing investments in
lawsuits brought against the Plaintiff. Edwards filed his Answer and Counterclaim for Abuse of
Process on December 21, 2009. After motions directed to the pleadings were resolved, discovery
by both sides commenced in March 2010. On April 16, 2010, Plaintiff issued a subpoena duces
tecum to the trustee for the former law firm of Rothstein Rosenfeldt and Adler,. ("RRA"), now
in a Chapter 11 proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court for the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Florida. The subpoena sought records necessary for the Plaintiff to prove his claims
against the Defendants. Since the scheme originated and took place within the law firm of RRA
and since the Plaintiff was not physically present to learn of the conversation about the scheme
directly, witness the presentation of RRA litigation files to investors, or obtain email or other
written communications to and from the RRA and the investors, the records are critical to his case
and otherwise unavailable to the Plaintiff to obtain relevant discovery related to his claim. The
specific details of Plaintiff's efforts to obtain the documents of that subpoena are set forth in the
following section.
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Epstein's Response in Opposition to Edwards' MSJ and Epstein's M/Strike
Based on Defendant Edwards' motion, not the Plaintiff's, on April 15, 2010, this court
set this matter for jury trial beginning October 25, 2010. On June 10, 2010, the undersigned law
firm was substituted for prior counsel of the Plaintiff.
The court has conducted two status conferences on this case, one on August 20, 2010 and
another on October 20, 2010. At each conference, counsel for the Plaintiff has continuously
advised the court of the Plaintiff's efforts to obtain necessary documents to proceed with further
discovery to establish his claims against the Defendants. As a result of matters raised at the status
conferences, a motion to continue was filed and granted, with the court resetting this case for trial
for an eight week docket beginning March 7, 2011 with a calendar call for February 25, 2011.
At the present time, only the depositions of Jeffrey Epstein and Bradley J. Edwards have
taken place, because of the inability of the Plaintiff to obtain the documents subpoenaed from the
trustee for RRA. The depositions of Michael Fisten, Russell Adler, Scott Rothstein, Ken Jenne,
Gary Farmer, Debra Villegas, A.J. Discala, Thane Richie, Michael Legamaro and Dean
Kretschmar are scheduled to begin January 19, 2011 through and including February 4, 2011,
subject to confirming availability of witnesses and counsel. However it is most practical to take
these depositions, after the Plaintiff has received the documents from the Trustee. This inability to
obtain the documents subpoenaed more that eight months ago, accounts for part of the delay in
setting the depositions, particularly since in at least two instances, the witnesses are or are about to
be in federal prison.
As will be shown below by the procedural history of this case, the court will see an
intentional effort by Defendant Edwards to delay the Plaintiff from obtaining the necessary
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discovery to respond to this motion on the one hand and a concerted effort, on the other hand, by
the Defendant Edwards to advance the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment and to
advance this matter for trial before the Plaintiff can conduct basic discovery.
B. RRA Bankruptcy- Efforts to Get Records.
On May 18, 2010, Judge Raymond Ray, Bankruptcy Judge for the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida ("Bankruptcy Court") entered an order that
established the process for anyone wishing to obtain discovery from the trustee. The operation of
the order was not limited to parties in the bankruptcy case. Further, the Bankruptcy Court
determined it had jurisdiction and retained jurisdiction with respect to all matters arising from or
related to the implementation or the interpretation of its order without any limitation on the form
(A:1).
On July 14, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel Production of Documents from the
trustee pursuant to the document production protocol established by the aforesaid order (A: 2).
On August 4, 2010, the Bankruptcy Court conducted a hearing on Plaintiff's motion to
compel and entered an order on August 13, 2010 appointing former Broward County Circuit Court
Judge Robert Carney as special master to review the documents responsive to the Plaintiff's
subpoena served on the trustee, to determine the applicability of any privileges asserted by
Bradley Edwards, or other former clients of Farmer Jaffee, where the Edwards presently works,
and to prepare a privilege log. The Plaintiff, without objection agreed and was ordered to pay the
legal fees and costs incurred by the special master in the preparation of this log (A :5). Prior to the
hearing, two motions in opposition were filed by Farmer Jaffee (A: 3&4).
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Epstein's Response in Opposition to Edwards' MSJ and Epstein's M/Strike
Subsequently, on October 13, 2010, the special master filed a motion seeking clarification
of the order appointing him (A: 7). Farmer Jaffee filed another motion in opposition (A: 8&9). A
hearing took place and an amended order was entered, which allowed Farmer Jaffee to review and
assist in the preparation of the privilege log (A: 10). Fanner Jaffe received a portion of the
electronically stored data on October 17, 2010 and were required to prepare a detailed privilege log
within thirty (30) days of receipt of the compact disk i.e., on or before November 15, 2010, at their
cost (A: 10).
On November 2, 2010, M. and Bradley Edwards filed a Motion for Relief from the
amended order and sought to have the Plaintiff pay for the production of all documents and fees
associated with the privilege log, which previously had been ordered by the court for Farmer Jaffe
to pay. In addition, Farmer Jaffe and Edwards asked for more time (A: 12). As a result of the
motion, an agreed order was entered granting additional time, and the Plaintiff agreed to pay the
cost of making physical copies of the documents on the compact disks for the purpose of making it
more convenient for Fanner Jaffee to prepare the privilege log (A: 13).
Even though Farmer Jaffee had received one compact disk on October 19, 2010 and
received another compact disk on or about November 15, 2010 from the trustee, on December 16,
2010 they filed an emergency motion, after agreeing to the order granting additional time, not only
for an extension of time but also for a stay in the preparation of the privilege log pending their
motion for summary judgment to be heard by this court (A: 16). Edwards filed a similar motion
with this court which is presently set for hearing on January 27, 2011.
On December 21, 2010, the Bankruptcy Court conducted a hearing and entered an order
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Epstein's Response in Opposition to Edwards' MSJ and Epstein's M/Strike
allowing through January 31, 2011 for the privilege log to be prepared (A: 17).
III. LEGAL STANDARD FOR GRANTING OR DENYING
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A. General Standards
In order to prevail, Edwards must meet two prerequisites and show: (1) the nonexistence of
a material factual issue, and (2) entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c),
(2006).
In Florida, the party moving for summary judgment must conclusively demonstrate the
nonexistence of an issue of material fact, and the court must draw every possible inference in favor
of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. Summary judgments should be
cautiously granted, and the trial court should not enter summary judgment unless the facts are so
crystallized that nothing remains but questions of law. If the evidence will permit different
reasonable inferences, it should be submitted to the jury as a question of fact, and summary
judgment should not be granted. McCraney v. Barberi, 677 So. 2d 355, 357 (Fla. 1s' DCA 1996);
Albelo v. Southern Bell, 682 So.2d 1126, 1129 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Finally, summary judgments
are not favored. O'Connor v. Marston, 717 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 5'h DCA, 1998).
It is also necessary for the movant to authenticate the undisputed facts upon which its claim
for summary judgment is based. Most of the facts and assertions contained throughout Edwards'
motion are =authenticated and cannot form the basis for any summary judgment. Fla. R. Civ. P.
1.540; Bifuko v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 693 So.2d 707 (Fla. 4th DCA
1997).
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Epstein's Response in Opposition to Edwards' MSJ and Epstein's M/Strike
Finally, summary judgment should not be granted until all discovery has been completed. Sica v.
Sam Caliendo Design, Inc., 623 So.2d 859 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).
B. The Motion is Legally Insufficient
On September 22, 2010, Edwards served a Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Summary
Motion") seeking to have this Court conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to
each count against him and to grant him judgment on the claims raised against him by Plaintiff in
this action. Edwards filed a 37-page "Statement of Undisputed Facts," consisting of 120 separate
paragraphs, most of which are either not material at all or, where they are conceivably material,
they are disputed. Arguably, only paragraphs 86 through 91 bear on the subject of this lawsuit.'
In support of these 120+ allegedly "undisputed" facts, Edwards served an eight inch tall
stack of "47 exhibits" and 22 "attachments" numbered respectively from "A" to "UU" and "1" to
"22". Collectively, we refer to these materials as the "Supporting Papers".
Among these Supporting Papers are 22 transcripts of depositions or excerpts of depositions
— the "Attachments," most of which were taken prior to the filing of this action in 2009 and before.
The other "Exhibits" are a compendium of linsworn letters, pleadings and other court filings,
hearing transcripts, an unauthenticated copy of what purports to be a plea agreement between Scott
Rothstein and the government,2 unsigned drafts, unsigned answers to interrogatories from another
Nevertheless, Edwards fills 35 pages with facts that are not material to any issue in this case for the
apparent purpose of prejudicing Plaintiff in this Court with a gratuitous and graphic recount of alleged conduct not in
issue in this case, such as Plaintiffs alleged sexual exploits with clients of Edwards. There can be no other reason,
since the Plaintiff has not placed those matters in issue.
2
See Exhibit 'SS." The statement of facts incorporated into the plea agreement refers throughout to
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case, New York Post and other media publications, items (such as phone messages) allegedly
garnered from Plaintiff and others pursuant to search warrants in criminal investigations of
Plaintiff, a purported copy of a visitor log from the Palm Beach County Sheriffs Office, flight
logs, and other documents the materiality of which is not facially apparent.3
All of the Supporting Papers, except Exhibits "N," fail to conform to the Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure and must be stricken.4 The Supporting Papers have not been certified, verified or
properly authenticated.
The law in the Fourth District, as well as in Florida's other courts of appeal, clearly and
unconditionally provides that unauthenticated documentary evidence may not be relied on or
considered in support of a motion for summary judgment. See Hollywood Towers Condo. Ass 'n,
Inc. v. Hampton, 993 So. 2d 174, 175-176 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (unauthenticated photocopies of
check, letter and bank statement attached to motion for summary judgment could not be used to
Rothstein and "other co-conspirators" without naming those others. It intimates that others working at RRA knew of
the Ponzi scheme and conspired to advance the criminal enterprise. Plaintiff believes Edwards is such a person,
notwithstanding Edwards' production of an unswom form letter from a federal victim witness specialist identifying
him as a possible victim of Rothstein (exhibit "TT"), but has not yet been provided the documentary evidence he has
been seeking to use against Edwards.
3
For example, Attachment "I" purports to be a I83-page deposition of Plaintiff in a case styled v.
Jeffrey Epstein then pending in this Court, but the copy of the transcript is not signed and certified by the court
reporter or otherwise authenticated and is therefore inadmissible. Attachment "2" consists of an excerpt of 9-pages of
the purported transcript ofa deposition ofa Jane Doe which apparently in its entirety is more than 568 pages in length.
Edwards included those pages to support the statement that Jane Doe was abused at least 17 times. It actually does not
support that statement, but regardless, the excerpt is not in any way authenticated. Attachments 3 through 22 suffer
from the same defect. The exhibits with the exception of "N" are no better.
This exhibit is the Affidavit ofDefendant Edwards which appears to have been sworn in conformance with
Florida Statutes, although much of what is sworn to is immaterial or disputed. Attachment 15 is not certified, appears
to be a complete transcript (not an excerpt) and bear the signature of a court reporter, but it hardly material. See
Statement of Undisputed Facts at paragraph 57. Exhibit "QQ" is a sworn affidavit; however, it consists almost entirely
of hearsay and double hearsay and must be stricken.
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Epstein's Response in Opposition to Edwards' MSJ and Epstein's NI/Strike
support motion); Bifulco v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 693 So. 2d 707, 710 (Ha. 4th DCA
1997) (trial court could not consider unsworn or uncertified insurance documents attached to
motion for summary judgment); Mack v. Commercial Indus. Park Inc., 541 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1989) (contractual exhibits which were unaccompanied by an affidavit could not be
considered in support of motion for summary judgment). 5 In Bifulco, the court of appeal
observed:
[I]t is unquestionably clear that the documents attached to
Appellee's motion are not sworn to or certified in any manner
whatsoever, nor are they in proper admissible form. They are not
accompanied by any affidavit of a records custodian or other proper
person attesting to their authenticity or correctness. . . . They were
received without any foundation other than the representations of
Appellee's counsel. In short, Rule I.510(e), by its very language,
excludes any document from the record on a motion for summary
judgment that is not one of the enumerated documents or is not a
certified attachment to a proper affidavit. The documents in
question in the case before us, standing by themselves, are
insufficient to satisfy the heavy burden Appellee must meet in order
to justify the granting ofsummary judgment in its favor.
693 So. 2d at 710.6
Here, it is unquestionably and undeniably clear that none of the Supporting Papers, save
5
Other courts of appeal have held the same. See, e.g., Nichols v. Preiser, 849 So. 2d 478, 481 (Fla. 2d DCA
2003) (trial court could not consider letters that were not sworn or certified); First Union Nail Bank ofFla. v. Ruiz,
785 So. 2d 589, 591 (Ha. 5th DCA 2001) (unsworn EEOC letter did not satisfy procedural strictures inherent in Rule
1.510(e)); Brooker v. Sarasota, Inc., 707 So. 2d 886, 887 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (trial court could not consider
unauthenticated document in ruling on motion for summary judgment).
6
Rule I .510(e) requires that °[s]worn or certified copies of all papers . . . referred to in an affidavit shall be
attached thereto or served therewith." See also First N. Am. NallBank v. Hummel, 825 So. 2d 502, 504 (Fla. 2d DCA
2002) (party opposing motion for summary judgment could not rely on documents that were not authenticated or
supported by an affidavit or other evidentiary proof); Tunnel v. Hicks, 574 So. 2d 264, 266 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
(same).
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two, are sworn or certified in any manner whatsoever.' They likewise are not accompanied by an
affidavit of a records custodian or other person attesting to their authenticity, completeness or
correctness. Each of these 67 Supporting Papers is therefore "insufficient" to support Defendant
Edward's heavy burden of proof and this court cannot rely on them to justify a grant of summary
judgment. Id.
Moreover, the Supporting Papers constitute inadmissible hearsay and the statements within
them cannot be considered for the truth. None (except Exhibit "N") has been authenticated by
anyone in an attempt to lay the required foundation for their admissibility as either public records
or business records. See Bifulco, 693 So. 2d at 710-711 (insurance documents attached to motion
for summary judgment were inadmissible under business records or public records exceptions to
hearsay rule where required predicate was not established); Gray v. State, 910 So. 2d 867, 869
(Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (document on Department of Corrections letterhead was hearsay where
foundation not laid for its admission as a business record or a public record); see also Adams v.
State, 521 So. 2d 337, 338 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (business records are inadmissible without a
proper foundation for their admission).
The Supporting Papers therefore constitute unauthorized and improper unauthenticated
documentary evidence which must be stricken from defendant Edwards's Statement of Undisputed
Facts that allegedly support his Motion for Summary Judgment and which cannot properly be
considered by this court in support of the Summary Motion.
The transcripts, no doubt, could be certified but they have not been.
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C. The Motion Is Premature Given That Discovery Has Been Stalled and
Plaintiff Has Been Unable to Obtain Proof of His Claim
Plaintiff has been attempting since last spring to obtain discovery of communications,
primarily in the form of emails originated and received at RRA with the intent to depose
appropriate witnesses after having had an opportunity to review the content. To this end, Plaintiff
served a subpoena on the bankruptcy trustee appointed to stand in the place of the now-defunct
firm's management since before this case was filed. The subpoena resulted in proceedings before
Honorable Judge Ray of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court and that court appointed a special master.
Since the appointment of the special master in August 2010, not a single document from
the RRA has been turned over to Plaintiff's counsel. No privilege log, not even a partial one, has
been submitted to the special master. While the amount of records is voluminous, Plaintiff had a
reasonable expectation that something would have been disclosed by now. It is clear that Edwards
and Farmer Jaffee have not been diligently proceeding in a manner to get the privilege log done so
that ultimately the subpoenaed documents can be provided to Plaintiff in time for this hearing or
the trial. In fact, Edwards, has consistently said that he should be relieved of the burden of
preparing this log until this Court rules on his Summary Motion, where he unabashedly claims
there is no evidence to support his involvement in the Ponzi scheme (A: 14&15).
This complete about face is mind boggling in that Edwards is now saying that Plaintiff is
not entitled to any of this discovery — even the allegedly non privileged documents -- and that
Edwards is entitled to a final summary judgment in his favor in this case.
The doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents a party who has successfully maintained a
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position in one proceeding, i.e., getting the Bankruptcy Court to grant an extension to January 31,
2011 to prepare the privilege log, cannot take a conflicting position in another proceeding, i.e.,
saying there is no evidence to implicate Edwards in the Ponzi scheme. Grau v. Provident Life
and All. Ins. Co., 899 So. 2d 396, 399 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).
Plaintiff has a good faith belief that discovery will reveal Edwards complicity in the Ponzi
scheme. Counsel for the investors has represented to the Bankruptcy Court that his clients were
shown the LM v. Epstein case files for the purposes of deciding whether to make the investments
(A: 6). Attached hereto is a order entered by the Bankruptcy Court (A: 18) granting partial
summary judgment against one of the principals of RRA, Russell Adler and his wife, which made
findings of facts which included:
. . . the purpose of the Ponzi scheme was to personally enrich
Rothstein and other co-conspirators and to supplement the income
and sustain the daily operation of RRA. In order to achieve this
purpose Rothstein and other co-conspirators utilized the offices of
RRA and the offices of other co-conspirators to convince potential
investors of the legitimacy and success of the law firm, which
enhanced the credibility of the purported investment opportunity. . .
RRA relied upon the Ponzi scheme to supplement and support the
operation and activities of RRA, to expand RRA by the hiring of
additional attorneys and support staff, to fund salaries and bonuses,
and to acquire larger and more elaborate office space and equipment
in order to enrich the personal wealth of the persons employed by
and associated with RRA.
Judge Cohns also noted the importance of RRA to Rothstein's
crimes which he stated that "the marketing component of the fraud
focused on attracting investors with deep pockets. Mr. Rothstein
displayed all the trappings of success, the multi-million dollar
homes the expensive cars, the boats, the restaurants, the jewelry and
8 Federal District Judge James Cohn is the judge for Rothstein's criminal case.
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a 70 lawyer law firm that appeared to be thriving. . .
Debra Villegas, RRA's Chief Operating Officer, plead t ty to one
count of conspiracy to commit money laundering. [M. 119 at
*83-93]. In her plea agreement, Villegas acknowledged that "a
co-conspirator [Rothstein] distributed lavish gifts, including exotic
cars, jewelry, boats, loans, cash and bonuses, to individuals and to
members of RRA in order to engender goodwill and loyalty and to
create the appearance of a successful law firm." [Id. at *92]. She
admitted that "[c]o-conspirators relied upon the purported success
of RRA, the existence of actual RRA civil matters and the
reputation of the law firm in the community to lure potential
investors. . ." [Id. At *118].
Edwards has also refused to answer questions in his deposition on frivolous privilege
claims. The Plaintiff is entitled to obtain this information in support of his claim. A Motion to
Compel is presently pending.
Plaintiff contends that at a minimum, the court should enter an order precluding the setting
of a hearing on any summary judgment motion by Edwards until Plaintiff has received the
documents subpoenaed and discovery related to those documents has concluded.
IV. THE SWORD AND SHIELD DOCTRINE DOES
NOT SUPPORT SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Edwards contends that Plaintiff must be denied any affirmative relief regardless of the
merits of his cause, because at his deposition taken in the instant case, Plaintiff refused to answer
certain questions, invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege. (Mot. at 19-20). Edwards also
argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff's assertion of the Fifth
Amendment raises adverse inferences which conclusively establish that Plaintiff's claims are
without merit. (Id. at 21-2). Edwards' arguments are wrong.
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First, Edwards misapprehends the nature and application of the "sword and shield"
doctrine, which "embraces the rule `that a plaintiff may not seek affirmative relief in a civil action
and then invoke the Fifth Amendment to avoid giving discovery in matters pertinent to the
DeLisi v. Bankers, Ins. Ca, 436 So. 2d 1099, 1100 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (quoting
City of St. Petersburg v. Naughton, 362 So. 2d 681, 685 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978) (emphasis added)).
See also Brancaccio v. Mediplex Mgmt. of Port St. Lucie, Inc., 711 So. 2d 1206, 1208-1210 (Fla.
4th DCA 1998) (approving City of St. Petersburg and Village Inn Rest. v. Aridi, 543 So. 2d
778,782 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)), in which the First District agreed that "sanctions may be necessary
where a plaintiff in a civil action invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege against revealing
relevant information in pretrial discovery." (emphasis added). The Fourth District explained in
Brancaccio that the "Supreme Court has disapproved of procedures which require a party to
surrender one constitutional right in order to assert another..." 711 So. 2d, at 1210. Thus, a "civil
defendant [does not] have an absolute right to have the action dismissed anytime a plaintiff
invokes his constitutional privilege."
Pursuant to the foregoing authorities, Plaintiff's claims may not be dismissed on summary
judgment pursuant to the "sword and shield" doctrine because the information Edwards sought to
elicit from Plaintiff at his deposition, and the answers Plaintiff declined to give in response to
questions about his alleged misconduct and criminal activity, would not provide any information
relevant to Plaintiff's claims or Edwards' defense of those claims. Plaintiffs allegations are
based on the belief that Edwards inflated purported claims against Plaintiff and conducted
discovery of high profile figures in the cases pending at the Rothstein firm, where the Ponzi
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scheme was hatched for the specific and exclusive purpose of luring investors. Plaintiff is entitled
to show that Edwards and his cohorts took actions not reasonably related to what was needed to
competently represent his clients, but rather, to pump up the attractiveness of the investment
opportunity. Edwards is entitled to inquire what Plaintiff knows about this activity and about
Plaintiff's damages. On the other hand, numerous questions regarding Plaintiff's allegedly illegal
sexual activities (See Plaintiff at 88-9, 95-6), and whether nationally-prominent acquaintances
engaged in illegal sexual activities (See Plaintiff at 89-95), would clearly not lead to the discovery
of evidence relevant to Plaintiff's claims in the instant case, and were asked solely to poison the
well .9 The court recently sustained Plaintiff's objections to discovery requests geared solely to
alleged sexual activity (..148,149,&150). Accordingly, the sword and shield doctrine does not
apply to the illegitimate and irrelevant questions which Plaintiff declined to answer on the basis of
the Fifth Amendment.
A review of Plaintiff's deposition demonstrates that he answered questions relevant to the
subject litigation, including why he was suing ■., the Ponzi scheme, and his damages, (See, e.g.,
Plaintiff at 13-14, 19-20, 23, 25, 28-30, 33, 36-8, 48-50, 52, 63, 65, 83, 101), and properly invoked
his Fifth Amendment privilege in response to inflammatory questions that are entirely irrelevant to
the subject litigation, including whether certain prominent acquaintances socialized with him in
the presence of under-age women (Plaintiff at 88-95) and the nature and extent of Plaintiff's
9
In Boys & Girls Club ofMarion County, Inc. v. J.A., 22 So. 3d 855, 856 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009), upon which
Edwards relies, the court noted that a plaintiff cannot avoid "legitimate" discovery and that a party "is entitled to the
discovery contemplated by the rules in order to ascertain the facts and fairly present its defenses." The questions to
which Plaintiff invoked his right against self-incrimination were not "to ascertain the facts and fairly present
[Edwards'] defenses." Id.
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alleged illegal sexual activities with minors. (Id at 106-111).10 As a matter of settled law,
Plaintiff's invocation of the Fifth Amendment to avoid giving discovery regarding impertinent
matters does not trigger application of the sword and shield doctrine.
Second, Edwards' argument that he is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of
adverse inferences to be drawn from Plaintiff's assertion of the Fifth Amendment is equally
flawed. Although the Supreme Court held in Baxter v. Palmiglano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976),
that an adverse inference could be drawn from a party's assertion of a Fifth Amendment privilege
in a civil suit, such silence "is not sufficiently weighty to carry a moving party's burden in a
motion for summary judgment." Fid. Funding of Cal., Inc. v. Reinhold, 79 F. Supp. 2d 110, 116
1997). As explained in LaSalle Bank Lake View v. Seguban, 54 F. 3d 387, 391 n.7 (7th
Cir. 1995):
Treating Seguban's silence as a separate piece of evidence
supporting the Bank's motion for summary judgment and drawing
inferences against the Segubans on the basis of that fact seems to be
in tension with the ordinary summary judgment rule that all
reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmovant.
See also Parsons & Whittemore Enter. Corp. v. Schwartz, 387 F. Supp. 2d 368, 372
2005) (assuming that a jury could draw an adverse inference form the invocation of the Fifth
Amendment, "the court is still required at summary judgment to draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the non-moving party."); Sec. & Exch. v. Monterosso, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS
108199, at *22 Fla. Sept. 28, 2010) ("Where adverse inferences are drawn from invocation
10 For example, Edwards' counsel asked Plaintiff whether he socialized with Donald Trump in the presence
of women under the age of 18. Plaintiffresponded by invoking his right against self-incrimination. (Plaintiff at 89).
Plaintiff also refused to answer the number of times he "engaged in oral sex with females under the age of 18." (Id at
110).
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Epstein v Rothstein, Edwards
CASE NO. 50 2009CA 040800XXXXMB AG
Epstein's Response in Opposition to Edwards' MSJ and Epstein's M/Strike
of the privilege, such inferences must not result in automatic summary judgment against the person
invoking the privilege."). Insofar as Florida law likewise requires that all inferences be drawn in
favor of Plaintiff, the non-moving party, Edwards is not entitled to summary judgment on the basis
of any adverse inferences from Plaintiff's assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination.
Moreover, the "reasonable references" which Edwards asks this Court to draw from
Plaintiff's refusal to answer certain questions (See Motion at 22) fall critically short of
demonstrating that there are no triable issues of material fact and that Edwards is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. A purported inference that Plaintiff was on a private plane "while
sexual assaults were taking place," or that he had physical contact with certain minors, is not even
probative of Plaintiff's claims, let alone dispositive. In sum, Edwards' argument that Plaintiff's
invocation of the Fifth Amendment compels the entry of summary judgment in favor of Edwards
must be rejected.
VI. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff Jeffrey Epstein respectfully requests that this Court enter
an Order denying the Motion for Summary Judgment of Bradley Edwards and striking Exhibits
"A" through "M" and "O" through "UU," as well as Attachments numbered "1" through "22,"
allegedly offered in support of Defendant Bradley J. Edwards's Statement of Undisputed Facts
submitted with his Motion for Summary Judgment as to all claims against him. Once the
unauthenticated exhibits are stricken, there is insufficient evidence for Edwards to carry his
burden for obtaining a summary judgment. Moreover, Edwards cannot carry his burden for
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Epstein v Rothstein, Edwards
CASE NO. SO 2009CA 040800XXXXMB AG
Epstein's Response in Opposition to Edwards' MSJ and Epstein's M/Strike
obtaining a summary judgment based on his interpretation of the "sword/shield doctrine".
Finally, because Edwards on the one hand has claimed there is not evidence to implicate him in
the Ponze scheme and on the other has actively opposed and delayed the preparation of the
privilege log so that Plaintiff can obtain the documents and conduct the relevant discovery to
establish Edward's involvement, the motion should be denied.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing habeen duly
furnished via O Email, O Facsimile, O U.S. Mail, O Hand Delivery, D! Federal Express
this 29 day of December, 2010 to:
Jack Scarola, Esq.
Searcy Denney Scarola Barnhart & Shipley, ■
Attorne s or Bradle Edwards
Marc S. Nurik,
Law Offices of Marc S. Nurik
Attornevslor
Attorneysf Scott Rothstein
Respectfully submitted,
,Yoseph L. Ac1
FloridaBar
Christopher E. t
Florida Bar
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Fowler White & Bume
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EFTA01081127
ℹ️ Document Details
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ae85b6820b0e996a290e2159a16b79d844cd762efd32872e0385cb8fb4937d85
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EFTA01081110
Dataset
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Pages
18
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