EFTA01762251.pdf

From: Office of Tene Rod-Larsen Sent: Monday, May 20, 2013 11:06 PM Subject: May 18 update 18 May, 2013 Article 1. <file:=//C:\Users\Efrat%20Elron\AppData\Local \Microsoft\WindowsVemporary%20Inter=et%20Files\Content.lE5\ONM AC3M2\18%.20May.doc#a> Al-Monitor Obama and =rdogan Edge Closer on Syria Kadri Gursel Article 2. <file:=//C:\Users\Efrat%20Elron\AppData\Local \Microsoft\Windows\Temporary%20Inter=er/020Files\Content.lE5\ONM AC3M2\18%.20May.doc#b> Ahram The Muslim=Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia Hicham Mourad Article 3. <file:=//C:\Users\Efrat%20Elron\AppData\Local \Microsoft\WindowsVemporary%20Inter=er/020Files\Content.IES\ONM AC3M2\18%20May.doc#c> American Thinker=/span> Qatar, the=New Player in the Middle East Michael Curt=s <http:=/www.americanthinker.com/michael_curtis_V> Article 4. <file:=//C:\Users\Efrat%20Elron\AppData\Local \Microsoft\WindowsVemporary°/020Inter=et%20Files\Content.IES\ONM AC3M2\18%20May.doc#d> Al-Monitor Saudi-Qata= Honeymoon In Lebanon is Over Nasser Chararahaspan> EFTA_R1_00067527 EFTA01762251 Article 5. <file:=HCAUsers\Efrat%20Elron\AppData\Local \Microsoft\WindowsVemporary%20Inter=et%20Files\Content.lE5\ONM AC3M2\18%20May.doc#e> RAND How Would = Nuclear-Armed Tehran Behave? Alireza Nader Article 6. <file:=HCAUsers\Efrat%20Elron\AppData\Local \Microsoft\Windows\Temporary%20Inter=et%20Files\Content.lE5\ONM AC3M2\18%20May.doc#f> Foreign Policy<Apan> How Americ= wll Fight the Next War Adm. Jonathan Gr=enert, Gen. Mark Welsh Article 7. The Washington P=st Book revie=: 'Beyond War by David Rohde Marc Lynch Article 1. Al-Monitor Obama and Erdogan Edge Closer On Syria</=> Kadri Gursel May 17 -- Everybody knows the joint objective of Turkish =rime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and US President Barack Obama is "Syr=a without Assad." Where they diverged was not the objective but on how to achieve that objective. Until their May 16 meeting at the White House, it was pos=ible to speak plainly on how the two leaders differed on ways and means of=reaching the goal of "Syria without Assad." In recent days, their different views appeared as contrasts.<=span> 2 EFTA_R1_00067528 EFTA01762252 Their difference was distinct above all in what kind of a=solution they supported in Syria. The uprising in Syria first turned to a =ivil war and could well be tending toward a regional conflict. But the Baathist regime was still standing, wi=h no indication that it would be going away anytime soon. Ankara was nevertheless persisting on a military solution=and continued to advocate creation of "secure zones" that could signif= partial occupation of Syria. Washington, on the other hand, had never warmed to the idea of a military intervention= especially one that it would have to lead and had good reasons to avoid. =he latest move was Washington's giving priority to a political/diplomati= solution anchored on a joint understanding reached between US Secretary of State John Kerry and his Russian counterpa=t, Sergei Lavrov, in their May 7 meeting in Moscow. In Washington's appr=ach, assistance and support for the opposition was to facilitate such a so=ution. As a subtext, one has to look to Washington and Ankara'= stances against the jihadists. Washington was concerned for the future of=Syria and its own security from Ankara's opening of Turkish territory to jihadist elements led by the pro-al- Qaeda =abhat al-Nusra, and was making this known to Ankara. The second main divergence was Ankara's insistence on A=sad's departure as a precondition to initiating any diplomatic- political=solution process. But Assad is not going anywhere. To insist on his exit as=a precondition to a political solution was possibly impeding peace by ruli=g out an agreed solution that could end up with Assad eventually leaving the stage. That, of course, meant eve= more destruction and misery for Syria in the meantime. We know that the US, too, favors a transition government =ithout Assad. But we don't think that the Obama administration was insis=ing on keeping Assad out of the negotiations aimed at establishing such a transition government. How the two parties wo=ld affect each other's stances was a matter of speculation before the Wh=te House meeting. Whose position was more realistic, more resilient and the=efore more persuasive given the realities? Whose was obsolete and had lost=its credibility? These questions have to be answered before evaluating the=messages that could well show the way for the near future that both leader= gave in their Rose Garden news conference under drizzling rain on May 16.<=p> Everybody knows there is no good solution for Syria. The =ost appropriate approach would be to choose the least bad option, and end =he bloodbath that is destroying that country and threatening the region with war. When that is the criterion, then it becomes impossible to=find anything to defend in Turkey's policy. Erdogan went to Washington a= a leader whose military-solution-without-Assad policy had failed. There is more. Erdogan sat down at Washington's negotiating table as a l=ader whose misguided Syria policy had endangered his country's security =nd stability and accumulated excessive negative energy along fragile sectarian fault lines. The bomb that went off on May 11in Reyhanli town, Hatay =rovince, where hundreds of thousands of Arab Alevis live, did not only kil= more than 50 and wound 150. It also rattled Erdogan's position considerably. As such, Erdogan went to Washington as a weakened leader =pen to suggestions that it was time to change his Syrian policy. Now we can assess who said what at the Rose Garden <http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and- video/video/2013/05/16/pres=dent-obama-holds-press-conference-prime-minister-erdogan> and what they meant. 3 EFTA_R1_00067529 EFTA01762253 Obama said, "Turkey is going to play an important ro=e as we bring representatives of the regime and opposition together in the=coming weeks." He went on: "We both agree that [Syrian President Bashar al-] Assad needs to go. He needs to transfer=power to a transitional body. That is the only way that we're going to res=lve this crisis. And we're going to keep working for a Syria that is free =rom Assad's tyranny; that is intact and inclusive of all ethnic and religious groups; and that's a source of=stability, not extremism, because it's in the profound interest of all our=nations, especially Turkey." In the questions and answers <http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/201405/16/president-obama-and-prime-minister- erdogan-turkey-hold-press-confer=nce> , Obama explained that "Geneva 2" did not mean reducing support =o the opposition by saying: "There's no magic formula for dealing w=th an extraordinarily violent and difficult situation like Syria's. If t=ere were, I think the prime minister and I already would have acted on it and it would already be finished. And instead, what we ha=e to do is apply steady international pressure, strengthen the opposition.=l do think that the prospect of talks in Geneva involving the Russians and=representatives about a serious political transition that all the parties can buy into may yield results.=94 These were the words that best explained Obama's position. Let's see what Prime Minister Erdogan said: "Syria was at the top of our agenda. And we have views =hat overlap, as the president has just said. But let me tell you tha= ending this bloody process in Syria and meeting the legitimate demands of the people by establishing a new government are =wo areas where we are in full agreement with the United States. To prevent=Syria from becoming an area of operations for terror organizations is amon= our priorities." In the Q&A, Erdogan outright referred to the Geneva p=ocess. He said: "As I said before, our views do overlap, and with our=discussions this evening, we will continue to explore what we can do together, what we can consider as parts of a road m=p looking at Geneva and beyond. Russia and China being part of this proces= is very important, and this is important in the context of the permanent =embers of the UN Security Council. Their participation in this process will certainly add greater impetus.&qu=t; It is possible to conclude from Erdogan's remarks that =e is committed to the Geneva process. This also shows that the validity of=Ankara's understanding of a military solution is no more. Political logic requires us to think that the Americans a=ked Ankara to persuade the opposition groups (that Ankara is close contact=with) to engage in the Geneva process. Furthermore, we will have to accept that from now on any military assistan=e to the opposition will serve not as a military solution but to keep the =ressure on the regime that has been lately gaining militarily in the field= It is interesting fthat Erdogan declares that he is "ag=inst terrorist organizations using Syria." Of course, what is importa=t here is what Erdogan understands of "terror organizations." Until now, we have not heard him or his government say a=word about considering Syria's al-Qaeda-linked Jabhat al-Nusra <http://www.globalresearch.ca/the- cia-qatar-and-the-creation-of-s=rias-jabhat-al-nusra/S335453> as a terror organization. He probably was referring to =he PYD, the PKK's Syrian extension. If so, there is nothing interesting =n what he says. But if he meant Jabhat al-Nusra, we will see. Another important development was his announcing for the =irst time that he will also be visiting the West Bank alongside Gaza in Ju=e. It was known that the Obama administration was not delighted with Erdogan visiting only Gaza. It is understood that E=dogan responded favorably to suggestions from the White House. The result is: The Ankara government that until yesterday=was pursuing an extremist, illusionary and ideological Syria policy as of =ay 16 has come close to a moderate and rational mainstream policies. =/span> 4 EFTA_R1_00067530 EFTA01762254 Kadri Gursel <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/contents/au=hors/kadr-gursel.html> is a contri=uting writer for Al- Monitor's Turkey Pulse and has written a column for the Turkish daily Milliyet <http://www.mill=yet.com.tr/Haber/> since 2007. He focu=es primarily on Turkish foreign policy, international affairs and Turkey=92s Kurdish question, as well as Turkey's evolving political Islam. Article 2. Ahram The Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia<=b> Hicham Mourad</=> 15 May 2013 -- Although the new Egyptian regime immediate=y displayed its willingness to continue the alliance forged between Cairo =nd Riyadh in the Mubarak era, Saudi leaders, despite the economic aid offered and the diplomatic formulas used= remain at least cautious vis-a-vis the new masters of Egypt. The Egyptian head of state reserved his first foreign visit for Saudi Arabi=, in July. He used the occasion to emphasise that his country is not seeki=g to "export" its revolution beyond its borders. The message was=twofold: Egypt will not attempt to encourage opposition in neighbouring countries to overthrow political regimes, or pr=vide support for the installation of Islamist regimes, from the Muslim Bro=herhood. These assurances were clearly not enough to allay the concerns of=the Saudi royal family, however, about the intentions of the Brotherhood, nor on the political situation in=Egypt. The position of Riyadh was somewhat surprising, given the support offered b= the ruling Al-Saud family to the Muslim Brotherhood, and Arab Islamist mo=ements in general, since the time of former President Gamal Abdel Nasser i= the 1950s and 60s, where Nasser tried through an active foreign policy to export socialism and Arab nation=lism — hostile to the West — to the Arab world. The assistance of Saud= Arabia to the Brotherhood took various forms, including political asylum =ranted to members of the Muslim Brotherhood from Egypt and other nationalities, such as Syrians and Jordanians, as wel= as funding the creation of Islamic charities in which the Muslim Brotherh=od played a major role, as with the Muslim World League, founded in Mecca =n 1962, and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, created in Jeddah in 1972.Both organisations were used to=proselytise in favor of Wahhabism, the religious doctrine of Saudi Arabia,=but at the same time served the propaganda of the Muslim Brotherhood. Although Saudi Arabia adopted Wahhabism — a form of Salafism, purified, a=stere, puritanical, and rigorous as a religious doctrine — it supported =he Muslim Brotherhood movement, whose doctrine, more flexible, seeks to re=oncile Islamic tradition and Western political experience, to counter socialism and Nasserism in the Arab world= The same goal was followed by President Anwar EI-Sadat in the 1970s to remo=e Nasser's legacy and support the change of Egypt's external alliances tow=rds the West and the Gulf oil monarchies. Saudi Arabia continued as well a=ter the death of Nasser to lend its support to the Muslim Brotherhood, as long as it served its interest t= fight liberal and secular forces and support the role of religion in poli=ics. It was perceived and used as a tool of its foreign policy. This alliance of circumstance does not rule out that Al-Saud family was sce=tical about the Brotherhood and its doctrine. This cautious Saudi approach=began early, in the late '40s, when the Muslim Brotherhood began to expand=outside of Egypt in several Arab countries. The Al-Saud family saw the activist and "republican" =ormula of Islam promoted by the Brotherhood as a threat to the absolute mo=archy formula established in Saudi Arabia, which advocates popular obedien=e and prohibits revolt against the political regime. At the time, the Brotherhood movement's founder, Hassan Al-Banna, asked Kin= Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud permission to open a branch of the Brotherhood in Saud= Arabia, but the founder of the Saudi monarchy, which prohibits any kind o= 5 EFTA_R1_00067531 EFTA01762255 political party or movement, politely declined. Nevertheless, the Muslim Brotherhood managed to spread its doctr=ne in the Arabian Peninsula, particularly through immigration of members o= the movement who fled the Nasser regime. The first real shock that hit the relationship between Riyadh and the Broth=rhood took place following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. While Sau=i Arabia relied on the US to liberate the occupied emirate and to ensure i=s own security against the threat of Saddam Hussein, the Muslim Brotherhood opposed Western intervention. Th=s position was interpreted as a sign of ingratitude. Following the liberat=on of Kuwait in 1991, Saudi Arabia witnessed the appearance of the first o=position movement, Al-Sahwa (Awakening), which challenged throughout the 90s the absolute monarchy of Al-Saud and c=lled for political reforms. Some Saudi leaders accused the Brotherhood of =eing Al-Sahwa's inspiration. The second shock, more violent, that hit the relationship between the Broth=rhood and Saudi Arabia came following the attacks of 11 September 2001 in =he United States. Some 15 of the 19 alleged attackers were Saudis. Part of=Saudi's rulers threw the blame for this "deviation" of some young Saudis on the doctrinal activ=sm advocated by the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly their most famous ide=logue, Saved Qutb, hanged by the Nasser regime in 1966. The Saudi interior=minister at the time, and the crown prince from October 2011 until his death on 16 June 2012, Nayef Bin Abdel- Aziz, a=cused the Muslim Brotherhood in 2002 of being the origin of most problems rn the Arab world. "The Brotherhood has done great damage to Saudi Arabia ... All our pro=lems come from the Muslim Brotherhood ... The Muslim Brotherhood has destr=yed the Arab world," he said firmly. However, the danger perceived by Al-Saud family from the Muslim Brotherhood=remained remote, as the movement was in opposition. Its coming to power in=Egypt and Tunisia — and perhaps tomorrow in Syria — thanks to unexpect=d popular uprisings, completely changed the situation. Hence the attitude of the less reserved Saudi authorities v=s-a-vis the new regime in Egypt. Riyadh fears that the rise to power of =he Brotherhood encourages Islamist opposition inspired by that movement to=resume activities within the kingdom. The arrest in the United Arab Emirates in late 2012 of 11 Egyptians accused=of forming a Brotherhood cell to help overthrow the UAE regime only reinfo=ced these fears. But far from the alleged plots against the Gulf States, the Saudi ruling fa=ily perceives the Brotherhood and its doctrine as an ideological rival to =ahhabism, which may spread and sow discord in the kingdom or threaten the =onarchy. It is not surprising in this context that several reports underlined Saudi financial support for t=e Egyptian Salafist current in the last parliamentary elections in late 20=1. The perception of danger also has a regional dimension, as some Saudi leade=s feared the rise of an alliance between Egypt, Turkey and Qatar — the o=ly Gulf state to maintain close ties with the Muslim Brotherhood — which=may reduce the dominant regional influence Saudi Arabia had exercised through its alliance with Mubarak's Egypt and S=ria's Bashar Al-Assad. In France, Qatar owns the popular soccer team Paris Saint=Germain and the accompanying PSG handball team. In addition it has &=bsp;holdings in Louis Vuitton as well as in French heavy industry, in the French oil company Total, in the media, and in real=estate on the French Riviera. Through its Al Jazeera Sports, it laun=hed the French TV channel beIN Sport. With its investment fund,=Divine Investments SA, it is preparing to buy Printemps, the department store chain, a transaction worth $2 billion. &nb=p;lt outbid Galeries Lafayette, the other great French store, which was =nterested in buying its rival.</=> In Italy, Qatar controls the fashion house Valentino. &nb=p;It has holdings in Tiffany's, in Credit Suisse, in the Banco Santander=Brasil, and in the Agricultural Bank of China. In March 2013, the emir of Qatar, who already had investments in Gre=ce, bought six Greek islands in the Echinades, in the Ionian Sea, for abou= $10 million; he intends to build palaces there for his three wives and 24=children. In Germany, the Qatar holdings include high-end real estate property in Berlin, including the five-star G=and Hyatt hotel in Potsdamer Platz, as well as holdings in Porsche, Volksw=gon, Siemens, and the construction group Hochtief. 6 EFTA_R1_00067532 EFTA01762256 The emir, as well as his son, was educated partly in Brit=in, where he has been purchasing significant pieces of property and shares= particularly in enterprises in London, where he is almost at home. The most striking of these are the prest=gious London store Harrods, previously owned by Mohamed Al Fayed; part of =he United States Embassy building in London; the five-star Park Lane Inter=ontinental Hotel; the 72-story skyscraper Shard, the tallest building in the European Union; parts of Canary Wharf G=oup; the very expensive One Hyde Park, an apartment block estimated to be =orth more than $1.5 billion; about 20 percent of the London Stock Exchange= and shares in various companies, including Sainsbury's, the third largest chain of supermarkets in Britain;=Barclay's Bank; Royal Dutch Shell; the Anglo- Swiss Xstrata, a major produc=r of coal; and Heathrow Airport, among others. Qatar has also tried =o purchase the art auction house Christie's and the retailer outlets of the House of Fraser. The United States became familiar with the activity of Qa=ar when its TV station Al Jazeera, the most important media outlet in the =iddle East, bought Current TV, founded by Al Gore, who received $70 million for his 20-percent share of the stati=n. Among the other properties Qatar has acquired or is acquiring in =he United States are liquid natural gas assets in the anticipation that th=y will be developed as liquefaction facilities like those in Qatar, thus becoming companies that will ex=ort gas from the U.S. Other holdings include the investment group Fi=myard Holdings, which bought Miramax from Disney. The country has bought a number of the advanced Boeing 78= Dreamliners, and a team of Boeing mechanics is expected to arrive shortly=in Doha, the capital of Qatar, to modify the batteries of the planes, and thus rectify the electronic problems that=have plagued the new aircraft. Qatar already has a large fleet of pl=nes that fly to over 125 cities in the world: in the U.S., they serve New =ork; Chicago; Washington, D.C.; and Houston. Qatar has now ordered more than 250 aircraft from Boeing as=well as the European Airbus, including the latter's A380 and A330 jet airl=ners, Europe's challenge to the Dreamliner. In this buying spree, Qatar has been acquiring strategic =hares in major companies throughout the world, claiming that these are goo= investments. It also claims that it has no mission to conquer the world. Perhaps this is the case, ye= it is reasonable to expect that its large investments will begin to influ=nce economic and political decisions in the countries in which they are ma=e. The immediate question is the character of the political agenda that results from Qatar's great wealth. In fact, Qatar is now playing an increasingly political i=ternational role. It has become a member of important organizations:=OPEC; the Gulf Cooperation Council, which it helped found; and the Arab League. It has made a show of friendsh=p to the U.S. by allowing the use its air bases to supply American forces =n Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet Qatar also allowed the Taliban, which Am=rica sees as a terrorist organization, to open a bureau on its soil. Thus, the direction of Qatar policy remai=s unclear. Qatar has intervened in Middle Eastern affairs, especiall= since the downfall of Egyptian President Mubarak, playing a role in Libya= in Syria, and in Egypt. Its activity in Libya in helping to bring down the Gaddafi regime was said to have been=on behalf of the rebel group associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. In Syria, it is supporting and arming the Islamic Nusra F=ont, which is affiliated with al-Qaeda and is part of the opposition to th= regime of President Assad. In this Qatar appears to be competing with Saudi Arabia, which is supporting a dif=erent opposition group. Again, it has good ties with Shiite Iran, bu= it also gave $5 billion in aid to Egypt after the overthrow of Mubarak an= is giving it another $3 billion, thus aiding the survival of the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood. Qatar has become involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, a=pearing willing to play a constructive role in that conflict's resolution.= In October 2012 the emir himself, accompanied by one of his wives, paid a visit to Gaza, where he was offici=lly greeted by the Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniya. His visi= led to a $254-million Qatar project to rebuild in the Gaza Strip. W=th additional allocations, the gift totaled $400 million. 7 EFTA_R1_00067533 EFTA01762257 This action, however, seems incompatible with the views e=pressed by Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr Al-Thani, Qatar's prime minist=r and foreign minister in Washington, on April 29, 2013. He then not only spoke of general support for the=2002 Saudi Arabian peace proposal and negotiations between the two parties= but also suggested compromises "comparable and mutually agreed minor=exchanges" of land. This was a position not espoused by the Palestinians. Noticeably, Al-Thani specifically =id not mention Jerusalem or the Palestinian refugee issue. By taking this =iewpoint, Qatar is implicitly assuming that the 1967 armistice lines, with=minor changes, will be the borders of a new Palestinian state. While the particular way in which the propo=al has been framed may not be completely acceptable to the Israelis, it is=contradictory to the position of the Palestinians who insist, as a minimum= on Israel's return to the 1948 lines. In addition to the differences over Al-Thani's statement, Qatar's re=ationship with Hamas and its policy towards the feud between Fatah and Ham=s is also not defined. What is clear is that Qatar's influence is being taken se=iously. That Qatar is now regarded as an important player was notice=ble when Afghan president Hamid Karzai visited the emir to discuss prospects of peace in Afghanistan, and to seek the emi='s help in dealing with the Taliban. The question for the United Stares and for Israel is how in their own policy-making to reconcile the vario=s and seemingly incompatible policies of Qatar. On the one hand, Qatar is a supporter of Islamist beliefs =nd parties, as a country with a seemingly cordial relationship with Hamas =n Gaza and a more ambiguous but generally friendly one with Saudi Arabia. =nbsp;On the other hand, it has established ties with the U.S. and European countries through involvement in the econo=ies of the West. It also appears willing to encourage the Arabs to s=rive for peace with Israel. As a small but wealthy emirate in the tu=bulent Middle East, perhaps Qatar is seeking to secure a safe position by assuming a role in the economy and politics o= the world. The Western countries are confronte= with the question of whether they are capable of dealing with the uncerta=nties, mysteries, and doubts about Arab policies. Whatever the answer, Qatar is now to be taken serious=y by the United States and Israel. March 8 alliance backed by Damascus and Iran, while Saudi Arabia stood with the March 14 coalit=on <http://middleeast.about.com/od/lebanon/g/me0904=7a.htm>, whose main Sunni constituent (the Future Movement) is a Saudi protege.=The reasons that drove Qatar to espouse its aforementioned position remain=unknown to this day; but some in Hezbollah <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulre/contents/articles/politics/2013/04/saudi-arabia- ambassador-lebanon.html> think that Doha's bias toward the Iranian-Syrian axis in Lebanon was not =enuine, but was merely a political role assigned by Washington on Qatar =97 the location of the largest American military base in the Arab Gulf. Th= Saudis, on the other hand, thought at the time that Qatar suffered from an "inferiority complex" that drove it t= try and emulate the role and influence of Saudi Arabia in the region and =he world. During that period, the Qataris often reiterated that the=smaller Arab nations had a problem with their larger neighbors who tried t= limit their political aspirations. The proponents of this view long expressed pride that small nations — su=h as Lebanon, Kuwait and Qatar — succeeded in creating political, econom=c, media and democratic models that made up for their small geographic and=demographic sizes, while proving they were worthy of overcoming their subservience to larger Arab countries such=as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria, and playing a prominent role in leading =he region. =a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2013/03/qatar-appoint-c=alition-head-syria.html" target="_blank">During the Syrian crisis and before, even when Hezbollah and its allies ousted Saad Hariri <http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopic=/people/h/saad_haririfindex.html> from the Lebanese premiership, the political divergence between Qatar and =audi Arabia in Lebanon lost its raison d'être, and they both re- adopted =he traditional Gulf policy of concentrating on weakening Iranian influence=in the Orient. Doha and Riyadh therefore switched to an offensive policy, through publicly supporting the Syrian op=osition bent on toppling Bashar al- Assad's Iranian-allied regime, and by=extension, weakening Iran's Lebanese allies, led by Hezbollah <http://www.al- 8 EFTA_R1_00067534 EFTA01762258 monitor.com/pul=e/originals/2013/05/hezbollah-nasrallah-speech-involvement-syria.html> =span style="font- size:18.0pt; color:black">. In its internal discussions, Hezbollah affirms that Qatar= funding stands behind the rise of Sheikh Ahmad al-Assir, who came to prom=nence in the last two years by challenging and criticizing Hezbollah from his Bilal bin Rabah mosque in Sidon. Hezbol=ah's information also indicates that Saudi Arabia is funding Salafist fa=tions in Lebanon that profess animosity towards the party. Yet, it's been obvious lately that the honeymoon betwee= Riyadh and Doha in Lebanon is ending. The main point of contention betwee= them this time is the issue of support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. While Qatar and Turkey are planning t= make the Brotherhood the spearhead of their future influence in Syria fol=owing Assad's ouster, Riyadh, on the other hand, backs the advent to pow=r of moderate Sunni factions, most of which are comprised of Syrian Army defectors and other figures who don=92t belong to Islamist movements. From Riyadh's perspective, its disagre=ment with Qatar about the Brotherhood is a strategic one. For Saudi Arabians wary of the ties between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamist Sahwa movement in Saudi Arabia, which today represents the main internal opposit=on to the Saudi ruling family. Riyadh wants Qatar to abandon its plan to b=ck the Muslim Brotherhood because it would become a source of strength for=the Saudi Sahwa movement if it were to attain power in Syria.</=> Riyadh is therefore developing a new policy in Lebanon, a=d has begun opening up to all Lebanese political powers, including Iran'= ally Hezbollah and the Christian Free Patriotic Movement, which belongs to the Iranian-Syrian axis of resistance= Saudi Arabia is also bolstering its influence on Sunni Lebanese factions,=in order to minimize Qatari influence over them. There are indications tha= Riyadh has succeeded in dispelling Qatar's role in Lebanon, as evidenced by the lack of visits by Lebanese =fficials to Doha recently, and the resurgence of visits to Saudi Arabia instead. Furthermore, Sheikh Assir's vitriolic Qatari-influenced verbal att=cks on Hezbollah have ceased lately. Qatar's role in the region is the subject of behind-the=scenes attacks by factions close to Article 5. <http://www.al- monitor.com/pul=e/originals/2013/04/saudi-arabia-intentions-lebanon.html> RAND How Would a Nuclear Tehran Behave? (Summary) Alireza Nader</=> May 2013 -- Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons is no= a foregone conclusion. The U.S. policy of imposing sanctions on Iran whil= pursuing diplomatic engagement may still dissuade the Islamic Republic from developing a nuclear weapons capability= However, that policy is not guaranteed to resolve the Iranian nuclear cri=is. Even an Israeli and/or U.S. military attack against Iran's nuclear f=cilities could not prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons; it could only delay such development. Therefor=, it is prudent to examine Iran's potential foreign policy, military doc=rine, and support for terrorism after it has obtained nuclear weapons. Thi= report seeks to explore how a nuclear-armed Iran would behave, if it would act aggressively, and what this would entai= for the United States and its main regional allies, including the Gulf Co=peration Council (GCC) and Israel. The key findings of the study are the following: 9 EFTA_R1_00067535 EFTA01762259 • The Islamic Republic is a revisionist state that seek= to undermine what it perceives to be the American-dominated order in the =iddle East. However, it does not have territorial ambitions and does not seek to invade, conquer, or occupy othe= nations. Its chief military aim is to deter a U.S. and/or Israeli military attack whi=e it undermines American allies in the Middle East. • Nuclear arms are unlikely to change Iran's fundamen=al interests and strategies. Rather, nuclear weapons would probably reinfo=ce Iran's traditional national security objectives, including deterring a U.S. and/or Israeli military attack. • Iran may feel more confident and gain a sense of pres=ige from a nuclear capability, but other factors, such as the regional geo=olitical environment and Iran's political, military, and economic capabilities, will have a greater bearing on Irania= calculations. • Iran's possession of nuclear weapons will lead to g=eater tension between the Shi'a theocracy and the conservative Sunni mon=rchies. However, Iran is unlikely to use nuclear weapons against other Muslim countries. Moreover, Iran's ability=to undermine the GCC is quite limited, especially given Tehran's diminishing=influence resulting from the Arab Spring and Iranian support for the Syria= government. • Nuclear weapons may provide Iran with the ultimate de=errent, but they are unlikely to be useful in coercing the GCC states, par=icularly in view of Iran's deteriorating economy. • The Islamic Republic views Israel in ideological term=. However, it is very unlikely that Iran would use nuclear weapons against=Israel, given the latter's overwhelming conventional and nuclear military superiority. • The Iranian government does not use terrorism for ide=logical reasons. Instead, Iran's support for terrorism is motivated by c=st and benefit calculations, with the aims of maintaining deterrence and preserving or expanding its influence in the=Middle East. • A nuclear-armed Iran is unlikely to extend its nuclea= deterrent to groups such as Hizballah or Hamas. So-called Iranian "prox=" groups have divergent interests from those of Tehran, especially Sunni Arab groups such as Hamas. Tehran is als= unlikely to provide nuclear weapons or nuclear technology to non-Iranian grou=s. 10 EFTA_R1_00067536 EFTA01762260 • Iran's possession of nuclear weapons will create gr=ater instability in the Middle East. An inadvertent or accidental nuclear =xchange between Israel and Iran is a dangerous possibility. However, there is not much evidence to suggest that rogue=elements could have easy access to Iranian nuclear weapons, even if the Is=amic Republic were to collapse. Elements of the political elite, including Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, may be fervent Mand=sts or millenarians, but their beliefs are not directly relat=d to nuclear weapons and will not shape Iran's nuclear decisionmaking. Alireza Nader is a senior international policy analyst=at the RAND Corporation and the lead co-author of Coping with a Nuclearizi=g Iran (2011). His research has focused on Iran's political dynamics, elite decisionmaking, and Iranian foreign poricy. Article 6. Foreign Policy<=p> How America wll Fight the Next War Adm. Jonathan Greenert, Gen. Mark Welsh May 16, 2013 -- Our military services and national securi=y leaders are consumed right now with reductions to defense budgets. Wheth=r from years of continuing resolutions, sequestration, or just less funding in general, our military will have to =djust to getting fewer dollars to protect our nation's security interests.=At the same time, the world continues to present challenges to U.S. intere=ts, including instability in North Africa and the Middle East, regular provocations from Iran and North Korea= and territorial disputes between China and its neighbors. Our military wi=l need an affordable and effective approach to counter coercion and assure=access to places where conflict is most likely and consequential. The caps established in 2011 by the Budget Control Act pl=ce defense spending at the same level as the early 2000s. This level of fu=ding was sufficient to organize, train, and equip a force able to defeat Saddam Hussein's military, deter Chinese =ggression against Taiwan, and occupy Iraq and Afghanistan. But our fiscal =ituation is different today. Personnel and infrastructure maintenance cost= have risen by double-digit percentages since 2003 as our services took on new missions, such as defending allies =rom ballistic missiles and countering piracy and illicit trafficking. Mean=hile, our competitors are more capable than a decade ago thanks to prolife=ation of weapons and other military technology. Less funding will compel us to reprioritize our efforts and ma=e some hard choices with respect to the size and shape of our forces. This=does not mean we will be unable to address our nation's security needs, bu= we will need to focus our investments and operations on our most important interests. The Defense Strategic Guidance <http://www.defense.govinews/d=fense_strategicguidance.pdf> issued in January 2012 assessed our security environment and fiscal circumstances following the f=rst set of BCA-imposed budget reductions. Although we are reevaluating tha= strategy in light of potential additional cuts imposed by sequestration, 11 EFTA_R1_00067537 EFTA01762261 =ne of the most significant challenges the strategy identified remains a concern: the dedicated effort by some na=ions and groups to prevent access to parts of the "global commons&quo=; -- those areas of the air, sea, cyberspace, and space that no one "=wns,' but upon which we all depend. These "anti-access" strategies employ military capabilities, geography, diplomatic pressure, a=d international law to impede the free use of ungoverned spaces. The Air-S=a Battle concept -- which disrupts the so-called "kill chains" o= our potential adversaries -- is our services' approach to negate these efforts. A new form of coercion Nations seeking to intimidate their neighbors are turning=to anti-access strategies because they are cost-effective. Merely threaten=ng to close key maritime crossroads such as the Strait of Hormuz or demonstrating the ability to cut off a cou=try from cyberspace or international airspace can be an effective tool for=regional and international coercion. Similarly, these capabilities can be =pplied to prevent or slow U.S. or allied assistance from arriving in time to stop or repel an attack -- p=oviding an aggressor much greater leverage over neighbors who depend on al=ies for security. Three well-known developments made this shift in our comp=titors' strategy possible. One, the world economy has become more intercon=ected, so impediments at air or maritime chokepoints have a much faster global impact. Two, technological advances =n sensing and precision have spurred the development of more lethal air de=enses and anti- ship cruise missiles; cheaper, more integrated surveillance=systems; and new weapons, such as anti-ship ballistic missiles. Improvements in automation have made thes= systems easier to use while proliferation has put them in the hands of a =ange of potential new adversaries. And three, the American way of projecti=g force changed from placing bases and garrisons close to potential battlefields to a more expeditionary stra=egy whereby a smaller overseas presence is supported by forces that can su=ge into the area from hundreds or thousands of miles away. In history there are numerous examples of anti-access cap=bilities and strategies. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, the "Desert Fox,=quot; used aircraft, gun emplacements, and mines during World War II to disrupt access to France during the D-Day landings =t Normandy. Mines were used in the Arabian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq "=tanker war" of the 198Os to hinder the passage of both countries' oil= Serbian forces and Saddam Hussein each employed Cold War-era air defenses in an attempt to deter intervention by NATO and = U.S.-led coalition respectively. Anti-access strategies have always been =mployed to increase the cost of intervention beyond an acceptable level an= show potential victims of aggression that help is not likely to come. Today, however, anti-access capabilities =ave much greater range and lethality. And they are typically employed as p=rt of an overall strategy in peacetime alongside legal, diplomatic, and ge=graphic means to deny access even before a conflict occurs. Anti-access strategies also undermine our ability to stab=lize crises. Suppose an aggressor threatens to attack a country within ran=e of its anti-access military capabilities. If we cannot reliably defeat the aggressor's array of cruise and ballistic=missiles, submarines, aircraft, etc. and project power, U.S. forces will b= less able to move into the area to interdict attacks, reassure our allies= and defuse potential hostilities. The Air-Sea Battle concept The Air-Sea Battle concept, approved by the secretary of =efense in 2011, is designed to assure access, defeat anti- access capabilit=es, and provide more options to national leaders and military commanders. Air-Sea Battle is one of the operational =oncepts nested within the overarching Joint Operational Access Concept (JO=C) -- the Joint Force's approach to defeating threats to access. Air-Sea B=ttle is not focused on one specific adversary, since the anti-access capabilities it is intended to defeat are=proliferating and, with automation, becoming easier to use. U.S. forces ne=d a credible means to assure access when needed to help deter aggression b= a range of potential adversaries, to assure allies, and to provide escalation control and crisis stability. =/span> Some examples of where Air-Sea Battle may apply indude t=e Arabian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, where a favorable location provides l=an the ability to threaten the production and passage of almost 20 percent of the world's oil. If Iran can demonstra=e or credibly assert that it can prevent or slow a U.S. response to its ag=ression, it is more able to coerce 12 EFTA_R1_00067538 EFTA01762262 its neighbors or the international comm=nity. In the eastern Mediterranean, the government of Syria has deployed an array of modern anti-air missile s=stems to raise the costs of outside intervention in its ongoing civil war.=And in the Pacific, North Korea has already demonstrated its willingness t= employ anti-access capabilities with the sinking in 2010 of the South Korean ship, Cheonan. Air-Sea Battle is not a military strategy; it isn't about=countering an invasion; it isn't a plan for U.S. forces to conduct an assa=lt. Air-Sea Battle is a concept for defeating threats to access and enabling follow-on operations, which could=include military activities as well as humanitarian assistance and disaste= response. For example, in the last several years, improved integration be=ween naval and air forces helped us respond to floods in Pakistan and to the earthquake and tsunami in Japa=. Normally, operational concepts are developed by commander= to carry out a specific set of actions in their area of responsibility. 1= contrast, the military services are using JOAC and Air-Sea Battle to guide their efforts to organize, train, a=d equip forces provided to operational commanders. Further, we are integra=ing these concepts into the tactics and procedures we develop to operate w=th our allies. This is similar to the effort in the 1980s to implement the "Air-Land" Battle co=cept and associated NATO concepts to defeat Soviet aggression in Central E=rope. That effort resulted in programs such as the JSTARS radar aircraft t=at we still use to track targets on land. And while Air-Land Battle was focused on a singular threat and region, the=idea of using a specific operational concept to guide investment is the sa=e approach we are taking with Air-Sea Battle. Breaking the "kill chain" Air-Sea Battle defeats threats to access by, first, disru=ting an adversary's command, control, communications, computers, intellige=ce, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems; second, destroying adversary weapons launchers (including=aircraft, ships, and missile sites►; and finally, defeating the weapons an=adversary launches. This approach exploits the fact that, to attack our force=, an adversary must complete a sequence of actions, commonly referred to a= a "kill chain." For example, surveillance systems locate U.S. forces, communications networks relay targeting inform=tion to weapons launchers, weapons are launched, and then they must hone i= on U.S. forces. Each of these steps is vulnerable to interdiction or disr=ption, and because each step must work, our forces can focus on the weakest links in the chain, not each and=every one. For example, strikes against installations deep inland are not =ecessarily required in Air-Sea Battle because adversary C4ISR may be vulne=able to disruption, weapons can be deceived or interdicted, and adversary ships and aircraft can be destro=ed. U.S. forces need not employ "symmetrical" appro=ches to counter each threat -- shooting missiles down with missiles, sinki=g submarines with other submarines, etc. Instead, as described in the JOAC and Air-Sea Battle, we will operate across domain=. For example, we will defeat missiles with electronic warfare, disrupt surveillance systems with electromagnetic or cyberattacks, and defeat air thr=ats with submarines. This is "networked, integrated attack" and it will require a force that is designed for -= and that regularly practices -- these kinds of operations. Building a truly "joint" force Conducting operations across domains requires rapid and t=ght coordination between air, ground, and naval forces -- a level of integ=ation well beyond today's efforts to merely pre-plan and deconflict actions between services. This integration =an't be achieved effectively and efficiently on an ad hoc basis. Forces mu=t be "pre-integrated" -- before the fight begins. This compels u= to work more closely as we develop and prepare our forces. Today, for example, instructors from the Navy's "Top=Gun" school routinely train with their counterparts at the Air Force =eapons School. As part of Air-Sea Battle we are pursuing this type of inter-service cooperation between all the services, =s well as within each branch of each service. Just as in tactical aviation= we are expanding our doctrine integration to include additional areas of =ollaboration -- such as Army air-defense forces and Marine reconnaissance units. With the doctrine, procedures, inv=stment, and training included in Air-Sea Battle's initiatives, we are movi=g from 13 EFTA_R1_00067539 EFTA01762263 cooperation toward integration across domains. To foster integratio= we are directing an intensified approach to building common procedures, complementary budgets, combined ex=rcises, and joint war games. An essential prerequisite for cross-domain operations is =ommunication and data links that connect sensors, decision- makers, and sho=ters armed with kinetic, electromagnetic, and cyber weapons. Our inves