EFTA00614311.pdf

Brown v. Advantage Engineering, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013 (1992) 20 Media L. Rep. 1252 15 Cases that cite this headnote 96o F.2d 1013 United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit. [2] Records ea Court records Antonio BROWN, Plaintiff, Once matter is brought before district court v. for resolution, it is no longer solely parties' ADVANTAGE ENGINEERING, INC., case, but also public's case; absent showing of Defendant—Third—Party Plaintiff—Appellee, extraordinary circumstances set forth by district Westlands Water District, Movant—Appellant, court in record, as required by Eleventh Circuit Square Butte Electric Cooperative, et al., Movants, Wilson decision, i.e., that sealing of record Amoco Chemical Company, Defendant— is necessitated by compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to that interest, Third—Party Defendant—Appellee, court file must remain accessible to public. Union Carbide Corporation, et al., Defendants—Third—Party Defendants. 58 Cases that cite this headnote No. 91—8675. I May 20, 1992. 131 Records Plaintiff in civil case moved for permissive intervention e• Court records for purposes of unsealing record in previous unrelated case Any member of public has standing to view against defendant brought by another party. The United documents in court file that had not been States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, sealed in strict accordance with requirements of No. 1:87-CV-1165-RHEL Robert H. Hall, J., denied motion Eleventh Circuit Wilson decision. as untimely. Plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals, Fay, Circuit Judge, held that district court abused its discretion in 31 Cases that cite this headnote sealing court record in previous litigation without showing of extraordinary circumstances as required by Eleventh Circuit Wilson decision. Attorneys and Law Firms Vacated and remanded. •1013 Robert S. Windholz, Atlanta, Ga., Phillip S. Cronin, Edmondson, Circuit Judge, dissented and filed opinion. Young, Wooldridge, Paulden, Self & Farr. Bakersfield, Cal., and Carolyn Oill, Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Wendy D. Brooks and Timothy T. Coates, Beverly Hills, Cal., for appellant. West Headnotes (3) •1014 Donald M. Fain, Fain, Major, & Wiley, Atlanta, Ga., for Advantage. [1] Records Court records James A. Orr, and Nicholas DeWitt, Paul, Hastings, Janofsky District court abused its discretion in sealing & Walker, Atlanta, Ga., for Amoco. court records in civil suit without showing of extraordinary circumstances as required by Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern Eleventh Circuit Wilson decision, and thus. District of Georgia. different plaintiff in subsequent unrelated suit Before FAY and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges, and against same defendant was entitled to obtain copies of summary judgment motion and other ATKINS • , Senior District Judge. related documents in previous action. WestlawNext © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1 EFTA00614311 Brown v. Advantage Engineering, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013 (1992) 20 Media L. Rep. 1252 water system. In its suit, Westlands seeks to show that Amoco Opinion Chemical is the alter•ego of ARPCO. FAY, Circuit Judge: After extensive discovery in the California action, Westlands This appeal once again concerns the public's right of access contacted Amoco Chemical directly to obtain copies of to judicial records in a civil case. The appellant seeks to Amoco Chemical's summary judgment motion and other review pleadings, motions, and evidence openly submitted related documents from the Georgia action. Westlands agreed in district court that were subsequently sealed pursuant to to be bound by the blanket protective order of the United a court monitored settlement. Because we conclude that the States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia if district court abused its discretion in sealing court records Amoco Chemical would provide the requested documents. without a compelling reason, we VACATE the district court's Amoco Chemical refused Westlands' request. 2 On December protective order sealing the file in this case and REMAND for 14, 1990. the district court issued an order permitting the proceedings consistent with this opinion. destruction of the sealed documents in the absence of any •1015 objection from counsel to preserve the record. (R8:I82 at I). Due to several letters in response from counsel, the record remained intact. I. BACKGROUND On July 30, 1986, Antonio Brown suffered severe injuries On February 7, 1991, Westlands filed a Federal Rule of from scalding oil resulting from an explosion at the Amoco Civil Procedure 24(b) motion for permissive intervention in Torlon Products' ("Torlon") plant in Atlanta, Georgia. Brown the Georgia action for the purpose of unsealing the record. recovered workers' compensation benefits for his injuries Westlands explained that the requested documents reportedly from Torlon. In 1987, Brown brought a personal injury suit contained admissions by Amoco Chemical regarding Torlon against Amoco Chemical Company ("Amoco Chemical"), that could prove helpful in Westlands' action against Amoco Torlon's parent company. At the close of discovery, Amoco Chemical and ARPCO in California. Amoco Chemical Chemical moved for summary judgment on the ground principally objected on the grounds that no pending action that it was immune from suit under Georgia's workers' existed in which Westlands could intervene, and that the compensation law because Amoco Chemical was Torlon's motion to intervene was untimely because it was filed more alter-ego at the time Brown was injured. than one year after Amoco Chemical's summary judgment was denied. The district court rejected Amoco Chemical's alter•ego defense, holding that there remained material issues of The district court denied Westlands' motion to intervene under Stalhvorth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257 (5th fact with respect to the alter-ego issue. I Amoco Chemical Cir.1977), which set forth four factors for use as guidelines in subsequently reached a settlement with Brown. One of the key negotiated elements of the settlement agreement was a determining the timeliness of a motion to intervene pursuant provision that the record would be sealed. Amoco Chemical to Rule 24(b). 3 Moreover, the district court stated that "Ulf apparently agreed to settle the case for an amount exceeding [Westlands] had tried to intervene at the time of the summary any of its previous settlement offers in exchange for Brown's judgment order, [Amoco Chemical] could have factored agreement that the record be sealed. The district court entered [Westlands'] request into its settlement decision. But because an order on July 27, 1990. sealing the record and dismissing [Westlands] waited until after the court sealed the record, their the case. intervention would deprive [Amoco Chemical] of a crucial benefit of the settlement." (R8:200 at 8). On October 13, 1989, in an unrelated action, Westlands Water District ("Westlands") sued Amoco Chemical and Amoco Westlands appeals the district court's denial of its motion Reinforced Plastics Company ("ARPCO"), in the United to intervene on the ground that the record in the Georgia States District Court for the Eastern District of California. action should never have been sealed absent a compelling ARPCO, like Torlon, is a subsidiary of Amoco Chemical. The reason, and the district court abused its discretion in finding complaint alleged that ARPCO designed, manufactured, and Westlands' motion to intervene untimely even if the record sold defective pipe to Westlands for use in an underground was properly sealed. Amoco Chemical argues that the district court actively participated in the settlement of the dispute WestlawNext © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 EFTA00614312 Brown v. Advantage Engineering, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013 (1992) 20 Media L. Rep. 1252 memorializing the condition that the record be sealed, and [2] It is immaterial whether the sealing of the record that the district court properly followed Stallworth regarding is an integral part of a negotiated settlement between the a motion to intervene. parties, even if the settlement comes with the court's active encouragement. Once a matter is brought before a court for resolution, it is no longer solely the parties' case, but also the public's case. Absent a showing of extraordinary II. DISCUSSION circumstances set forth by the district court in the record [1] We squarely addressed the central issue presented in consistent with Wilson, the court file must remain accessible this case in Wilson v. American Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568 to the public. (I Ith Cir.1985). The facts in Wilson are strikingly similar to the case at hand: a plaintiff who had filed a wrongful [3] Thus, because it is the rights of the public, an absent death action against a jeep manufacturer in California state third party, that are at stake, any member of the public has court requested that the judicial records in a federal district standing to view documents in the court file that have not court action in Georgia be unsealed in order to permit the been sealed in strict accordance with Wilson, and to move the plaintiff to invoke offensive collateral estoppel against the court to unseal the court file in the event the record has been jeep manufacturer in the California action. Id. at 1569. As improperly sealed. As we find nothing in the record to support here, all pleadings, motions, and evidence were filed with the the sealing of the court file, we treat the appellant's motion to Clerk of the Court and open to the public. The only distinction intervene as a motion to unseal the file. of note between Wilson and the instant case is that in Wilson the record was sealed after a jury verdict and here the record Accordingly, we VACATE the district court's protective was sealed prior to trial, but it is a distinction without a order sealing the record and REMAND for proceedings difference. consistent with Wilson and this opinion. In Wilson, we took great pains "weighing the competing EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting: interests of preserving the district court's authority in The strange things about today's court's opinion are how encouraging settlement agreements and the public's right to easily it assumes that the public interest in civil litigation access to public trials." Id. We found that "[t]he starting generally differs from the interests of the litigants (themselves point in such a discussion is the proposition that, absent some members of the public) in a particular case, how little exceptional circumstances, trials are public proceedings." Id. significance is given to the fact that this case was settled After discussing the strong common law presumption in favor before trial (unlike Wilson v. American Motors Corp.. 759 of access, we applied the following standard: F.2d 1568 (11th Cir.1985), upon which today's court relies 'We do not hold that every hearing, so heavily), and how the considerable jurisprudence on deposition, conference or even trial in deference in reviewing motions to intervene goes mostly a case of this kind must be open to unmentioned. the public. We do hold that "where, as in •1016 the present case, the [court] Because the case involves in no way the public nature of trials attempts to deny [ . aorns in order occurring in open court, this case is materially different from to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive Wilson. I This case permits us to look at the law on opening information, it must be shown that the the sealed files of cases that settle before trial to scrutiny by denial is necessitated by a compelling persons not party to the litigation when there is no claim or governmental interest, andis narrowly reason to believe that the files need to be seen to check on tailored to b..) that interest." ' either the honesty or the efficiency of the judicial system's handling of the case and when the procedural mechanism Id., at 1571 (quoting Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 802 used to gain access is a Rule 24(b) motion for permissive (I I th Cir.1983) (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior intervention filed many months after the case was ended by Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-07. 102 S.Ct. 2613, 2619-20, 73 settlement. L.Ed.2d 248 (1982))) (emphasis added). WestlawNext © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3 EFTA00614313 Brown v. Advantage Engineering, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013 (1992) 20 Media L. Rep. 1252 For permissive intervention, the standard of review is abuse of discretion. Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 263 It seems plain to me that the public wants civil cases involving (5th Cir.I 977). And intervention after settlement or entry of private litigants to be concluded fairly, peacefully and without judgment is not favored. See, e.g., McDonald v. E.J. Lavino too much cost to the general public. It is nowhere as nearly Co., 430 F.2d 1065, 1071 (5th Cir.I 970) (recognizing well- plain to me that the public wants much or needs much to know established principle that intervention after judgment usually about every dispute settled between private parties so long not granted); Reeves v. Wilkes, 754 F.2d 965, 971 ( I 1th as no one claims that the court, as a public institution, acted Cir.1985) (affirming intervention denial in part because time wrongfully in the pertinent case. And, in this case, no one and effort spent to formulate settlement of case would be for even hints at judicial wrongdoing or inefficiency or anything naught); cf. also Engra, Inc. v. Gabel, 958 F.2d 643. 645 else negative about the court. (5th Cir.1992) (viewing as untimely motion to intervene filed eight months after settlement); Aleut Corp. v. Tyonek Native Let us recall that litigants are not wholly separate from the Corp., 725 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir.1984) (finding no abuse public. Litigants are part of the public, and I am unwilling of discretion *1017 where court denied intervention motion to assume too quickly that the public wants something very 2 different from what litigants in a given case want. Defendants filed on eve of settlement). Timeliness is important when moving to intervene. Given just the delay in filing the motion rarely have much say about being hauled into court. I and the importance of finality in litigation, that is, a case's doubt that they somehow waive all or most of their privacy being over for all purposes at some reasonable, definite time, privileges simply because someone—justifiably or not—files there is no abuse of discretion here. But, there is more that suit against them. Plaintiffs also often come to court as a supports the district court's judgment. last resort, sometimes forced to do so by the arbitrariness of others. They ought not to have to surrender much of their For the purpose of civil litigation, courts exist chiefly as a privacy as a condition of making use of the institutions the public service to persons who cannot work out their private public provides for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Given disputes and need the intervention of an unbiased entity to the sweep of pretrial discovery, it is easy to understand that help bring the controversy to an end. Briefly stated, the public much private information about litigants can be dredged up in interest in civil litigation is mainly that these private disputes the pretrial process. All of this information may become part be concluded peacefully, fairly and without too much cost to of the court record. I doubt that the public, each of whom may society as a whole. Voluntary settlements are peaceful, less be a litigant tomorrow, believes all that information ought to costly to society than full litigation and, because parties are be fair game once a person becomes a litigant, especially if making their own choice, usually will be as fair to both parties the pertinent case is settled and never goes to trial. as the results reached following full litigation. Court practices facilitating, as opposed to obstructing, settlements advance *1018 Turning to this case, I see no good reason to allow Westlands to intervene in a case that did not, in fact, involve generally the public's goals for civil litigation. 3 Westlands in any way and which had been over for seven Allowing private parties in civil litigation in federal court to months before Westlands sought to intervene. 4 The public's seal the terms of their settlements and other parts of pretrial right to know is a captivating phrase; but this case is, in reality, records significantly promotes voluntary settlements in some about Westlands convenience. If Westlands were allowed cases. For example, no one disputes that the settlement to intervene and then to look at the sealed pretrial records reached in this case depended on the record being sealed. it might be easier for Westlands to prevail in its own civil lawsuit against Amoco. I understand Westlands' desire. I do The linchpin of today's opinion is this idea: "Once a matter not think poorly of Westlands' efforts. But Westlands remains is brought before a court for resolution, it is no longer the free to conduct discovery in its own suit against Amoco. And parties' case but also the public's case "This statement is true I do not see Westlands' convenience as a compelling public in a sense; but it does not seem to help us much in deciding interest that overrules the privacy expectations of the litigants whether the district court abused its discretion in denying a in this case, the public interest in promoting settlements that motion to intervene in this case. Nor does it lead directly to would be diminished if Westlands prevailed, the value of the conclusion that pretrial records in civil cases that have finality that would be undercut if this case were reopened for been concluded by settlement ought to be easily opened by any purpose, and the timeliness rule that intervention after nonparties to the litigation. settlement or judgment is unfavored. WeStlaWNeXt © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. EFTA00614314 Brown v. Advantage Engineering, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013 (1992) 20 Media L. Rep. 1252 (less than the most compelling circumstances is enough to prevent access to judicial records not involving trial The issue before us is whether the district court abused its proceedings); and FDIC v. Ernst & Ernst, 677 F.2d 230, discretion by denying permissive intervention. I cannot say 232 (2d Cir.1982) (once confidentiality order is entered the district court abused its discretion in denying Westlands' and relied upon, it can be modified only if "extraordinary motion to intervene. Wilson v. American Motors Corp.. circumstances" or "compelling need" warrants modification). 759 F.2d at 1569 ("This appeal raises important issues regarding the public's right of arri-cs to civil trials.") is I would affirm the district court's judgment. not controlling: no motion to intervene was even involved in Wilson, and no trial is involved here. See also Nixon v. Warner. 435 U.S. 589, 98 S.Ct. 1306. 55 L.Ed.2d 570 Parallel Citations (1978) (no absolute right of access to judicial records); Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark. 654 F.2d 423 (5th Cir.1981) 20 Media L. Rep. 1252 Footnotes Honorable C. Clyde Atkins. Senior U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of Florida. sitting by designation. 1 For the district court's opinion denying Amoco Chemical Company's motion for summary judgment. see Brown v. Advantage Engineering. Inc.. 732 F.Supp. 1163 (N.D.Ga.1990). 2 Had the district court found that Amoco Chemical was the alter-ego of Torlon in the Georgia action. Amoco Chemical would have been immune from suit because of Georgia's workers' compensation exclusivity provisions. However, in the California action, an alter-ego relationship would be detrimental to Amoco Chemical as ARPCO is apparently an unfunded subsidiary in terms of paying judgments. exposing Amoco Chemical as the parent company. 3 The four factors are: (I) "Dille length of time during which the would-be intervenor actually knew or reasonably should have known of his interest in the case before he petitioned for leave to intervene"; (2) "(tjhe extent of the prejudice that the existing parties to the litigation may suffer as a result of the would-be intervenors failure to apply for intervention as soon as he actually knew or reasonably should have known of his interest in the case": (3) "Mire extent of the prejudice that the would-be intervenor may suffer if his petition for leave to intervene is denied": and (4) "(t]he existence of unusual circumstances militating either for or against a determination that the application is timely."Stallworth v. Monsanto Co.. 558 F.2d 257.264-66 (5th Cir.1977). 1 A case is authority only for what it actually decides. Wilson dealt with disclosure of trial proceedings and actually distinguished itself from earlier circuit precedent less favorable to easy access to court material on the ground that Wilson was dealing with a trial. See Wilson v. American Motors Corp.. 759 F.2d 1568. 1571 (1I th Cir.1985). Language such as "What transpires in the courtroom is public property" is stressed throughout Wilson. See, e.g., id. at 1570. The court in Wilson had no authority to decide any case other than Wilson. and the facts of this case are not much like Wilson. 2 The idea that intervention can occur after settlement or final judgment also raises worrisome jurisdictional questions. See. e.g.. Tosco Corp. v. Node!. 804 F.2d 590.592 (10th Cir.1986) (concluding that settlement deprived court of jurisdiction to hear nonparties' motion to intervene). 3 If fewer cases settled and more cases went to trial, the court system would not be able to handle the additional work without significant changes—probably costly changes—in the court system. This is another public benefit to having cases settle. 4 Westlands waited for more than three months after it knew about this case's existence before moving to intervene. End of Document (0 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. WestlawNext © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 5 EFTA00614315