EFTA01171780.pdf

From: US GIO To: Undisclosed recipients:; Subject: J.P. Morgan Eye on the Market: The morning after (Italy) Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 19:47:54 +0000 Attachments: 11-14-I1_ EOTM - The moming_after.pdf lane -Images: image002.png; image004.png; image006.png; image008.png; image014.png Eye on the Market, November 14, 2011 Topics: Challenges facing a new Italian government; the IMF effect; and good news of the week (since there was some) The morning after. There's some enthusiasm about a new Italian government, but now the hard work begins. The tricky thing about structural reforms is that they are more easily accomplished when times are good, so you can spread the adjustment more slowly, and with counter-cyclical support from the private sector. The problem is, few countries do that. Italy is facing this challenge in spades: it ranks 123M out of 142 countries in terms of labor market efficiency (142=worst), and unfortunately, the labor market reforms Italy is considering are among the most growth-depressing reforms of all, in the short term. I found agreement on this point in meetings last week with some of Italy's largest industrialists. Italy needs to fix its labor markets... .....but that tends to come at a price in terms of near-term month Labor market efficiency Growth response to structural reforms 2011 Score, from bestto worst Cumulative percent change in real GDP per capita uinrc 5% 5.75 ' US 4% Trade Reform UK Tax Reform 5.25 • jpry 3% IRL 2% BEL Pell- DE FR 1% BR Katy 0% SI Financial 3.75 OR .1% Reform -2% Labor Reform 3.25 • -3% 2.75 0 3 6 9 12 Source: world Economic Forum Corroetitrvencee Repat(142 comby universe). Source: International Monetary Fund.Years The multi-dimensional uncertainties are enormous. Will markets reward Italy for austerity decisions (if they are taken), and sit tight with their 1.9 trillion in Italian bonds, even as Italy's debt ratios rise further as a recession hits? Will Europe be able to leverage private sector capital and increase the size of its bailout facility, which as things stand now is inadequate if needed to fund Italy and Spain for 2012 and 2013? What will happen if European banks needing higher capital ratios opt to shrink their balance sheets instead of issue equity? Will the ECB buy a lot more Italian debt now that Italy is enacting austerity budgets? Will the IMF come to Italy's rescue? It's hard to say, particularly on this latter point; as shown on the next page, in the cases of Mexico, Russia, Indonesia and Argentina, events became unglued after IMF and other bilateral loans were announced. Bottom line: it is difficult to be very optimistic on prospects for in-flight refueling and repairs of a monetary union in distress. [here have been articles on Italy's extensive household wealth, as well as 1.8 trillion Euros of state-owned assets that could be sold to pay down debt. On the former, there's no question household wealth exists, but getting at it is another issue. The Sociedi Italiana di Economia Pubblica and the University of Linz estimate that Italy's tax evasion is the highest in the OECD, and has been rising since the late 1980's. On the sale of state-owned assets, it's a possibility, but Italy only sold non-financial assets worth 2% of GDP in the entire period from 1997 to 2006. Italy owns 17 billion in publicly tradable shares, but the rest looks more complicated. What's even more disturbing: an analysis showing that from 1997 to 2006, the improvement in Italy's debt ratio was almost entirely due to temporary measures, with little improvement in its structural deficit. Understanding Europe is like a visit to the psychiatrist: every answer simply leads to another question. EFTA01171780 As we wrote last week, economics and finance trump politics almost all the time lad, which means that Europe's structural problems may be a lot more important to investors than the names of the politicians in charge. Even as we consider the possibility of politics as a positive catalyst, we are all still looking for more evidence of how it will actually work on a regional level [b]. A comment that has stuck with me since I first saw it was this remark from the author of the 1992 German Constitutional Court opinion on Maastricht [c]. In the words of the author, the Maastricht treaty... "...is not able to support its own premise: the common ground ofa European Staatsvolk which belongs together: a minimum ofhomogeneity in basic constitutional attitudes, a legal language accessible to all, economic and cultural similarities or at least someforces ofapproximation, the possibility ofpolitical exchange through media, which reach the whole ofEurope, a leadership known in Europe andparties active across Europe. A European-isation without a prior European consciousness and therefore without a European people with a concrete capability and readinessfor common statehood would be, in terms ofthe history ofthought, un-European." The assertion that as a region, Europe's aggregate debt and deficit levels are lower than the US, the UK and Japan may not matter until there is Federalization of European revenues, or until its sovereign issuers are subject to the same market and budget discipline that applies to US states. This is the kind of "statehood readiness" that the author may have been referring to. The IMF as White Knight? The charts below are from our Sovereign Default Time Capsule, published in May 2010. Note how IMF and other bilateral loans did not mark the end of the problem. The quotes on Russia are a useful reminder that the IMF is often not a great judge of investment merit, and that single-country investment funds may have too much money at stake in one place to think about worst-case outcomes. Argentina Mexico Sovereign debtprice: 113i8 2017 Peso/USD 120 'Argentina till dollarize before undergoing a 2 110 dy foreign exchange crisis' - Argentine Creation of 520 NI Exchange 100 y lAnister•Elect Machnea j6100) 3 • Stabilization Fund 12/961 9D 'Argentina may save 513 bn 4 Treasury Secretary Robed 4110'.. over Sy ears in bond swap' RUM, to Senate Foreign 80 -8toomberg [06/011 Creation of permanent Relations Committee: low 56.7 bn line of credit for 70 60 Banks. the UN. IADB and Spain promise 540 bit it aid. 'This should 'Argentina bonds gained on increased optimism the IMF 5 6 Mexico from the United States and Canada [4194) / probability event that few could have anticipated' 14(951 vdr approve additional 50 improve theInv estment climate, and f inancing to help avoid default' together 4th enhanced domestic and 40 external confidence, lay the ground for - Blomberg (OMI) 7 30 sustained economic Argentine growth' -IMF tilanagiv Director (12/001 8 20 Jan-98 Jan-99 Jan-00 Jan-01 Jan-02 Jan-03 Jan-04 De -93 May-94 Nov-94 May-95 Nov-95 Source: Bloomberg. Source: Bloomberg. Russia 'This takes the Indonesia pressure off. and Sovereign debt price: GKO (T-Bill) 3/10/1999 Russia can now Sovereign debt price 731 2006 90 The IMF Executive Board completed the review of the trade on its own 120 Extended Fund Facility. and agreed to disburse a 5700 fundamentals-- IMF likely to resume mien trench*, thu bringing the program back on track HermitageRussia 110 terming under 540 bn 80 Fund [0 PA 100 package (04/981 90 I 70 80 'Although the entire East Asian experience gives ground for ig 70 optimism over the prospects for t ,••• 'Up to this point, the monists on Russia 60 have boon more right than the pessimists. development, that is particularly true There is good reason tobelieve the optimists Russia stock and 60 of Malaysia, Indonesia and e been very bonds soared after the impressed by the 50 will continue to be rigM.* Stanley Fischer, 50 Thailand' —IMF Director on the negotiations with the new IMF Managing Director 101/98} promise of 522.6 bn in Pacific Rim, (10/96) loans led by the IMF — 40 Cabinet' - IMF leal98) Bloom 07196 40 30 Jan-98 Feb-98 Mar-98 Apr-98 May-98 Jun-98 Jul-98 Aug-98 Jul-96 Dec-96 May-97 Oct-97 Mer-98 Aug-98 Source: Bloomberg, Inlerndional Monetary Fund. Source: Bloomberg. The difference this time is that these countries didn't have the ECB as a potential lender (and buyer) of last resort. Will the ECB continue to expand its balance sheet (shown below)? It is possible that the increasing risk of the ECB balance sheet, rather than its increasing size, is what is bothering the Bundesbank and German members of the ECB. EFTA01171781  Total public support to European banks and sovereigns Billions. EUR 1,000 900 • Purchasesof collateralized bank bonds 800 • Purchases of Periphery bonds (SNIP) 700 • Repo to Periphery Banks 600 • Repo to Core Banks 500 400 300 200. 100 I I 2000 200 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20 0 201 1 Source. NCBs,ECB, Bloomberg. November2011 Unrelated good news of the week, and what equity market pricing looks like ** Continued improvement in US state and local tax collections ** Signs that global inflation has peaked, including in China; we expect inflation to fall by around 1% or more in the next few months, allowing for some easing in China next year ** S&P 500 profits and top-line sales grew by 18% and 10%, respectively, in Q3 vs 2010. However, the magnitude of earnings outperformance and CEO capital spending intentions are beginning to show signs of weakness ** Modest improvements in high-frequency data in the US, including chain store sales, jobless claims, small business sentiment, job openings and consumer credit The simple observation is that there is a lot of worrying news about sovereign risk in the U.S. and Europe, and that equity markets appear to be incorporating that. As shown below, the trailing earnings yield of the S&P 500, adjusted for inflation, is close to the highest level seen in roughly 50 years. Even assuming a 15% decline in earnings next year, which would be a par-for-the-course earnings recession, these yields would still be on the cheaper end of their historical range. Real S&P 500 trailing earnings yield Trailing eamings yield of the cap-weighted S&P 500 less core CPI 8% As of 11/11/11 7% 6% 5% 4% 3% 2% 1% 0% -1% Assuming a 15% -2% decline in earnings 1956 1962 1968 1974 1980 1986 1992 1998 2004 2010 Source: Robert Shier, SW, corporate reports. Empatal ROSESIChPan Michael Cembalest Chief Investment Officer Notes [a] Another example of premature extrapolation is the May 2011 capture of Osama Bin Laden, heralded at the time in some research reports as a very positive catalyst for equity markets. That weekend turned out to be the peak for the year on the S&P 500, as the US fiscal deficit, of which elevated military spending is a part, became a catalyst for the S&P downgrade of the US just 3 months later. [b] In October, Trichet noted how European integration has been around for a while, and cited the "Revocation of the Edict of Nantes". This refers to Louis XIV's revocation of a law protecting Protestant Huguenots, which resulted in their expulsion to other countries. It's hard to escape the EMU's contradictions: even when trying to provide evidence of regional integration, its long-standing cultural differences remain. EFTA01171782 [c] Written by Paul Kirchhof, as per Bernard Connolly of Hamiltonian Global in his 2003 essay on the European Monetary Union. Components of labor market efficiency, as defined by the World Economic Forum in its Global Competitiveness Report Cooperation in labor-employer relations; Flexibility of wage determination; Rigidity of employment; Hiring and firing practices; Redundancy costs; Pay and productivity; Reliance on professional management; Brain drain; Female participation in labor force "ShouldItaly SellIts Nonfinancial Assets to Reduce the Debt?", Stefania Fabrizio, IMF Policy Discussion Paper, April 2008 "The value added ofunderground activities: size and measurement of the shadow economies of110 countries", Friedrich Schneider, Johannes Kepler University of Linz, June 2002 The material containedherein is intended as a generalmarket commentary. Opinions expressed herein are those ofMichael Cembalest and may differ from those of other J.P. Morgan employees and affiliates. This information in no way constitutes J.P. Morgan research and. houldnot be treated as such. 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