EFTA01756297.pdf

From: Office of Tene Rod-Larsen Sent: Tuesday, October 15, 2013 8:04 AM Subject: October 15 update 15 October, 2013 Article 1. The Washington Post The world must tell Iran: No more half-steps Ray Takeyh Article 2. Foreign Policy Why the United States can't force Iran's nuclear hand Colin H. Kahl, Alireza Nader Article 3. Bloomberg The Rise and Fall of Israel's Settlement Movement Jeffrey Goldberg Article 4. The Guardian<http://www.guardian.co.uk/theguardian> As the M.E's power blocs fracture, so do hopes of stability Wadah Khanfar<http://www.theguardian.com/profile/wadah-khanfar> Article 5. NYT The Middle East Pendulum Roger Cohen<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/columns/rogerc=henh Article 6. Foreign Affairs The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies Christopher Davidson Article 7. Foreign Policy Do American Jews think peace with Palestine is possible? Bruce Stokes Article 8. EFTA_R1_00057609 EFTA01756297 Chatham House The 3D printer is threatening to change the world Roger Highfield Article 1. The Washington Post The world must tell Iran: No more half-steps Ray Takeyh October 14, 2013 -- The great powers are again resuming diplomatic efforts =o settle the Iran nuclear issue. Expectations are high, as Iran is now pre=umed to be ruled by pragmatists<http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle=east/rouhani-sworn-in-as-irans- president/2013/08/04/eb322736-fd2S-11e2-829=-0ee5075b840d_story.html> who seek to end its isolation. Although much of =he recent international focuschttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/iranian-=resident-hassan-rouhani- takes-diplomatic-tone-at-military-event/2013/09/22=313937f4-2393-11e3-9372-92606241ae9c_story.html> has been on President Has=an Rouhani<http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/iranians-await-presidential=election-results- following-extension-of-polling-hours/2013/06/15/3800c276-=593-11e2-a73e-826d299ff459_story.html> and his indefatigable foreign minis=er<http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/kerry-irans-zarif=hold- unusual-private-meeting-on-sidelines-of-nuclear-talks/2013/09/26/d2fd=fac-2700-11e3-9372- 92606241ae9c_story.html>, Mohammad Javad Zarif<http://n.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/kerry- iranian-foreign-minister-to-meet/2013/09/23/bS9fa3dc-2480-11e3-ad0d-b7c8d2a594b9_story.html>, the =ritical decisions will be made by Iran's Supreme National Security Counc=l. The composition of that body and its new leadership say much more than =ouhani's proclamations<http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/i=ans- khamenei-approves-rouhanis-diplomacy/2013/10/05/75fa8336.2db9.11e3-b14=-298f46539716_story.html> do about the direction of Iran's foreign polic=. The council increasingly is populated by a cohort of hard-liners who have s=ent much of their career in the military and security services. The head o= the council is Ali Shamkhani<http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle- =ast/2013/09/11/Iran-s-president-names-Ali-Shamkhani-as-new-supreme-securit=-council-chief.html>, a hardened member of the Revolutionary Guards and fo=mer minister of defense who has played a critical role in all of Iran's =mportant national security decisions since the inception of the theocracy.=Shamkhani's deputy is a shadowy Revolutionary Guards officer, Ali Hussei=i-Tash, who for decades has been involved in Iran's nuclear deliberation=. This new cast of characters was critical of former president Mahmoud Ahmadi=ejad and his unwise provocations and rhetorical excess. They sense that as=lran increases its power, it behooves Tehran to present itself as a more r=asonable actor, imposing limits on expressions of its influence and accedi=g to certain global norms. For instance, Iran has condemned<http://www.was=ingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/irans-president-rouhani-responds-to-syria=weapons- deal/2013/09/16/55c63526-lecl-11e3-9ad0-96244100e647_story.html> t=e use of chemical weapons in Syria<http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nat=onal-security/nearly-1500-killed-in-syrian-chemical-weapons-attack- us-says=2013/08/30/b2864662-1196-11e3-85b6-d27422650f&story.html> and has declar=d its readiness to deal constructively with the nuclear issue. Despite their interest in diplomacy and embrace of more tempered language, =hamkhani and his advisers believe that Iran must claim its hegemonic role.=With the displacement of Iran's historical enemies in Afghanistan and Ir=q, and the unsteady political transitions in the Arab world, they sense th=t it is a propitious time for the Islamic Republic to claim the mantle of =egional leadership. Tehran has been offered a rare opportunity to emerge a= the predominant power of the Persian Gulf and a pivotal state in the Midd=e East. It is immaterial whether its assessment of regional trends is corr=ct, as such perceptions condition its approach to international politics. The newly empowered conservatives at the council's helm also believe that=lran needs a nuclear capability to enhance its influence. As Husseini-Tash=noted in 2006 during a rare public appearance, "The nuclear program is a= opportunity for us to make endeavors to acquire a strategic position and =onsolidate our national identity." But they also recognize the importanc= of offering confidence-building measures to an incredulous international =ommunity. All of this is not to 2 EFTA_R1_00057610 EFTA01756298 suggest that Iran is inclined to suspend i=s nuclear program or relinquish the critical components of such a program.=They are, however, more open to dialogue than the Ahmadinejad government w=s. Moreover, they stress that a reasonable Iran can assuage U.S. concerns =bout its nuclear development without having to abandon the program. Despite its softened rhetoric, the new Iranian regime can be expected to co=tinue asserting its nuclear "rights" and to press its advantages in a =ontested Middle East. The Islamic Republic plans to remain an important ba=ker of the Assad dynasty in Syria, a benefactor of Hezbollah and a support=r of Palestinian rejectionist groups. It will persist in its repressive ta=tics at home and continue to deny the people of Iran fundamental human rig=ts. This is a government that will seek to negotiate a settlement of the n=clear issue by testing the limits of the great powers' prohibitions. Washington need not accede to such Iranian conceptions. The United States a=d its allies are entering this week's negotiations in a strong position.=Iran's economy is withering<http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/irans- au=omakers-stalled-by-sanctions/2013/10/14/515725aa-3261-11e3-ad00-ec4c6b3lcb=d_story.html> under the combined pressures of sanctions and its own manage=ial incompetence. The Iranian populace remains disaffected as the bonds be=ween state and society have been largely severed since the Green Revolutio= of 2009. The European Union is still highly skeptical of Iran, a distrust=that Rouhani's charm offensive has mitigated but not eliminated. Allied =iplomats can use as leverage in the forthcoming negotiations the threat of=additional sanctions and Israeli military force. Given the stark realities, it is time for the great powers to have a maxima=ist approach to diplomacy with Iran. It is too late for more Iranian half-=teps and half-measures. Tehran must account for all its illicit nuclear ac=ivities and be compelled to make irreversible concessions that permanently=degrade its ability to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program at a more =onvenient time. Anything less would be a lost opportunity. Ray Takeyh is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Article 2. Foreign Policy Six reasons why the United States can't force Iran's nuclear hand Colin H. Kahl, Alireza Nader October 14, 2013 -- Iranian president Hasan Rouhani's recent charm offensiv= has raised expectations for a diplomatic breakthrough heading into this w=ek's nuclear negotiations between Iran and the United States, Britain, Chi=a, France, Germany, and Russia (the so-called P5+1) in Geneva. Sanctions h=ve taken a heavy toll on the Iranian economy, and the Islamic Republic may=finally be motivated to take steps to rein in its nuclear program, includi=g accepting limits on uranium enrichment, in exchange for lessening the pr=ssure. Hawks in Israel and Washington, however, have been quick to describe Rouhan= as a "wolf in sheep's clothing<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013=10/04/bibi_netanyahu_missing_cartoon_posters_iran_nuclear_t hreat>," warnin= that the Iranian regime may agree to "cosmetic changes" to its nuclear pr=gram in exchange for sanctions relief, but ultimately will do little to co=strain its quest for the bomb. In particular, they have cautioned the Obam= administration against acquiescing to an agreement that allows Iran to co=tinue any domestic uranium enrichment, even at low levels suitable only fo= civilian nuclear power and under stringent international supervision. In =is Oct. 1 speech to the U.N. General Assembly, for example, Israeli Prime =inister Benjamin Netanyahu insisted that only a complete dismantling of Ir=n's enrichment program could prevent Tehran from developing nuclear weapon=. This position has been echoed by conservative think tanks in Washington =nd by numerous voices on Capitol Hill. Their collective mantra: "a bad dea= is worse than no deal." Attempting to keep Iran as far away from nuclear weapons as possible by ins=sting on "zero enrichment" seems sensible. But in reality, the quest for t=e optimal deal would doom diplomacy with Iran, making the far worse outcom=s of unconstrained Iranian nuclearization or a military showdown over Tehr=n's nuclear program much more likely. Uranium enrichment is one pathway to producing bomb-grade explosive materia= for nuclear weapons, and all else being equal, it is easier to verify the=total absence of such activities than different gradations of them. Of cou=se, it would clearly be preferable if Iran ended its uranium enrichment ac=ivities altogether. Moreover, most countries with civilian nuclear power p=ants forgo domestic enrichment, so it seems reasonable to demand the same =f Tehran. 3 EFTA_R1_00057611 EFTA01756299 (Although it is also the case that Argentina, Brazil, Germany, .1-pan, and the Netherlands have domestic enrichment capabilities while remai=ing compliant with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.) But while a permanent end to Iranian enrichment would be ideal, it is also =ighly unrealistic. The Iranian regime has invested enormous amounts of pol=tical capital and billions of dollars over decades to master the knowledge=and centrifuge technology associated with uranium enrichment -- and nothin= will put that genie back in the bottle. Indeed, one is hard pressed to fi=d a single bona fide Iran expert on the planet that believes Tehran would =ccept a diplomatic deal with the P5+1 that zeroed out enrichment for all t=me. And here's six reasons why: 1. Backing an end to enrichment would be political suicide for Rouhani. Iran's new president simply can't agree to permanently end enrichment. In 2=03, during his previous role as Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, he convin=ed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to accept a temporary suspension =f enrichment. But further talks with the international community stalled i= early 2005 over a failure to agree on Iran's right to enrichment, and Teh=an ended its suspension shortly thereafter. Rouhani believes -- as do his =ritics in the Revolutionary Guard and the supreme leader -- that the West =ocketed Iranian concessions and Tehran got nothing in return. The failure =f Iran's earlier approach under Rouhani facilitated the rise of Mahmoud Ah=adinejad and his hardline policies, including the development of a much mo=e robust uranium enrichment capability. Rouhani is unlikely to make that m=stake again. And even if Rouhani were somehow convinced to do so, he would=be savaged by his right flank, significantly undercutting his presidency. 2. It's a matter of pride and principle for the regime. The regime has invested far too much of its domestic legitimacy in defendin= Iran's "rights" (defined as domestic enrichment) to completely capitulate=now, regardless of the pressure. The nuclear program and "resistance to ar=ogant powers" are firmly imbedded in the Islamic Republic's ideological ra=son d'etre. Khamenei, the ultimate decider on the nuclear file, and the Re=olutionary Guards will not give up on the program altogether, for it could=be a viewed by their supporters and opponents alike as a total defeat. However, Khamenei may accept a deal that constrains Iran's nuclear program =ut still allows limited enrichment. Under such an agreement, he could tell=the Iranian people: "I said we never wanted nuclear weapons and I have iss=ed a fatwa (religious ruling] against them. I insisted that our rights be =espected, and now they are." But if Khamenei cries uncle and dismantles th= entire program, how will he explain the billions invested and justify the=years of sanctions and isolation to his people? What would it all have bee= for? Khamenei likely fears such a humiliation more than he fears economic=collapse or targeted military strikes against his nuclear facilities. 3. If Iran does want to go nuclear, sanctions aren't going to stop it in ti=e. Although hawks believe Tehran is on the ropes and that additional sanctions=can force Iran to completely dismantle its nuclear program, economic and n=clear timelines don't align. To be sure, Iran's economy is in dire straits= and a desire to alleviate the pressure is driving the regime's apparent w=llingness to negotiate more seriously. But despite the current pain, Iran =s not facing imminent economic collapse. This may be a dark period in Tehr=n, but Khamenei likely believes that Iran weathered worse times during the=Iran-Iraq war. Some analysts have warned that Iran could achieve a critica= "breakout capability" -- the ability to produce fissile material for nucl=ar weapons so fast that it could not be detected or stopped -- sometime in=mid-2014. Yet, even if the U.S. Congress goes forward with additional hars= sanctions, the regime is not likely to implode before it reaches this tec=nical threshold and, if it did, it might make little difference. Even the =mprisoned leadership of the Green Movement and Iranian secularists opposed=to the Islamic Republic support domestic uranium enrichment. The only way =o stop a breakout capability is to get a deal, fast -- and that means acce=ting some limited enrichment under strict safeguards. 4. Washington is still an effective bogeyman. Khamenei likely believes that Rouhani's election and the Iranian president'= new moderate tone provide sufficient domestic and international credibili=y to mitigate the downside risks of failed diplomacy. Congress could attem=t to force Tehran to accept maximalist demands by increasing sanctions, bu= the supposed mechanism for pressure affecting Iranian calculations is the=regime's fear of popular unrest. Yet, if P5+1 negotiations are seen to fai= because of Washington's insistence on zero enrichment, the Iranian public=is likely to blame the United Sates not the regime for the failure. Econom=c pressure on the regime may increase as a result, but popular pressure to=change course may not. 5. Pressure will become less effective if the United States comes off as th= intransigent party. If talks collapse because of Washington's unwillingness to make a deal on e=richment -- a deal Russia and China and numerous other European and Asian =ations support -- it will also become harder to enforce sanctions. Whether=or not 4 EFTA_R1_00057612 EFTA01756300 Rouhani's diplomatic overtures are genuine, he has already succeede= in shifting international perceptions of Iran. If the United States, rath=r than Iran, comes across as the unreasonable party, it will become much m=re difficult to maintain the international coalition currently isolating t=e government in Tehran. Some fence sitters in Europe and Asia will start t= flirt with Iran again, leaving the United States in the untenable positio= of choosing between imposing sanctions on banks and companies in China, E=rope, India, Japan, or South Korea, or acquiescing to the erosion of the c=mprehensive sanctions regime. 6. An uncompromising stance could drive Iran toward the bomb. Finally, if talks fail because the United States insists on a maximalist po=ition, Khamenei and other Iranian hardliners will likely interpret it as d=finitive proof that Washington's real goal is regime change rather than a =uclear accord. Solidifying this perception would likely enhance, rather th=n lessen, Tehran's motivation to seek a nuclear deterrent as the only mean= of ensuring regime survival. A permanent end to Iranian enrichment is not in the cards. Instead of pushi=g for an impossible goal, the United States and other world powers should =ush for a possible one<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/07/10/ge=ting_to_yes_with_iran>: an agreement that caps Iranian enrichment at the 5=percent level (sufficient for civilian power plants but far away from bomb=grade) under stringent conditions designed to preclude Tehran's ability to=rapidly produce nuclear weapons, including restrictions on Iran's stockpil= of low enriched uranium, limitations on centrifuges, intrusive inspection=, and halting the construction of a plutonium reactor that could open an a=ternative pathway to nuclear weapons. Such an accord would allow Khamenei =nd Rouhani to claim Iran's "rights" had been respected, giving them a face=saving way out of the current nuclear crisis. Even this might be difficult=for the Iranian regime to stomach. But if paired with meaningful sanctions=relief, it has a much better chance of success than insisting on the compl=te dismantling of Iran's program. Washington should not accept a bad deal. But if we are to avoid the worst p=ssible outcomes -- unconstrained enrichment leading to an eventual Iranian=bomb or another major war in the Middle East -- then a good-if-imperfect d=al is preferable to no deal at all. Colin H. Kahl is an associate professor in Georgetown University's Edmund A= Walsh School of Foreign Service and a senior fellow and director of the M=ddle East Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. In 2=09-2011, he was the deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle E=st. Alireza Nader is a senior international policy analyst at the nonprofi=, nonpartisan RAND Corporation. Article 3. Bloomberg The Rise and Fall of Israel's Settlement Movement Jeffrey Goldberg Oct 14, 2013 -- Moments after Hanan Porat and his fellow Israeli paratroope=s had crossed the Suez Canal as spearheads of a furious Israeli counteratt=ck in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, he was severely wounded in an Egyptian mort=r bombardment. The Egyptians and Syrians had surprised Israel on Yom Kippu=, with an atrocious loss of life, and crushed the country's post-Six Day=War belief in its own invincibility. As Porat lay recovering in his hospi=al bed, his chest ravaged by shrapnel wounds, he thanked God that he wasn=92t in the burn unit. And then, as Yossi Klein Halevi<http://www.harpercol=ins.com/authors/19429/Yossi_Klein_Halevi/index.aspx> writes in his new boo=, "Like Dreamers<http://www.harpercollins.com/books/Like-Dreamers-Yossi-=lein-Halevi/?isbn=9780060545765>," the next phase of Porat's life mi=sion was revealed. He read, in his hospital bed, an article in a kibbutz newspaper by a writer=named Arnon Lapid, titled, "An Invitation to Weeping." Porat wasn't a =ember of the secular kibbutz elite; he was a member of a more marginalized=group of religious Zionists, who envied the kibbutznikim, and respected th=m as well. He was stunned by what Lapid wrote: "I want to send you all =n invitation to weeping ... I will weep over my dead, you will weep over y=urs ... we'll weep ... for the illusions that were shattered, for the as=umptions that were proven to be baseless, the truths that were exposed as =ies ... And we will pity ourselves, for we are worthy of pity." Halevi =rites that when Porat read this lament he "felt as if his wounds were be=ng torn open. He would have shouted if he had the voice. Pity the generati=n privileged to restore 5 EFTA_R1_00057613 EFTA01756301 Jewish sovereignty to the land of Israel? What sma=l-mindedness, what weakness of character! Where would the Jews be now if, =n 1945, they had thought like this Arnon Lapid? Israelis would do now what=Jews always did: Grieve for their dead and go on, with faith and hope." =Porat would soon help usher into existence a new movement, a settlement en=erprise that would be self-consciously modeled on Israel's original sett=er movement, the socialist, Zionist and fiercely anti-religious pioneering=formations that built the original kibbutzim. The early kibbutznikim were =he men and women who laid the foundations for the reborn Jewish state and =ed that state through the first decades of its existence, but by 1973 they=appeared to be a spent force, exhausted spiritually, morally and political=y. Porat's movement, which would cover the biblical heartland of the Je=ish people with settlements -- a heartland the secular world referred to a= the West Bank, but which Jews knew by the ancient names of Judea and Sama=ia -- would be driven by devotion to God and his demands, not by a secular=vision of Jews liberated from the ghettoes and freed from the fetters of c=pitalism. This movement, which coalesced around Porat's Gush Emunim -- the "Bloc =f the Faithful" -- has defined Israel's political agenda for the past =0 years, just as the kibbutz movement and its leaders shaped Israel and it= priorities through the early period of its existence. What is so fascinat=ng about these two movements is that, for all their transformative success= they have both failed to complete their missions. The kibbutzim didn't =urn Israel into a socialist paradise, and the hubris and shortsightedness =f the Labor elite, which sprung from the kibbutz movement, brought Israel =ow in October 1973. And the religious-nationalist settlement movement has succeeded in moving h=ndreds of thousands of Israelis into the biblical heartland, but it has ne=er been able to convince the majority of Israelis that the absorption of t=e West Bank into a "Greater Israel" represents their country's salva=ion, rather than a threat to its existence. The thwarted utopianism of the=e two movements is the subject of "Like Dreamers," which is a magnific=nt book, one of the two or three finest books about Israel I have ever rea=. Halevi tells the story of seven men -- paratroopers who participated in =he liberation of Jerusalem in 1967 -- who became leaders and archetypes of=Israeli's competing utopian movements. When I met Halevi in New York recently, I was filled with questions about w=at this history augured for Israel's future. The first one to cross my min=: How did the Orthodox settlers so easily supplant the leftist kibbutz eli=e as the nation's pioneering vanguard? "The left lost its vigor at precisely the moment that religious Zionism d=scovered its own vigor," Halevi told me. "The key here is 1973. After =967, not much happened. There were a couple of settlements, but the Labor =overnment kept everyone on a tight leash, and the religious Zionists were =ntensely frustrated. The empowering moment for religious Zionists was due =o Labor's failures in the Yom Kippur War. A generation of young kibbutzn=kim came out of 1973 deeply demoralized. People like Porat realized that t=e left had lost the plot." Halevi went on, "In Israel, you never naturally evolve from one state of =hinking to another. We careen. So we careened toward religious Zionism and-the settlement movement." But in your book, I said, you suggest that the settlers have failed to gain=legitimacy for their movement among the mass of Israelis. How did they fai=? 'The settlement movement failed during the first Palestinian uprising.=Israelis realized then the price of the occupation, that there was no such=thing, as settler leaders promised, as a benign occupation. That kind of i=lusion went in the late 1980s." Halevi noted one small irony here: If the first Palestinian uprising dispel=ed the idea that Israel could occupy the Palestinians cost-free and in per=etuity, the second Palestinian uprising -- which began after the peace pro=ess failed in 2000, dispelled the left-wing argument that territorial comp=omise with the Palestinians would be easily achieved once Israel opened it=elf to the possibility of peace. "The second uprising was the end of the dream of the Peace Now movement, =ecause the worst terrorism in Israel's history happened after we made th= offer for real territorial compromise at Camp David, and after the Clinto= proposals, and after we offered to redivide Jerusalem, becoming the first=country in history to voluntarily offer shared sovereignty in its capital =ity." So, reality has discredited both the right and left. What comes next? The n=xt great ideological movement in Israeli history is centrism, Halevi said.="The Israeli centrist believes two things: A. the Arab world refuses to =ecognize our legitimacy and our existence; and B. we can't continue occu=ying them. I believe passionately that the left is correct about the occup=tion, and I believe the right is correct in its understanding of the inten=ions of the Middle East toward the Jewish state." I argued that "centrism" possesses neither the magnetic power of social=st transformation nor the messianic qualities implicit in the settlement e=terprise. Halevi disagreed. "Centrism is taking a people that hasn't f=nctioned as a people, 6 EFTA_R1_00057614 EFTA01756302 hasn't functioned as a nation, for 2,000 years -- =hat is in some ways an anti-people, who have so many different ideologies =nd ways of being -- and learning how to function as a working nation. That=92s a large cause." Will centrist Israel overcome the power of the right? And what is its progr=m? In a coming post, I'll look at the ideological and practical challeng=s to the solutions centrism puts forward to the Israeli-Arab crisis. In th= meantime, go out and read Halevi's book; nothing explains more eloquent=y why Israel, more than most any other country, lives or dies based on the=power and justice of its animating ideas. Article 4. The Guardian<http://www.guardian.co.uk/theguardian> As the Middle East's power blocs fracture, so do hopes of stability Wadah Khanfar<http://www.theguardian.com/profile/wadah-khanfar> 14 October 2013 -- In the Middle East, long-established alliances are shift=ng dramatically. As one political leader in the region said to me recently= "The ground is shaking under our feet and we must keep all our options op=n." Three major events over the past three months have destabilised the ol= order: a military coup against Mohamed Morsi's government<http://www.theg=ardian.com/world/2013/jul/03/mohamed-morsi-egypt-second-revolution> in Egy=t; the Russian-American agreement to destroy Syria's chemical weapons<http=//www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/27/syria-deadline-destroy-chemical-we=pons-november>; and a phone call between Obama and the new Iranian preside=t Hassan Rouhani<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/27/obama-phone-=all-iranian-president-rouhani>. But first: what did the old order look like? Before Hosni Mubarak's regime =as overthrown in Egypt, the Middle East was split into two main axes. The =o-called axis of moderation — Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, UAE and Kuwai= — was aligned with the west, supported the Palestinian National Authori=y and encouraged a political settlement with Israel. The axis of resistance — Iran, Syria and the political movements of Hamas=and Hezbollah — had a strained relationship with the west and considered=a political settlement with Israel as a surrender. Qatar and Turkey stood =lose to this axis, maintaining good relations with the axis of moderation. The fall of Mubarak's regime in January 2011 removed Egypt from the axis of=moderation and triggered the current regional turmoil. The Syrian uprising=against the Bashar al-Assad regime drove the Hamas leadership out of Syria=http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17192278>, and out of the axis=of resistance. Turkey and Qatar also moved further away after both express=ng public support for the Syrian rebels. In this way, the axis of resistance was transformed into an axis of Iranian=Shia power, extending from Tehran to Nouri al-Maliki's government in Iraq =nd Hezbollah in Lebanon — a resilient axis united by support for the Ass=d regime. After Morsi's election, Turkey and Qatar lent Egypt financial and political=support, forming a new strategic alliance. Thus the coup that overthrew Mo=si in July was a strategic earthquake. But it was welcomed by what was lef= of the axis of moderation: Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, and Jordan. The Sau=i king congratulated the interim president of Egypt and, with Kuwait and t=e UAE, offered him a package of aid exceeding $12bn, and King Abdullah II =f Jordan was the first Arab leader to visit Cairo after the coup. However,=Qatar and Turkey condemned the coup. Iran, though not sorry to see Morsi g= given his support for the Syrian revolution, was concerned to see Egypt s=rongly aligned once more with Iran's enemies. The aftershocks of the coup continue to affect the region. The countries su=porting it had hoped the military would enforce its rule in a matter of we=ks, but they miscalculated: three months on the Egyptian scene hasn't sett=ed down. There are still constant marches and protests, as well as an impo=ed evening curfew. Military and security measures have been taken against =he Sinai and several cities and villages opposing the coup, and are drivin= the country into a state of economic paralysis. On a regional level, there were other miscalculations, too. The new axis of=moderation tried to topple the Islamist movements in Tunisia and Libya, wh=le the Egyptian army began destroying the tunnels linking Gaza and Sinai a= well as launching an extensive campaign against Hamas with the hope of en=ing its control of the Gaza Strip. At the same time, the new axis of moder=tion also strained its relationship with Turkey, one of the most strategic=lly important countries in the region. However, the greatest miscalculation the new axis made was its evaluation o= the Russian and American position on Syria. This axis hoped Basher al-Ass=d's regime would be quickly eliminated and replaced with a regime aligned =ith the 7 EFTA_R1_00057615 EFTA01756303 axis of moderation, while also excluding jihadists from the scene.=Saudi and UAE diplomacy supported an American military strike against Assa=. They communicated with Russia to give assurances and incentives to ensur= that the Russians would refrain from effective rejection of any strikes. =owever, the Russian-American deal to disarm Syria's chemical weapons was a=surprise. This was then followed by the developing closeness between Iran =nd both the US and Britain<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/02/ob=ma-rouhani-phone-call-us-iran>, which further complicated the situation an= derailed the aims of the axis of moderation. The restructuring of regional alliances is still ongoing. The two countries=that would benefit most from being politically close would be Turkey and l=an. Iran, burdened by an economic blockade and on the verge of talks with =he west<http://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-iran-nuclear-talks-=0131014,0,2879074.story>, has an interest in the Iraqi and Syrian crises b=ing resolved in a manner that would guarantee the preservation of its powe= while bringing stability to the region. Meanwhile, Turkey also has an interest in putting an end to the bloodshed i= Syria and Iraq because of the detrimental impact the conflicts are having=on Turkey's own stability and economic development. In addition, Turkey's =elationship with the axis of moderation has deteriorated since the coup in=Egypt, and it needs to make diplomatic moves to revive its regional influe=ce. However, the transformations in the region are expected not only to affect =he position of countries, but that of the Islamist movements as well. In p=rticular it will be interesting to see how Hamas re-evaluates its regional=relations and whether the targeting of the movement in Gaza will drive it =o restore close relations with Iran. The region as a whole has suffered from conflict between the two axes for y=ars, and this has led to civil wars and sectarian conflict. It is now clea= that the struggle in Syria has reached a critical point for both sides, a=d there will be no solution unless Iranians, Turks and Arabs can work toge=her. As for Iraq, its legislative elections will be held in a few months. =ectarian polarisation in the country is claiming hundreds of lives on a mo=thly basis. Without reconciling Sunnis, Shias and Kurds, Iraq too is headi=g for more violence. Conflicting axes cannot achieve stability in the region; only co-operative =lions of all the parties and countries involved can hope to do that. Toda= this all seems a distant hope, and the region may have to experience more=turmoil and chaos before this fact is accepted. Wadah Khanfar is a former director general of the al-Jazeera television net=ork. Article 5. NYT The Middle East Pendulum Roger Cohen<http://topics.nytimes.com/topinews/international/columns/rogerc=henk October 14, 2013 -- The Middle Eastern strongmen are back. The counterrevol=tion is in full swing. Islamists and secular liberals do battle. The Shiit= and Sunni worlds confront each other. A two•state Israeli-Palestinian pea=e looks impossible. Freedom is equated with chaos. For this region there i= no future, only endless rehearsals of the past. Poisoned by colonialism, stymied by Islam's battle with modernity, inebri=ted by oil, blocked by the absence of institutions that can mediate the fu=y of tribe and ethnicity, Middle Eastern states turn in circles. Syria is =ow the regional emblem, a vacuum in which only the violent nihilism of the=jihadi thrives. Just two and a half years after the Arab Spring, talk of the future — any=future — seems preposterous. Countries build futures on the basis of thi=gs that do not exist here: consensus as to the nature of the state, the ru=e of law, a concept of citizenship that overrides sectarian allegiance, an= the ability to place the next generation's prosperity above the settlin= of past scores. Syria's Bashar al-Assad has gassed his own people. Iraq is again engulfed=in Sunni-Shiite violence. The U.S.-trained Egyptian Army has slaughtered m=mbers of the Muslim Brotherhood. It is hard to recall the heady season of =011 when despots fell and Arabs spoke with passion of freedom and personal=empowerment. The Arab security state has shown its resilience; it breeds e=tremism. As the political theorist Benjamin Barber has noted, "Fundament=lism is religion under siege." A scenario of endless conflict is plausible. Yet there are glimmerings. Rep=essive systems have survived but mind-sets have changed. The young people =f the region (the median age in Egypt, where nearly one quarter of all Ara=s live, is 25) 8 EFTA_R1_00057616 EFTA01756304 will not return to a state of submission. They have tasted =hat it is to bring change through protest. As in Iran, where the deep refo=mist current was crushed in 2009 only to resurface in 2013, these currents=run deep and will reemerge. Here in Turkey, the closest approximation to a liberal order in a Middle Ea=tern Muslim state exists. That is the region's core challenge: finding a=model that reconciles Islam and modernity, religion with nonsectarian stat=hood. So it is worth recalling that Turkey's democracy is the fruit of 9= years of violent back-and-forth since Mustafa Kemal Ataturk founded the R=public in 1923, and imposed a Western culture. Only over the past decade, with the arrival in power of Recep Tayyip Erdoga=, has the idea taken hold that Islam is compatible with a liberal order. F=r many secular Turks the swing of the pendulum has been excessive. The pro=ests at Gezi Park this summer were about Erdogan's invasion in the name =f Islam of Turks' personal lives. This was democratic pushback from Turk=y's secular coast against the conservative Anatolian heartland. If in Turkey it has taken 90 years for a democracy to evolve that is not an=i-Islamic, then the 30 months since the Arab Spring are a mere speck in ti=e. Moreover, as Mustafa Akyol points out in his book "Islam Without Extr=mes," Turkey, unlike most other Muslim countries, was never colonized, w=th the result that political Islam did not take on a virulent anti-Western=character. It was not a violent reaction against being the West's lackey= as in Iran. Now Iran, under its new president, Hassan Rouhani, is trying again to build=moderation into its theocracy and repair relations with the West. Such att=mpts have failed in the past. But the Middle Eastern future will look very=different if the U.S. Embassy in Tehran — symbol of the violent entry in=o the American consciousness of the Islamic radical — reopens and the Is=amic Republic becomes a freer polity. Nothing inherent to Islam makes it anti-Western. History has. The Islamic r=volution was an assertion of ideological independence from the West. As po=er in the world shifts away from the West, this idea has run its course. I=anians are drawn to America. The United States can have cordial relations with Iran just as it does with=China, while disagreeing with it on most things. A breakthrough would demo=strate that the vicious circles of the Middle East can be broken. I believe the U.S. Embassy in Tehran will reopen within five years because =he current impasse has become senseless. With Iran inside the tent rather =han outside, anything would be possible, even an Israeli-Palestinian peace= If Arabs could see in Israel not a Zionist oppressor but the region's mos= successful economy, a modern state built in 65 years, they would pose the=selves the right questions about openness, innovation and progress. Israel= in turn, by getting out of the business of occupation and oppression, cou=d ensure its future as a Jewish and democratic state. There is another future for the Middle East, one glimpsed during the Arab S=ring, but first it must be dragged from the insistent clutches of the past= Article 6. Foreign Affairs The Arab Sunset: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies Christopher Davidson October 10, 2013 -- Since their modern formation in the mid-twentieth centu=y, Saudi Arabia and the five smaller Gulf monarchies -- Bahrain, Kuwait, O=an, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) -- have been governed by hig=ly autocratic and seemingly anachronistic regimes. Nevertheless, their rul=rs have demonstrated remarkable resilience in the face of bloody conflicts=on their doorsteps, fast-growing populations at home, and modernizing forc=s from abroad. One of the monarchies' most visible survival strategies has been to stren=then security ties with Western powers, in part by allowing the United Sta=es, France, and Britain to build massive bases on their soil and by spendi=g lavishly on Western arms. In turn, this expensive militarization has aid=d a new generation of rulers that appears more prone than ever to antagoni=ing Iran and even other Gulf states. In some cases, grievances among them =ave grown strong enough to cause diplomatic crises, incite violence, or pr=mpt one monarchy to interfere in the domestic politics of another. It would thus be a mistake to think that the Gulf monarchies are somehow in=incible. Notwithstanding existing internal threats, these regimes are also=facing mounting external ones -- from Western governments, from Iran, and =ach other. And these are only exacerbating their longstanding conflicts an= inherent contradictions. HOME BASES 9 EFTA_R1_00057617 EFTA01756305 The existence of substantial Western military bases on the Arabian Peninsul= has always been problematic for the Gulf monarchies. To their critics, th= hosting of non-Arab, non-Muslim armies is an affront to Islam and to nati=nal sovereignty. Their proliferation will likely draw further criticism, a=d perhaps serve as yet another flashpoint for the region's opposition mo=ements. Among the largest Western installations in the Gulf is al-Udeid Air Base in=Qatar, which owes its existence to the country's former ruler, Sheikh Ha=ad bin Khalifa al-Thani. In 1999, al-Thani told the United States that he =ould like to see 10,000 American servicemen permanently based in the emira=e, and over the next few years, the United States duly began shifting pers=nnel there from Saudi Arabia. Today, al-Udeid houses several thousand U.S.=servicemen at a time and has also served as a forward headquarters of U.S.=Central Command (CENTCOM), a U.S. Air Force expeditionary air wing, a CIA =ase, and an array of U.S. Special Forces teams. Nearby Bahrain hosts<http:=/www.nytimes.com/2011/02/18/world/middleeast/18fleet.html?_r=0> [2] the =.S. Naval Forces Central Command and the entire U.S. Fifth Fleet, which in=ludes some 6,000 U.S. personnel. The United States recently downsized its =orce in Kuwait, but four U.S. infantry bases remain, including Camp Patrio=, which is believed to house about 3,000 U.S. soldiers and two air bases. The United States plans to further expand its regional military presence in=the near future. As CENTCOM recently announced, the country will be sendin= the latest U.S. antimissile systems to at least four Gulf states. These a=e new versions of the Patriot anti-missile batteries that the United State= already sent to the region and are meant to assuage the Gulf rulers' fe=rs of Iranian missile attacks. Tellingly, the announcement did not reveal =xactly which states had agreed to take the U.S. weapons. Yet analysts wide=y assume that the unnamed states are Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE. Equally, if not more, problematic than hosting so many foreign military bas=s has been the Gulf monarchies' ever-rising spending on Western arms. Al=hough much of the equipment is inappropriate for bolstering defensive capa=ilities or is superfluous to peacekeeping operations -- the kinds of missi=ns Gulf soldiers are likely to find themselves undertaking -- Gulf leaders=regarded the trade as necessary for their protection. By most measures, such spending has gotten out of hand. As a proportion of =DP, the Gulf monarchies' purchases make them the biggest arms buyers in =he world. Even the poorer Gulf states, which are grappling with declining =esources and serious socioeconomic pressures, spend far beyond their means= Of all of the monarchies' purchases, Saudi and UAE procurements have attr=cted the most attention. In 2009 alone, the UAE purchased nearly $8 billio= in U.S. military equipment, making it the United States' biggest arms c=stomer that year. Saudi Arabia, for its part, purchased about $3.3 billion=in hardware. In December 2011, the United States announced that it had fin=lized a $30 billion sale of Boeing-manufactured F-15 fighter jets to the S=udi Royal Air Force. And a UAE firm has reportedly partnered with a U.S. c=mpany, General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, to bring predator drones to t=e UAE. This venture makes the UAE the first foreign buyer to acquire U.S. =rone technology. In the West, the sales have not been without criticism. The pro-Israel lobb=, for example, has repeatedly argued that the sale of such high-grade equi=ment to the Gulf monarchies will erode Israel's "qualitative edge" i= the region. The programs will also prove troublesome inside the Arab king=oms, as the region's ruling families will find it increasingly difficult=to justify such massive transactions to their beleaguered national populat=ons. Given existing regional tensions, they are likely to continue increas=ng spending anyway -- be it on tanks, warplanes, or naval vessels. COMMON CAUSE The monarchies are also under pressure to deal with Iran, and some of them =ee posturing against Tehran as a convenient mechanism for containing domes=ic opposition, distracting from growing socio-economic pressures, and mani=ulating sectarian tensions. Since the beginning of the Arab Spring, the Gu=f monarchs have gone to great lengths to highlight Shia membership in oppo=ition movements, a tactic that has allowed them to delegitimize critics --=falsely -- as Iranian agents. Thus far, the strategy has enjoyed some limited success; members of the Gul='s Sunni populations have been quick to accuse Shia activists of being tra=tors. Many Western authorities continue to lend support to the monarchies =n the grounds that the alternative would be Iran-style theocratic, revolut=onary, and anti-Western governments. Still, the risks of such rabid anti-Iran sentiments are serious and possibl= existential. By acting on such attitudes, Gulf monarchs have undermined t=eir longstanding position as neutral peace brokers and distributors of reg=onal development aid, and made themselves into legitimate targets in any c=nflict in the Persian Gulf. It is unlikely that the fathers of today's G=lf rulers would have allowed that to happen, no matter how deeply they dis=rusted their neighbor across the Gulf. This previous generation sidelined =ost confrontations with Iran -- including even the 1971 seizure of 10 EFTA_R1_00057618 EFTA01756306 three U=E islands by the Shah -- in recognition of shared economic interests and t=e substantial Iranian expatriate populations that reside in many of the mo=archies. All that is now ancient history in states like Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and t=e UAE. Saudi officials have taken a particularly aggressive stance. Accord=ng to a leaked U.S. diplomatic cable from 2008, the Saudi king has "repe=tedly exhorted the United States to cut off the head of the snake" -- Ir=n's nuclear weapons program. Another cable from the same year quoted a v=teran Saudi minister for foreign affairs suggesting a U.S. or NATO offensi=e in southern Lebanon to end Iran- backed Hezbollah's grip on power there= And a former Saudi intelligence chief has said publicly that Saudi Arabia=should "consider acquiring nuclear weapons to counter Iran." In early 2011, Bahrain's rulers took full advantage of anti-Iranian senti=ents to act against domestic opponents, announcing that they would deport =11 Shia residents who had "links to Hezbollah and Iran's Revolutionary=Guard." In practice, that meant expelling hundreds of Bahrain's Lebanese=residents, suspending all flights between the capital Manama and Beirut, a=d warning Bahraini nationals not to travel to Lebanon due to "threats an= interference by terrorists." Abu Dhabi's attitude toward Iran originally appeared to have been more he=itant, perhaps because of its previous ruler's more moderate policies. A=cording to a 2006 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi, the UAE govern=ent told U.S. officials that "the threat from al-Qaeda would be minor co=pared to if Iran had nukes...but that it was reluctant to take any action =hat might provoke its neighbor."