EFTA01759876.pdf

From: Office of Teqe Rod-Larsen Sent: Monday, August 26, 2013 4:46 PM Subject: August 26 update 26 August, 2013 Article 1. The Daily Beast Obama's New Syria Options Leslie H. Gelb<http://www.thedailybeast.com/contributors/leslie-h-gelb.html= Article 2. The Wall Street Journal Syria's Gas Attack on Civilization Andrew Roberts Article 3. The Washington Post Syria will require more than cruise missiles Eliot A. Cohen Article 4. The Wall Street Journal The Failed Grand Strategy in the Middle East Walter Russell Mead Article 5. NYT Adrift on the Nile Bill Keller<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/referencenimestopics/people/k/bi=l_keller/index.html> Article 6. The National Interest Arab Spring or Islamic Spring? Ross Harrisonchttp://nationalinterest.org/profile/ross-harrison> Article 7. The New York Times Reading Tweets from Iran Editorial EFTA_R1_00063893 EFTA01759876 Article 1. The Daily Beast Obama's New Syria Options Leslie H. Gelb<http://www.thedailybeast.com/contributors/leslie-h-gelb.html= Aug 25, 2013-- After the most recent use of chemical weapons in Syria<http:=/www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/08/21/new-chemical-weapons-attack-cou=d-kill-obama-s-syria- strategy.html>, President Obama is sheltering his nex= moves even from his closest advisers as the whole Obama administration in=hes painfully toward what they all see as the moment of truth in Syria. Once again, he could walk away from the use of force because that option ha= little backing either in his administration or among Americans generally.=But after an endless run of inter-agency meetings at the White House, the =ense is that he is nearing three conclusions: first, the Syrian government=has put his credibility on the line irrevocably and inescapably; second, h= now must take direct military action to punish the government of Presiden= Bashar al-Assad, though not in a manner that commits him to further use a= force; and third, he needs to combine whatever force he uses now with dra=atic and diplomatic initiatives. Officials expect White House decisions to come quickly at this point. Most =fficials openly lament how they are being whipsawed between a general cons=nsus in the administration against employing U.S. military force backed by=huge opposition to doing so (60 percent) among polled Americans, and a gro=ing and potent consensus among foreign policy experts and politicians to g=ve Assad a hard punch. Most administration officials and most Americans just can't see any lasti=g benefits from any form of direct U.S. military involvement in Syria, and=they fear that initial actions would lead only to more and more force. On =he other hand, policy experts and politicians are arguing with increasing =igor that America's and Obama's credibility in the Middle East and in =he world are on the line, that he has drawn so many red lines<http://www.t=edailybeast.com/articles/2013/05/05/obama-s-syrian-red-line-could-return-u=-to-the-mistakes-of- iraq.html> against Assad's use of chemicals that nei=her he nor the U.S. can afford further thumb-sucking. This credibility arg=ment is deeply reinforced by a humanitarian one. The refugee<http://www.th=dailybeast.com/witw/articles/2013/08/23/syrian-refugee-crisis-reaches-one-=illion- children.html> and death tolls<http://www.thedailybeast.com/article=/2012/08/27/syrian-uprising-body-count-spikes- as-assad-forces-massacre-civ=lians.html> are already sky high and leaping daily and now require more th=n mere rhetoric and emergency aid. With these pressures and considerations in mind, here are the overlapping p=licy choices the Obama team has looked at over the last week: 1. Wait on the reports of U.N. inspectors, now apparently heading toward th= site where chemical weapons were, in all probability, fired off. The expe=tation is the inspectors will find that such weapons were, in fact, employ=d. Few expect the inspectors can come to a definitive conclusion on whethe= the government or the rebels fired them. But the presumption is bound to =e that the weapons belong to the government and that the government was re=ponsible. As quickly as possible, take the matter to the U.N. Security Cou=cil, but anticipate a Russian and Chinese veto of military action. Taking =hese steps is more or less a given for Obama to satisfy his impulses to bo= to international law. 2. Meantime, go to friendly Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia and the Gulf =mirates, plus key European allies such as Britain and France and see if th=y will join a military coalition as they did in Libyachttp://www.thedailyb=ast.com/newsweek/2011/04/03/nicolas-sarkozy-s-war-on-gaddafi-influenced- by=philosopher-bernard-henri-levy.html>. This wouldn't provide full interna=ional or legal cover, but it would help. U.S. officials don't expect muc= support from Arab states, but hope for some from Paris and London. All th=s is to ensure the U.S. doesn't have to act alone. 3. Provide more and better military arms to the rebels, and this time actua=ly expedite the equipment. Most administration officials still don't li=e this option. They remain unconvinced that they know enough about the reb=ls to make sure the aid doesn't fall into the wrong hands<http://www.the=ailybeast.com/articles/2013/06/15/will-arming- syrian-rebels-lead-to-disast=r.html>. 4. Attack Syrian government military targets with cruise missiles, drones o= with the foregoing plus piloted U.S. aircraft. The number of attacks woul= be limited. The U.S. military still doesn't care for this option any mo=e than it likes the idea of arming the rebels. They don't see its having=much effect on either Syrian capability or morale. They worry that it will=produce only demands for more bombing. 2 EFTA_R1_00063894 EFTA01759877 5. Go further than air attacks and establish no fly zones over parts of Syr=a. These zones would border Turkey and Jordan, and perhaps Iraq, with the =ntent of protecting refugees and hitting Syrian fighters when and where po=sible. Some Congressional hawks love this option, but in the view of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, it would be very difficult to establish and cond=ct. The logistical problems are enormous and at least Turkey and Jordan wo=Id have to participate, an unlikely prospect. 6. Try to use the horror and political pressures of 3 EFTA_R1_00063895 EFTA01759878