EFTA00874196.pdf

From: Office of Terje Rod-Larsen Subject: May 18 update Date: Mon, 20 May 2013 23:06:16 -4)000 18 May, 2013 Article 1. Al-Monitor Obama and Erdogan Edge Closer on Syria Kadri Gursel Article 2. Ahram The Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia Hicham Mourad Article 3. American Thinker Qatar, the New Player in the Middle East Michael Curtis Article 4. Al-Monitor Saudi-Qatar Honeymoon In Lebanon is Over Nasser Chararah Article 5. RAND How Would a Nuclear-Armed Tehran Behave? Alireza Nader Articles. Foreign Policy How America wll Fight the Next War Adm. Jonathan Greened, Gen. Mark Welsh Article 7. The Washington Post Book review: `Beyond War' by David Rohde Marc Lynch Ari,Lic I. Al-Monitor Obama and Erdogan Edge Closer On Syria Kadri Gursel May 17 -- Everybody knows the joint objective of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and US President Barack Obama is "Syria without EFTA00874196 Assad." Where they diverged was not the objective but on how to achieve that objective. Until their May 16 meeting at the White House, it was possible to speak plainly on how the two leaders differed on ways and means of reaching the goal of "Syria without Assad." In recent days, their different views appeared as contrasts. Their difference was distinct above all in what kind of a solution they supported in Syria. The uprising in Syria first turned to a civil war and could well be tending toward a regional conflict. But the Baathist regime was still standing, with no indication that it would be going away anytime soon. Ankara was nevertheless persisting on a military solution and continued to advocate creation of "secure zones" that could signify partial occupation of Syria. Washington, on the other hand, had never warmed to the idea of a military intervention, especially one that it would have to lead and had good reasons to avoid. The latest move was Washington's giving priority to a political/diplomatic solution anchored on a joint understanding reached between US Secretary of State John Kerry and his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, in their May 7 meeting in Moscow. In Washington's approach, assistance and support for the opposition was to facilitate such a solution. As a subtext, one has to look to Washington and Ankara's stances against the jihadists. Washington was concerned for the future of Syria and its own security from Ankara's opening of Turkish territory to jihadist elements led by the pro-al-Qaeda Jabhat al-Nusra, and was making this known to Ankara. The second main divergence was Ankara's insistence on Assad's departure as a precondition to initiating any diplomatic-political solution process. But Assad is not going anywhere. To insist on his exit as a precondition to a political solution was possibly impeding peace by ruling out an agreed solution that could end up with Assad eventually leaving the stage. That, of course, meant even more destruction and misery for Syria in the meantime. We know that the US, too, favors a transition government without Assad. But we don't think that the Obama administration was insisting on keeping Assad out of the negotiations aimed at establishing such a transition EFTA00874197 government. How the two parties would affect each other's stances was a matter of speculation before the White House meeting. Whose position was more realistic, more resilient and therefore more persuasive given the realities? Whose was obsolete and had lost its credibility? These questions have to be answered before evaluating the messages that could well show the way for the near future that both leaders gave in their Rose Garden news conference under drizzling rain on May 16. Everybody knows there is no good solution for Syria. The most appropriate approach would be to choose the least bad option, and end the bloodbath that is destroying that country and threatening the region with war. When that is the criterion, then it becomes impossible to find anything to defend in Turkey's policy. Erdogan went to Washington as a leader whose military-solution-without-Assad policy had failed. There is more. Erdogan sat down at Washington's negotiating table as a leader whose misguided Syria policy had endangered his country's security and stability and accumulated excessive negative energy along fragile sectarian fault lines. The bomb that went off on May 11 in Reyhanli town, Hatay province, where hundreds of thousands of Arab Alevis live, did not only kill more than 50 and wound 150. It also rattled Erdogan's position considerably. As such, Erdogan went to Washington as a weakened leader open to suggestions that it was time to change his Syrian policy. Now we can assess who said what at the Rose Garden and what they meant. Obama said, "Turkey is going to play an important role as we bring representatives of the regime and opposition together in the coming weeks." He went on: "We both agree that [Syrian President Bashar al-] Assad needs to go. He needs to transfer power to a transitional body. That is the only way that we're going to resolve this crisis. And we're going to keep working for a Syria that is free from Assad's tyranny; that is intact and inclusive of all ethnic and religious groups; and that's a source of stability, not extremism, because it's in the profound interest of all our nations, especially Turkey." In the questions and answers, Obama explained that "Geneva 2" did not mean reducing support to the opposition by saying: "There's no magic EFTA00874198 formula for dealing with an extraordinarily violent and difficult situation like Syria's. If there were, I think the prime minister and I already would have acted on it and it would already be finished. And instead, what we have to do is apply steady international pressure, strengthen the opposition. I do think that the prospect of talks in Geneva involving the Russians and representatives about a serious political transition that all the parties can buy into may yield results." These were the words that best explained Obama's position. Let's see what Prime Minister Erdogan said: "Syria was at the top of our agenda. And we have views that overlap, as the president has just said. But let me tell you that ending this bloody process in Syria and meeting the legitimate demands of the people by establishing a new government are two areas where we are in full agreement with the United States. To prevent Syria from becoming an area of operations for terror organizations is among our priorities." In the Q&A, Erdogan outright referred to the Geneva process. He said: "As I said before, our views do overlap, and with our discussions this evening, we will continue to explore what we can do together, what we can consider as parts of a road map looking at Geneva and beyond. Russia and China being part of this process is very important, and this is important in the context of the permanent members of the UN Security Council. Their participation in this process will certainly add greater impetus." It is possible to conclude from Erdogan's remarks that he is committed to the Geneva process. This also shows that the validity of Ankara's understanding of a military solution is no more. Political logic requires us to think that the Americans asked Ankara to persuade the opposition groups (that Ankara is close contact with) to engage in the Geneva process. Furthermore, we will have to accept that from now on any military assistance to the opposition will serve not as a military solution but to keep the pressure on the regime that has been lately gaining militarily in the field. It is interesting fthat Erdogan declares that he is "against terrorist organizations using Syria." Of course, what is important here is what Erdogan understands of "terror organizations." Until now, we have not heard him or his government say a word about considering Syria's al- Qaeda-linked Jabhat al-Nusra as a terror organization. He probably was EFTA00874199 referring to the PYD, the PKK's Syrian extension. If so, there is nothing interesting in what he says. But if he meant Jabhat al-Nusra, we will see. Another important development was his announcing for the first time that he will also be visiting the West Bank alongside Gaza in June. It was known that the Obama administration was not delighted with Erdogan visiting only Gaza. It is understood that Erdogan responded favorably to suggestions from the White House. The result is: The Ankara government that until yesterday was pursuing an extremist, illusionary and ideological Syria policy as of May 16 has come close to a moderate and rational mainstream policies. Kadri Gursel is a contributing writerfor Al-Monitor's Turkey Pulse and has written a column for the Turkish daily Milliyet since 2007. Hefocuses primarily on Turkish foreign policy, international affairs and Turkey's Kurdish question, as well as Turkey's evolving political Islam. Arncle Ahrarn The Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia Hicham Mourad 15 May 2013 -- Although the new Egyptian regime immediately displayed its willingness to continue the alliance forged between Cairo and Riyadh in the Mubarak era, Saudi leaders, despite the economic aid offered and the diplomatic formulas used, remain at least cautious vis-à-vis the new masters of Egypt. The Egyptian head of state reserved his first foreign visit for Saudi Arabia, in July. He used the occasion to emphasise that his country is not seeking to "export" its revolution beyond its borders. The message was twofold: Egypt will not attempt to encourage opposition in neighbouring countries to overthrow political regimes, or provide support for the installation of Islamist regimes, from the Muslim Brotherhood. These assurances were clearly not enough to allay the concerns of the Saudi royal family, however, about the intentions of the Brotherhood, nor on the political situation in Egypt. EFTA00874200 The position of Riyadh was somewhat surprising, given the support offered by the ruling Al-Saud family to the Muslim Brotherhood, and Arab Islamist movements in general, since the time of former President Gamal Abdel Nasser in the 1950s and 60s, where Nasser tried through an active foreign policy to export socialism and Arab nationalism — hostile to the West — to the Arab world. The assistance of Saudi Arabia to the Brotherhood took various forms, including political asylum granted to members of the Muslim Brotherhood from Egypt and other nationalities, such as Syrians and Jordanians, as well as funding the creation of Islamic charities in which the Muslim Brotherhood played a major role, as with the Muslim World League, founded in Mecca in 1962, and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, created in Jeddah in 1972.Both organisations were used to proselytise in favor of Wahhabism, the religious doctrine of Saudi Arabia, but at the same time served the propaganda of the Muslim Brotherhood. Although Saudi Arabia adopted Wahhabism — a form of Salafism, purified, austere, puritanical, and rigorous as a religious doctrine — it supported the Muslim Brotherhood movement, whose doctrine, more flexible, seeks to reconcile Islamic tradition and Western political experience, to counter socialism and Nasserism in the Arab world. The same goal was followed by President Anwar El-Sadat in the 1970s to remove Nasser's legacy and support the change of Egypt's external alliances towards the West and the Gulf oil monarchies. Saudi Arabia continued as well after the death of Nasser to lend its support to the Muslim Brotherhood, as long as it served its interest to fight liberal and secular forces and support the role of religion in politics. It was perceived and used as a tool of its foreign policy. This alliance of circumstance does not rule out that Al-Saud family was sceptical about the Brotherhood and its doctrine. This cautious Saudi approach began early, in the late '40s, when the Muslim Brotherhood began to expand outside of Egypt in several Arab countries. The Al-Saud family saw the activist and "republican" formula of Islam promoted by the Brotherhood as a threat to the absolute monarchy formula established in Saudi Arabia, which advocates popular obedience and prohibits revolt against the political regime. At the time, the Brotherhood movement's founder, Hassan Al-Banna, asked King Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud permission to open a branch of the Brotherhood EFTA00874201 in Saudi Arabia, but the founder of the Saudi monarchy, which prohibits any kind of political party or movement, politely declined. Nevertheless, the Muslim Brotherhood managed to spread its doctrine in the Arabian Peninsula, particularly through immigration of members of the movement who fled the Nasser regime. The first real shock that hit the relationship between Riyadh and the Brotherhood took place following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. While Saudi Arabia relied on the US to liberate the occupied emirate and to ensure its own security against the threat of Saddam Hussein, the Muslim Brotherhood opposed Western intervention. This position was interpreted as a sign of ingratitude. Following the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, Saudi Arabia witnessed the appearance of the first opposition movement, Al- Sahwa (Awakening), which challenged throughout the 90s the absolute monarchy of Al-Saud and called for political reforms. Some Saudi leaders accused the Brotherhood of being Al-Sahwa's inspiration. The second shock, more violent, that hit the relationship between the Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia came following the attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States. Some 15 of the 19 alleged attackers were Saudis. Part of Saudi's rulers threw the blame for this "deviation" of some young Saudis on the doctrinal activism advocated by the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly their most famous ideologue, Sayed Qutb, hanged by the Nasser regime in 1966. The Saudi interior minister at the time, and the crown prince from October 2011 until his death on 16 June 2012, Nayef Bin Abdel-Aziz, accused the Muslim Brotherhood in 2002 of being the origin of most problems in the Arab world. "The Brotherhood has done great damage to Saudi Arabia ... All our problems come from the Muslim Brotherhood ... The Muslim Brotherhood has destroyed the Arab world," he said firmly. However, the danger perceived by Al-Saud family from the Muslim Brotherhood remained remote, as the movement was in opposition. Its coming to power in Egypt and Tunisia — and perhaps tomorrow in Syria — thanks to unexpected popular uprisings, completely changed the situation. Hence the attitude of the less reserved Saudi authorities vis-à-vis the new regime in Egypt. Riyadh fears that the rise to power of the Brotherhood encourages Islamist opposition inspired by that movement to resume activities within the kingdom. EFTA00874202 The arrest in the United Arab Emirates in late 2012 of 11 Egyptians accused of forming a Brotherhood cell to help overthrow the UAE regime only reinforced these fears. But far from the alleged plots against the Gulf States, the Saudi ruling family perceives the Brotherhood and its doctrine as an ideological rival to Wahhabism, which may spread and sow discord in the kingdom or threaten the monarchy. It is not surprising in this context that several reports underlined Saudi financial support for the Egyptian Salafist current in the last parliamentary elections in late 2011. The perception of danger also has a regional dimension, as some Saudi leaders feared the rise of an alliance between Egypt, Turkey and Qatar — the only Gulf state to maintain close ties with the Muslim Brotherhood — which may reduce the dominant regional influence Saudi Arabia had exercised through its alliance with Mubarak's Egypt and Syria's Bashar Al- Assad. American Thinker Qatar, the New Player in the Middle East Michael Curtis May 18, 2013 -- A surprising and ambitious newcomer on the international scene and in the politics of the Middle East is the Persian Gulf Emirate of Qatar, a country that became independent in 1971 when Britain ended its protectorate there. This small country, with a population of 1.8 million, a large part consisting of foreign workers, is "punching above its weight," to use a phrase of which President Barack Obama is fond. Qatar is fortunate because of its abundance of natural resources. It is the world's largest exporter of liquefied natural gas due to development of the technology called the Main Cryogenic Heat Exchanger, which can cool the gas and make it usable. The result Qatar, with very high GDP growth and a low unemployment rate, now about one percent, has become the country with the highest per-capita income in the world. As a result of its wealth, Qatar under the autocratic rule of the emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani , who took power in 1995 after a bloodless EFTA00874203 coup against his own father, has been relentlessly active in acquiring valuable and prestigious assets around the world. Some, if not all, of these acquisitions are known publicly and can be briefly listed. In France, Qatar owns the popular soccer team Paris Saint-Germain and the accompanying PSG handball team. In addition it has holdings in Louis Vuitton as well as in French heavy industry, in the French oil company Total, in the media, and in real estate on the French Riviera. Through its Al Jazeera Sports, it launched the French TV channel beIN Sport. With its investment fund, Divine Investments SA, it is preparing to buy Printemps, the department store chain, a transaction worth $2 billion. It outbid Galeries Lafayette, the other great French store, which was interested in buying its rival. In Italy, Qatar controls the fashion house Valentino. It has holdings in Tiffany's, in Credit Suisse, in the Banco Santander Brasil, and in the Agricultural Bank of China. In March 2013, the emir of Qatar, who already had investments in Greece, bought six Greek islands in the Echinades, in the Ionian Sea, for about $10 million; he intends to build palaces there for his three wives and 24 children. In Germany, the Qatar holdings include high-end real estate property in Berlin, including the five- star Grand Hyatt hotel in Potsdamer Platz, as well as holdings in Porsche, Volkswagon, Siemens, and the construction group Hochtief. The emir, as well as his son, was educated partly in Britain, where he has been purchasing significant pieces of property and shares, particularly in enterprises in London, where he is almost at home. The most striking of these are the prestigious London store Harrods, previously owned by Mohamed Al Fayed; part of the United States Embassy building in London; the five-star Park Lane Intercontinental Hotel; the 72-story skyscraper Shard, the tallest building in the European Union; parts of Canary Wharf Group; the very expensive One Hyde Park, an apartment block estimated to be worth more than $1.5 billion; about 20 percent of the London Stock Exchange; and shares in various companies, including Sainsbury's, the third largest chain of supermarkets in Britain; Barclay's Bank; Royal Dutch Shell; the Anglo-Swiss Xstrata, a major producer of coal; and Heathrow Airport, among others. Qatar has also tried to purchase the art auction house Christie's and the retailer outlets of the House of Fraser. EFTA00874204 The United States became familiar with the activity of Qatar when its TV station Al Jazeera, the most important media outlet in the Middle East, bought Current TV, founded by Al Gore, who received $70 million for his 20-percent share of the station. Among the other properties Qatar has acquired or is acquiring in the United States are liquid natural gas assets in the anticipation that they will be developed as liquefaction facilities like those in Qatar, thus becoming companies that will export gas from the U.S. Other holdings include the investment group Filmyard Holdings, which bought Miramax from Disney. The country has bought a number of the advanced Boeing 787 Dreamliners, and a team of Boeing mechanics is expected to arrive shortly in Doha, the capital of Qatar, to modify the batteries of the planes, and thus rectify the electronic problems that have plagued the new aircraft. Qatar already has a large fleet of planes that fly to over 125 cities in the world: in the U.S., they serve New York; Chicago; Washington, •.; and Houston. Qatar has now ordered more than 250 aircraft from Boeing as well as the European Airbus, including the latter's A380 and A330 jet airliners, Europe's challenge to the Dreamliner. In this buying spree, Qatar has been acquiring strategic shares in major companies throughout the world, claiming that these are good investments. It also claims that it has no mission to conquer the world. Perhaps this is the case, yet it is reasonable to expect that its large investments will begin to influence economic and political decisions in the countries in which they are made. The immediate question is the character of the political agenda that results from Qatar's great wealth. In fact, Qatar is now playing an increasingly political international role. It has become a member of important organizations: OPEC; the Gulf Cooperation Council, which it helped found; and the Arab League. It has made a show of friendship to the U.S. by allowing the use its air bases to supply American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet Qatar also allowed the Taliban, which America sees as a terrorist organization, to open a bureau on its soil. Thus, the direction of Qatar policy remains unclear. Qatar has intervened in Middle Eastern affairs, especially since the downfall of Egyptian President Mubarak, playing a role in Libya, in Syria, and in Egypt. Its activity in Libya in helping to bring down the Gaddafi EFTA00874205 regime was said to have been on behalf of the rebel group associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. In Syria, it is supporting and arming the Islamic Nusra Front, which is affiliated with al-Qaeda and is part of the opposition to the regime of President Assad. In this Qatar appears to be competing with Saudi Arabia, which is supporting a different opposition group. Again, it has good ties with Shiite Iran, but it also gave $5 billion in aid to Egypt after the overthrow of Mubarak and is giving it another $3 billion, thus aiding the survival of the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood. Qatar has become involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, appearing willing to play a constructive role in that conflict's resolution. In October 2012 the emir himself, accompanied by one of his wives, paid a visit to Gaza, where he was officially greeted by the Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniya. His visit led to a $254-million Qatar project to rebuild in the Gaza Strip. With additional allocations, the gift totaled $400 million. This action, however, seems incompatible with the views expressed by Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr Al-Thani, Qatar's prime minister and foreign minister in Washington, on April 29, 2013. He then not only spoke of general support for the 2002 Saudi Arabian peace proposal and negotiations between the two parties, but also suggested compromises "comparable and mutually agreed minor exchanges" of land. This was a position not espoused by the Palestinians. Noticeably, Al-Thani specifically did not mention Jerusalem or the Palestinian refugee issue. By taking this viewpoint, Qatar is implicitly assuming that the 1967 armistice lines, with minor changes, will be the borders of a new Palestinian state. While the particular way in which the proposal has been framed may not be completely acceptable to the Israelis, it is contradictory to the position of the Palestinians who insist, as a minimum, on Israel's return to the 1948 lines. In addition to the differences over Al-Thani's statement, Qatar's relationship with Hamas and its policy towards the feud between Fatah and Hamas is also not defined. What is clear is that Qatar's influence is being taken seriously. That Qatar is now regarded as an important player was noticeable when Afghan president Hamid Karzai visited the emir to discuss prospects of peace in Afghanistan, and to seek the emir's help in dealing with the Taliban. The question for the United States and for Israel is how in their own policy- EFTA00874206 making to reconcile the various and seemingly incompatible policies of Qatar. On the one hand, Qatar is a supporter of Islamist beliefs and parties, as a country with a seemingly cordial relationship with Hamas in Gaza and a more ambiguous but generally friendly one with Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, it has established ties with the U.S. and European countries through involvement in the economies of the West. It also appears willing to encourage the Arabs to strive for peace with Israel. As a small but wealthy emirate in the turbulent Middle East, perhaps Qatar is seeking to secure a safe position by assuming a role in the economy and politics of the world. The Western countries are confronted with the question of whether they are capable of dealing with the uncertainties, mysteries, and doubts about Arab policies. Whatever the answer, Qatar is now to be taken seriously by the United States and Israel. Al-Monitor Saudi-Qatar Honeymoon In Lebanon is Over Nasser Chararah May 17-- The silent conflict raging between Qatar and Saudi Arabia currently revolves around two main axes. The first is their respective positions vis-à-vis the Muslim Brotherhood, and their disagreement as to whether to back or reject its ascent to power in Syria. The second concerns Saudi Arabia's objection to the disproportionate — relative to its size — Qatari role in the region, while the latter insists on allowing its role to play out. According to sources knowledgeable in internal Saudi affairs, Riyadh considers its dispute with Qatar — subsequent to the latter's support for the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood reaching power — as a dispute with strategic overtones. Lately, specifically after the naming of Tammam Salam as prime minister-designate to form a new Lebanese government, the alliance between Doha and Riyadh in managing the Lebanese arena has shown signs of disintegrating. The last time the two countries were in accord over EFTA00874207 Lebanon was when [former Lebanese] Prime Minister Saad Hariri visited Qatar last summer, and later appeared in a photograph with Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim when both visited Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz. The Syrian crisis was responsible for restoring harmony between Qatar and Saudi Arabia in Lebanon; throughout the preceding period, between 2006 and 2011, Qatar had taken the side in Lebanon of the March 8 alliance backed by Damascus and Iran, while Saudi Arabia stood with the March 14 coalition, whose main Sunni constituent (the Future Movement) is a Saudi protégé. The reasons that drove Qatar to espouse its aforementioned position remain unknown to this day; but some in Hezbollah think that Doha's bias toward the Iranian-Syrian axis in Lebanon was not genuine, but was merely a political role assigned by Washington on Qatar — the location of the largest American military base in the Arab Gulf. The Saudis, on the other hand, thought at the time that Qatar suffered from an "inferiority complex" that drove it to try and emulate the role and influence of Saudi Arabia in the region and the world. During that period, the Qataris often reiterated that the smaller Arab nations had a problem with their larger neighbors who tried to limit their political aspirations. The proponents of this view long expressed pride that small nations — such as Lebanon, Kuwait and Qatar — succeeded in creating political, economic, media and democratic models that made up for their small geographic and demographic sizes, while proving they were worthy of overcoming their subservience to larger Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria, and playing a prominent role in leading the region. During the Syrian crisis and before, even when Hezbollah and its allies ousted Saad Hariri from the Lebanese premiership, the political divergence between Qatar and Saudi Arabia in Lebanon lost its raison , and they both re-adopted the traditional Gulf policy of concentrating on weakening Iranian influence in the Orient. Doha and Riyadh therefore switched to an offensive policy, through publicly supporting the Syrian opposition bent on toppling Bashar al-Assad's Iranian-allied regime, and by extension, weakening Iran's Lebanese allies, led by Hezbollah. In its internal discussions, Hezbollah affirms that Qatari funding stands behind the rise of Sheikh Ahmad al-Assir, who came to prominence in the EFTA00874208 last two years by challenging and criticizing Hezbollah from his Bilal bin Rabah mosque in Sidon. Hezbollah's information also indicates that Saudi Arabia is funding Salafist factions in Lebanon that profess animosity towards the party. Yet, it's been obvious lately that the honeymoon between Riyadh and Doha in Lebanon is ending. The main point of contention between them this time is the issue of support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. While Qatar and Turkey are planning to make the Brotherhood the spearhead of their future influence in Syria following Assad's ouster, Riyadh, on the other hand, backs the advent to power of moderate Sunni factions, most of which are comprised of Syrian Army defectors and other figures who don't belong to Islamist movements. From Riyadh's perspective, its disagreement with Qatar about the Brotherhood is a strategic one. For Saudi Arabia is wary of the ties between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamist Sahwa movement in Saudi Arabia, which today represents the main internal opposition to the Saudi ruling family. Riyadh wants Qatar to abandon its plan to back the Muslim Brotherhood because it would become a source of strength for the Saudi Sahwa movement if it were to attain power in Syria. Riyadh is therefore developing a new policy in Lebanon, and has begun opening up to all Lebanese political powers, including Iran's ally Hezbollah and the Christian Free Patriotic Movement, which belongs to the Iranian-Syrian axis of resistance. Saudi Arabia is also bolstering its influence on Sunni Lebanese factions, in order to minimize Qatari influence over them. There are indications that Riyadh has succeeded in dispelling Qatar's role in Lebanon, as evidenced by the lack of visits by Lebanese officials to Doha recently, and the resurgence of visits to Saudi Arabia instead. Furthermore, Sheikh Assir's vitriolic Qatari-influenced verbal attacks on Hezbollah have ceased lately. Qatar's role in the region is the subject of behind-the-scenes attacks by factions close to Saudi Arabia in Lebanon, and talk about it being a country that is trying to fight above its weight class has risen to prominence once again. All of this points to Saudi Arabia having decided to excise Qatar from the Lebanese as well as the Eastern scenes. This is all part of a comprehensive Saudi agenda to strike at the Muslim Brotherhood and EFTA00874209 weaken the influence of the countries that support it in sensitive areas of the Arab and Muslim worlds. Nasser Chararah is a contributing writerfor Al-Monitor's Lebanon Pulse andfor multiple Arab newspapers and magazines, as well as the author of several books on the Hezbollah-Israeli conflict. He is also the head of the Lebanese Institutefor Studies and Publications and has workedfor the Palestinian Research Center. Artick 5. RAND How Would a Nuclear Tehran Behave? (Summary) Alircza Nader May 2013 -- Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons is not a foregone conclusion. The U.S. policy of imposing sanctions on Iran while pursuing diplomatic engagement may still dissuade the Islamic Republic from developing a nuclear weapons capability. However, that policy is not guaranteed to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis. Even an Israeli and/or U.S. military attack against Iran's nuclear facilities could not prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons; it could only delay such development. Therefore, it is prudent to examine Iran's potential foreign policy, military doctrine, and support for terrorism after it has obtained nuclear weapons. This report seeks to explore how a nuclear-armed Iran would behave, if it would act aggressively, and what this would entail for the United States and its main regional allies, including the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Israel. The key findings of the study are the following: • The Islamic Republic is a revisionist state that seeks to undermine what it perceives to be the American-dominated order in the Middle East. EFTA00874210 However, it does not have territorial ambitions and does not seek to invade, conquer, or occupy other nations. Its chief military aim is to deter a U.S. and/or Israeli military attack while it undermines American allies in the Middle East. • Nuclear arms are unlikely to change Iran's fundamental interests and strategies. Rather, nuclear weapons would probably reinforce Iran's traditional national security objectives, including deterring a U.S. and/or Israeli military attack. • Iran may feel more confident and gain a sense of prestige from a nuclear capability, but other factors, such as the regional geopolitical environment and Iran's political, military, and economic capabilities, will have a greater bearing on Iranian calculations. • Iran's possession of nuclear weapons will lead to greater tension between the Shi'a theocracy and the conservative Sunni monarchies. However, Iran is unlikely to use nuclear weapons against other Muslim countries. Moreover, Iran's ability to undermine the GCC is quite limited, especially given Tehran's diminishing influence resulting from the Arab Spring and Iranian support for the Syrian government. • Nuclear weapons may provide Iran with the ultimate deterrent, but they are unlikely to be useful in coercing the GCC states, particularly in view of Iran's deteriorating economy. • The Islamic Republic views Israel in ideological terms. However, it is very unlikely that Iran would use nuclear weapons against Israel, given the latter's overwhelming conventional and nuclear military superiority. • The Iranian government does not use terrorism for ideological reasons. Instead, Iran's support for terrorism is motivated by cost and benefit calculations, with the aims of maintaining deterrence and preserving or expanding its influence in the Middle East. EFTA00874211 • A nuclear-armed Iran is unlikely to extend its nuclear deterrent to groups such as Hizballah or Hamas. So-called Iranian "proxy" groups have divergent interests from those of Tehran, especially Sunni Arab groups such as Hamas. Tehran is also unlikely to provide nuclear weapons or nuclear technology to non-Iranian groups. • Iran's possession of nuclear weapons will create greater instability in the Middle East. An inadvertent or accidental nuclear exchange between Israel and Iran is a dangerous possibility. However, there is not much evidence to suggest that rogue elements could have easy access to Iranian nuclear weapons, even if the Islamic Republic were to collapse. Elements of the political elite, including Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, may be fervent Mandists or millenarians, but their beliefs are not directly related to nuclear weapons and will not shape Iran's nuclear decisionmaking. Alireza Nader is a senior international policy analyst at the RAND Corporation and the lead co-author of Coping with a Nuclearizing Iran (2011). His research has focused on Iran's political dynamics, elite decisionmaking, and Iranian foreign policy. Anicic 6. Foreign Policy How America wll Fight the Next War Adm. Jonathan Greenert, Gen. Mark Welsh May 16, 2013 -- Our military services and national security leaders are consumed right now with reductions to defense budgets. Whether from years of continuing resolutions, sequestration, or just less funding in general, our military will have to adjust to getting fewer dollars to protect our nation's security interests. At the same time, the world continues to present challenges to U.S. interests, including instability in North Africa and the Middle East, regular provocations from Iran and North Korea, and territorial disputes between China and its neighbors. Our military will need EFTA00874212 an affordable and effective approach to counter coercion and assure access to places where conflict is most likely and consequential. The caps established in 2011 by the Budget Control Act place defense spending at the same level as the early 2000s. This level of funding was sufficient to organize, train, and equip a force able to defeat Saddam Hussein's military, deter Chinese aggression against Taiwan, and occupy Iraq and Afghanistan. But our fiscal situation is different today. Personnel and infrastructure maintenance costs have risen by double-digit percentages since 2003 as our services took on new missions, such as defending allies from ballistic missiles and countering piracy and illicit trafficking. Meanwhile, our competitors are more capable than a decade ago thanks to proliferation of weapons and other military technology. Less funding will compel us to reprioritize our efforts and make some hard choices with respect to the size and shape of our forces. This does not mean we will be unable to address our nation's security needs, but we will need to focus our investments and operations on our most important interests. The Defense Strategic Guidance issued in January 2012 assessed our security environment and fiscal circumstances following the first set of BCA-imposed budget reductions. Although we are reevaluating that strategy in light of potential additional cuts imposed by sequestration, one of the most significant challenges the strategy identified remains a concern: the dedicated effort by some nations and groups to prevent access to parts of the "global commons" -- those areas of the air, sea, cyberspace, and space that no one "owns," but upon which we all depend. These "anti- access" strategies employ military capabilities, geography, diplomatic pressure, and international law to impede the free use of ungoverned spaces. The Air-Sea Battle concept -- which disrupts the so-called "kill chains" of our potential adversaries -- is our services' approach to negate these efforts. A new form of coercion Nations seeking to intimidate their neighbors are turning to anti-access strategies because they are cost-effective. Merely threatening to close key maritime crossroads such as the Strait of Hormuz or demonstrating the ability to cut off a country from cyberspace or international airspace can be an effective tool for regional and international coercion. Similarly, these EFTA00874213 capabilities can be applied to prevent or slow U.S. or allied assistance from arriving in time to stop or repel an attack -- providing an aggressor much greater leverage over neighbors who depend on allies for security. Three well-known developments made this shift in our competitors' strategy possible. One, the world economy has become more interconnected, so impediments at air or maritime chokepoints have a much faster global impact. Two, technological advances in sensing and precision have spurred the development of more lethal air defenses and anti-ship cruise missiles; cheaper, more integrated surveillance systems; and new weapons, such as anti-ship ballistic missiles. Improvements in automation have made these systems easier to use while proliferation has put them in the hands of a range of potential new adversaries. And three, the American way of projecting force changed from placing bases and garrisons close to potential battlefields to a more expeditionary strategy whereby a smaller overseas presence is supported by forces that can surge into the area from hundreds or thousands of miles away. In history there are numerous examples of anti-access capabilities and strategies. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, the "Desert Fox," used aircraft, gun emplacements, and mines during World War II to disrupt access to France during the D-Day landings at Normandy. Mines were used in the Arabian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq "tanker war" of the 1980s to hinder the passage of both countries' oil. Serbian forces and Saddam Hussein each employed Cold War-era air defenses in an attempt to deter intervention by NATO and a U.S.-led coalition respectively. Anti-access strategies have always been employed to increase the cost of intervention beyond an acceptable level and show potential victims of aggression that help is not likely to come. Today, however, anti-access capabilities have much greater range and lethality. And they are typically employed as part of an overall strategy in peacetime alongside legal, diplomatic, and geographic means to deny access even before a conflict occurs. Anti-access strategies also undermine our ability to stabilize crises. Suppose an aggressor threatens to attack a country within range of its anti- access military capabilities. If we cannot reliably defeat the aggressor's array of cruise and ballistic missiles, submarines, aircraft, etc. and project power, U.S. forces will be less able to move into the area to interdict attacks, reassure our allies, and defuse potential hostilities. EFTA00874214 The Air-Sea Battle concept The Air-Sea Battle concept, approved by the secretary of defense in 2011, is designed to assure access, defeat anti-access capabilities, and provide more options to national leaders and military commanders. Air-Sea Battle is one of the operational concepts nested within the overarching Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) -- the Joint Force's approach to defeating threats to access. Air-Sea Battle is not focused on one specific adversary, since the anti-access capabilities it is intended to defeat are proliferating and, with automation, becoming easier to use. U.S. forces need a credible means to assure access when needed to help deter aggression by a range of potential adversaries, to assure allies, and to provide escalation control and crisis stability. Some examples of where Air-Sea Battle may apply include the Arabian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, where a favorable location provides Iran the ability to threaten the production and passage of almost 20 percent of the world's oil. If Iran can demonstrate or credibly assert that it can prevent or slow a U.S. response to its aggression, it is more able to coerce its neighbors or the international community. In the eastern Mediterranean, the government of Syria has deployed an array of modern anti-air missile systems to raise the costs of outside intervention in its ongoing civil war. And in the Pacific, North Korea has already demonstrated its willingness to employ anti-access capabilities with the sinking in 2010 of the South Korean ship, Cheonan. Air-Sea Battle is not a military strategy; it isn't about countering an invasion; it isn't a plan for U.S. forces to conduct an assault. Air-Sea Battle is a concept for defeating threats to access and enabling follow-on operations, which could include military activities as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster response. For example, in the last several years, improved integration between naval and air forces helped us respond to floods in Pakistan and to the earthquake and tsunami in Japan. Normally, operational concepts are developed by commanders to carry out a specific set of actions in their area of responsibility. In contrast, the military services are using JOAC and Air-Sea Battle to guide their efforts to organize, train, and equip forces provided to operational commanders. Further, we are integrating these concepts into the tactics and procedures we develop to operate with our allies. This is similar to the effort in the EFTA00874215 1980s to implement the "Air-Land" Battle concept and associated NATO concepts to defeat Soviet aggression in Central Europe. That effort resulted in programs such as the JSTARS radar aircraft that we still use to track targets on land. And while Air-Land Battle was focused on a singular threat and region, the idea of using a specific operational concept to guide investment is the same approach we are taking with Air-Sea Battle. Breaking the "kill chain" Air-Sea Battle defeats threats to access by, first, disrupting an adversary's command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems; second, destroying adversary weapons launchers (including aircraft, ships, and missile sites); and finally, defeating the weapons an adversary launches. This approach exploits the fact that, to attack our forces, an adversary must complete a sequence of actions, commonly referred to as a "kill chain." For example, surveillance systems locate U.S. forces, communications networks relay targeting information to weapons launchers, weapons are launched, and then they must hone in on U.S. forces. Each of these steps is vulnerable to interdiction or disruption, and because each step must work, our forces can focus on the weakest links in the chain, not each and every one. For example, strikes against installations deep inland are not necessarily required in Air-Sea Battle because adversary C4ISR may be vulnerable to disruption, weapons can be deceived or interdicted, and adversary ships and aircraft can be destroyed. U.S. forces need not employ "symmetrical" approaches to counter each threat -- shooting missiles down with missiles, sinking submarines with other submarines, etc. Instead, as described in the JOAC and Air-Sea Battle, we will operate across domains. For example, we will defeat missiles with electronic warfare, disrupt surveillance systems with electromagnetic or cyberattacks, and defeat air threats with submarines. This is "networked, integrated attack" and it will require a force that is designed for -- and that regularly practices -- these kinds of operations. Building a truly "joint" force Conducting operations across domains requires rapid and tight coordination between air, ground, and naval forces -- a level of integration well beyond today's efforts to merely pre-plan and deconflict actions between services. This integration can't be achieved effectively and EFTA00874216 efficiently on an ad hoc basis. Forces must be "pre-integrated" -- before the fight begins. This compels us to work more closely as we develop and prepare our forces. Today, for example, instructors from the Navy's "Top Gun" school routinely train with their counterparts at the Air Force Weapons School. As part of Air-Sea Battle we are pursuing this type of inter-service cooperation between all the services, as well as within each branch of each service. Just as in tactical aviation, we are expanding our doctrine integration to include additional areas of collaboration -- such as Army air-defense forces and Marine reconnaissance units. With the doctrine, procedures, investment, and training included in Air-Sea Battle's initiatives, we are moving from cooperation toward integration across domains. To foster integration we are directing an intensified approach to building common procedures, complementary budgets, combined exercises, and joint war games. An essential prerequisite for cross-domain operations is communication and data links that connect sensors, decision-makers, and shooters armed with kinetic, electromagnetic, and cyber weapons. Our investments, guided by the Air-Sea Battle concept, are building increasingly robust networks able to communicate between each service's platforms, even in a contested electromagnetic environment. Part of this effort is focused on the systems and procedures for Joint Tactical Networking to connect today's aircraft and ships with new 5th generation aircraft, such as the F-35 and F-22. Two recent tests advanced our efforts to promote Joint Tactical Networking. In the first, an Air Force F-22 provided updated targeting information to a Navy submarine-launched Tomahawk missile. Similarly, in September 2012 an Army Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS) ashore successfully guided a U.S. Navy SM-6 surface-to-air missile to intercept an incoming cruise missile, demonstrating t