EFTA00719559.pdf

From: Office of Terje Rod-Larsen Subject: March 3 update Date: Mon, 05 Mar 2012 19:18:43 +0000 3 March, 2012 Article 1. The Atlantic Obama to Iran and Israel: 'As President of the United States, I Don't Bluf Jeffrey Goldberg Article 2. The Washington Post Mideast peace, with something short of a deal Robert Malley and Aaron David Miller Article 3. The daily Beast Shimon Peres's Influence Wanes as Israel Grows More Bellicose Toward Iran Dan Ephron Article 4. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Fearful of a nuclear Iran? The real WMD nightmare is Syria Charles P. Blair Article 5. The Daily Star Hamas rattles the Resistance Axis Rami G. Khouri Article 6. Pew Research Center Millennials will benefit and suffer due to their hyperconnected lives (Overview) Anick I. The Atlantic EFTA00719559 Obama to Iran and Israel: 'As President of the United States, I Don't Bluff Jeffrey Goldberg Mar 2 2012 -- At the White House on Monday, President Obama will seek to persuade the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, to postpone whatever plans he may have to bomb Iran's nuclear facilities in the coming months. Obama will argue that under his leadership, the United States "has Israel's back," and that he will order the U.S. military to destroy Iran's nuclear program if economic sanctions fail to compel Tehran to shelve its nuclear ambitions. In the most extensive interview he has given about the looming Iran crisis, Obama told me earlier this week that both Iran and Israel should take seriously the possibility of American action against Iran's nuclear facilities. "I think that the Israeli government recognizes that, as president of the United States, I don't bluff." He went on, "I also don't, as a matter of sound policy, go around advertising exactly what our intentions are. But I think both the Iranian and the Israeli governments recognize that when the United States says it is unacceptable for Iran to have a nuclear weapon, we mean what we say." The 45-minute Oval Office conversation took place less than a week before the president was scheduled to address the annual convention of AIPAC, the pro-Israel lobbying group, and then meet, the next day, with Prime Minister Netanyahu at the White House. In the interview, Obama stated specifically that "all options are on the table," and that the final option is the "military component." But the president also said that sanctions organized by his administration have put Iran in a "world of hurt," and that economic duress might soon force the regime in Tehran to rethink its efforts to pursue a nuclear-weapons program. "Without in any way being under an illusion about Iranian intentions, without in any way being naive about the nature of that regime, they are self-interested," Obama said. "It is possible for them to make a strategic calculation that, at minimum, pushes much further to the right whatever potential breakout capacity they may have, and that may turn out to to be the best decision for Israel's security." The president also said that Tehran's nuclear program would represent a "profound" national-security threat to the United States EFTA00719560 even if Israel were not a target of Iran's violent rhetoric, and he dismissed the argument that the United States could successfully contain a nuclear Iran. "You're talking about the most volatile region in the world," he said. "It will not be tolerable to a number of states in that region for Iran to have a nuclear weapon and them not to have a nuclear weapon. Iran is known to sponsor terrorist organizations, so the threat of proliferation becomes that much more severe." He went on to say, "The dangers of an Iran getting nuclear weapons that then leads to a free-for-all in the Middle East is something that I think would be very dangerous for the world." The president was most animated when talking about the chaotic arms race he fears would break out if Iran acquired a nuclear weapon, and he seemed most frustrated when talking about what he sees as a deliberate campaign by Republicans to convince American Jews that he is anti-Israel. "Every single commitment I have made to the state of Israel and its security, I have kept," he told me. "Why is it that despite me never failing to support Israel on every single problem that they've had over the last three years, that there are still questions about that?" Though he struck a consistently pro-Israel posture during the interview, Obama went to great lengths to caution Israel that a premature strike might inadvertently help Iran: "At a time when there is not a lot of sympathy for Iran and its only real ally, [Syria,] is on the ropes, do we want a distraction in which suddenly Iran can portray itself as a victim?" He also said he would try to convince Netanyahu that the only way to bring about a permanent end to a country's nuclear program is to convince the country in question that nuclear weapons are not in its best interest. "Our argument is going to be that it is important for us to see if we can solve this thing permanently, as opposed to temporarily," he said, "and the only way historically that a country has ultimately decided not to get nuclear weapons without constant military intervention has been when they themselves take [nuclear weapons] off the table. That's what happened in Libya, that's what happened in South Africa." And though broadly sympathetic to Netanyahu's often-stated fear that Iran's nuclear program represents a Holocaust-scale threat to the Jewish state, and the Jewish people, Obama suggested strongly that historical fears cannot be the sole basis for precipitous action: "The prime minister is head of a modern state that is mindful of the profound costs of any military action, and in our consultations with the Israeli government, I think they take those costs, and EFTA00719561 potential unintended consequences, very seriously." But when I asked the president if he thought Israel could damage its reputation among Americans with an attack on Iran -- an attack that could provoke Iranian retaliation against American targets, and could cause massive economic disruption -- he said, "I think we in the United States instinctively sympathize with Israel." President Obama also shared fascinating insights about his sometimes tension-filled relationship with Netanyahu -- and spoke at length about Syria -- but for that, you'll have to read the entire interview. Here is a transcript of our conversation: JEFFREY GOLDBERG: From what we understand, Prime Minister Netanyahu is going to ask you for some specific enunciations of red lines, for specific promises related to the Iranian nuclear program. What is your message to the prime minister going to be? What do you want to get across to him? PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA: First of all, it's important to say that I don't know exactly what the prime minister is going to be coming with. We haven't gotten any indication that there is some sharp "ask" that is going to be presented. Both the United States and Israel have been in constant consultation about a very difficult issue, and that is the prospect of Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon. This is something that has been one of my top five foreign-policy concerns since I came into office. We, immediately upon taking over, mapped out a strategy that said we are going to mobilize the international community around this issue and isolate Iran to send a clear message to them that there is a path they can follow that allows them to rejoin the community of nations, but if they refused to follow that path, that there would be an escalating series of consequences. Three years later, we can look back and say we have been successful beyond most people's expectations. When we came in, Iran was united and on the move, and the world was divided about how to address this issue. Today, the world is as united as we've ever seen it around the need for Iran to take a different path on its nuclear program, and Iran is isolated and feeling the severe effects of the multiple sanctions that have been placed on it. At the same time, we understand that the bottom line is: Does the problem get solved? And I think that Israel, understandably, has a profound interest not just in good EFTA00719562 intentions but in actual results. And in the conversations I've had over the course of three years, and over the course of the last three months and three weeks, what I've emphasized is that preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon isn't just in the interest of Israel, it is profoundly in the security interests of the United States, and that when I say we're not taking any option off the table, we mean it. We are going to continue to apply pressure until Iran takes a different course. GOLDBERG: Go back to this language, 'All options on the table.' You've probably said it 50 or 100 times. And a lot of people believe it, but the two main intended audiences, the supreme leader of Iran and the prime minister of Israel, you could argue, don't entirely trust this. The impression we get is that the Israeli government thinks this is a vague expression that's been used for so many years. Is there some ramping-up of the rhetoric you're going to give them? PRESIDENT OBAMA: I think the Israeli people understand it, I think the American people understand it, and I think the Iranians understand it. It means a political component that involves isolating Iran; it means an economic component that involves unprecedented and crippling sanctions; it means a diplomatic component in which we have been able to strengthen the coalition that presents Iran with various options through the P-5 plus 1 and ensures that the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] is robust in evaluating Iran's military program; and it includes a military component. And I think people understand that. I think that the Israeli government recognizes that, as president of the United States, I don't bluff. I also don't, as a matter of sound policy, go around advertising exactly what our intentions are. But I think both the Iranian and the Israeli governments recognize that when the United States says it is unacceptable for Iran to have a nuclear weapon, we mean what we say. Let describe very specifically why this is important to us. In addition to the profound threat that it poses to Israel, one of our strongest allies in the world; in addition to the outrageous language that has been directed toward Israel by the leaders of the Iranian government -- if Iran gets a nuclear weapon, this would run completely contrary to my policies of nonproliferation. The risks of an Iranian nuclear weapon falling EFTA00719563 into the hands of terrorist organizations are profound. It is almost certain that other players in the region would feel it necessary to get their own nuclear weapons. So now you have the prospect of a nuclear arms race in the most volatile region in the world, one that is rife with unstable governments and sectarian tensions. And it would also provide Iran the additional capability to sponsor and protect its proxies in carrying out terrorist attacks, because they are less fearful of retaliation. GOLDBERG: What would your position be if Israel weren't in this picture? PRESIDENT OBAMA: It would still be a profound national-security interest of the United States to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. GOLDBERG: Why, then, is this issue so often seen as binary, always defined as Israel versus Iran? PRESIDENT OBAMA: I think it has to do with a legitimate concern on the part of Israel that they are a small country in a tough neighborhood, and as a consequence, even though the U.S. and Israel very much share assessments of how quickly Iran could obtain breakout capacity, and even though there is constant consultation and intelligence coordination around that question, Israel feels more vulnerable. And I think the prime minister and the defense minister, [Ehud Barak,] feel a profound, historic obligation not to put Israel in a position where it cannot act decisively and unilaterally to protect the state of Israel. I understand those concerns, and as a consequence, I think it's not surprising that the way it gets framed, at least in this country, where the vast majority of people are profoundly sympathetic to Israel's plight and potential vulnerabilities -- that articles and stories get framed in terms of Israel's potential vulnerability. But I want to make clear that when we travel around the world and make presentations about this issue, that's not how we frame it. We frame it as: this is something in the national-security interests of the United States and in the interests of the world community. And I assure you that Europe would not have gone forward with sanctions on Iranian oil imports -- which are very difficult for them to carry out, because they get a lot of oil EFTA00719564 from Iran -- had it not been for their understanding that it is in the world's interest, to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. China would not have abided by the existing sanctions coming out of the National Security Council, and other countries around the world would not have unified around those sanctions, had it not been for us making the presentation about why this was important for everyone, not just one country. GOLDBERG: Is it possible that the prime minister of Israel has over- learned the lessons of the Holocaust? PRESIDENT OBAMA: I think the prime minister has a profound responsibility to protect the Israeli people in a hostile neighborhood, and I am certain that the history of the Holocaust and of anti-Semitism and brutality directed against the Jewish people for more than a millennium weighs on him when he thinks about these questions. I think it's important to recognize, though, that the prime minister is also head of a modern state that is mindful of the profound costs of any military action, and in our consultations with the Israeli government, I think they take those costs, and potential unintended consequences, very seriously. GOLDBERG: Do you think Israel could cause damage to itself in America by preempting the Iranian nuclear program militarily? PRESIDENT OBAMA: I don't know how it plays in America. I think we in the United States instinctively sympathize with Israel, and I think political support for Israel is bipartisan and powerful. In my discussions with Israel, the key question that I ask is: How does this impact their own security environment? I've said it publicly and I say it privately: ultimately, the Israeli prime minister and the defense minister and others in the government have to make their decisions about what they think is best for Israel's security, and I don't presume to tell them what is best for them. But as Israel's closest friend and ally, and as one that has devoted the last three years to making sure that Israel has additional security capabilities, and has worked to manage a series of difficult problems and questions over the past three years, I do point out to them that we have a sanctions architecture that is far more effective than anybody anticipated; that we have a world that is EFTA00719565 about as united as you get behind the sanctions; that our assessment, which is shared by the Israelis, is that Iran does not yet have a nuclear weapon and is not yet in a position to obtain a nuclear weapon without us having a pretty long lead time in which we will know that they are making that attempt. In that context, our argument is going to be that it is important for us to see if we can solve this thing permanently, as opposed to temporarily. And the only way, historically, that a country has ultimately decided not to get nuclear weapons without constant military intervention has been when they themselves take [nuclear weapons] off the table. That's what happened in Libya, that's what happened in South Africa. And we think that, without in any way being under an illusion about Iranian intentions, without in any way being naive about the nature of that regime, they are self-interested. They recognize that they are in a bad, bad place right now. It is possible for them to make a strategic calculation that, at minimum, pushes much further to the right whatever potential breakout capacity they may have, and that may turn out to be the best decision for Israel's security. These are difficult questions, and again, if I were the prime minister of Israel, be wrestling with them. As president of the United States, I wrestle with them as well. GOLDBERG: Could you shed some light on your relationship with the prime minister? You've met with him more than with any other world leader. It's assumed that you have a dysfunctional relationship. What is it like? PRESIDENT OBAMA: I actually think the relationship is very functional, and the proof of the pudding is in the eating. The fact of the matter is, we've gotten a lot of business done with Israel over the last three years. I think the prime minister -- and certainly the defense minister -- would acknowledge that we've never had closer military and intelligence cooperation. When you look at what I've done with respect to security for Israel, from joint training and joint exercises that outstrip anything that's been done in the past, to helping finance and construct the Iron Dome program to make sure that Israeli families are less vulnerable to missile strikes, to ensuring that Israel maintains its qualitative military edge, to fighting back against delegitimization of Israel, whether at the [UN] Human Rights Council, or in front of the UN General Assembly, or during EFTA00719566 the Goldstone Report, or after the flare-up involving the flotilla -- the truth of the matter is that the relationship has functioned very well. GOLDBERG: Are you friends? Do you talk about things other than business? PRESIDENT OBAMA: You know, the truth of the matter is, both of us have so much on our plates that there's not always a lot of time to have discussions beyond business. Having said that, what I think is absolutely true is that the prime minister and I come out of different political traditions. This is one of the few times in the history of U.S.-Israeli relations where you have a government from the right in Israel at the same time you have a center-left government in the United States, and so I think what happens then is that a lot of political interpretations of our relationship get projected onto this. But one thing that I have found in working with Prime Minister Netanyahu is that we can be very frank with each other, very blunt with each other, very honest with each other. For the most part, when we have differences, they are tactical and not strategic. Our objectives are a secure United States, a secure Israel, peace, the capacity for our kids to grow up in safety and security and not have to worry about bombs going off, and being able to promote business and economic growth and commerce. We have a common vision about where we want to go. At any given moment -- as is true, frankly, with my relationship with every other foreign leader -- there's not going to be perfect alignment of how we achieve these objectives. GOLDBERG: In an interview three years ago, right before he became prime minister, Netanyahu told me that he believes Iran is being run by a "messianic apocalyptic cult." Last week, General Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. referred to the Iranian leadership as "rational." Where do you fall on this continuum? Do you feel that the leaders of Iran might be so irrational that they will not act in what we would understand to be their self-interest? PRESIDENT OBAMA: I think you're right to describe it as a continuum. There is no doubt they are isolated. They have a very ingrown political EFTA00719567 system. They are founded and fueled on hostility towards the United States, Israel, and to some degree the West. And they have shown themselves willing to go outside international norms and international rules to achieve their objectives. All of this makes them dangerous. They've also been willing to crush opposition in their own country in brutal and bloody ways. GOLDBERG: Do you think they are messianic? PRESIDENT OBAMA: I think it's entirely legitimate to say that this is a regime that does not share our worldview or our values. I do think, and this is what General Dempsey was probably referring to, that as we look at how they operate and the decisions they've made over the past three decades, that they care about the regime's survival. They're sensitive to the opinions of the people and they are troubled by the isolation that they're experiencing. They know, for example, that when these kinds of sanctions are applied, it puts a world of hurt on them. They are able to make decisions based on trying to avoid bad outcomes from their perspective. So if they're presented with options that lead to either a lot of pain from their perspective, or potentially a better path, then there's no guarantee that they can't make a better decision. GOLDBERG: It seems unlikely that a regime built on anti-Americanism would want to appear to succumb to an American-led sanctions effort. PRESIDENT OBAMA: I think the question here is going to be: What exactly are their genuine interests? Now, what we've seen, what we've heard directly from them over the last couple of weeks is that nuclear weapons are sinful and un-Islamic. And those are formal speeches from the supreme leader and their foreign minister. GOLDBERG: Do you believe their sincerity? PRESIDENT OBAMA: My point here is not that I believe the sincerity of the statements coming out of the regime. The point is that for them to prove to the international community that their intentions are peaceful and EFTA00719568 that they are, in fact, not pursuing weapons, is not inconsistent with what they've said. So it doesn't require them to knuckle under to us. What it does require is for them to actually show to the world that there is consistency between their actions and their statements. And that's something they should be able to do without losing face. GOLDBERG: Let me flip this entirely around and ask: Why is containment not your policy? In the sense that we contained the Soviet Union, North Korea -- PRESIDENT OBAMA: It's for the reason I described -- because you're talking about the most volatile region in the world. It will not be tolerable to a number of states in that region for Iran to have a nuclear weapon and them not to have a nuclear weapon. Iran is known to sponsor terrorist organizations, so the threat of proliferation becomes that much more severe. The only analogous situation is North Korea. We have applied a lot of pressure on North Korea as well and, in fact, today found them willing to suspend some of their nuclear activities and missile testing and come back to the table. But North Korea is even more isolated, and certainly less capable of shaping the environment [around it] than Iran is. And so the dangers of an Iran getting nuclear weapons that then leads to a free-for-all in the Middle East is something that I think would be very dangerous for the world. GOLDBERG: Do you see accidental nuclear escalation as an issue? PRESIDENT OBAMA: Absolutely. Look, the fact is, I don't think any of it would be accidental. I think it would be very intentional. If Iran gets a nuclear weapon, I won't name the countries, but there are probably four or five countries in the Middle East who say, "We are going to start a program, and we will have nuclear weapons." And at that point, the prospect for miscalculation in a region that has that many tensions and fissures is profound. You essentially then duplicate the challenges of India and Pakistan fivefold or tenfold. GOLDBERG: With everybody pointing at everybody else. EFTA00719569 PRESIDENT OBAMA: With everybody pointing at everybody else. GOLDBERG: What getting at specifically is, let's assume there's a Hezbollah attack on Israel. Israel responds into Lebanon. Iran goes on some kind of a nuclear alert, and then one-two-three -- PRESIDENT OBAMA: The potential for escalation in those circumstances is profoundly dangerous, and in addition to just the potential human costs of a nuclear escalation like that in the Middle East, just imagine what would happen in terms of the world economy. The possibilities of the sort of energy disruptions that we've never seen before occurring, and the world economy basically coming to a halt, would be pretty profound. So when I say this is in the U.S. interest, not saying this is something like to solve.. saying this is something we have to solve. GOLDBERG: One of the aspects of this is the question of whether it's plausible that Barack Obama would ever use military power to stop Iran. The Republicans are trying to make this an issue -- and not only the Republicans -- saying that this man, by his disposition, by his character, by his party, by his center-left outlook, is not going to do that. PRESIDENT OBAMA: Look, if people want to say about me that I have a profound preference for peace over war, that every time I order young men and women into a combat theater and then see the consequences on some of them, if they're lucky enough to come back, that this weighs on me -- I make no apologies for that. Because anybody who is sitting in my chair who isn't mindful of the costs of war shouldn't be here, because it's serious business. These aren't video games that we're playing here. Now, having said that, I think it's fair to say that the last three years, I've shown myself pretty clearly willing, when I believe it is in the core national interest of the United States, to direct military actions, even when they entail enormous risks. And obviously, the bin Laden operation is the most dramatic, but al- Qaeda was on its [knees] well before we took out bin Laden because of our activities and my direction. In Afghanistan, we've made very tough EFTA00719570 decisions because we felt it was very important, in order for an effective transition out of Afghanistan to take place, for us to be pushing back against the Taliban's momentum. So aside from the usual politics, I don't think this is an argument that has a lot of legs. And by the way, it's not an argument that the American people buy. They may have complaints about high unemployment still, and that the recovery needs to move faster, but you don't hear a lot of them arguing somehow that I hesitate to make decisions as commander in chief when necessary. GOLDBERG: Can you just talk about Syria as a strategic issue? Talk about it as a humanitarian issue, as well. But it would seem to me that one way to weaken and further isolate Iran is to remove or help remove Iran's only Arab ally. PRESIDENT OBAMA: Absolutely. GOLDBERG: And so the question is: What else can this administration be doing? PRESIDENT OBAMA: Well, look, there's no doubt that Iran is much weaker now than it was a year ago, two years ago, three years ago. The Arab Spring, as bumpy as it has been, represents a strategic defeat for Iran, because what people in the region have seen is that all the impulses towards freedom and self-determination and free speech and freedom of assembly have been constantly violated by Iran. [The Iranian leadership is] no friend of that movement toward human rights and political freedom. But more directly, it is now engulfing Syria, and Syria is basically their only true ally in the region. And it is our estimation that [President Bashar al- Assad's] days are numbered. It's a matter not of if, but when. Now, can we accelerate that? We're working with the world community to try to do that. It is complicated by the fact that Syria is a much bigger, more sophisticated, and more complicated country than Libya, for example -- the opposition is hugely splintered -- that although there's unanimity within the Arab world at this point, internationally, countries like Russia are still blocking potential UN mandates or action. And so what we're trying to do - - and the secretary of state just came back from helping to lead the Friends EFTA00719571 of Syria group in Tunisia -- is to try to come up with a series of strategies that can provide humanitarian relief. But they can also accelerate a transition to a peaceful and stable and representative Syrian government. If that happens, that will be a profound loss for Iran. GOLDBERG: Is there anything you could do to move it faster? PRESIDENT OBAMA: Well, nothing that I can tell you, because your classified clearance isn't good enough. (Laughter.) This is part of, by the way, the context in which we have to examine our approach toward Iran, because at a time when there is not a lot of sympathy for Iran and its only real ally is on the ropes, do we want a distraction in which suddenly Iran can portray itself as a victim, and deflect attention from what has to be the core issue, which is their potential pursuit of nuclear weapons? That's an example of factors that -- when we are in consultation with all our allies, including the Israelis, we raise these factors, because this is an issue of many dimensions here, and we've got to factor all of them in to achieve the outcome that hopefully we all want. GOLDBERG: Do the Israelis understand that? There have been disagreements between Israel and the U.S. before, but this is coming to a head about what the Israelis see as an existential issue. The question is: In your mind, have you brought arguments to Netanyahu that have so far worked out well? PRESIDENT OBAMA: I think that in the end, Israel's leaders will make determinations based on what they believe is best for the security of Israel, and that is entirely appropriate. When we present our views and our strategy approach, we try to put all our cards on the table, to describe how we are thinking about these issues. We try to back those up with facts and evidence. We compare their assessments with ours, and where there are gaps, we try to narrow those gaps. And what I also try to do is to underscore the seriousness with which the United States takes this issue. And I think that Ehud Barak understands it. I think EFTA00719572 that Prime Minister Netanyahu, hopefully when he sees me next week, will understand it. And one of the things that I like to remind them of is that every single commitment I have made to the state of Israel and its security, I have kept. I mean, part of your -- not to put words in your mouth -- but part of the underlying question is: Why is it that despite me never failing to support Israel on every single problem that they've had over the last three years, that there are still questions about that? GOLDBERG: That's a good way to phrase it. PRESIDENT OBAMA: And my answer is: there is no good reason to doubt me on these issues. Some of it has to do with the fact that in this country and in our media, this gets wrapped up with politics. And I don't think that's any secret. And if you have a set of political actors who want to see if they can drive a wedge not between the United States and Israel, but between Barack Obama and a Jewish American vote that has historically been very supportive of his candidacy, then it's good to try to fan doubts and raise questions. But when you look at the record, there's no "there" there. And my job is to try to make sure that those political factors are washed away on an issue that is of such eat strategic and security importance to our two countries. And so when talking to the prime minister, or my team is talking to the Israeli government, what I want is a hardheaded, clear-eyed assessment of how do we achieve our goals. And our goals are in sync. And historically, one of the reasons that the U.S.-Israeli relationship has survived so well and thrived is shared values, shared history, the links between our peoples. But it's also been because it has been a profoundly bipartisan commitment to the state of Israel. And the flip side of it is that, in terms of Israeli politics, there's been a view that regardless of whether it's a Democratic or Republican administration, the working assumption is: we've got Israel's back. And that's something that I constantly try to reinforce and remind people of. GOLDBERG: Wait, in four words, is that your message to the prime EFTA00719573 minister -- we've got Israel's back? PRESIDENT OBAMA: That is not just my message to the prime minister, that's been my message to the Israeli people, and to the pro-Israel community in this country, since I came into office. It's hard for me to be clearer than I was in front of the UN General Assembly, when I made a more full-throated defense of Israel and its legitimate security concerns than any president in history -- not, by the way, in front of an audience that was particularly warm to the message. So that actually won't be my message. My message will be much more specific, about how do we solve this problem. Anicic 2. The Washington Post Mideast peace, with something short of a deal Robert Malley and Aaron David Miller March 3 -- President Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will devote little time Monday to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in part because of Iran and election-year politics. But the principal cause is this: A negotiated, two-state solution is running harder than ever against intractable political and psychological realities in Israel, Palestine and the Arab world. These are pushing toward a de facto outcome that will not be negotiated, comprehensive or conflict-ending. Even assuming Netanyahu is prepared to embrace a two-state solution acceptable to Palestinians, he would have to take on powerful settler and right-wing constituencies at a time when regional tumult and Iran's nuclear progress exacerbate national feelings of insecurity. Netanyahu's assertion that the Palestinian split and instability in the Arab world counsel against risky moves might be a convenient excuse to do nothing — but that doesn't necessarily make it wrong. And he is unlikely to jeopardize his political future or his country's security chasing a solution that, to his mind, does both. Among Palestinians, the brewing crisis over President Mahmoud Abbas's potential succession, popular disenchantment with the peace process and EFTA00719574 the appeal of internationalizing the conflict mean there are few political incentives for flexibility toward Israel. Divisions between the Fatah and Hamas factions complicate matters: Their recent agreement is paper-thin and highlights that, for now, Palestinians are focused more on immediate politics than on their longer-term fate. Then there are regional developments: Abbas can no longer rely on influential Arab cover for controversial compromises. The Islamist wave is a reliable indicator of where popular Arab sentiment resides; it probably will not translate into imminent hostility toward Israel but, at a minimum, excludes a forthcoming approach. Conditions will not remain static. Over time, the political landscape is likely to be carved by local actors' concerns. Reports of Israel's isolation may be exaggerated, but international ill will is mounting. Israelis recognize that if Palestinians remain under occupation for much longer, they may drop their call for independent statehood and demand equal rights in a single, binational (i.e., no longer Jewish) state. Israel has a potential answer: a withdrawal from the most populated areas of the West Bank, preserving the bulk of settlements and overall Israeli dominion and sparing the country a wrenching internal conflict. The idea is not new: Mooted in Gaza in 2005, its planned extension to the West Bank was halted when Palestinians' acquisition of weapons through a porous border with Egypt soured Israelis' mood. Sooner or later, the plan could be revived, coupled with an Israeli military presence in the Jordan Valley to minimize risks of a Gazan repeat. Fatah and the Ramallah-based Palestinian Authority have a long-term objective that differs markedly from Israel's: a state enjoying full sovereign rights on virtually all the land occupied in 1967. But many among them are working toward goals that are closer at hand: building institutions of a putative state, governing their people and lessening Israel's footprint. They are unlikely to agree with Jerusalem over the scope of its withdrawal, which almost certainly makes negotiations futile. For now, a unilateral Israeli decision could suit both sides. A greater chasm separates Hamas's and Israel's ideas for a permanent solution. Paradoxically, this means they could be inclined to settle for a long-term de facto understanding — what the Islamist movement calls a truce and Israel calls an interim arrangement. Here, too, their perspectives collide, as Hamas's conception of a truce entails a full withdrawal from the West Bank and the right of return for Palestinian EFTA00719575 refugees, steps Israel will adamantly reject in a permanent or temporary agreement. Still, an Israeli pullout from parts of the West Bank, coupled with a mutual cease-fire but without any interaction with or recognition of the Jewish state, is something Hamas would welcome as a victory without endorsing as a deal. Such an outcome would promote the protagonists' short-term interests. Israel would mollify Western critics and neutralize the Palestinian demographic threat; Fatah could continue building institutions of a future state; Hamas again may claim credit for pushing Israel back without compromising on core principles. But the conflict would endure. Israel would not achieve Arab recognition or an end to Palestinian claims; Fatah would not have produced a sovereign, independent state or resolved the refugee issue; and Hamas would have to acquiesce in the continued presence of a Jewish state on what it considers Palestinian land. The ultimate reckoning would still loom, arguably under conditions more inimical to the comprehensive resolution all claim to seek. Since the inception of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the status of the land between the Jordan River and Mediterranean Sea has been determined almost invariably by acts of war or unilateral decisions. Even the Oslo Accords altered the status of Palestinian territory little on the ground. Someday this may change. For now, events outside the negotiating room again deserve far more consideration than what's happening inside — and could shape Israeli-Palestinian relations for some time to come. Robert Malley is director of the International Crisis Group's Middle East and North Africa Program. Aaron David Miller, a distinguished scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Centerfor Scholars, is the author of theforthcoming book "Can America Have Another Great President?" The daily Beast Shimon Peres's Influence Wanes as Israel Grows More Bellicose Toward Iran Dan Ephron EFTA00719576 March 2, 2012 -- The oddest odd couple in Israeli politics might just be Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Shimon Peres, both of whom are in Washington this week for meetings with President Obama. Netanyahu is an unwavering skeptic with a deep devotion to Greater Israel, Peres a relentlessly optimistic peacenik. Yet for much of the past three years, Netanyahu had no bigger booster than Peres, who repeatedly vouched for him with foreign leaders and assured people he genuinely wants peace. Netanyahu, in return, allowed Peres a brief role in contacts with the Palestinians, though as president, his job description restricts him mostly to pomp and circumstance. Now the honeymoon might be ending. People familiar with the relationship say tensions have bubbled to the surface in recent months over how to cope with Iran's nuclear ambitions and what to offer the Palestinians. So much so that while Netanyahu is expected to tell Obama that Israel will take action on its own if sanctions against Iran don't produce quick results—raising the specter of a regional war—Peres has different ideas. "When you see that the United States and Europe are taking steps [to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons] ... that's the way right now," he told Newsweek in a recent interview in Jerusalem. "We don't have to monopolize it." That Israel's two most senior political figures don't see eye to eye on the weightiest issues of the day is hardly unprecedented. Israel's first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, is said to have imbued the presidency with zero executive powers precisely to prevent his political rival, Chaim Weizmann, from having a role in the decision making. But it's a reminder that even as Israel edges toward confrontation with Iran, in defiance of Washington, how to deal with the mullahs is the subject of fierce debate inside Israel—not just within the political establishment but also in the military and the intelligence community. It's also a reflection of Netanyahu's diminished status among a certain group of politicians, public figures, and journalists who believed three years ago that Netanyahu would surprise everyone by striking a deal with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. Peres is merely the latest member of the group to face disillusionment. "For a long time, Peres nurtured the hope that with his input and consultation, Netanyahu would be much more forthcoming and active in the peace process," says David Landau, who has coauthored two EFTA00719577 books with Peres and sees him regularly. "But of late, Peres has given up that hope." The backstory of the bromance between Peres and Netanyahu is a complicated one. In 1996 the two had squared off in one of Israel's most fiercely fought elections for prime minister, just months after a right-wing Jew murdered Israeli leader Yitzhak Rabin in a bid to halt the Oslo peace process. Peres succeeded Rabin, but then lost to Netanyahu by less than half a percentage point, leaving the Israeli left with the feeling that the assassin had won—and casting a dark cloud over the fate of the peace process. Yossi Beilin, who served as a member of Peres's cabinet at the time, recalls feeling bereft, "really broken," when results were announced. Yet he found Peres remarkably composed. He remembers overhearing Peres ask his wife on the phone that day what she was cooking. When the answer, chicken, came back, Peres gave her the standard response: I'll be home for lunch. The ability to rebound from defeat was vintage Peres, but he didn't seem to harbor a grudge against Netanyahu, which surprised people around him. Peres is not above bad-mouthing political enemies— his decades-long rivalry with Rabin, a member of his own party, produced some seriously nasty invective. But people who know him say they've never heard him utter a bad word about Netanyahu, either after the election or in the years since. Landau attributes the courtesy to a certain reverence for Yoni Netanyahu, Benjamin's brother, who was killed leading the daring rescue of hostages at Entebbe in 1976. Peres, who served as defense minister at the time, dispatched Yoni on the mission and carries the burden of effectively having signed his death warrant. One way or another, Peres seems to have welcomed Netanyahu's return to the prime minister's office in 2009, even as members of the peace camp cringed. By then Peres had been serving as president for almost two years and was able to lend a hand by, among other things, smoothing early wrinkles in Netanyahu's relationship with Obama. But the good will appears to have run out last September, when Netanyahu vetoed a meeting Peres was to have held with Abbas in Amman, Jordan. The two had met secretly on four previous occasions in what amounted to the most vigorous surge of diplomacy between Israelis and Palestinians in years. Netanyahu hoped the meetings would divert Abbas from petitioning the United Nations for membership, according to a source in Netanyahu's inner circle, EFTA00719578 a move Israel feared would lead to its isolation. When Abbas pressed ahead with the •. initiative, Netanyahu terminated the Peres backchannel. About the prospects of an agreement with the Palestinians, Peres said the gaps were small, a characterization that is at odds with even the most upbeat assessments in the region. In the interview with Newsweek, Peres sidestepped questions about tensions with Netanyahu. At 88, Peres has more than a quarter century on the Israeli prime minister, a gap that seems to infuse even his frustrations with an avuncular spirit. But he did say repeatedly that giving time for sanctions against Iran to work was the right thing to do (Netanyahu has said the sanctions aren't enough and has made clear to the Americans that Israel might launch airstrikes). He also said Obama appeared to have a "deep conviction" that Iran must not get the bomb, in contrast to the skepticism some people around Netanyahu express about the American president. "Let's give the necessary time to see the effect of the economic sanctions," he said in his Jerusalem office. "There is quite an important alliance to prevent it from happening [Iran developing nuclear weapons]. Give them a chance." About the prospects of an agreement with the Palestinians, Peres said the gaps were small, a characterization that is at odds with even the most upbeat assessments in the region. Israelis and Palestinians have not engaged in sustained talks in more than three years, the longest diplomatic drought since the start of the Oslo peace process in 1993. Most observers believe that both sides are moving away from an agreement that would resolve their conflict, not toward one. But Peres is irrepressible as always. He says the setbacks are blips on a graph line that has mostly ascended since the '70s and '80s, when Israel and the PLO refused to even recognize each other. And he believes there's no real alternative to the two-state solution if Israel wants to maintain its democratic character. Peres recently co-wrote a book with Landau about his mentor, Ben-Gurion. It concludes that Ben-Gurion's greatest decision was accepting the United Nations partition plan, which gave Israel a state but much less territory than it sought. The book is a historical accounting from a man who worked under him for decades. But Landau says Peres also thinks of it as a contemporary tract. "He's trying to deliver a message to people here and now that nothing has changed since Ben-Gurion's EFTA00719579 decision," Landau said. "In order to maintain a democratic country, Israel needs to forgo part of the territory." Anicle 4 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Fearful of a nuclear Iran? The real WMD nightmare is Syria Charles P. Blair 1 March 2012 -- As possible military action against Iran's suspected nuclear weapons program looms large in the public arena, far more international concern should be directed toward Syria and its weapons of mass destruction. When the Syrian uprising began more than a year ago, few predicted the regime of President Bashar al-Assad would ever teeter toward collapse. Now, though, the demise of Damascus's current leadership appears inevitable, and Syria's revolution will likely be an unpredictable, protracted, and grim affair. Some see similarities with Libya's civil war, during which persistent fears revolved around terrorist seizure of Libyan chemical weapons, or the Qaddafi regime's use of them against insurgents. Those fears turned out to be unfounded. But the Libyan chemical stockpile consisted of several tons of aging mustard gas leaking from a half-dozen canisters that would have been impossible to utilize as weapons. Syria likely has one of the largest and most sophisticated chemical weapon programs in the world. Moreover, Syria may also possess an offensive biological weapons capability that Libya did not. While it is uncertain whether the Syrian regime would consider using WMD against its domestic opponents, Syrian insurgents, unlike many of their Libyan counterparts, are increasingly sectarian and radicalized; indeed, many observers fear the uprising is being "hij