EFTA00234224.pdf

Case 9:08-cv-80804-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/21/2008 Flietit0A ()MO D.C. ELECT July 18, 2008 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT STEVEN M. LARIMORF SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA CLERK D.S. DIST. CT. S.O. OF FLA. • MIAMI 08-80804-Civ-MARRA/JOHNSON CASE NO.: JANE DOE, a/k/a JANE DOE #1, Plaintiff, vs. JEFFREY EPSTEIN, HALEY ROBSON, and SARAH KELLEN, Defendants. NOTICE OF REMOVAL In accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1446, and 1332(a)(1), the defendants, Jeffrey Epstein, hereby remove this action' from Palm Beach County Circuit Court to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, and respectfully state as follows: Introduction Six months ago, this plaintiff filed virtually the identical lawsuit in this Court. See Jane Doe #1 v. Epstein, Case No. 08-cv-80069-KAM (S.D. Fla. filed Doe v. Epstein et at, Case No. 50 2008 CA 006596 XXXX MB (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. filed Mar. 6, 2008). Lewis "Fein 1059 044.444vEleuf Skim 340, E0coRuT Good,Etas 33133 1REM EFTA00234224  Case 9:08-cv-80804-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/21/2008 Page 2 of 100 Jan. 24, 2008) (the "First Federal Action"). The First Federal Action named Jeffrey Epstein as the sole tortfeasor, made the identical operative allegations as the instant Amended Complaint, and demanded damages of $50 million. (The amount of the demand against Epstein is evidently the product of recent reports in the press that Epstein is wealthy.) The First Federal Action was quickly followed by a series of substantially identical "Jane Doe" lawsuits, all filed by the same attorney in a three-month span. Compare Jane Doe #1 v. Epstein, Case No. 08-cv-80069-KAM (S.D. Fla. filed Jan. 24, 2008), with Jane Doe #2 v. Epstein, No. 08-CV-80119-KAM (S.D. Fla. filed Feb. 6, 2008) (asserting identical causes of action based on the same operative allegations), Jane Doe #3 v. Epstein, No. 08-CV-80232-KAM (S.D. Fla. filed Mar. 5, 2008) (same), Jane Doe #4 v. Epstein, No. 08-CV-80380-KAM (S.D. Fla. filed Apr. 14, 2008) (same), and Jane Doe #5 v. Epstein, No. 08-80381-CV-KAM (S.D. Fla. filed Apr. 14. 2008) (same). On February 20, amid these filings, Jane Doe #1 was deposed in State of Florida v. Jeffrey Epstein, 502006CF009454AXXXMB (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct., filed Jul. 19, 2006), a parallel state-court criminal action. During that deposition, she made numerous admissions that completely undermined the allegations against Epstein that she had pled in her complaint. A copy of her deposition, with names 2 Lewis rein a 3059 Guts Avmue, Sum 340, Coccor4T Goovr,FICOUDA 33133 20t316 EFTA00234225  Case 9:08-cv-80804-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/21/2008 Page 3 of 100 redacted, is attached hereto (Exhibit A). Two days later, counsel for Jane Doe #1 filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice in the First Federal Action. See Doe #1 v. Epstein, Case No. 08-CV-80069-KAM, DE 9. Two weeks later (March 6, 2008), having changed lawyers, Jane Doe #1 refiled her complaint in Florida Circuit Court as the instant case, adding two nominal defendants Mr. Epstein's personal secretary, and MB one of Jane Doe #1's contemporaries. These defendants have nothing to do with the plaintiffs case against Mr. Epstein, except that the presence oa as a defendant in this new case, because she is a citizen of Florida (Am. Compll 4), would ostensibly prevent complete diversity.2 As discussed below, however, was named in the refiled lawsuit only to destroy diversity jurisdiction, and to prevent any application of 18 § 3509(k), a mandatory stay provision applicable in federal court 2 2 Defendant Kellen is a citizen of New York (Am. Compl. ¶ 5), and is therefore a nonresident defendant for purposes of diversity jurisdiction and removal. 3 Section 3509(k) of Title 18, United States Code, provides as follows: It; at any time that a cause of action for recovery of compensation for damage or injury to the person of a child exists, a criminal action is pending which arises out of the same occurrence and in which the child is the victim, the civil action shall be stayed until the end of all phases of the criminal action and any mention of the civil action during the criminal proceeding is prohibited. As used in this subsection, a criminal action is pending until its final adjudication in the trial court. 3 Lewis Tein 3059 GIUNO AveNue, Sum 340, COcoolur Giovi, hoop* 33133 3 of 316 EFTA00234226  Case 9:08-cv-80804-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/21/2008 Page 4 of 100 besides having nothing to do with the substantive allegations of the plaintiff's $50,000,000 case, is a community-college student with no assets whatever. Even if this case purports to identify a new (and strategically nondiverse) tortfeasor, the reified lawsuit is still directed against only one defendant—Jeffrey Epstein. Then and now, the operative allegations are the same: Jane Doe alleges that Jeffrey Epstein assaulted her "in violation of Chapter 800 of the Florida Statutes."4 (Am. Compl. 1 18.) To sharpen her lawsuit, the plaintiff says she is seeking damages in connection with a "conspiracy" (Am. Compl. ¶ 22), a "plan" (Am. Compl. ¶ 32), a "scheme" (Am. Compl. ¶ 32), and an "enterprise" (Am. Compl. ¶ 32). These theories of liability, however, cannot be supported by the allegations in the Amended Complaint. Even if everything in the Amended Complaint were true, recovery against Haley Robson, under any formulation, is impossible under Florida law. Focusing on the real parties to this controversy, the instant case could have (once again) been brought here in federal court—just like the four other "Jane 18 U.S.C. § 3509(k) (emphasis added). Chapter 800, Florida Statutes, is entitled, "Lewdness; Indecent Exposure." 4 Levyfrttyin n 3059 Gus&Avow', Sun 340,030,0Ln Gaon. ilORIDA 33133 4.0316 EFTA00234227  Case 9:08-cv-80804-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/21/2008 Page 5 of 100 Doe" lawsuits presently pending against Epstein, filed by this plaintiff's former lawyer. This case is properly removed to federal court, first, because there is complete diversity among the real parties-in-interest, second, because the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, and third, because this Notice complies with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1446. Discussion A. This case is properly removable because it falls within the original jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. A state-court case is properly removable when "it could have been brought, originally, in a federal district court." Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 83 (2005) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)). This case was originally filed in federal district court, and it is the same case today. Even though it was reconfigured to look like a state-court lawsuit, this action falls squarely within the bounds of the diversity-jurisdiction statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(aX1) (establishing that federal district courts have original jurisdiction over cases where the amount in controversy [is more than $75,000] . . . and [when the controversy] is between citizens of different states"). 5 Lewis Tein n. 3059 Gump Ave mut Sulu 340, Cocorout Goon. haulm 33133 So1316 EFTA00234228  Case 9:08-cv-80804-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 07121:2008 Page 6 of 100 1. The amount in controversy in this action exceeds $75,000. This case is a duplicate of the First Federal Lawsuit. In that case, Jane Doe pled "damages in excess of $50 million." See Doe v. Epstein, No. 08-80069-KAM (S.D. Fla. filed Jan. 24, 2008) (Compl. 1 6). That allegation is now deleted and the Amended Complaint substitutes a generic prayer for relief.5 It is clear, however, that Jane Doe still seeks more than $75,000 in damages. This case, precisely like the First Federal Action, seeks damages in connection with an alleged assault. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16-19.) The Amended Complaint alleges that Jane Doe "has suffered and will continue to suffer severe and permanent traumatic injuries, including mental, psychological, and emotional damages." (Am. Compl. ¶ 19.) These are the identical injuries Jane Doe asserted in the First Federal Action, and are no less serious simply because pled under a state-court caption. Cf., e.g., Woods v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 523 F. Supp. 2d 812, 820 (N.D. III. 2007) (determining, in the context of diversity jurisdiction, that the $75,000 threshold had been satisfied, and "clearly [surpassed]," based on "the nature of the injuries alleged" in the complaint). 5 The Complaint seeks damages for "[more than] . . . $15,000." (Am. Compl. ¶ 6.) This boilerplate is routinely used in Florida pleading practice to trigger application of section 26.012, Florida Statutes, the statute that establishes the jurisdictional amount required for filing in Florida's Circuit Court (as opposed to County Court). 6 LestiCreinn. 3059 GUM° Avow'. Soul 340, COComut Gaovt, kouo• 33133 5 of 316 EFTA00234229  Case 9:08-cv-80804-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/21/2008 Page 7 of 100 To cement this point, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has said that "[w]hen [a] complaint does not claim a specific amount of damages, removal from state court is proper if it is facially apparent from the complaint that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional requirement." Williams v. Best Buy Co., Inc., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001). This case meets that standard, and satisfies the first prong of diversity jurisdiction. 2. There is complete diversity among the real parties to this controversy. Diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity. Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 187 (1990) ("Since its enactment, we have interpreted the diversity statute to require `complete diversity' of citizenship." (citing Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267-68 (1806))). See also MacGinnitie v. Hobbs Group, LLC, 420 F.3d 1234, 1239 (1 1 th Cir. 2005) (stating that "[c]omplete diversity requires that no defendant in a diversity action be a citizen of the same state as any plaintiff"). As demonstrated below, this case satisfies the statutory requirement of complete diversity. (a) Plaintiff Jane Doe is a citizen of Florida. (Am. Compl. ¶ 1.) 6 Jane Doe may, in fact, be a citizen of Georgia. not Florida, as she pled in her Amended Complaint. See New York Post, Jul. 1, 2008 (reporting that "On his way into court [for his state-court guilty plea on June 30], Epstein was served with a copy of a lawsuit by Doe, who has since moved to another state."); Jane Doe Depo. at 77, 112 (indicating that 7 Lewis stein n. 3059 Gum Amax, hart 340, CocomO GamFlora 33133 7 0 316 EFTA00234230  Case 9:08-cv-80804-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/21/2008 Page 8 of 100 (b) Defendant Jeffrey Epstein is a citizen of the U.S. Virgin Islands! (c) Defendant Sarah Kellen is a citizen of New York. (Am. Compl. ¶ 5.) 3. Defendant was fraudulently joined to defeat diversity. "A non-diverse defendant who is fraudulently joined does not defeat diversity because his citizenship is excluded from the diversity calculus." Shenkar v. Money Warehouse, Inc., No. 07-20634-CIV, 2007 WL 3023531, at *1 (S.D. Fla. her twin sister lives with her mother in Georgia); Affidavit of Dawn LaVogue Sandberg, at ¶ 1(stating, "I am the mother and natural guardian for Jane Doe #1" with jurat executed in Georgia before a Georgia notary), DE 4-2, Jane Doe No. I v. Epstein, Case No. 08- 80069-Civ-Marra (1/29/08); Intervenor's Complaint, at ¶ 2 (filed by "Jane Doe's Mother" and stating that "Jane Doe's Mother is a citizen and resident of the State of Georgia."). DE 5-2, Jane Doe No. I v. Epstein, Case No. 08-80069-Civ-Marra (1/29/08); Petition for Removal of Disability of Non-Age, at ¶¶ 1, 2. 7 (filed "on behalf of S.D.G.." alleging that "The mother is Da[w]n Lavogue Sandberg, and her address is .... Ga.," and stating that - S.D.G. is also the unnamed party in a lawsuit filed by her father on her behalf in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Case No. 08-80069, which was filed without the consent of the mother"), In re Sandberg v. Gonzalez, Case No. 50 2008 DR 001141 (Palm Beach Co. Family Ct.) (1/31/08). If this turns out to be the case, there is complete diversity, regardless of Robson's citizenship. Although the Eleventh Circuit has recently indicated that a district court may not conduct jurisdictional discovery under such circumstances, another division of this Court has since allowed it. Compare Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1215-16, 1221 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that jurisdictional discovery to determine citizenship upon removal is inappropriate), with Calixto v. BASF Constr. Chemicals, LLC, slip op., Case No. 07-60077-CIV-ZLOCH, 2008 WL 1840717, *1 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2008) (ordering that parties "shall engage in jurisdictional discovery for the Court to determine the citizenship of BASF and whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction over this action"). The Amended Complaint erroneously states that Jeffrey Epstein is a citizen of New York. 8 Lewis "reins 3059 Gt.** AvtNur, Sum 340. Cooaaul Gaov1, Rama 33133 Sof 316 EFTA00234231  Case 9:08-cv-80804-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/21/2008 Page 9 of 100 Oct. 15, 2007) (Moreno, J.) (citing Riley v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 292 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002)); accord, e.g., Tedder v. F.M.C. Corp., 590 F.2d 115, 117 (5th Cir. 1979) (denying motion to remand where two resident defendants were joined for the fraudulent purpose of defeating federal jurisdiction). In this case, the plaintiff relies on her original allegations to support three causes of action against Haley Robson: civil conspiracy (Am. Compl. 920-23); Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23-28); and civil RICO (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 29-34). These allegations, however, do not support these claims, or any other theory of liability that would allow recovery against CI Parks v. The New York Times Ca, 308 F.2d 474, 477 (5th Cir. 1962) (observing that "determination of fraudulent joinder is to be based on whether there was a real intention on colorable grounds to procure a joint judgment") (emphasis added).8 (a)Nonresident defendants have a right of removal. The removal statute was enacted specifically "to protect defendants." Legg v. Wyeth, 428 F.3d 1317, 1325 (11th Cir. 2005). Cf., e.g., Picquet v. Amoco Prod. Co., 513 F. Supp. 938, 941 (M.D. La. 1981) (explaining that courts developed the fraudulent-joinder doctrine to protect "the right [of removal] granted to 8 In Bonner v. City ofPrichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en bane), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to October I, 1981. 9 Lewis Tein n. 3059 GRAND AVINUI. Suits 340, Cocoma Won, CIORIOA 33133 9o33,6 EFTA00234232  Case 9:08-cv-80804-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/21/2008 Page 10 of 100 [defendants] by . . . Congress"). In this case, by reconstituting her original federal lawsuit and refiling it in state Court, the plaintiff has clearly sought to avoid the strictures of the mandatory stay of this case that federal law requires under 18 U.S.C. § 3509(k).9 In federal court, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3509(k), this action must be automatically stayed pending final disposition of an ongoing parallel criminal action against Mr. Epstein. See 18 U.S.C. § 3509(k) (providing that a parallel civil 9 By filing in state court, the plaintiff's attorney has also evidently sought to avoid the clear command of our local rules forbidding public comment about the merits of a pending lawsuit. Compare S.D. Fla. Local Rule 77.2(7) (- A lawyer or law firm associated with a civil action shall not during its investigation or litigation make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement, other than a quotation from or reference to public records, which a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if there is a reasonable likelihood that such dissemination will interfere with a fair trial and which relates to (a) Evidence regarding the occurrence or transaction involved. (b) The character . . . of a party . . (d) The lawyer's opinion as to the merits of the claims . . . ."), with Ricci—Leopold Home Page, http:// www.riccilaw.com (click on "Breaking News," then access the hyperlink entitled, 03/13/08 - Consumer Justice Attorney Ted LeopoldFiles Case to aid Jane Doe in seeking justice against sexual predator Jeffrey Epstein and his associates. ) (describing character of party defendant Epstein as a "sexual predator" (a term defined by Florida criminal statutes) and quoting the plaintiff's attorney "Ted Leopold, managing partner" as characterizing Epstein as "an extremely powerful and wealthy man," with "vast resources," who acted "in the vilest way" at his "lavish mansion" with "lurid fantasies" and inflicting "untold damage," and opining that he should "be held accountable;" also quoting the plaintiff's attorney as opining that "[t]his case is both about justice and making sure that a wealthy and powerful man knows that he is not above the law;" also quoting the plaintiff's attorney's view of the evidence that plaintiff "continues to endure emotional trauma daily") (Web site last visited July 17, 2008). 10 Lewis • Tein PI 3033 Gasuo Amyl. Surer 340, CIXONUT G4ovr, kola 33133 10 04319 EFTA00234233  Case 9:08-cv-80804-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/21/2008 Page 11 of 100 action arising from an alleged sexual assault of a minor "shall be stayed until the end of all phases of [any] criminal action") (emphasis added). In this case, there is a parallel federal criminal grand jury action pending in the Southern District of Florida, In re Grand Jury, No. FGJ 07-103(WPB) (S.D. Fla.), which arises out of the same allegations pled here. Thus, in resorting to fraudulent joinder, the plaintiff has sought to avoid any application of this otherwise controlling statute. Cf. Doe v. Francis, No. 5:03 CV 260 MCR/WCS, 2005 WL 517847, at *1-2 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 10, 2005) (staying civil diversity action over plaintiffs' objections on grounds that "the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3509(k) is clear that a stay is required in a case . . . where a parallel criminal action is pending which arises from the same occurrence involving minor victims") (emphasis added). Even outside the context of a mandatory federal statute, "the Supreme Court [has] admonished [that] `the Federal courts should not sanction devices intended to prevent a removal to a Federal court where one has that right, and should be equally vigilant to protect the right to proceed in the Federal court.'" Lea, 428 F.3d at 1325 (citing Wecker v. Nat'l Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 186 (1907)). See also id. (observing that "Congress `did not extend [to defendants a right of removal] with one hand, and with the other give plaintiffs a bag of tricks II Lewis fl ing-I. 3059 GaAs° Avt htn, SLAT, 340. COCCALIT G,ovr, Fiona 33133 31 of 318 EFTA00234234  Case 9:08-cv-80804-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/21/2008 Page 12 of 100 to overcome it"' (quoting McKinney v. Bd. of Trustees of Maryland Cmty. Coll.. 955 F.2d 924, 928 (4th Cir. 1992))). To protect a nonresident defendant's right of removal, a federal court will "determine the matter of jurisdiction" by examining "the true situation both as to parties and causes of action." Bernblum v. Travelers' Inc. Co., 9 F. Supp. 34, 35 (W.D. Mo. 1934) (emphasis added). See also id. (observing that "[t]he federal courts will . . . strike out the fiction injected into a case by a party to prevent removal"). In accordance with these principles, a plaintiff cannot destroy diversity jurisdiction simply by conjuring up a nondiverse defendant; there must be at least some "possibility that the state law might impose liability on [the nondiverse] defendant under the circumstances alleged in the complaint." Florence v. Crescent Res., LLC, 484 F.3d 1293, 1299 (11th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). See also, Holloway v. Morrow, No. 07-0839-WS-M, 2008 WL 401305, at *5 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 11, 2008) (emphasizing that "ItJhe potential for legal liability must be reasonable, not merely theoretical" (quoting Legg v. Wyeth, 428 F.3d 1317, 1325 n.5 (11th Cir. 2005))) (emphasis added). In this case, the plaintiffs have tried to whip Jane Doe's original, one- defendant complaint into a froth that looks non-federal. Cf. Owens v. Swan, 962 F. Supp. 1436, 1439 (D. Utah 1997) (noting that "although plaintiffs' amended 12 Levyk:Ctin M. 3059 GweAvanur,SUOTE 340, Coormul Glow, flOOICIA 33133 12 04 316 EFTA00234235  Case 9:08-cv-80804-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/21/2008 Page 13 of 100 complaint contains four claims for relief, the first and second claims state only one cause of action") (emphasis added). Using her original allegations and adding nothing, Jane Doe has tried to add claims against for civil conspiracy (Am. Compl. ¶1 20-23), Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24-28), and civil RICO (Compl. ¶9 29-34) in order to append a nondiverse defendant to her Complaint. These claims, however, are untenable under Jane Doe's own allegations, and therefore cannot be used to destroy diversity jurisdiction. (b) There is no ssibili that the plaintiff can establish a cause of action agains under Florida law. (i) The conspiracy claim against must fail. As a general rule, "[a]n actionable conspiracy [under Florida law] requires an actionable underlying tort or wrong." Wright v. Yurko, 446 So. 2d 1162, 1165 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).1° 10 This case is governed by the general rule. Cf. Churruca v. Miami Jai-Alai, Inc., 353 So. 2d 547,550 (Fla. 1977) (noting that while there is "ordinarily . . . no independent tort for conspiracy," there is a narrow exception to this rule when "the plaintiff can show some peculiar power of coercion possessed by the conspirators by virtue of their combination") (emphasis added). See generally Liappas v. Augoustis, 47 So. 2d 582,583 (Fla. 1950) (observing that "'instances of conspiracy which is in itself an independent tort are rare and should be added to with caution" (quoting Fleming v. Dane, 22 N.E.2d 609, 611, (Mass. 1939))) (emphasis added). Plainly, this case involves the general rule, not the narrow exception, because only one person could have caused Jane Doe's injuries. CI Martin v. Marlin, 529 So. 2d 1174, 1179 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (upholding 13 Lewis Tann. 3059 Gomainwtkvi, Sun 340, (WONT G.ovejtam 33133 13 Of S16 EFTA00234236  Case 9:08-cv-80804-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/21/2008 Page 14 of 100 Here, Jane Doe cannot assert a cause of action for "violation of Chapter 800, Florida Statutes" (Am. Compl. ¶ 18) because there is no private right of action under that Chapter. See generally Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Plaza Materials Corp., 908 So. 2d 360, 374 (Fla. 2005) (observing that "not every statutory violation carries a civil remedy" (citing Villazon v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc.. 843 So. 2d 842, 852 (Fla. 2003))). See also, e.g., Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Ferre, 636 F. Stipp. 970 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (King, C.J.) (holding that violation of Florida's criminal extortion statute does not give rise to a civil cause of action for damages); Mantooth v. Richards, 557 So. 2d 646, 646 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff's claim for parental kidnapping where "the mentioned statutes concern only criminal violations and do not afford a civil remedy") (citation omitted) (emphasis added); Wright v. Yurko, 446 So. 2d 1162, 1165 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (holding that "[a]n act which does not constitute a basis for a cause of action against one person cannot be made the basis for a civil action for conspiracy"). In this case, Jane Doe's claim under Count II (civil conspiracy) fails because it derives exclusively from Count I (violation of Chapter 800, Florida Statutes). Cf grant of summary judgment against claim for independent conspiracy, noting that -[w]hen the concerted acts of the defendants do not create a greater harm than if the acts were committed by one person alone. then there can be no recovery"). 14 Lewis Minn. 3059 Gam° Aviliut, Sum 340, Oxciran Gotovi, ROMA 33133 14 et 316 EFTA00234237  Case 9:08-cv-80804-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/21/2008 Page 15 of 100 Buchanan v. Miami Herald Publ'g Co., 230 So. 2d 9, 12 (Fla. 1969) (holding that where Count I of the complaint had failed to state a cause of action for malicious prosecution, there could be no civil-conspiracy claim in Count II "based on the allegations of Count I"). Because the statute she expressly pleads as the basis for Count I, Chapter 800, Florida Statutes, provides no civil remedy, Jane Doe cannot prevail on Count I. Therefore, she cannot prevail on her claim for conspiracy (Count II) to violate Chapter 800, Florida Statutes (Count I). (ii) The plaintiff cannot prevail against nondiverse defendant Haley Robson on her claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (LIED). Even if the plaintiff, for the sake of argument, can assert an LIED claim against Jeffrey Epstein, the plaintiff still does not have a cause of action for LIED against First, the plaintiff cannot recover damages in connection with her own illegal conduct; and second, the plaintiff's purported LIED claim fails as a matter of law. 15 Lewis rein n. 3059 Gate Avikut, SUITE 340, Coconut 64ovi, itO*100. 33133 15 ol 516 EFTA00234238  Case 9:08-cv-80804-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 07)21:2008 Page 16 of 100 1. The plaintiff seeks damages in connection with her own illegal conduct. The plaintiff concedes that she went to Jeffrey Epstein's house "to give Epstein a massage for monetary compensation." (Am. Compl. ¶ 13.) The plaintiff also concedes, in the guise of an allegation, that "brought Jane Doe to Epstein's mansion in Palm Beach" to help the plaintiff execute her own plan. (Am. Compl. ¶ 13.) Yet, the plaintiff's plan was illegal: under Florida law, it is a crime "to practice massage" without a license. § 480.047, Fla. Stat. (1997). To say it another way, the plaintiff admits that she went to Mr. Epstein's house to commit a crime. Based on these allegations, it is clear that the plaintiff seeks damages in connection with her own illegal conduct; this is enough to support a finding of fraudulent joinder. See Florence v. Crescent Resources, LLC, 484 F.3d 1293, 1298 n.3 (11th Cir. 2007) (acknowledging that "under some circumstances, application of an affirmative defense can support a finding of fraudulent joinder). This conclusion is supported by well-established principles. Under Florida law, a plaintiff cannot recover damages flowing from her own illegal conduct. See Hall v. Hall, 93 Fla. 709, 112 So. 622, 628 (1927) (referring to "the universal rule of our law that one in a court of justice cannot complain . . . of another's wrong whereof he was a partaker") (internal quotation marks and citation 16 Lewis 'reins. 3059 Gina° Avoiut, Sun 340, Cocoso Gsove, Elmo^ 33133 16 01316 EFTA00234239  Case 9:08-cv-80804-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/21/2008 Page 17 of 100 omitted) (emphasis added); Turner v. Anderson, 704 So. 2d 748, (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) ("[N]o public policy should allow appellant to recover damages as a result of engaging in criminal conduct such as occurred in this case."). CI Ewell v. Daggs, 108 U.S. 143, 149 (1883) (stating that "`[n]o court will lend its aid to a [plaintiff] who founds [a] cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal act'") (quoting Holman v. Johnson, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (K.B. 1775)); see also id. (explaining that this policy is ("not for the sake of the defendant, but because [the courts] will not lend their aid to such a plaintiff" (quoting Holman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120)) (emphasis added); Balas v. Ruzzo, 703 So. 2d 1076, 1082 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (Harris, J., concurring) (remarking in the context of an action brought against an alleged prostitution house that "the court should continue its tradition of not interceding in civil conflicts involving transactions that are either illegal or are against public policy"). Based on the foregoing, the plaintiff cannot blame someone els for the consequences of her own criminal conduct. CI Fe/d & Sons, Inc. v. Pechner, Dorfman, Wolfe, Rounick and Cabot, 458 A.2d 545, 552 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (holding that law-firm clients could not recover damages flowing from their own criminal acts, even though clients' lawyers had suggested the unlawful conduct to begin with). See also Turner v. Anderson, 704 So. 2d 748, 751 (Fla. 4th 17 Lewis 'Minn. 3059 G4Atto Amax. Sum 340, COCONUT GROVE, hasp 33133 17 01316 EFTA00234240  Case 9:08-cv-80804-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 0721:2008 Page 18 of 100 DCA 1998) (approving reasoning in Feld & Sons, holding that "no public policy should allow [a plaintiff] to recover damages as a result of engaging in criminal conduct" where the plaintiff had provided false testimony at an arbitration proceeding). 2. The plaintiffs LIED claim fails as a matter of law. To state a cause of action for TIED, a complaint must allege four elements: i I ) deliberate or reckless infliction of mental suffering; (2) outrageous conduct; (3) the conduct caused the emotional distress; and (4) the distress was severe. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. McCarson, 467 So. 2d 277, 278 (Fla. 1985). Whether conduct is outrageous enough to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is a question of law, not a question of fact. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Steadman, 968 So. 2d 592, 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (citations omitted). In this case, without reaching the question of "outrage," the plaintiff has failed to show that , conduct - - allegedly arranging an illegal sexual massage that the plaintiff herself agreed to perform - - itself caused the plaintiff to suffer any emotional distress. Even if the alleged agreement was fraudulently induced, the plaintiff's LIED claim flows from Epstein's alleged conduct, not the joint conduct o nd Doe in planning the massage. 18 Lewis. Tein • .•• Ann 3059 GausAvniut,Sunt HO, Cocain Goovt, hots' 33133 1801316 EFTA00234241  Case 9:08-cv-80804-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/21:2008 Page 19 of 100 (iii) The plaintiff cannot prevail on her claim for civil remedies for criminal practices or racketeering ("civil RICO") pled in Count IV. A cause of action under section 772.104, Florida Statutes ("Civil Remedies for Criminal Practices") requires a showing of direct injury. Even assuming for the sake of argument that Jane Doe can establish that the defendants engaged in a "pattern of criminal activity," she cannot establish that she was directly injured by those activities. Section 772.104 allows someone to bring a civil RICO claim only if "he or she has been injured by reason of any RICO violation. § 772.104, Fla. Stat. (2007). Here, the allegations in Count IV, even if they are true, do not add up to a civil RICO claim because there is no proximate cause between the purported "pattern of criminal activity" and Jane Doe's alleged injuries. In a doomed attempt to satisfy the extremely high burden of pleading civil RICO under Florida law, the Amended Complaint lists a series of violations rooted in Florida's prostitution statutes. (Am. Compl. 1 31.) According to the Amended Complaint, the defendants participated in a criminal enterprise . . . or conspir[acy]" (Am. Compl. 1 30) over an unspecified length of time "to repeatedly find and bring [Jeffrey Epstein] underage girls . . . in order for Epstein to solicit, coerce, entice, compel, or force such girls in acts of prostitution and/or lewdness" (Am. 19 Lewis 3059 Guam Aviriur,Sufi. 3,Wtact:wan Gkovi, limo* 33133 19 of 316 EFTA00234242  Case 9:08-cv-80804-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/21/2008 Page 20 of 100 Compl. ¶ 32). The alleged "pattern of criminal activity" comprises violations of Chapter 796, Florida Statutes—the chapter that proscribes various crimes of prostitution.° These allegations do not tie directly into Jane Doe's alleged psychic injuries. In contrast to a cognizable RICO claim, this action concerns only an isolated occurrence. More important, the alleged injuries in this case are pled to have resulted from an alleged sexual assault, an assault "in violation of Chapter 800 of the Florida Statutes" (Am. Compl. ¶ 18)—not anything having to do with the facilitation of prostitution, or more succinctly, the violation of Florida's prostitution law. Civil RICO claims are extraordinarily difficult to plead successfully. There are examples in the case law of RICO claims stemming from a prostitution enterprise, but they are vastly different from what plaintiff pleads here. They involve, for example, prostitutes who sued a house of prostitution (as an "enterprise") for inflicting systematic and repetitive abuse on them, over time. See Baku v. Ruzzo, 703 So. 2d 1076, 1077 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (offering an example of a civil RICO claim against the operators of an alleged "house of prostitution," The Amended Complaint alleges a "pattern of criminal activity" comprising the following criminal violations: §§ 796.03, 796.07(2)(0, 796.07(2Xh), 796.045, and 796.04, Fla. Stat. (Am. Compl. 131.) 20 Lewis itsin 3059 GRAND swum, Same 340, CoCONut Gaovt, ROMA 31133 20 at SIG EFTA00234243  Case 9:08-cv-80804-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/21/2008 Page 21 of 100 where petitioners alleged that they had "suffered emotional pain, anguish, humiliation, insult, indignity, loss of self-esteem, inconvenience, hurt and emotional distress" as a result of being forced repeatedly, over time, to "perform sexual acts to retain their employment"). Here, even if the Amended Complaint can be read to plead that the defendants schemed to solicit other massages from other people (see, e.g., Am. Compl. TV 9, 11, 12, 32), those activities are not alleged in any way to have impacted Jane Doe. Cf., e.g., Palmas Y Bambu, S.A. v. F..I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., Inc., 881 So. 2d 565, 570 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (holding that "'indirect injuries, that is injuries sustained not as a direct result of predicate acts . . . will not allow recovery under Florida RICO."' (quoting O'Malley v. St. Thomas Univ., Inc., 599 So. 2d 999, 1000 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992))) (emphasis added). Because the Amended Complaint does not satisfy the direct-injury requirement under Florida's RICO law, Jane Doe has failed to allege a cause of action against for violation of section 772.103, Florida Statutes. B. This Notice satisfies the procedural requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1446. 1. This notice of removal is timely. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1446, this notice of removal is timely. Only defendant Epstein has been served with process. Defendants and 21 Lewis:Teinn. 3059 Gum} Avtme. Sum 340, Cocomo Gaon, FIOROA 33133 21 outs EFTA00234244  Case 9:08-cv-80804-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/21/2008 Page 22 of 100 have not yet been served. In a multi-defendant lawsuit, removal is timely when effected within 30 days after the last defendant is served. See Hill Dermaceuticals, Inc. v. RX Solutions, United Health Group, Inc., No. 6:08-cv-330-Or1-311CRS, 2008 WL 1744794, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 11, 2008) (concluding that removal petition was timely where it was filed within 30 days after the last defendant was served). 2. Notice has been given, and state-court papers have been filed. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), defendants have served this Notice of Removal on July 18, 2008. All papers filed in State Court are attached to this Removal Petition. 3. There is unanimity among the defendants. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § I446(b) the undersigned are authorized to represent that all of the defendants join this Petition and consent to removal. Conclusion Because this is a civil action between citizens of different states, excluding any fraudulently joined parties, and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs, this Court has original jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(aX1).