EFTA01785152.pdf

From: Office of Tana Rod-Larsen Sent: Monday, May 13, 2013 6:16 PM Subject: May 11 update Article 1. <file:///ClUsers/Efrat=20Elron/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/Temporary%20Internet%20Files/Conte=t.IES/NXRD KT39/11%20May.doc#a> NYT Why=Putin Can't Solve Syria David Rohde <http://rendezvous.blo=s.nytimes.com/author/david-rohde/> Article 2. <file:///ClUsers/Efrat=20EIron/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/Temporary%20Internet%20Files/Conte=t.lE5/NXRD KT39/11%20May.doc#b> The Washi=gton Post In =yria's war, the lines that matter aren't red Fouad Aja=i Article 3. <file:///ClUsers/Efrat=20EIron/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/Temporary%20Internet%20Files/Conte=t.IE5/NXRD KT39/11%20May.doc#c> Fpreign A=fairs Isr=el's Man in Damascus Efraim Halevy <http://www.foreignaffarrs.com/author/efraim-halevy> Article 4. <file:///ClUsers/Efrat=20EIron/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/Temporary%20Internet%20Files/Conte=t.IE5/NXRD KT39/11%20May.doc#d> Al-Arabiy= Spe=tre of bankruptcy haunts Egypt Adel al-Toraifi Article 5. <file:///ClUsers/Efrat=20EIron/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/Temporary%20Internet%20Files/Conte=t.IE5/NXRD KT39/11%20May.doctte> EFTA_R1_00107014 EFTA01785152 Project S=ndicate The=Egypt-Israel Peace Test Itamar Rabinovich <http://www.project-syn=icate.orecontributor/itamar-rabinovich> , <http://www.project- syndicate.org/contributornamara-witte=> Article 6. <file:///ClUsers/Efrat=20EIron/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/Temporary%20Internet%20Files/Conte=t.IES/NXRD KT39/11%20May.doc#f> The Atlan=ic Wha= Is China's Plan for The Middle East? Matt Schi=venza Art=cle 7. The Natio=al Interest The=Day After a Strike on Iran Marwan Muasher <http://nationalinteres=.org/profile/marwan•muasher> Article 8= Prospect<=span> Mic=ael Sandel and AC Grayling in conversation Article 1. NYT Why Putin Can't Solve Sy=ia David Rohde <http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/author/david-=ohdeh May 11, 2013 -- Moscow — Afte= marathon meetings with Secretary of State John Kerry here this week, the =ussian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, hinted that Moscow might finally pressure President Bashir al-Assad of Syria to l=ave office. 2 EFTA_R1_00107015 EFTA01785153 "We are not interested in the fate =f certain individuals," Mr. Lavrov said at a late night news conference <httpl=www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/05/209117.htm> on Tuesday. "We are interested in the fate=of the Syrian people." Mr. Lavrov and Mr. Kerry announced th=t they would host an international conference where Syrian government officials and rebels will be given a chance to name an i=terim government <http:=/www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/07/us-syria-crisis-conference-idUSBRE9461=S20130507> . The odds of the two sides agreeing are low but Mr. Kerry d=serves credit for securing a small diplomatic step forward here. The problem is that Mr. Lavrov =nd his boss, President Vladimir Putin, may be unable to deliver on Mr. Ass=d. For nearly two years, Mr. lavro= and Mr. Putin have served as the Syrian leaders' chief diplomatic allie= but Iran has provided far more military support. Russian analysts say Washington is kidding itself if it believes Mr. Putin=can orchestrate a quick and easy Assad exit. "All of this is wishful think=ng," said Sergei Strokan, a columnist for the liberal Moscow daily Komme=sant. "Moscow has quite limited influence on the Syrian regime." Decades from now, President Bar=ck Obama's decision to not arm Syria's rebels may be condemned or prai=ed. But a visit to Moscow this week showed that it has come at an immediate price. Washington's failure to act created a=vacuum that Mr. Putin and Mr. Lavrov used to boost Russia's global stand=ng. "For the last two years, Lavrov has=dramatically elevated his profile on the world stage," Susan Glasser rec=ntly wrote in Foreign Policy magazine. "He has done so by almost singl=-handedly defying Western attempts to force some united action <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/arti=les/2013/04/29/minister_no?page=full> to stop Syria's deadly civil war." Mr. Lavrov and Mr. Putin have a=so used Syria to bolster their standing at home. Mr. Kerry's widely publ=cized visit coincided with the one-year anniversary of disputed elections in Russia that led to Mr. Putin's third term in of=ice. Before meeting with Mr. Kerry, Mr. Putin fired a key lieutenant who w=s the architect of the system that has allowed the Russian leader to contr=l major industries, seize most media outlets and intimidate or co-opt rivals. With the price of oil low, Putin's =il-dependent economy is flagging. Barring a surge in prices, massive socia= welfare payments are unsustainable. <=ont face="Times New Roman">Corruption is endemic, consuming an estimated $300 billion a year <http://www.blo=mberg.com/news/2013-05-07/strongman-putin-is-no-match-for-corruption.html> , 16 percent of Russia's g=oss domestic product. Transparency International, an anti-corruption group= named Russia the worst nation on earth in its most recent Bribe Payer's index <http://bpi.transparency.org/bpi2=11/results/> , which ranks firms on their likelihood to bribe. A spate of recent laws on libel, prot=sts, blasphemy and treason has made it more difficult to exercise basic rights chttp://artic=es.washingtonpost.com/2013-04-17/world/38597570_1_russia-putin-alexander-c=erkasov> , the Washington Post reported last month.=Mr. Putin also recently ordered prosecutors nationwide to search for non- g=vernmental organizations that have failed to abide by a new law requiring them to register as "foreign agen=s" if they receive foreign funding. Mr. Putin is probably secure un=il the end of his term in 2016. But a slowing economy and public fatigue w=th Mr. Putin are taking a toll. In the end, the key factor may be the price of oil, the pillar of Putin's one-dimens=onal economy. "If the price of oil drops below $50 [a barrel), it is a death sentence,=94 said a Russian analyst who asked not to be named.<=p> On the international stage, mea=while, Russia is ascendant. For Mr. Putin, Mr. Kerry's request for help =arked the achievement of a decade-old goal. From the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's 1999 bombing of Kosovo, to=the 2003 3 EFTA_R1_00107016 EFTA01785154 invasion of Iraq, to the 2011 U.N.-backed toppling of Muammar Gad=afi, Moscow has been largely irrelevant. Mr. Putin saw each post-Cold War =merican intervention as an attempt to remove opponents, not defend human rights. "In Putin's view, they were all v=ctims of a cynical U.S. plot for global domination," journalist Lucian K=m wrote last year, "whe=e any weapon is fair game, be it smart bomb, a pro-democracy grant or Twitte=." <http://www.luciankim.com/blogs/Ircian-in-moscow/the-syrian-connection/> Instead of being the West's p=tential victim, Mr. Putin is now its vital interlocutor. Maria Lipman, a s=holar-in-residence at the Carnegie Moscow Center and a leading political analyst, said Mr. Putin's logic is simple= "You may denounce us," she explained, "but when it comes to the mos= important international issue today, you come to Moscow."=/span> So, why is the Obama administra=ion turning to Mr. Putin for help? The answer is simple: the White House=92s deep desire to not get entangled in Syria. To American officials, a deal with Russia is a cost-free solution. The geo=olitical equivalent, if you will, of a drone strike. No Americans lives wi=l be lost. There will be little domestic political risk. In truth, though, there is no e=sy way to stem the conflict in Syria, which increasingly threatens to dest=bilize the region. Blame is widespread. Mr. Assad, of course, is the worst culprit. His refusal to relinquish powe= in the face of an initially peaceful protest movement has led to the kill=ng of an estimated 70,000 people. In Washington, Mr. Obama allowed exagger=ted fears of another Iraq to paralyze his administration. Mr. Putin, though, has arguably=been the most cynical. He exaggerated his control of Mr. Assad and may als= be double- dealing. Twenty-four hours after Mr. Kerry lef= Moscow, the press reported that Russia was planning to sell surface-to-air missiles to Syria <http://news.yahoo.rom/kerry-russia-sells-missile-defense-syria-1S2511867.html> that would make any American intervention in the conflict vastly more difficult. The Wall Street J=urnal reported that Israeli officials had warned the Obama administration <http://online.wsj.com/article/S=.10001424127887324059704578471453006383248.html> of Russia's imminent sa=e to Syria of sophisticated 5-300 missiles with a range of 125 miles. Asked about the sale at a press=conference in Rome on Thursday, Mr. Kerry said Washington would prefer tha= Russia not provide arms to Syria and called the missiles "potentially destabilizing" to Israel. If true, the missi=e sale would be a personal affront to Mr. Kerry, who lauded Mr. Putin and =r. Lavrov in Moscow. Sale or no sale, the proposed c=nference should be carried out. Both sides may miraculously agree on an in=erim government. But it is more likely that the =nited States has lost control of the rebels, particularly the jihadists. A=d Russia has lost control of Mr. Assad, who retains Tehran's backing and has killed so many people that he canno= compromise. Syria's downward spiral will continue. Article 2.</=ont> The Washington Post 4 EFTA_R1_00107017 EFTA01785155 4=ont> In Syria's war, the line= that matter aren't red Fouad Ajami May 9 -- It is rarely a go=d idea to draw maps in a hurry. But that is what colonial cartographers di= in the Arab world after the First World War, and the borders they painted were superimposed on old tribal and religious=attachments that long predated the new states. Today, the folly of those lines is ma=e clear, as Syria's war <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/reported-israeli- airs=rikes-threats-of-retaliation-complicate-syrian-civil-war/2013/05/06/4e8217=6-b67b-11e2-92f3- 1291801936b8_story.html?tid=pm_world_pop> threatens not just its territorial unity but that of its neighbors as we=l. Alas, it was perhaps optimistic to ev=r imagine that the fighting between Syria's Alawite regime and the Sunni=led rebellion would remain within the country's borders. Syria is at once the pivot and a mirror of the Fertile Crescent, =nd its sectarian and ethnic fissures reproduce themselves in neighboring A=ab states. As an oddly passive President Obama ponders what he might do in Syria <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/on-=yria-recent- developments-favor-case-for-stepped-up-us-military-aid/2013/05=06/b0089cce-b682-11e2-b94c- b684dda07add_story.html> — and whether to do anything at all — he should b= less preoccupied with red lines of his own making than with the blurring 4 the lines drawn in Arab sands decades ago. On the map, Tripoli, on the Med=terranean Sea, lies within the borders of Lebanon and is the country's s=cond-largest city. But Tripoli, staunchly Sunni, with an Alawite minority, has always been within the orbit of the S=rian city of Horns. So it is no mystery that a deadly conflict now rages in=Tripoli between Sunni and Alawite neighborhoods, rendering the place ungov=rnable. Sunni jihadists and preachers see the Syrian struggle as their own, an opportunity to evict the Alawites=from their midst and to restore Sunni primacy. Look to Iraq, on Syria's eastern bo=der, for the region's quintessential artificial entity. Today, the gover=ment in Baghdad, Shiite-led for the first time in a millennium, sides with the Alawite dictatorship <http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013=03-24/world/37989851_1maliki-iranian-flights-state-john-f-kerry> in Damascus. But in western Iraq, the Sunni strongholds of Anba= province and Mosul have been stirred up by the Syrian rebellion. The same=tribes straddle the border between the two countries. Smugglers and traders, and now Sunni warriors, pay that=border no heed. The American war upended the or=er of things in Iraq; the Sunni minority lost out to the Shiites and brist=ed under that change of fortunes. The Syrian rebellion, a Sunni upheaval against an Alawite minority, has been a boon t= the Sunnis of Iraq. The Sunnis have bottomless grievances against the gov=rnment of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. To them, Maliki, who spent a qua=ter-century exiled in Syria and Iran, is an agent of the Iranian theocracy. So even though the regime in S=ria did its best to subvert the new order in Baghdad — between 2003 and =009, Syria was the transit point for jihadists converging on Iraq to fight=the Americans and the Shiites — the Maliki government, with oil money, and anchored in the power of the (Shiit=) Dawa party, is throwing a lifeline to the Syrian dictator.=/span> The Shiite appetite in Iraq has grown=with the eating. Anti-terrorism laws and the provisions of de-Baathificati=n have been unleashed on the Sunnis, and the forces of order have become instruments of the Maliki government. Thou=ands languish in prison on spurious charges, and protests <http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-0S- 03/world/38994=22_1_security-forces-sunni-protest-site-civil-war> have broken out in Sunni cities. The Syrian conflict has added fuel to the=fire. If the Sunnis needed proof that the Shiite coalition in the region (=omprising Iran, the Iraqi state, the Alawite regime in Damascus and Hezbol=ah in Lebanon) is hell-bent on robbing them of their historic place in Iraq, their government's tilt to=ard Bashar al-Assad provided it. 5 EFTA_R1_00107018 EFTA01785156 It was a matter of time before =hese millennial conflicts were given new life by the Syrian civil war, whi=h has acquired the passion of a religious calling. So Shiite warriors from Iraq and Lebanon flock to Syria today, th=y tell us, to protect the shrine of Sayyida Zeinab in the eastern suburbs =f Damascus. It is easy work for Hasan Nasrallah, the secretary general of =ezbollah, to dispatch young foot soldiers to Damascus and drape his support for the Syrian dictator in the =arb of religious duty. Terrorist groups, Nasrallah sai= on April 30, had threatened to overrun and destroy the shrine. "If such=a crime were to take place, it will carry with it grave consequences," he warned. "Countries supporting these gr=ups will be held responsible for this crime." Nasrallah is not a subtle man. He pro=laimed nothing less than a sectarian war over Syria: "Syria has real fri=nds in the region, and the world will not allow Syria to fall into the hands of America, Israel and the takfiri grou=s," or militant Islamists. Nasrallah, very much in the tradition of Mali=i in Baghdad, offended the Sunnis in his own country. Sunni preachers in B=irut, Sidon and Tripoli have called on their own <http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-04- 27/world/38856=12_1_syrian-rebels-syrian-civil-war-syrian-border-region> to rise to the defense of the Syrian rebellion. The schism over Syria was given=away in a Pew survey released May 1 that found 91percent of Lebanon's S=iites had a favorable opinion of Assad, and 8 percent held an unfavorable one. The results among the country's Sunni= were the reverse: 7 percent favorable, 92 percent unfavorable. Such estra=gement in a small, claustrophobic country! Syria's war plays out differently a=ong its neighbors. Jordan, through no choice of its own, is caught up in t=e struggle as southern Syria, for all practical purposes, spills over its border. An estimated 500,000 Syrians have made their way into Jordan <http://ar=icles.washingtonpost.com/2013-04-21/world/38717617_1_syrians-jordanians-am=an-government> — almost a staggering 10 percent of that=country's population. Jordan is overwhelmingly Sunni, so it has been spa=ed the virulence of the vendettas blowing through Iraq and Lebanon. But it has its own fault line — between a secu=ar monarchy and a strong Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood is invested i= the success of the rebellion in Syria, and the monarchy is on edge. It ca='t close its border in the face of the Syrians, and it struggles to cope with a huge economic burden <http://articl=s.washingtonpost.com/2013-03-04/world/37438059_1_zaatari-syrian-refugees-n=w- refugees> amid its own scarcities. It waits for deliverance —=help from the Gulf Arabs and from the United States — and prays for an a=d to this war from hell. Israel is, of course, a Syrian =eighbor apart. Wisely, it initially kept a policy of benign yet watchful n=glect of this fight. There was no love lost for the Syrian dictatorship but no faith that the rebels would make better=neighbors if and when they came to power. On the one hand, the dictatorshi=, under Assad and his father before him, had kept the peace on the Israeli=Syrian border. But the Syrians had also stoked tensions on the Lebanese-Israeli frontier and had given Ir=n access to the Mediterranean, so perilously close to Israel. It was the b=tter part of wisdom to steer clear of Syria's fire.=/p> But alleged Israeli airstrikes <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_eastfisrael-sa=s-hezbollah-target-not- syria/2013/05/06/438d805e-b683-11e2-92f3-f291801936=8_story.html> over Damascus in recent days have demonstrated the limits of Isra=l's patience. The targets were depots of Iranian missiles, meant to be d=livered to Hezbollah. These missiles had a range of 200 miles and could carry half-ton warheads. The Israelis m=de good on their "red line." They would not permit Hezbollah that kind=of power over their security. Even with all this instability,=I don't believe that the borders of the Fertile Crescent will be erased.=Western Iraq will not secede and join Syria, nor will Tripoli slip into Syria. But a Syria ruled by a Sunni majority wo=ld rewrite the rules of the region's politics. 6 EFTA_R1_00107019 EFTA01785157 It could put an end to the mili=arization of Syrian society that has wrecked that country. Free of despoti=m, the Syrian middle class might erect the foundations of a more open and merciful nation. Syria is a land of merchan=s and commerce, and therein lies the hope that a better country could emer=e from this ruin. Lebanon, too, would be given a =hance at normalcy. The power of Hezbollah in that country has derived to a=great extent from the power of the Syrian dictatorship. If Syria is transformed, Lebanon must change as well, and th= power of Hezbollah could be cut down to size. Utopia will not visit the r=gion after the fall of the Syrian tyranny, but there is no denying that be=ter politics may take hold in Syria and in its immediate neighborhood. The remarkable thing about this=drawn-out fight, now entering its third year, is the passivity of the Unit=d States. A region of traditional American influence has been left to fend for itself. Of course, these sectarian enmi=ies do not lend themselves to an outsider's touch. Nor did Obama call up=these furies; they cannot be laid at his doorstep. But the unwillingness of his administration to make a clean break with Ass=d helped radicalize the Syrian rebellion. The landscape would have been al=ered by American help. A no-fly zone near the border with Turkey could hav= sheltered and aided the rebels. An early decision to arm the rebellion would have leveled the killing fiel=. Four of the president's principal foreign policy advisers from his fir=t term advocated giving weapons to the rebels — Secretary of State Hilla=y Rodham Clinton, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, CIA Director David Petraeusand the chairman of the Joint Chi=fs of Staff, Gen. Martin Dempsey. But the president overrode them, his cau=ion of no help in a conflict of such virulence. Under the gaze of the world, Obama in=tead =font face="Times New Roman">drew a red line <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/04=30/video-obama-reiterates-syria-red-line-but-vague- on-response-if-crossed/. target=> on the use of chemical weapons and warned that his calculus would chang= if these weapons were used or moved around. He thus placed his credibilit= in the hands of the Syrian dictator and, in the midst of a storm of his own making, fell back on lawyerly dist=nctions. A Greater Middle East, an Islam=c world, used to American campaigns of rescue — Kuwait in 1991, Bosnia i= 1995, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, Iraq in 2003, Libya in 2011 — is now witnessing the ebb of American power and responsibility. Obama has held his fire in the face of great slaughte=, and truth be known, congressional and popular opinion have given him a p=ss. America has wearied of Middle Eastern wars. Syrian rebels sure that the Ame=ican cavalry would turn up after this or that massacre have been bitterly =isappointed. It's the tragic luck of the Syrians that their rebellion has happened on the watch of an American pres=dent who has made a fetish of caution, who has seen the risks of action an= overlooked the consequences of abdication. Fouad Ajami, a senior fellow =t Stanford University's Hoover Institution, is the author of "The Syri=n Rebellion" and "Dream Palace of the Arabs: A Generation's Odyssey." Article 3.<=a> Fpreign Affairs<Apan> Israel's Man in Damascus<kont> Efraim Halevy 7 EFTA_R1_00107020 EFTA01785158 May 10, 2013 -- In October 1995= Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin telephoned Egyptian President Hosni =ubarak to inform him that peace was at hand between Israel and Syria. Two weeks later, Rabin was dead, killed by a rea=tionary Jewish Israeli fanatic; the peace agreement that Rabin referenced =ied not long thereafter. But Israeli hopes for an eventual agreement with =he Assad regime managed to survive. There have been four subsequent attempts by Israeli prime ministers -- one=by Ehud Barak, one by Ehud Olmert, and two by Benjamin Netanyahu -- to for=e a peace with Syria. This shared history with the As=ad regime is relevant when considering Israel's strategy toward the ongo=ng civil war in Syria. Israel's most significant strategic goal with respect to Syria has always been a stable peace, and t=at is not something that the current civil war has changed. Israel will in=ervene in Syria when it deems it necessary; last week's attacks testify =o that resolve. But it is no accident that those strikes were focused solely on the destruction of weapons depot=, and that Israel has given no indication of wanting to intervene any furt=er. Jerusalem, ultimately, has little interest in actively hastening the f=ll of Bashar al-Assad. Israel knows one important thin= about the Assads: for the past 40 years, they have managed to preserve so=e form of calm along the border. Technically, the two countries have always been at war -- Syria has yet to officially r=cognize Israel -- but Israel has been able to count on the governments of =afez and Bashar Assad to enforce the Separation of Forces Agreement from 1=74, in which both sides agreed to a cease-fire in the Golan Heights, the disputed vantage point along the=r shared border. Indeed, even when Israeli and Syrian forces were briefly =ocked in fierce fighting in 1982 during Lebanon's civil war, the border =emained quiet. Israel does not feel as confide=t, though, about the parties to the current conflict, and with good reason= On the one hand, there are the rebel forces, some of whom are increasingly under the sway of al Qaeda. On the other, th=re are the Syrian government's military forces, which are still under As=ad's command, but are ever more dependent on the Iranian Revolutionary G=ard and Hezbollah, which is also Iranian-sponsored. Iran is the only outside state with boots on the ground in Syria, and alth=ugh it is supporting Assad, it is also pressuring his government to more c=osely serve Iran's goals -- including by allowing the passage of advance= arms from Syria into southern Lebanon. The recent visit by Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Salehi to Damascus, durin= which he announced that Iran would not allow Assad to fall under any circ=mstances, further underscored the depth of Iran's involvement in the fig=ting. It is entirely conceivable, in other words, that a post-Assad regime in Syria would be explicitly pro=96a1 Qaeda or even more openly pro-Iran. Either result would be unacceptab=e to Israel. Of course, an extended civil wa= in Syria does not serve Israel's interests either. The ongoing chaos is=attracting Islamists from elsewhere in the region, and threatening to destabilize Israel's entire neighborhood, inc=uding Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq. It could also cause Assad to lose control=of -- or decide to rely more on -- his stockpile of chemical weapons. Even though these problems have=a direct impact on Israel, the Israeli government believes that it should =eal with them in a way that does not force it to become a kingmaker over Assad's fate. Instead, it would prefer to =aintain neutrality in Syria's civil war. Israel does not want to tempt Ass=d to target Israel with his missile stockpile -- nor does it want to alien=te the Alawite community that will remain on Israel's border regardless of the outcome of Syria's war. Last week's attacks were a ca=e in point. Israel did not hesitate to order air strikes when it had intel=igence that arms were going to be funneled from Syria to Hezbollah. Although Israel took care not to assume official =esponsibility for the specific attack, Minister of Defense Moshe Yaalon pu=licly stated that Israel's policy was to prevent the passage of strategi= weaponry from Syria to Lebanon. But parallel with that messaging, Israel also made overt and covert effort= to communicate to Assad that Jerusalem was determined to remain neutral i= Syria's civil war. The fact that those messages were received in Damasc=s was reflected in the relatively restrained response from the Assad regime: a mid- level Foreign Ministry of=icial offered a public denouncement of Israel -- and even then the Syrian =overnment offered only a vague promise of reprisal, vowing to respond at a=time and in a manner of its choosing. 8 EFTA_R1_00107021 EFTA01785159 As brutal as the Syrian war has=become, Israel believes that another international crisis is even more urg=nt: Iran's continued pursuit of a nuclear program. Jerusalem has long believed that mid-2013 would be an hour of dec=sion in its dealings with Iran. In the interim, Israel wants to focus its =wn finite resources on that crisis -- and it would prefer that the rest of=the world does the same. Article 4.4=ont> AI-Arabiya</=pan> =font color="11000000">Spectre of bankrupta haunts Egypt Adel al-Toraifi aspan> 9 May 2013 -- There were t=o worrying pieces of news from Egypt this week. One was the reshuffling of=Prime Minister Hisham Kandil's cabinet based on partisan calculations, rather than competencies as was initially =oped. The second piece of news was the report that Egypt's population no= stands at more than 84 million. This is the result of the birth rate doub=ing during the revolution due to the decline in birth control programs, which had previously been sponsored=by the government and international institutions. The population increase =s a concern for a very simple reason; it will present additional financial=and environmental burdens on Egyptian society, particularly in the country's already overcrowded cities and sl=ms. Two decades ago, Egypt was=one of the world's largest agricultural exporters, whereas today it is o=e of the largest importers of wheat. For this reason, it is no surprise that we find President Mursi requesting tha= his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin—at the height of Russian militar= aid to the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria —grant Egypt preferential rat=s in an attempt to reduce the cost of subsidizing bread. There can be no doubt that the economy could force p=litical concessions simply to guarantee the price of bread. In a country w=ere incomes have declined over the past two years, more than 60% of foreig= currency reserves have evaporated, and the Egyptian pound has lost 7% of its value since the beginning of the=year, talk about a program of economic reform is not just necessary, it is=crucial. Unfortunately, it does not seem that the ruling party today—or =he Brotherhood, if you prefer—is serious about solving the problems facing the Egyptian treasury and the ec=nomy at large, not to mention putting an end to the weakening of the Egypt=an pound and record inflation. Delaying the crisis=/font> However, more dangerous th=n this is some observers resorting to the tactic of "delaying the crisis=94 for future budgets, saying that the deficit in the trade budget is normal under such circumstances, and that this can =nly be resolved in future budgets. This is because expenditure, from their=point of view, is necessary to revive growth during the current stage of e=onomic slowdown that Egypt is experiencing. In principle, this proposa= has merit. However, in terms of implementation during the Mursi era, expe=diture—rather than investment—is already on the rise, thanks to government assistance programs, not to mention othe= financial burdens on the state. Of course, there are those in Egypt who p=ay down the risk of the treasury becoming bankrupt, believing that the Egy=tian economy is, as they say, too big to fail. They base this on Egypt's huge human resources and wealth, =nd expected sources of financing, such as foreign investment and tourism, =articularly if political stability can be ensured. 9 EFTA_R1_00107022 EFTA01785160 More than 60% of foreign c=rrency reserves have evaporated, talk about a program of economic reform i= not just necessary, it is crucial Adel al-Toraifi Those who hold this opinio= believe that domestic demand will prevent the Egyptian economy from facin= bankruptcy. But hold on—this view is based more on the sense of Egyptian national dignity, rather than the language o= numbers. Brazil and Mexico would have announced bankruptcy during the 198=s were it not for the intervention of the International Monetary Fund (IMF= and the World Bank. Everybody knows how countries like Chile in 1975 and Yugoslavia in 1989 and Nicaragu= in 1990 went bankrupt, or, to put it in the language of economists, exper=enced huge inflation and the collapse of the national economy. Let us take Argentina in t=e 1980$ as an example. Argentina borrowed in a way that repayments became = heavy burden, and following the loss of political stability in the country—as is happening today in Egypt—inte=national lenders refused to help. As a result, the country had no choice b=t to devalue its currency in order to reduce the value of its debt. This w=s a way of announcing bankruptcy. Egyptian vulnerability Is the Egyptian treasury v=lnerable to bankruptcy? Not yet, but if it continues on this course then t=ere can be no doubt that this will be its fate. There can also be no doubt that some people are relying on Western o= Gulf assistance; nobody wants to see the Egyptian treasury declare bankru=tcy, as it would have political and security consequences for everybody.4=ont> However, at the same time,=the Egyptian government is not helping itself or allowing others to help i= to fix the situation. What does it mean for Kandil to name an al-Azhar professor specializing in Islamic jurisprud=nce and murabaha (Sharia-compliant sale) as the country's new finance mi=ister? What does specializing in Islamic studies have to do with the USD 4=8 billion interest-based IMF loan? The answer is that this minister was appointed simply because he is affili=ted with the Muslim Brotherhood, and he only has the power to pass directi=es—not to implement the required corrective plan.</=pan> Although the judgment agai=st the new finance minister may come a little early, would it not have bee= better to choose a competent Egyptian with international experience who enjoys the confidence of the national pr=vate sector. If you remain unconvinced of the possibility of bankruptcy, t=en you must face the facts: Egyptian GDP per capita is less than U.S. $2,0=0 per annum and the average Egyptian household's expenditure on foodstuffs represents more than 50% of its an=ual income, despite government subsidies of bread, cooking oil and fuel.q=ont> According to a study by re=earcher Dalibor Rohm`, of the Washington-based Cato Institute entitl=d "Towards a reform of Egypt's commodity subsidies," a third of Egyptian public spending goes on subsidizing foodstuff and othe= goods, while around 80% of the Egyptian population depends on government =inancial assistance. This is the state of affairs created by the 1952 revo=ution, which turned Egypt into a consumption-based economy, establishing a black market which, for decade=, specialized in pillaging this financial assistance. Rohat's stu=y shows that only a quarter of this assistance finds its way to Egypt's =oor, with the rest benefitting the middle and upper income brackets. Reforming government suppo=t It is true that some of th= ruling Freedom and Justice Party members have spoken on a number of occas=ons about their intentions to reform the system of government support, suggesting a number of mechanisms that faile= to achieve much. However, the IMF loan conditions are based mainly on the=gradual reduction of fuel subsidies, which is a pledge that Qandil's gov=rnment has failed to fulfil, fearing the response of the street which is still in a "revolutionary" mindset= 10 EFTA_R1_00107023 EFTA01785161 Egypt could try replacing =he government subsidization system—which is a program whose corruption a=d lack of effectiveness has been proven for decades—with direct support for the poor: directly providing funds, or c=upons, to the poor so that the government can revive market competition. T=ere are a number of successful examples of this model; however, that does rot necessarily mean that it would succeed in Egypt. There are a number of reasons for this, most prominently=the government's lack of administrative competence, not to mention the l=ck of legitimacy that would allow the ruling party to take difficult decis=ons without the street rising up against them. In Iran, for example, Pres=dent Ahmadinejad tried to implement this in two stages. However, the resul= was an increase in expenditure, as more than 95% of the people applied for direct financial assistance, while the =olitical parties and forces rejected the price increase imposed on fuel. 1= other words, the results were both counterproductive and costly: the peop=e know how to take advantage of the government's funds. The Freedom and Justice Pa=ty are facing a huge challenge, and failing in this task may take Egypt bark decades, both economically and politically.<=p> <=span> Adel al-Toraifi is the =ditor-in-Chief of Asharq al-Awsat and Editor-in-Chief of Al Majalla magazi=e. As a specialist in Middle Eastern affairs his research focuses on Saudi-Iranian relations, foreign policy decision m=king in the Gulf and IR theories on the Middle East. <=span> =/font> Article 5.</=ont> Project Syndicate4=ont> =font color="#000000">The Egypt-Israel Pea=e Test Itamar Rabinovich <http://www.project-=yndicate.org/contributor/itamar-rabinovich> , Tamara =ittes <http://www.project-syndicate.org/contributo=/tamara-wittes> =/span> <=span> 10 May 2013 -- The rocket strike= that a militant Islamist group recently fired from the Egyptian Sinai int= the Israeli city of Eilat served as yet another reminder of how delicate bilateral relations remain two years afte= Egypt's revolution. Terrorist activity could easily cause a crisis on t=e border, with the potential to trigger an unwanted confrontation that wou=d threaten the peace treaty<=font> <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/isr=gypt.asp> that normalized bilateral relations in 1979. To avoid such an outcome, Isr=el and Egypt must take convincing action now to uphold the treaty.&n=sp; Last November, when hostilities erupted in Gaza, Egyptian President =ohamed Morsi mediated a swift resolution, even providing a guarantee for t=e cease-fire with Gaza's ruling Mamas. Morsi thus implicitly 11 EFTA_R1_00107024 EFTA01785162 recommitted=Egypt to upholding peace on the border and to playing a constructive role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Th=s boosted confidence in Israel that the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt's ruli=g party, would uphold the 1979 peace treaty. But Morsi has not explicitly =ndorsed peace with Israel and has avoided direct engagement with Israeli leaders. Preserving peace is in bot= countries' interests. The attack on an Egyptian army outpost in the Sin=i last summer, in which armed militants killed 16 soldiers, demonstrated that terrorism threatens Egypt just as it does I=rael. In this volatile environment, reverting to a confrontational relatio=ship with Israel would be extremely dangerous, inviting the risk of anothe= disastrous war. Upholding the peace treaty with Israel would have the opp=site effect, enabling Egypt to pursue its goals of consolidating the military's authority at home and e=hancing its influence throughout the Middle East. Egyptian and Israeli leade=s must recognize that the ongoing struggle to secure the Sinai Peninsula =96 which the treaty established as a demilitarized zone — is testing peace daily. Israel has so far tolerated Egyptian milirary activity and force deployments that technically violate the bilateral =reaty, approving them retroactively in the hope that Egypt will do more to=secure the border and crack down on weapons smuggling into Gaza. But Israel has little confidence that the =eployments will enhance its security, and Israeli leaders are becoming inc=easingly anxious about the Egyptian military's mobilization of forces wi=hout notice. In Egypt, the treaty is even more clearly under threat. The Muslim B=otherhood has long called for a referendum on the treaty, viewing the rest=ictions on Egyptian forces in the Sinai as an affront to national sovereig=ty. The Brothers condemned Morsi's involvement in resolving the Gaza crisis last year, portraying it as kowto=ing to Israel. In fact, Morsi is under fire from both the left and the right for up=olding former President Hosni Mubarak's obliging approach to Israel, as =ell as for reasserting Mubarak's authoritarian bargain — diplomatic an= financial support in exchange for "stability" — with the United States. Faced with a collapsing economy and approachin= elections, the temptation for Morsi to stoke nationalist, anti-Israel sen=iment will become stronger. A major incident on the border could be enough=to push him over the edge. In order to sustain the peace treaty, Egypt and Israel should renegotiate its milit=ry annex to allow Egypt to deploy forces in previously restricted zones an= re- establish full sovereignty over the Sinai. Such a move would strengthe= bilateral relations, generate goodwill in Egypt, and increase Israel's confidence in the Muslim Brothe=hood's commitment to peace. During such a renegotiatio=, the two countries would discuss in detail the most effective approach to=tackling their shared challenges related to terrorism and transnational crime, in order to ensure that Egypt's in=reased military presence in the Sinai also enhances Israel's security. E=ypt's newly democratic government would be more strictly accountable for=fulfilling the treaty's terms if it played an active role in establishing them. At the same time, the agreement would=boost domestic support for Egypt's government and enhance its regional s=anding. Likewise, US involvement in the negotiations would benefit all parti=s. The process would provide an opportunity for the Egyptian military to e=gage with the US, helping to bolster its case for aid in a difficult envir=nment. Moreover, the US could set=clear, narrow terms for the talks and provide a guarantee that the outcome=would not impinge on Israel's core interests, thereby mitigating Israeli officials' fears that opening the treaty's =ilitary annex for revision would call into question its other terms. Final=y, playing a successful role in bolstering Israel-Egypt relations could ad=ance US Secretary of State John Kerry's diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East. In a region as volatile as=the Middle East, no country can afford to take peace for granted. But, by =enewing their bilateral treaty now, Egypt and Israel would maximize their chances of prolonging an arrangement that =as kept them from fighting for more than three decades. Itamar Rabinovich, a fo=mer ambassador of Israel to the United States (1993.1996), currently is ba=ed at Tel Aviv University, New York University, and the Brookings Institution. Tamara Wittes is Director of the Saban Cent=r at the Brookings Institution. 12 EFTA_R1_00107025 EFTA01785163 Article 6.</=ont> The Atlantic =font color="1$000000">What Is China's Plan=for The Middle East? Matt Schiavenza <=span> May 10 2013 -- Solving the=lsrael/Palestine crisis has long been the holy grail of American foreign p=licy -- an elusive goal that each successive president has strived to achieve. Like moths to a flame, American presiden=s cannot resist the temptation to solve a problem from which so many other=issues -- terrorism and Iran, notably -- seem to come from.<=span> Could China, then, be stealing A=erica's thunder? President Xi linping made waves <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/06/world/asir/mahmoud-abbas-benjamin-netanyahu-in-china.html?_r=1&> last week by inviting both Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and P=lestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas to China, a diplomatic maneuver that elicit=d the attention <http://blogs.seattletimes.com/opinionnw/201=/05/08/beijing-as-a- middle-east-power-brokerh (and app=oval <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/w=rldviews/wp/2013/05/03/why- its-great-news-that-china-wants-to-mediate-isra=l-palestine-talks/> ) of the U.S. media. The ambitions for the visit weren't terribly ambitious;=Netanyahu and Abbas never met, and Xi issued a bland "four-point plan=quot; that reinforced existing norms for resolving the crisis. But the ver= fact that China thrust itself in the situation nonetheless was significant. Why, then, did China decide to do it?<=font> There are two major forces=at play. First, publicly claiming an interest in solving this crisis is co=sistent with China's new global approach to foreign policy. For years, China focused its attention primarily on its=periphery, but as its economy grew Beijing needed to come up with a strate=y to deal with the rest of the world, one that, at least, went beyond &quo=;just sell us natural resources and we'll let you do whatever you want to your people." Now, a strategy h=s emerged. On the United Nations Security Council China has formed a=de facto alliance with Russia, using their respective vetoes to stymie American-led initiatives. Beijing has also flexed its diplomatic muscle through organizations like the Shanghai Cooperation =rganization (a grouping of Central Asian republics plus China) and the Ass=ciation of Southeast Asian Nations (which, though not a member, China exer=s significant influence in). China may claim to be just a middle-income developing country, but in diplomatic=terms it has become much more than that. However, Beijing's involve=ent in the Middle East has as much to do with the United States than it do=s with China. Prospects for U.S. brokerage of Israeli/Palestinian peace are bleaker than they've been in a long time.=President Obama's relationship with Netanyahu, to put it mildly, is not wa=m, and the continued split between Fatah and Hamas complicates matters fur=her. The administration has also publicly signaled a "pivot to Asia", a declaration that foreign =olicy priorities won't be dominated by the Middle East forever. And when r=cently asked about the Israeli/Palestinian crisis, Secretary of State John=Kerry pessimistically gave the "two-state solution" a window of two more years. Clearly, Washington doesn't fee= good about the situation. So will China fill the breach? B=ijing's involvement does offer a fresh dynamic to the region; whereas Wash=ngton is seen as a staunch Israel ally, China tilts much more toward the Palestinians. It wasn't a coincidence that i= was Mahmoud Abbas, not Netanyahu, who was awarded full state visit honors=in China. That said, China still lacks the clout to play more than a peripheral role in the Middle East peace process=-- something Beijing surely knows. But by meeting with the two leaders, Xi=Jinping served a timely reminder that his country, at the very least, wasnrt going to sit this issue out anymore. 13 EFTA_R1_00107026 EFTA01785164 Article 7.<=a> The National Interest The Day After a Strike on =ran Marwan Muasher May 10, 2013 -- All eyes are on=what it will take to prevent Iran from getting its hands on a nuclear weap=n. If sanctions and diplomacy prove incapable of containing Tehran's nuclear ambitions—and soon—a military strike =o destroy or at the very least delay its program is seen as the least bad =ption available. Iran gaining a nuclear-weapons capability is a red line t=at the United States and Israel just won't let it cross. But not enough thought has been=given to what happens after a strike is actually carried out. Debate in the United States end= at how to prevent Iran from getting the bomb, while the repercussions of = military strike are not widely discussed. This ominously echoes the run up to the war in Iraq.ap> When Washington was preparing t= invade Saddam Hussein's Iraq, little consideration was given to what ca=e next. Ten years later, the mistakes are evident. Iraq did not pose the immediate security threat that Washington b=lieved, forcefully building a democracy was easier said than done, and the=difficulties bogged U.S. troops down for years. The war cost trillions of =ollars and damaged America's standing in the Arab world. And now the real issues are bei=g left unaddressed again. Conventional wisdom holds that a military strike=on Iran is the best thing to do in the face of a legitimate fear. But tough questions must not be avoided. Will a strike stop Tehran from =ursuing a nuclear weapon or push it to weaponize? A successful military attack on=Iran's nuclear facilities will likely set the country's program back, =ut it won't be enough to end its nuclear activities for good. A strik