An Op Ed on Afghanistan if you want it

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-- The purpose is to help the Administration out of the box on the signature of the BSA. The op ed reflects a lot of input from U.S. experts on the subject, some key Afghan leaders, and from some Administration officials. I believe that the Administration would find it helpful -- and this is a problem that certainly needs solving. Let me know what you think. "U.S. officials are struggling again with Afghan President Hamid Karzai. After painful and prolonged negotiations, they reached agreement on a draft "bilateral security agreement" or BSA. The draft BSA lays the foundation for leaving U.S military forces in Afghanistan after the end of 2014. It is expected to involve 8,000 to 10,000 U.S. troops with counterterrorism, training, and other responsibilities in support of Afghan forces. Most U.S. Afghanistan experts believe such a residual force is critical if Afghan forces are to continue to improve and professionalize. Only with such help will they have a reasonable chance of containing the Taliban and giving Afghan authorities the space to negotiate an inclusive political settlement including the Taliban. Some of our NATO allies will also leave forces but only if we do. Most experts also believe that without such residual forces, the billions of dollars in financial support promised for the Afghan security forces and for Afghanistan's economic development simply will not materialize. Without this assistance, few believe any Afghan government can survive for very long. So the stakes are high -- for Afghanistan, and for preserving the investment of lives and treasure that the United States and its coalition allies have made over the last twelve years. Initially President Karzai said he would sign the BSA after its approval by a traditional convocation of Afghan leaders called a Loya Jirga. The BSA received overwhelming approval, But Karzai nonetheless declined to sign. He has required further concessions: an end to counterterrorism raids into Afghan homes at night, active U.S. support for the peace process with the Taliban, and non-interference in the April election to choose President Karzai's successor. Lately he has threatened not to sign at all and to leave it to his successor. U.S. officials have responded by pressuring President Karzai directly and indirectly and setting a succession of missed deadlines, most recently saying that the BSA must be signed in "weeks, not months." So far, nothing has worked. U.S. officials need an alternative approach. One option would be for President Obama to make a public statement along the following lines. First, he would praise Afghanistan's progress in assuming greater responsibility for its security, in improving the education, health, and well-being of its citizens, and in preparing for the upcoming Presidential election. He would state that, to support that progress, he has directed U.S. forces to curtail all but essential night raids, he is committed to facilitating the peace process, and pledges full support for an April election free from all outside influences. These statements would not represent a major U.S. policy change, but together they would offer President Karzai a face saver if in fact he wishes to sign the BSA. Second, President Obama would announce the specific number of troops that he is prepared to leave in Afghanistan post-2014 and direct the Pentagon to develop plans on that basis. He would call on our NATO allies to announce similar force commitments. This step would go a long way to reassuring the candidates for the Afghan Presidency and the Afghan people of America's post-2014 presence. The lack of such reassurance has become a source of serious instability, threatening the success of the Afghan election and the morale of the Afghan security forces. For similar reasons, President Obama should resist any pressure to set at this point a date for the termination of the U.S. post-2014 deployment. Third, President Obama would state that while he is willing to sign the BSA with President Karzai, he is also willing to sign it post-April with a new Afghan President. U.S. officials should then stop pressuring President Karzai -- or anyone else -- for a signature before the April election. Such pressure only strengthens President Karzai's hand, encourages further delay, and makes the United States look weak and desperate. President Obama should make clear in his statement that his troop commitment is dependent upon the ultimate signature of the BSA. But a post-election April or May signing by a new Afghan president would give more than enough time to complete the necessary U.S. military planning before the end of the year. Indeed, informed experts say that even without the BSA, U.S. forces could remain in Afghanistan after 2014 under the existing Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) (although our allies would have to negotiate a new SOFA for their forces with the new Afghan government). Recent polling suggests that over 60% of the American people believe the Afghan war was not worth fighting. But the same poll suggests that 55% support leaving some U.S. forces for training and "anti-insurgency" operations. And public statements by members suggest that a post-2014 deployment would have bipartisan Congressional support. President Obama should avoid any suggestion that he might embrace a "zero option" and leave no U.S. troops post-2014. Almost every Afghan expert believes it would destabilize Afghanistan, place the Presidential election in doubt, and ultimately risk the collapse of the Afghan security forces. It would profoundly affect U.S. security interests. Afghanistan would become once again a safe haven for terrorists -- who, history shows, would ultimately attack U.S. interests and territory. Afghanistan would contribute to destabilizing a nuclear-armed Pakistan. And the Afghan people would forfeit all the progress they have made (with our help) in building a more tolerant, inclusive, secure, and prosperous society. There are less than three months to go before elections to replace President Karzai. U.S. policy must not be based on frustration with Karzai's mercurial behavior. It must be based on ensuring the election of a legitimate successor to President Karzai with whom the United States can sign a BSA that is overwhelmingly in the interests of both countries." All -- That's it. May be a little long for you but Autumn has shown great skill in helping to shrink my stuff without losing the substance. And I will help. At the same time, the subject is important enough to warrant an extended treatment. Thank you for your consideration. Steve Stephen J. Hadley (202) 431-9797 Delivered-To: [email protected] Received: by 10.204.162.79 with SMTP id u15csp185380bkx; Mon, 13 Jan 2014 19:38:43 -0800 (PST) X-Received: by 10.66.248.130 with SMTP id ym2mr34314407pac.9.1389670721915; Mon, 13 Jan 2014 19:38:41 -0800 (PST) Return-Path: <[email protected]> Received: from st11p01mm-asmtp003.mac.com (st11p01mm-asmtp003.mac.com. [17.172.204.238]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id p3si17523067pbj.218.2014.01.13.19.38.40 for <multiple recipients>; Mon, 13 Jan 2014 19:38:41 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of [email protected] designates 17.172.204.238 as permitted sender) client-ip=17.172.204.238; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of [email protected] designates 17.172.204.238 as permitted sender) [email protected]; dmarc=pass (p=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=me.com Received: from [142.131.201.122] (unknown [142.131.201.122]) by st11p01mm-asmtp003.mac.com (Oracle Communications Messaging Server 7u4-27.08(7.0.4.27.7) 64bit (built Aug 22 2013)) with ESMTPSA id <[email protected]>; Tue, 14 Jan 2014 03:38:29 +0000 (GMT) X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:5.11.87,1.0.14,0.0.0000 definitions=2014-01-14_02:2014-01-14,2014-01-14,1970-01-01 signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=notspam policy=default score=0 spamscore=0 suspectscore=2 phishscore=0 adultscore=0 bulkscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=7.0.1-1308280000 definitions=main-1401130223 Subject: An Op Ed on Afghanistan if you want it MIME-version: 1.0 (1.0) From: Stephen Hadley <[email protected]> Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii X-Mailer: iPad Mail (11B554a) Message-id: <[email protected]> Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2014 22:37:23 -0500 CC: Aysha Chowdhry <[email protected]>, Catherine Eng <[email protected]> Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable To: Fred Hiatt <[email protected]>, Fred Hiatt <[email protected]>, Jackson Diehl <[email protected]>, Jackson K Diehl <[email protected]>, Autumn Brewington <[email protected]>, Autumn Brewington <[email protected]> All -- The purpose is to help the Administration out of the box on the signature of= the BSA. The op ed reflects a lot of input from U.S. experts on the subjec= t, some key Afghan leaders, and from some Administration officials. I belie= ve that the Administration would find it helpful -- and this is a problem th= at certainly needs solving. Let me know what you think. =20 "U.S. officials are struggling again with Afghan President Hamid Karzai. Af= ter painful and prolonged negotiations, they reached agreement on a draft "b= ilateral security agreement" or BSA. The draft BSA lays the foundation for l= eaving U.S military forces in Afghanistan after the end of 2014. It is expe= cted to involve 8,000 to 10,000 U.S. troops with counterterrorism, training,= and other responsibilities in support of Afghan forces. Most U.S. Afghanistan experts believe such a residual force is critical if A= fghan forces are to continue to improve and professionalize. Only with such= help will they have a reasonable chance of containing the Taliban and givin= g Afghan authorities the space to negotiate an inclusive political settlemen= t including the Taliban. Some of our NATO allies will also leave forces but= only if we do. =20 Most experts also believe that without such residual forces, the billions of= dollars in financial support promised for the Afghan security forces and fo= r Afghanistan's economic development simply will not materialize. Without t= his assistance, few believe any Afghan government can survive for very long.= So the stakes are high -- for Afghanistan, and for preserving the investme= nt of lives and treasure that the United States and its coalition allies hav= e made over the last twelve years. Initially President Karzai said he would sign the BSA after its approval by a= traditional convocation of Afghan leaders called a Loya Jirga. The BSA rec= eived overwhelming approval, But Karzai nonetheless declined to sign. He ha= s required further concessions: an end to counterterrorism raids into Afgha= n homes at night, active U.S. support for the peace process with the Taliban= , and non-interference in the April election to choose President Karzai's su= ccessor. Lately he has threatened not to sign at all and to leave it to his= successor. U.S. officials have responded by pressuring President Karzai directly and in= directly and setting a succession of missed deadlines, most recently saying t= hat the BSA must be signed in "weeks, not months." So far, nothing has work= ed. U.S. officials need an alternative approach. One option would be for President Obama to make a public statement along the= following lines. First, he would praise Afghanistan's progress in assuming greater responsibi= lity for its security, in improving the education, health, and well-being of= its citizens, and in preparing for the upcoming Presidential election. He w= ould state that, to support that progress, he has directed U.S. forces to cu= rtail all but essential night raids, he is committed to facilitating the pea= ce process, and pledges full support for an April election free from all out= side influences. These statements would not represent a major U.S. policy change, but togethe= r they would offer President Karzai a face saver if in fact he wishes to sig= n the BSA. Second, President Obama would announce the specific number of troops that he= is prepared to leave in Afghanistan post-2014 and direct the Pentagon to de= velop plans on that basis. He would call on our NATO allies to announce sim= ilar force commitments. This step would go a long way to reassuring the candidates for the Afghan Pr= esidency and the Afghan people of America's post-2014 presence. The lack of= such reassurance has become a source of serious instability, threatening th= e success of the Afghan election and the morale of the Afghan security force= s. For similar reasons, President Obama should resist any pressure to set a= t this point a date for the termination of the U.S. post-2014 deployment. Third, President Obama would state that while he is willing to sign the BSA w= ith President Karzai, he is also willing to sign it post-April with a new Af= ghan President. U.S. officials should then stop pressuring President Karzai= -- or anyone else -- for a signature before the April election. Such press= ure only strengthens President Karzai's hand, encourages further delay, and m= akes the United States look weak and desperate. President Obama should make clear in his statement that his troop commitment= is dependent upon the ultimate signature of the BSA. But a post-election A= pril or May signing by a new Afghan president would give more than enough ti= me to complete the necessary U.S. military planning before the end of the ye= ar. Indeed, informed experts say that even without the BSA, U.S. forces cou= ld remain in Afghanistan after 2014 under the existing Status of Forces Agre= ement (SOFA) (although our allies would have to negotiate a new SOFA for th= eir forces with the new Afghan government). Recent polling suggests that over 60% of the American people believe the Afg= han war was not worth fighting. But the same poll suggests that 55% support= leaving some U.S. forces for training and "anti-insurgency" operations. An= d public statements by members suggest that a post-2014 deployment would hav= e bipartisan Congressional support. President Obama should avoid any suggestion that he might embrace a "zero op= tion" and leave no U.S. troops post-2014. Almost every Afghan expert believ= es it would destabilize Afghanistan, place the Presidential election in doub= t, and ultimately risk the collapse of the Afghan security forces. It would= profoundly affect U.S. security interests. Afghanistan would become once a= gain a safe haven for terrorists -- who, history shows, would ultimately att= ack U.S. interests and territory. Afghanistan would contribute to destabili= zing a nuclear-armed Pakistan. And the Afghan people would forfeit all the p= rogress they have made (with our help) in building a more tolerant, inclusiv= e, secure, and prosperous society. There are less than three months to go before elections to replace President= Karzai. U.S. policy must not be based on frustration with Karzai's mercuri= al behavior. It must be based on ensuring the election of a legitimate succ= essor to President Karzai with whom the United States can sign a BSA that is= overwhelmingly in the interests of both countries." =20 All -- That's it. May be a little long for you but Autumn has shown great s= kill in helping to shrink my stuff without losing the substance. And I will= help. At the same time, the subject is important enough to warrant an exte= nded treatment.=20 Thank you for your consideration. Steve Stephen J. Hadley (202) 431-9797=