EFTA01879355.pdf

From: Office of Terje Rod-Larsen Sent: Fri 6/8/2012 3:59:52 PM Subject: June 8 update 8 June, 2012 Article 1. Foreign Policy Brother Number One Shadi Hamid Article 2. Al-Ahram Weekly Revolution in chaos Ayman El-Amir Article 3. The Washington Post Obama's friend in Turkey David Ignatius Article 4. World Politics Review Disabling Iran's Oil Weapon Frida Ghitis Article 5. Center for a New American Security Risk and Rivalry: Iran, Israel and the Bomb EFTA_R1_00290858 EFTA01879355  Dr. Colin H. Kahl, Melissa Dalton, Matthew Irvine The New Republic Why a Syrian Civil War Would Be a Disaster For U.S. National Security Robert Satloff Article 7. Vanity Fair The Netanyahu Paradox David Margolick Article I. Foreign Policy Brother Number One Shadi Hamid June 7, 2012 -- Egypt is on the cusp of its first real experiment in Islamist governance. If the Muslim Brotherhood's Mohamed Morsi comes out on top in the upcoming presidential runoff election, scheduled for June 16 and 17, the venerable Islamist movement will have won control of both Egypt's presidency and its parliament, and it will have a very real chance to implement EFTA_R1_00290859 EFTA01879356 its agenda of market-driven economic recovery, gradual Islamization, and the reassertion of Egypt's regional role. Over the course of Egypt's troubled transition, the Brotherhood has become increasingly, and uncharacteristically, assertive in its political approach. Renouncing promises not to seek the presidency and entering into an overt confrontation with the ruling military council, the Brotherhood's bid to "save the revolution" has been interpreted by others as an all-out power grab. Egypt's liberals, as well as the United States, now worry about the implications of unchecked Brotherhood rule and what that might mean for their interests. Things couldn't have been more different two years ago. Under the repression of Hosni Mubarak's regime, the Brotherhood's unofficial motto was "participation, not domination." The group was renowned for its caution and patient (some would say too patient) approach to politics. When I sat down with Morsi in May 2010 -- just months before the revolution and well before he could have ever imagined being Mubarak's successor -- he echoed the leadership's almost stubborn belief in glacial but steady change. He even objected to a fairly anodyne description of the movement's political activities: "The word 'opposition' has the connotation of seeking power," Morsi told me then. "But, at this moment, we are not seeking power because [that] requires preparation, and society is not prepared." The Muslim Brotherhood, being a religious movement more than a political party, had the benefit of a long horizon. Morsi wasn't well known back then. He was an important player in the Brotherhood, but did not seem to have a particularly distinctive set of views. He was a loyalist, an enforcer, and an operator. And he was arguably good at those things. But being, EFTA_R1_00290860 EFTA01879357 or becoming, a leader is a different matter. Despite heading the Brotherhood's parliamentary bloc and later leading the group's newly formed Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), Morsi struggled to command respect across ideological lines. He rarely spoke like someone who liked making concessions or doing the hard work necessary for building consensus. Like many Brotherhood leaders, he nurtured a degree of resentment toward Egypt's liberals. They were tiny and irrelevant, the thinking went, so why were they always asking for so much? In May 2010, the opposition seemed to be coming alive, but in a uniquely Egyptian way. At one protest in Tahrir Square, each group -- Islamists, liberals, and leftists -- huddled in its own part of the square. I asked Morsi why there wasn't greater cooperation between Islamists and liberals. "That depends on the other side," he said, echoing what the liberals were saying about the Brotherhood. This thinly veiled disdain could be papered over when liberals, leftists, and Brotherhood members were facing a dictator they all hated. And, during the revolution, Brotherhood members, Salafists, liberals, and ordinary Egyptians joined hands and put the old divisions aside -- if only for a moment. When Mubarak fell, though, there was little left to unite them. The international community, particularly the United States, shares the liberals' fear of Islamist domination, but for a very different set of reasons. Historically, the Brotherhood has been one of the more consistent purveyors of anti-American and anti- Israeli sentiment. While some Brotherhood leaders, particularly lead strategist Khairat El Shater, are less strident in their condemnations and less willfully creative with their conspiracy theories in private, Morsi is not. In a conversation with me, he volunteered his views on the 9/11 terrorist attacks without any EFTA_R1_00290861 EFTA01879358 prompting. "When you come and tell me that the plane hit the tower like a knife in butter," he said, shifting to English, "then you are insulting us. How did the plane cut through the steel like this? Something must have happened from the inside. It's impossible." According to various polls, such views are held by most Egyptians, including leftists and liberals, but that doesn't make them any less troubling. It is perhaps ironic, then, that out of the Brotherhood's top officials, Morsi has spent the most time in the United States. He is a graduate of the University of Southern California and, interestingly, the father of two U.S. citizens -- a reminder that familiarity can sometimes breed contempt. At a recent news conference, Morsi discussed his time living abroad, painting a picture of a society in moral decay, featuring crumbling families, young mothers in hospitals who have to "write in the name of the father," and couples living together out of wedlock. We don't have these problems in Egypt, he said, his voice rising with a mixture of pride and resentment. I met Morsi again, a year later in May 2011, at the Brotherhood's new, plush headquarters in Muqattam, nestled on a small mountain on Cairo's outskirts. The Brotherhood leader seemed surprisingly calm. He punctuated his Arabic with English expressions; he made jokes (they weren't necessarily funny), name-checked the 1978 film The Deer Hunter, and even did an impromptu impression of a former U.S. president. In the early days, in the afterglow of the 18-day uprising, the group's leaders were still careful to say the right things. He was quick to point out that 2,500 of the FJP's 9,000 founding members were not from the Brotherhood, and included Christians. He was also dismissive of ultraconservative Salafi movements. They weren't politically mature yet, he said. The implication was obvious: The Brotherhood, unlike the Salafists, had spent decades first EFTA_R1_00290862 EFTA01879359 learning and then playing -- rather skillfully at times -- the game of politics. They learned how and when to compromise and how to justify it to their conservative base. Now, nearly 28 years after first entering parliament in 1984, the group was taking pains to present itself as the moderate, respectable face of political Islam. But the Brotherhood soon realized that it had stumbled upon one of those rare moments where a country's politics are truly open and undefined. So they decided to seize it, alienating many of their erstwhile liberal allies in the process. This approach was a good fit with the Brotherhood's distinctly majoritarian approach to democracy: They had won a decisive popular mandate in the parliamentary elections, with 47 percent of the vote, so why shouldn't they rule? Eventually, the Brotherhood decided to go for broke. "We have witnessed obstacles standing in the way of parliament to take decisions to achieve the demands of the revolution," Morsi said in March. "We have therefore chosen the path of the presidency not because we are greedy for power but because we have a majority in parliament which is unable to fulfill its duties." The more important question is: Does it really matter what Morsi thinks? The Brotherhood's presidential campaign was never about Morsi. It was about the Brotherhood, and Morsi just happened to be the substitute candidate -- an unlikely accident of history -- after the charismatic Shater was disqualified from the race. This is what makes it difficult to assess a Morsi presidency. Over the past year, Shater's personal office has become the address for a steady stream of big-shot investors and visiting dignitaries, including senior U.S. officials. Those who have met him have come out both impressed and reassured. It was Shater who plucked Morsi from relative obscurity to join EFTA_R1_00290863 EFTA01879360 the Brotherhood's Guidance Bureau, the organization's top decision-making body, and then selected him to lead the Brotherhood's political arm. Up until now, there has been little daylight between the two men. But will Shater be able to maintain his sway if Morsi ascends to Egypt's highest office? Some Brotherhood members are already chafing at the idea of Shater -- whom supporters and detractors alike portray as a brilliant but domineering operative -- serving as the power behind the throne: "If Morsi is able to free himself from the shadow of Shater, his policies will be balanced. If Shater stays in control, Morsi will become increasingly unpopular and fail to govern effectively," one Brotherhood member who has worked with both figures told me. "Will Morsi become the son who surpassed the father?" On the campaign trail, Morsi has proved a quick study and a hard worker. Campaign aides have worked to repackage him, coaching him on his speaking style and how to use his hands in interviews. In the process, the candidate has grown more confident -- and it's starting to show. His May 30 appearance on Yosri Fouda's television program showed a surprisingly fluent speaker, a far cry from his earlier, shaky media appearances. As one Brotherhood member remarked, "The new Morsi of today is different from the person I knew." Although Morsi outperformed most polls in coming out on top in the first round of elections, for the Brotherhood, his 25 percent share of the vote amounted to something of a shock. The group's internal projections, based on polling conducted weeks before the vote, saw Morsi with a commanding lead -- it was only a question of how close he would get to 50 percent. Morsi's lack of charisma -- as well as the lack of respect he commands among non-Islamists -- was part of the reason for his disappointing showing. But it was also the result of a series of EFTA_R1_00290864 EFTA01879361 more serious mistakes and miscalculations. Brotherhood officials had become detached from the changing tenor in the group's former strongholds in the Nile Delta, where the Brotherhood was overtaken by Ahmed Shafiq, Mubarak's last prime minister. The Islamist-dominated parliament had failed to pass the sweeping reform legislation that many had expected. Most controversial was an attempt to stack the constituent assembly with Brotherhood supporters, a classic case of political overreach. After the revolution, the Brotherhood -- like so many other political forces in Egypt's toxic political scene -- became consumed by paranoia, fearing that some combination of liberals, leftists, and old regime elements were out to get them. A democratic opening, as welcome as it was, came with its own risks. The rise of Brotherhood defector Abdel Moneim About Fotouh as a viable candidate was seen as an unprecedented threat to organizational unity and discipline. This paranoia, mixed with an old-fashioned dose of political cynicism, seeped into the group's discourse on foreign policy. When Egypt's ruling military council lifted a travel ban on American NGO workers in an attempt to defuse a political crisis, the Brotherhood-led parliament pounced, using the episode to call for a no-confidence vote and demand the removal of the military-appointed government. Brotherhood parliamentarians blamed the Egyptian government for giving into American pressure and called on Egypt to refuse U.S. aid. "I wish members of the U.S. Congress could listen to you now to realize that this is the parliament of the revolution, which does not allow a breach of the nation's sovereignty or interference in its affairs," said parliament speaker Saad al-Katatni, a Brotherhood EFTA_R1_00290865 EFTA01879362 official, in reaction to the debate. The Brotherhood has found itself doing a difficult dance, thinking one thing in private and saying another in public. Such mixed messages are also a function of the love-hate schizophrenia that many Brotherhood members -- and Egyptians in general -- seem to display toward the United States. I remember the early days of Barack Obama's presidency, when Brotherhood officials would complain bitterly about the White House's disinterest in democracy promotion. "For Obama, the issue of democracy is 15th on his list of priorities," one Brotherhood official told me in May 2010. "There's no moment of change like there was under Bush." It is true that the Brotherhood, along with most of Egypt, hates particular U.S. policies, particularly those related to Palestine. It also tends to think that somehow -- usually through creative, indirect means -- the United States is responsible for various nefarious plots against Egypt. But that doesn't mean that a Brotherhood-dominated government would immediately reorder Cairo's international alliances. For all the public vitriol, the Brotherhood actually feels more comfortable with America than it does with America's adversaries: "The U.S. is a superpower that is there and will be there, and it is not to anyone's benefit to have this superpower going down, but we want it to go up with its values and not with its dark side," one senior Brotherhood official told me. "What are the values driving China across the globe?... It's just pure profit. The Russians and the Chinese, I don't know their values! Western European and American core values of human rights and pluralism -- we practiced this when we were living there." Values aside, a Morsi administration simply would not be able to afford a rupture in relations with the United States. A Muslim EFTA_R1_00290866 EFTA01879363 Brotherhood-led Egypt will need to rebuild its deteriorating economy, and U.S. and European loans, assistance, and investment will be crucial to this effort. There's also no certainty that a President Morsi could drastically alter Egypt's foreign policy even if he wanted to -- regardless of what Egypt's new constitution says, the military and the intelligence services will continue to exercise veto power over critical defense and national security issues. While there are limits to how much the Brotherhood can alter Egypt's foreign policy, there are also limits to how far it can go in satisfying U.S. concerns. As Egypt becomes more democratic, elected leaders will have no choice but to heed popular sentiment on foreign policy. And in an otherwise divided polity, the only real area of consensus is the need for an independent, assertive foreign policy that re- establishes Egypt's leading role in the region. That means tension and disagreement with the United States will become a normal feature of the bilateral relationship. The model to look to is Turkey, led by the Islamically oriented Justice and Development Party, which has employed anti-Israel rhetoric to useful domestic effect. The effect of a Morsi presidency on domestic policy is similarly hazy. Egypt's byzantine bureaucracy remains stocked with Mubarak loyalists and could block any changes that Morsi tries to push through. As a former political advisor to the Brotherhood predicted to me, the "state machinery will devour him." To further confuse matters, Morsi is one of the rare presidential candidates who believes in limiting the power of his own office. In his TV interview with Fouda, he again stated his preference: an interim period with a mixed presidential- parliamentary system, which would pave the way for a system in EFTA_R1_00290867 EFTA01879364 which the legislature held complete sway. A Brotherhood-led assembly is set to draft a constitution that will define the relative powers of elected institutions. But, of course, Morsi's opinion on the matter could change once he became president. The Muslim Brotherhood's first experience in governance will be an experiment, and one the organization may not be prepared for. Elections have consequences. We just don't know what they'll be. And, for that matter, neither does Morsi. Shadi Hamid is director of research at the Brookings Doha Center and a fellow at the Saban Centerfor Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. Amick 2. Al-Ahram Weekly Revolution in chaos Ayman El-Amir 7 - 13 June 2012 -- Revolutions that changed the course of history took years to mature, distil their fundamental principles and sow them in their spheres of influence and beyond. This was the case of the American, French and Russian revolutions. The EFTA_R1_00290868 EFTA01879365 Egyptian Revolution of 25 January 2011, which is barely 17 months old, is still in its infancy, grappling with the priorities of its agenda. It seems more concerned with the issue of retribution than of building a new order. There is, of course, the valid argument that it cannot build a new order unless it has demolished the old one. However, the Egyptian revolution is permeated by the mood of revenge. That probably explains the nationwide outrage that has engulfed the country following the court sentences in the case of former president Hosni Mubarak, his sons and associates. When the presiding judge, Ahmed Refaat, handed down a life sentence for Mubarak and his interior minister, Habib El-Adli, the crowd in the courtroom cheered Allahu Akbar (God is great). But when the charges against six top lieutenants were dropped for lack of concrete evidence, that had probably been tampered with and destroyed earlier by the defendants, the courtroom exploded "The people want to purge the judiciary" and went into a melee that continued outside the court bwwuilding. The protest demonstrations that followed in Tahrir Square and 18 other major Egyptian cities encapsulated the people's sentiment that what they wanted was revolutionary justice rather than the standard legal justice the country's judiciary has long been flattered for. Some of the demonstrators were not even happy with the life sentence against Mubarak and wanted him sentenced to death. Others interpreted it as a 25-year sentence that would be reduced drastically after further review by the Court of Cassation and that Mubarak would be ultimately released after a few weeks and probably whisked out of the country. The rumour mill was turning out all kinds of stories. EFTA_R1_00290869 EFTA01879366 After 30 years of Mubarak rule and its devious policies that enriched a few thousand loyalists and sent millions of others into the abyss of poverty, Egyptians firmly embraced conspiracy theory. It became second nature to them. A wide credibility gap developed between the government and its public officials and the people. Even the legal system was not immune to it, especially that the Mubarak regime manipulated the justice system in the same way the 23 July movement handled domestic policy: reward loyalists and penalising critics. This has been the culture of governance for 60 years. Furthermore, corruption infected the entire country. From the smallest town to the most prestigious seat of power, everything worked by bribery and go- betweens. That was the legacy of the Mubarak regime -- indeed of the entire era since the 23 July 1952 military coup. Revolutionary justice, as an extraordinary form of punishment, is extrajudicial. It involves state security and revolutionary courts and has often worked against Egyptians. For 60 years, it was invariably used to suppress the opposition and to punish opponents, including Marxists and members of the Muslim Brotherhood alike. Rulings of up to the death sentence were passed on different occasions against different individuals by special courts that tarnished the reputation of the country's judicial system. Cases of torture, sometimes leading to death, were never fully investigated or brought to justice. Revolutionary justice has been tamed since the days of "the Terror" under Robespierre at the peak of the 1789 French Revolution when 15,000 to 20,000 French men and women were executed by the guillotine for expressing moderately opposite views. Yet, extraordinary forms of justice are sometimes called up in times of turmoil. Colonel Muammar EFTA_R1_00290870 EFTA01879367 Gaddafi of Libya was summarily executed by one shot in the head without any due process of law. His execution met with little if any protest because his own countrymen and most people around the world had already condemned him as a villain. Nikolai Ceausescu of Romania and his wife were summarily executed by a firing squad in 1990 after being condemned to death by a political court in a small room adjacent to the execution arena. Egyptians wanted extraordinary justice against the Mubarak clique for the extraordinary injustice of killing 840 and injury of more than 6,400 young people who demonstrated against his regime. They wanted revolutionary courts or trials in a Tahrir Square court followed by public hanging of the culprits. But times have changed. The Egyptian public is right in suspecting that many assets of the Mubarak regime are still in power; thousands of his loyalists manage state and public affairs and economic policies. Should a national government closely monitored by the people and answerable to them be installed, and all the country's institutions be regulated by a civil, democratic and modern constitution, that would affirm the separation of powers, the country would be on the right course for change. It is unfortunate that the Muslim Brotherhood has jumped on the bandwagon of public outrage to settle accounts with its rivals, reaffirm its one-track agenda and restore the confidence it had lost in the eyes of the public since last November's parliamentary elections. They have also used the opportunity to try and control the formation of the Constituent Assembly that will draft a permanent constitution. That was why they EFTA_R1_00290871 EFTA01879368 boycotted the all-party meeting called by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) Tuesday to amend the Constitutional Declaration of March 2011, to pre-empt any attempt by the Brotherhood to dominate the proposed assembly. It resorts to delay tactics to gain time until the transitional period is terminated, SCAF's, mandate has expired, and a Muslim Brotherhood president is in power. The Brotherhood succeeded in quickly mobilising tens thousands of Egyptians in major cities to protest the rulings, and incited some of them to undermine the other presidential candidate scheduled for the rerun, Ahmed Shafik, by presenting him as an accessory to the Mubarak regime. That was violently rejected by Shafik who labelled the Brotherhood as "the forces of chaos and darkness". Again, the Brotherhood overplayed their hand by using the protest to raise the sagging image of Mohamed Mursi, their candidate, by attacking Shafiq. Looking forward to the presidential election rerun, the electorate still remembers what a voracious appetite the Brotherhood has for power. In the eyes of the public, it clearly wants to consolidate the powers of all state institutions into its hands. It is trying, rather successfully, to fire up people and to turn their wrath against Shafiq for the Brotherhood's ulterior motives. Egyptians have only one last chance to restore the balance of the political system they envision: the composition of a multifarious Constituent Assembly. Should the Brotherhood succeed in vilifying Shafiq to give an edge to Mursi and to capture the presidency, the drafting of the new constitution is doomed to fall prey to theocratic tendencies. Instead, it should affirm the principles of the civil nature of the state, citizenship, equality and endorsement of the international covenants of human rights. EFTA_R1_00290872 EFTA01879369 For this to happen, the Constituent Assembly should steer clear of any religious-leaning members and preferably consist mainly of jurists. Additionally, SCAF should ensure that the position of the president is not endowed with extraordinary powers or privileges. But the Brothers have a mind of their own. After flexing their muscles in public squares, they felt that they muster enough power to boycott an all-party meeting with SCAF and to turn a deaf ear to a proposal by other presidential candidates for setting up an interim presidential council. Egyptians have a great deal to learn from their modern history. The celebrated constitution of 1923 was drafted by 18 members, mostly jurists, selected from among the 30-member Committee of the Constitution. The 18 members were called "the Committee of General Principles," which drafted the bulk of the constitution. In the course of the debate, a member proposed, as a courtesy to the Egyptian Copts, the constitution should provide a special quota for the Copts as a minority. The proposal was vehemently opposed by a prominent Copt at the time, Fikri Makram Ebeid, who argued that the rights of the Copts were fully protected and guaranteed by the constitutional provisions of citizenship and equality. The proposal was later dropped. That was the Egypt that was. The writer isformer corespondent of Al-Ahram in Washington, DC, andformer director of the UN Radio and Television in New York. EFTA_R1_00290873 EFTA01879370 Aold, The Washington Post Obama's friend in Turkey David Ignatius June 8 - Istanbul -- As President Obama was feeling his way in foreign policy during his first months in office, he decided to cultivate a friendship with Turkey's headstrong prime minister, Recep Tavyip Erdogan. Over the past year, this investment in Turkey has begun to pay some big dividends — anchoring U.S. policy in a region that sometimes seems adrift. Erdogan's clout was on display this week as he hosted a meeting here of the World Economic Forum (WEF) that celebrated the stability of the "Turkish model" of Muslim democracy amid the turmoil of the Arab Spring. One panel had the enraptured title "Turkey as a Source of Inspiration." In a speech Tuesday, Erdogan named Turkey's achievements over the decade he has been in power: Its economy has grown an annual average of 5.3 percent since 2002, the fastest rate of any country in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; gross domestic product has more than tripled, as have its foreign reserves; investment from abroad has increased more than 16 times. For Erdogan, receiving a visit from the WEF was a kind of vindication. The Turkish leader walked angrily offstage at the EFTA_R1_00290874 EFTA01879371 group's 2009 meeting in Davos, Switzerland, after a panel moderator (yours truly) didn't allow him time to respond to Israeli President Shimon Peres's remarks about the Gaza war. This week, that moment seemed well in the past. Turkey's ascendancy in the region may seem obvious now, but it was less so in 2009, when Obama began working to build a special relationship. To an otherwise predictable European itinerary for his first overseas trip in April 2009, he added a stop in Ankara. What impressed the Turks wasn't just that he spoke to their parliament but that earlier, in Strasbourg, he pushed for a greater role for Turkey in NATO, and in Prague he argued for Turkish membership in the European Union. Obama and Erdogan continued their courtship despite a sharp deterioration in Turkey's relations with Israel after the Gaza war and despite U.S. worries in early 2010 that Ankara was becoming too friendly with Iran. Obama expressed his concerns in a blunt two-hour conversation at the June 2010 Group of 20 summit in Toronto. Since then, according to both sides, there has been growing mutual trust. "My prime minister sees a friend in President Obama," says Egemen Bagis, the minister for European affairs and one of Erdogan's closest political advisers. "The two can very candidly express their opinions. They might not always agree, but they feel confident enough to share positions." An example of the Obama-Erdogan channel was their meeting in March at the Asian summit in Seoul. The top item was Obama's request that Erdogan convey a message to Iran's supreme leader about U.S. interest in a nuclear agreement. In Seoul, Erdogan EFTA_R1_00290875 EFTA01879372 also promised to reopen a Greek Orthodox seminary on the island of Halki, granting a request that Obama had made in 2009; Erdogan had earlier agreed to Obama's request that Turkey permit services at an ancient Armenian church on Akdamar Island in Lake Van. Turks cite several other concessions made by the Turkish leader: Obama persuaded him to install a missile-defense radar system that became operational this year, upsetting Tehran. And at U.S. urging, Erdogan reversed his initial opposition to NATO intervention last year in Libya. In playing the Turkey card, Obama has upset some powerful political constituencies at home. Jewish groups protest that Obama's warming to Ankara has come even as Israel's relationship with Turkey has chilled almost to the freezing point. Armenian groups are upset that Obama has soft-pedaled his once-emphatic call for Turkey to recognize the genocide of 1915. And human-rights groups complain that the United States is tolerating Erdogan's squeeze on Turkish journalists, judges and political foes. But as the Arab Spring has darkened, the administration has been glad for its alliance with this prosperous Muslim democracy — which it can celebrate as a beacon for the neighborhood. Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkey's ambitious foreign minister, argues that his country is a role model for Arabs because it shows that democracy brings dignity, not chaos or extremism. Bagis puts it this way: "There are many Muslim leaders who can go to Egypt and pray in a mosque. And there are many Western EFTA_R1_00290876 EFTA01879373 leaders who can go talk about democracy. Erdogan did both." For Turkey these days, that's something of a trump card. But there's a mutual dependence. It seems fair to say that no world leader has a greater stake in Obama's reelection than the Turkish prime minister. Article 4. World Politics Review Disabling Iran's Oil Weapon Frida Ghitis 07 Jun 2012 -- One of the obvious dangers of a possible war with Iran over its controversial nuclear program is that it could push oil prices sharply higher and, in turn, send the global economy into a tailspin. But a number of developments, some very deliberately set in motion by Iran's adversaries, have recently converged to erode the effectiveness of Iran's powerful oil weapon. The sharp edge of Iran's oil power has been dulled through painstaking tactical moves by Washington and its allies, but the most significant change came not by design, but by misfortune. Ironically, the fear that a conflict with Iran would cause a spike in petroleum prices and trip the world into a new recessionary spiral has been blunted by evidence that major economies are already suffering an economic slowdown. The sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone and the unexpected slowdown in growth EFTA_R1_00290877 EFTA01879374 in the U.S. have helped depress the price of oil in the commodities markets to well below $100 a barrel, the lowest level in eight months. Lower oil prices are bad news for Iran for two reasons. First, they slash the Islamic Republic's principal source of income. Second, they make the cost of conflict with Iran more bearable for the West. Tehran and the West continue their talks over Iran's uranium enrichment efforts, with Iran insisting the program has only peaceful intent and the West, bolstered by analysis from International Atomic Energy Association inspectors, claiming that the program looks suspiciously like one aiming to produce nuclear weapons. New talks are scheduled in Moscow for June 18, but there is scant evidence that the two sides are coming closer to an agreement. The threat of military action hangs in the air as Israel watches warily and Washington reiterates that "all options" are on the table. As a top oil producer, with control of the sea lane through which other major oil exporters ship their hydrocarbon exports to the rest of the world, Iran has enormous potential to greatly disrupt oil markets. Its geographical location, spanning the eastern shores of the Persian Gulf, means that global oil supplies could suffer as an unintended consequence of military conflict. But it also gives Tehran the ability to squeeze supplies deliberately. Just how seriously the West takes the risk became evident late last year, when Iran threatened to block the flow of oil through the Persian Gulf. As the West announced stricter economic sanctions, Iranian Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi warned that "not a drop of oil will pass through the Strait of Hormuz" if the planned measures went into effect. About 40 percent of tanker oil, or 20 percent of global oil supplies, pass EFTA_R1_00290878 EFTA01879375 through Hormuz. Stopping that flow would send a shockwave through oil markets. Washington did not take the threat lightly. The chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Martin Dempsey, put it plainly: If Iran moved to close the strait, he said, the U.S. would "take action and reopen the strait." The same message was repeated by Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and reportedly delivered through a secret channel to Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was informed that closing the strait would constitute the crossing of a "red line" that could trigger an armed military response. Much has happened in the ensuing months. Before Iran has had a chance to decide if it wants to stop the flow of its own petroleum products, the West is planning to slash purchases of Iranian oil. A European Union embargo is scheduled to start in July, and China has already cut its purchases of Iranian oil by about a quarter. Even Turkey has sharply reduced purchases of Iranian oil. Under normal circumstances, squeezing the flow of crude oil from the world's second-largest producer would be a form of self-flagellation for the West. But oil supplies have been deliberately boosted from other sources, just as demand is easing because of economic problems. Saudi Arabia, which sides with the West against Iran, its historical rival, has increased oil production to the highest levels in 23 years. And overall OPEC output has reached the highest level since 2008. Iran plans to pressure OPEC to lower production during this month's meeting, hoping to raise prices. Iran still has the ability to disrupt oil markets, which will undoubtedly affect consumers everywhere. But major oil- EFTA_R1_00290879 EFTA01879376 importing nations have sent notice that they are prepared to deal with threats to the global supply. During last year's war in Libya, another important oil exporter, the International Energy Agency surprised markets with its announcement that it would release 60 million barrels from the global strategic petroleum reserves. The announcement alone caused prices to drop 4.5 percent in one day. As tensions have heated up with Iran, Washington has persuaded its allies to draw up a similar plan. During last month's G-8 meeting in Chicago, the world's major economies agreed to coordinate their response and work together to lower oil prices should a confrontation with Iran make it necessary. Meanwhile, as the West moves to reduce its dependence on Iranian oil or on oil that passes through the Strait of Hormuz, Gulf oil producers are seeking alternate routes to bring their hydrocarbons to the global market. The United Arab Emirates, the fourth-largest exporter, is about to open a 225-mile pipeline that will allow it to bypass Hormuz to reach shipping terminals for its oil exports. And Abu Dhabi is reportedly planning yet another pipeline for its liquefied natural gas, also allowing it to reach tankers without passing through the narrow strait. In the meantime, the U.S., the world's biggest consumer of oil, has managed to considerably lower its reliance on crude oil imports. Higher domestic oil and natural gas production has resulted in a significant decline in America's need to buy from international markets, bringing seaborne imports to the lowest levels in more than 15 years. America still imports 45 percent of the oil it consumes, and the price of those imports is set by the global commodities markets. That means that the U.S., like any country that imports fuel, would feel the effects of a conflict in the world's top oil- EFTA_R1_00290880 EFTA01879377 producing region, the Persian Gulf. But Iran's ability to unilaterally inflict pain has been sharply reduced. Even more troubling for Iran, if a war started today, global oil supplies are better prepared to withstand the shock than they have been in a long time. As the world worries that Iran may build a nuclear weapon, Iran's most powerful weapon to keep a Western military strike at bay has become much less effective. Frida Ghitis is an independent commentator on world affairs and a World Politics Review contributing editor. Article 5. Center for a New American Security Risk and Rivalry: Iran, Israel and the Bomb Dr. Colin H. Kahl, Melissa Dalton, Matthew Irvine (Executive Summary) 06/06/2012 - - A nuclear-armed Iran would pose a significant challenge to U.S. and Israeli interests and would increase the prospects for regional conflict. Nevertheless, a preventive military strike against Iran's nuclear program by either the United States or Israel at this time is not the best EFTA_R1_00290881 EFTA01879378 option, and rushing to war would risk making the threat worse. Although Iran could probably be deterred from deliberately using or transferring nuclear weapons, a nuclear-armed Iran would be a more dangerous adversary in several respects. Believing that its nuclear deterrent would make it immune from retaliation, the Iranian regime would likely increase its lethal support to proxies such as Hezbollah and Hamas and commit more brazen acts of terrorism abroad, thus creating more frequent arises in the Levant. The Israeli-Iranian rivalry would be more prone to crises, and these crises would entail some inherent risk of inadvertent escalation to nuclear war. Preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons should therefore remain an urgent priority for both the United States and Israel. Until Iran appears poised to weaponize its nuclear capability, however, the preferable option is to continue the current combination of pressure and diplomacy. All options, including preventive military action, should remain on the table, but policymakers should recognize that the potential risks and costs associated with using force are high. Military action should remain a last resort, which should be contemplated only by the United States and only under stringent conditions. This report is the first in a series on the consequences of Iranian nuclearization.1 It examines the direct threat that a nuclear-armed Iran might pose to Israel and the associated risks of Israeli-Iranian nuclear confrontation. Our analysis of these potential dangers concludes: • The threat from Iran's nuclear program is growing but not yet imminent. Credible evidence suggests that Iran is pursuing a "nuclear hedging" strategy that aims to EFTA_R1_00290882 EFTA01879379 develop the indigenous technical capability to rapidly produce nuclear weapons at some point, should Iran's supreme leader decide to do so. However, Iran is at least a year - and likely further - away from developing nuclear weapons. • Multiple Iranian nuclear futures are possible. If Iran's nuclear progress continues, the supreme leader could conceivably be satisfied with stopping at a "threshold" capability just short of full-fledged weaponization. If the Iranian regime chooses instead to cross the nuclear threshold, the ultimate size and character of Iran's nuclear arsenal could follow a number of different pathways, each of which would produce different risks. • Iran is unlikely to deliberately use a nuclear weapon or transfer a nuclear device to terrorists for use against Israel. The Iranian regime is not suicidal and is sufficiently rational for the basic logic of nuclear deterrence to hold. • A nuclear-armed Iran would nevertheless be more aggressive and dangerous than an Iran without nuclear weapons. If Tehran thought that its nuclear deterrent would protect it against retaliation, Iran would be emboldened to increase its support for proxies in the Levant and terrorism abroad. EFTA_R1_00290883 EFTA01879380  • A more crisis-prone Israeli-Iranian rivalry would create some inherent risk of inadvertent nuclear war. The possibility of Israeli-Iranian nuclear escalation has been somewhat exaggerated, but it is not trivial and would have potentially devastating consequences. As policymakers attempt to head off those challenges, we make several recommendations: • Preventing a nuclear-armed Iran should remain the priority. Given the threat posed by a nuclear-armed Iran, current policy rightly emphasizes prevention rather than containment with regard to the possibility of Iran developing nuclear weapons. • The United States and Israel should avoid taking steps that limit diplomatic options. The best diplomatic outcome would be to roll back Iran's current nuclear progress. Yet even as policymakers aggressively pursue preventive efforts, they should avoid drawing diplomatic red lines - most notably, insisting that Iran end all domestic uranium enrichment - that box in negotiators and make creative solutions to the Iranian nuclear threat more difficult. • The use of force should be a last resort. As the United States and its partners pursue a diplomatic solution that pressures Iran to meet its international obligations, all options, including possible military action, should remain EFTA_R1_00290884 EFTA01879381  on the table. However, because of the enormous risks and uncertain benefits involved, a preventive strike on Iran's nuclear program should remain a last resort. Such a strike should only be considered if four conditions are met: 1. all nonmilitary options have been exhausted, 2. Iran has made a clear move toward weaponization, 3. there is a reasonable expectation that the strike would set back Iran's program significantly and 4. a sufficiently large international coalition is available to help manage the destabilizing consequences of the strike and to work collectively in the aftermath to contain Iran and hinder it from rebuilding its nuclear program. . Israel should not attack Iran. A near-term Israeli attack on Iran fails to meet any of the previous criteria and would likely backfire, increasing the risks to Israeli security and regional stability. Only the United States - if it had exhausted all other options and faced compelling evidence that Iran was determined to produce a bomb - would have any hope of producing a significant delay in Iran's nuclear program while holding together the type of coalition required for effective poststrike containment. Dr. Colin H. Kahl is a Senior Fellow at the Centerfor a New American Security and an associate professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. Melissa G. Dalton is a Visiting Fellow at the EFTA_R1_00290885 EFTA01879382 Centerfor a New American Security. Matthew Irvine is a Research Associate at the Centerfor a New American Security. Article 6 The New Republic Why a Syrian Civil War Would Be a Disaster For U.S. National Security Robert Satloff June 7, 2012 -- Speaking Thursday before the U.N. General Assembly, just one day after the latest massacre of civilians by government-affiliated forces, Kofi Annan warned that the crisis in Syria was on a disastrous course. "If things do not change, the future is likely to be one of brutal repression, massacres, sectarian violence and even all-out civil war," he said. "All Syrians will lose." Annan, of course, is not the first to evoke the term "civil war" in reference to the crisis in Syria, which has already resulted in more than 10,000 dead and 50,000 missing. The term has EFTA_R1_00290886 EFTA01879383 become a favorite of opponents of intervention in Syria, who use it to conjure up the image of a human swamp of chaos, destruction and mayhem that is bloodier than what Syria has suffered over the past sixteen months, less tractable to resolution, and violently inhospitable to outsiders. The unspoken assumption is that while such a scenario may be horrible for Syrian civilians, it would not rise to the level of an international crisis—at least not one that would have much impact on the United States. But if commentators have mostly been justified in raising the specter of civil war, they have mostly been wrong in assessing its consequences. If Syria descends into the chaos of all-out civil war, it's not only Syrians who will lose out, as Annan suggests. Very c