EFTA01763885.pdf

From: Office of Tene Rod-Larsen < III Sent: Saturday, October 27, 2012 5:52 PM Subject: October 26 update Article 1.4=> Article 2.4=> The Newsweek/=aily Beast Signals=That Iran Has Retaliation in Works Bruce Riedel Article 3.4=> Foreign Polic= Why Is Qatar Mucking Around in Gaza? <http://www.foreignpolicy=com/articles/2012/10/25/why_is_qatar_mucking_around_ingaza> David B. Robe=ts Article 4.</=> Foreign Affai=s Why Isr=el Should Trade Its Nukes Uri Bar-Josep= Article 5.<1=> Wall Street J=urnal The Isl=mist Threat Isn't Going Away Michael J= Totten Article 6.4=> The New York =imes How Cas=ro Held the World Hostage James G. Blig=t and Janet M. Lang EFTA_R1_00070728 EFTA01763885 Article 7. The Economist=/span> Xi Jinp=ng: The man who must change China Article 1.</=pan> Al-Monitor Why Khamenei Will Compromise</=ont> Meir Javedanfar <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/contents/authors/meir-ja=edanfar.html> Oct 25= 2012 -- The Iranian regime is currently facing tough open-ended sanctions= Judging by the recent presidential foreign-policy <http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/22/politics/debate-mainbar/ind=x.html> , there is no end on =he horizon as neither candidate would be willing to reduce sanctions unless Iran Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei backs down.&nb=p; The economic challenges posed by the current sanctions are by far the b=ggest foreign-induced challenge that Khamenei has faced since assuming the=role in 1989. Should the current sanctions and iso=ation regime imposed by the West against Iran continue in their current fo=mat, in my opinion it is highly likely that Khamenei will be forced to make a new set of compromises at the nucle=r talks. This could happen within two to three years, at most. Compr=mises are likely to include the following: Dropping the demand that the West recogniz= Iran's right to enrich uranium as a precondition (This recognition is kkely to be postponed until all other outstanding issues have been resolved.) The Iranian regime is likely to offe= these compromises as part of a step-by-step program. After each step is t=ken, part of the current sanctions against Iran would be lifted and nuclear fuel would be supplied, at stages agreed =n by both parties. Khamenei is also very likely to insi=t that ultimately Iran be allowed to enrich at lower levels on its soil. 1= is likely that the Israeli government would accept such a proposal, as its biggest concern is enrichment at Ford=w and Iran's current unwillingness to answer IAEA questions. A clean bill =f health for Iran's nuclear program from the IAEA, as well as a subsequent=tough inspection regime by it, would alleviate many of Israel's major concerns. These compromises would be in contra=t to Khamenei's current prposal to the P5+1 <http://backchannel.al- monitor.com/index.php/2012/07/1028/=ran-seeks-sustained-dialogue/> , which does not show any willingness on Iran's part to compromise on its enrichment facility at For=ow or to answer questions about its previous activities to the IAEA. Altho=gh president Ahmadinejad has in the past offered <http://www.english.rfi.fr/americas/20100820-iran-stop- nuc=ear-enrichment-if-fuel-supply-ensured> to stop enrichment at 20% if nuclear fuel is supplied to Iran, this offer was not pursued as he has no authorit= over Iran's nuclear program. 2 EFTA_R1_00070729 EFTA01763886 Khamenei would need to offer new com=romises in order to secure his regime's survival. By allowing the sanction= to continue, Khamenei could ultimately face the economic collapse of his regime. This is a price which Iran's m=st powerful man would be unwilling to pay. Nothing is worth more to him th=n the stability of his government. There are numerous reasons behind th= Iranian regime's inability to get through the current challenges withou= having to offer a new set of compromises. The supreme leader's style of leadership and its consequences are one of t=em. Khamenei is no Mohammad Mossadegh. 1= other words, he has failed to convert his nuclear policies into a nationa=istic consensus issue as Mossadegh was able to do with his oil-nationalization policies. This is due to numerous =easons. Khamenei does not have the charisma and, more importantly, the nat=onalist credentials of the former prime minister, who was overthrown by th= CIA and MI6 in 1953. Also, Mossadegh was elected democratically, whereas Khamenei was not. Mossadegh had the ba=king of the majority of the Iranian people, whereas I believe that Khamene= only has the support of a minority. When Mossadegh resigned in 1952 =and was replaced by Ahmad Qavam <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmad_Qavam> <=ont face="Times New Roman">, protests erupted after he announced his int=ntion to reverse Mossadegh's stance and to negotiate with the British in order to end the oil dispute. However, if Kh=menei announces that he is willing to show compromise at the nuclear talks= instead of protesting, many inside Iran are likely to celebrate.</=pan> Evidence of Khamenei's failure to =ake the nuclear issue into a nationalistic one are not difficult to find. =hese include his refusal to hold a referendum on the issue, something which opposition leader Mir-Hossein Mousavi 63% of respondents want the regime to compromise at the nuclear talks. Tha= poll was soon removed and nothing similar has appeared since. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2010/07/100707J07_iran89_mir=ossein_musavi_international_policy.shtml> Khamenei is no Ruhollah Khomeini eit=er. He does not have the credentials of Iran's charismatic leader of the=1979 revolution. Khomeini managed to unite the regime behind him for eight years to fight Saddam Hussein. This is in =ddition to being able to get through numerous domestic challenges. Khamene= has failed to create such unity. His falling out with every single presid=nt who has served under him including Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is testimony of the divisive nature of his leadership.=This is in addition to the 2009 post-election uprising in Iran, something =hich never happened under Khomeini as he was more successful in uniting th= different regime factions. This is one of the reasons why the regime has failed <http://in.mobile.re=ters.com/article/topNews/idINDEE88806E20120909> Meir Javedanfar<A> is an Iranian-Israeli Middle East analyst. He teaches the Contemporary Iranian Politics Course a= the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) in Herzliya. Article 2. The Newsweek/Daily =east In Saudi Arabia and Israel, Si=nals That Iran Has Retaliation in Works Bruce Riedel 3 EFTA_R1_00070730 EFTA01763887 October 26, 2012 -- The Iranians and their Hiz=ullah ally are sending warning signals about how they might fight a future war with the United States and Israel. The s=gnals aren't subtle—Tehran intends to retaliate for any attack on its nuclea= facilities <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/10/22/israel-s=top-iran-expert-you-can-t-out-negotiate-the- mullahs.html> with blows against America's allies in the region, hitting their most se=sitive oil and nuclear facilities. A P=Iestinian man listens to a speech by Hizbullah chief Sayyed Hassan Nasrall=h on Hizbullah's Al-Manar TV, Oct. 11, 2012. Hassan Nasrallah claimed Thursday responsibility for sending a drone which="flew over important installations" in Israel on Oct. 6 and was =owned over the northern part of the Negev desert. (Wissam Nassar, Xinhua /=Landov) =/a>The U.S a=d Iran have been adversaries since 1979; we fought an undecla=ed naval war in the late 1980s <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/07/06/the-last=time-we-fought-iran.html> . The American presidential election has seen both candidates threaten Iran rith military action if it does not forsake development of a nuclear arsena= and halt its nuclear enrichment program. Iran has long threatened it will=retaliate dramatically and decisively if it is attacked by the U.S., Israel or both. Now it is showing some of i=s plans for doing just that. On Aug. 15, a cyberattack hit Saudi oil giant Aramco w=th devastating results. According to U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, 30,000 computer workstations were rendered useles= and had to be replaced. Aramco, which Forbes magazine ranks as the world=92s largest oil company and is the key to Saudi Arabia's production, had=data on many of its hard drives erased and replaced with photos of a burning U.S. flag. Panetta did not directly =ccuse Iran of responsibility, but other U.S. officials have pointed right =t Tehran. Panetta concluded that Iran has "undertaken a concerted effort=to use cyberspace to its advantage." =/a>A few day= later in Qatar, a similar virus attacked the RasGas natural-gas company, = joint venture between Exxon Mobil and the state-owned Qatar Petroleum, which operates the world's largest natural-=as field. According to Panetta, the two attacks were "probably the most =estructive attack the private sector has seen to date." Neither attack d=rectly targeted the sensitive Aramco and RasGas computer systems that operate the oil industry itself—the att=cks were more aimed at its management systems. =/a>The timin= was significant. The attack was launched on the eve of the Islamic holy =93night of power," or Lailat al Qadr, which commemorates when the Quran was first revealed to the Prophet Muhammad by =he angel Gabriel. Shia Muslims believe it also coincides with the date on =hich Ali, Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, was fatally wounded by a poi=on-coated sword in Iraq. The Saudi and Qatari governments would understand the message clearly; Iran can atta=k your economy. In effect: we don't need to shut the Strait of Hormuz, w= will shut down your computer instead. =/a>At least =he Saudi attack was an inside job. According to The New York Times, a comp=ny insider or insiders probably inserted a memory stick that contained the virus. Aramco has almost 60,000 employee=, about 70 percent of which are Shia Muslims from the kingdom's Eastern =rovince along the Persian Gulf, and where almost all of Saudi Arabia's o=l is found. The Saudi Shia community has been in a state of growing unrest since the start of the Arab Awakenin= in 2011. There have been increasingly violent protests against the House =f Saud in the Shia community, which has long faced discrimination by the S=udis. Since Saudi troops crossed the King Fand Causeway last year to suppress demonstrations in neighboring=Bahrain by the Shia majority there, anger at the Saudi royal family has be=ome even more pronounced among Shia in Eastern Province. Aramco, in short,=is a target-rich environment for angry Saudi Shia with ties to Iran. Only a tiny minority would need to see= Iranian technical help to penetrate the digital heart of the kingdom's =il industry. =/a>The Saudi=Ministry of Interior has long been obsessed with Iranian intelligence acti=ity among the Shia minority. The ministry has always believed a Shia terror group with links to Iran was responsible=for the 1996 attack on the U.S. air base in Khobar that killed 19 U.S. ser=icemen and wounded 372 Americans, Saudis, and other nationalities. The Kho=ar Towers are located close to Aramco headquarters in Dhahran. 4 EFTA_R1_00070731 EFTA01763888 The O4. 6 drone was intended to signal Israel that both Iran and Hizbullah see =imona as an attractive target for missile attacks if Iran is attacked. =/a>Hizbullah=followed up the cyberattack with a drone mission on Oct. 6. An Iranian-bui=t surveillance drone dubbed Ayoub flew from Lebanon into southern Israel before being shot down by t=e Israeli air force <http://www.thedailyb=ast.com/cheats/2012/10/08/drone-shows-israel-penetrable.html> . Officials from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Force told the Al Arabiya n=wspaper that the target was the Israeli nuclear reactor at Dimona, the cen=erpiece of Israel's nuclear program. Hizbullah's leader, Hassan Nasral=ah, later gave a speech taking credit for the drone flight and warned Israel that more would follow. =/a>Again the=timing was no accident. It was the 39th anniversary of the start of the 19=3 war, the devastating Arab- Israeli conflict in which 10,000 Israelis were killed or wounded. It was also a stunning fa=lure for Israeli intelligence, which failed to see the attack coming until=just hours before Egypt and Syria struck. Hizbullah was warning it, too, m=ght surprise Israel. At the Israel Defense Forces, Major General Aviv Kochavi, director of military intellige=ce, estimates that Hizbullah today has some 80,000 rockets and missiles ai=ed at Israel from Lebanon. The Oct. 6 drone was intended to signal Israel =hat both Iran and Hizbullah see Dimona as an attractive target for missile attacks if Iran is attacked. =/a>Iran's =apabilities to inflict substantial damage on the Saudi and other gulf-stat= oil industries by cyberwarfare are difficult for outsiders to assess. Iran is a relative newcomer; until now, it has be=n mostly a victim. Iranian and Hizbullah abilities to penetrate Israers=anti-missile defenses are also hard to estimate. Those defenses are among =he best in the world, thanks to years of U.S. military assistance and Israeli ingenuity. So it is hard to know h=w hard Iran can really strike back if it is attacked. Bluffing and chest-t=umping are a big part of the Iranian game plan. But the virus and the dron= together sent a signal, don't underestimate Iran. Bruce Riedel is a Senior Fellow a= the Brookings Institution's Saban Center and a professor at Johns Hopkins=School of Advanced International Studies. A specialist on the Middle East, he served in the CIA for thirty years. Article 3. Foreign Policy =hy Is Qatar Mucking Around in Gaza? David B. Roberts October 25, 2012 -- A deeply contrar=an streak has taken hold in Qatar these days. Insulated by U.S. security g=arantees, eager to use its burgeoning fiscal reserves, and propelled by its elites' reformist zeal, Doha continues to e=ert a disproportionate influence on regional politics. Emir Hamad bin Khal=fah Al Thani's latest move was a dramatic vis=t <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/24/world/middleeast/pledgi=g-400-million-qatari-emir-makes-historic-visit-to- gaza-strip.html> to the Gaza Strip, becoming the first head of state to visit the Palestini=n territory since Hamas wrested control of it in 2007. Unlike some of its less imaginative =rab rivals, Qatar saw Hamas's regional isolation as an opportunity rather =han a problem. Despite its alliance with the United States, Doha has been nurturing its ties with the Palestinian I=lamist group 5 EFTA_R1_00070732 EFTA01763889 for some time: Its worst kept secret is that Khaled Meshal, H=mas's leader, has had a house there for many years and has been increasing=y seen in Doha since Hamas was forced to leave <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/28/world/middleeast/khaled=meshal-the-leader-of-hamas-vacates- damascus.html> Syria in early 2012. Doha has also opened its pocketbook to Hamas, pled=ing <http://www=reuters.com/artide/2012/10/23/palestinians-gaza-qatar-idUSL5E8LNISNIX201210=3> $250 million in February -- a gift that was increased to $400 million upon=the emir's visit. The injection of funds, however, is =ot the most important aspect of Sheikh Hamad's trip. By breaking Hamas's r=gional isolation and explicitly recognizing its rule over Gaza, Doha has strengthened the militant group's hand agains= its Palestinian rivals. An official from the Palestinian Authority, which=is in charge of the West Bank, begrudgingly welcomed the visit while noting <http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/AleqM5j5N1Wfi5=DJ9Ec3bdFWw2yvt0CeFg?docId=a40c2cc342144bb6 87f736cfeb13302c> that "no one should deal with Gaza as a separate entity from the Palestinian territories and f=om the Palestinian Authority." Unlike the Palestinian Authority, Is=ael felt no need to Israel soften its criticism. An Israeli spokesman carp=d bitterly about the emir's trip, saying=/font> <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4295973,00.html= target=> that the emir was "throwing=peace under a bus." The visit further highlights Israel'= loss of influence with Qatar. Relations between the two countries warmed =ith the opening of an Israeli trade office in Doha in 1996 (reputedly close to Meshal's house) as the two sides looke= to ship Qatari gas to Israel, with Enron acting <http://www.nytimes.com/1995/01/20/business/deal-by-enron-=ith-qatar.html> as the intermedia=y. The deal failed, however, and relations ebbed and flowed until December 2008, when Qatar cut ties in protest of Is=ael's offensive against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Rumors that Doha was atte=pting to restart relations were finally put to rest with a leaked memo fro= Israel's Foreign Ministry labelling <http://www.nrg.co.il/online/l/ART2/275/145.html?hp=1&am=;cat=404&loc=2> Qatar =s a "leading activist" against Israel, decisively cutting whatever informal relations remained. The Iranian angle Iran, with whom Qatar maintains cord=al official relations, joins Israel and the Palestinian Authority in an un=ikely triumvirate watching proceedings in Gaza with glum resignation. Tehran officials are doubtlessly looking ba=k nostalgically to happier times only a few years back, when their proxy H=zbollah all but defeated the Zionist Entity -- winning Iran no small degre= of Arab support for its material support to the Lebanese militant organization. Back then, Hamas was also s=ill ensconced in Iran's camp, and Syria was a stable ally that appeared to=be gradually increasing its influence in the Middle East. Indeed, while Israel and the Palesti=ian Authority may view Qatar's embrace of Hamas with chagrin, it is Iran t=at is the central loser in this drama. The emir's visit is part of a larger Qatari policy to unseat and reorient =rucial Iranian allies around the Middle East -- and by extension, amputate=a long-used, effective limb of Iranian foreign policy. This is a remarkabl= forthright policy, for Iran will not -- and cannot -- take it lying down. This new policy is most evident in S=ria, where Qatar is explicitly and unashamedly supporting <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000087239639044368410457=062842929673074.html> the 19-month insurgency with mone=, equipment, and at the very least light weaponry -- little less than a de=laration of war against President Bashar al-Assad, Iran's core ally. But Qatar's new activism is also app=rent in Gaza, where Doha has likely decided to take action precisely becau=e of Hamas's break from Iran. When Tehran stopped <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/21/us-palestinians=hamas- finance-idUSTRE77K18320110821> sending money to Hamas after the =roup failed to publically support Iran's embattled ally in Syria, Qatar sa= an opportunity to split the Palestinian group from its long-time sponsor.=While its $400 million donation is earmarked for humanitarian development, not only is such support fungible,=but there are 6 EFTA_R1_00070733 EFTA01763890 doubtless other financial arrangements being made between Qa=ar and Hamas on this trip -- further strengthening the ties between the Pa=estinian Islamist movement and Doha. This move will, of course, catalyze =nother round of speculation that Qatar is supporting the rise of the Musli= Brotherhood across the Arab world. That Qatar's supports the Brotherhood is not in doubt -- indeed, it hardly trie= to conceal its efforts at engaging with the Islamist movement in Egypt, T=nisia, Libya, Syria and now with Hamas, another Brotherhood offshoot. Yet =atar is not nefariously trying to replace the Shia Crescent with a Brotherhood Banana, curving from Syria=through Gaza, Egypt, and on to Libya and Tunisia. Doha is much more pragma=ic and less Machiavellian than that: It is leveraging its relations where =hey exist, and looking to bolster popular, effective, moderate Muslim parties with whom it has relations. </=ont> Qatar's vanguard role in weakening a=key plank of Iranian foreign policy indicates that Doha must feel deeply s=cure with its relationship with Tehran, for it would hardly undertake such aggressive moves if it felt imminently =hreatened. Indeed, there is an obvious flashpoint between the two regional=powers: Qatar and Iran share the world's largest gas field, which has been=responsible for Qatar's recent spike in wealth. Traditionally, this has meant that Qatar treated Iran wit= a great deal of respect. Relations were carefully improved in the 1990s a= the field was being developed, as Doha sought to avoid an escalation afte= numerous instances <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy- analysis/view/c=anging-conventional-military-balance-in-the-gulf> of Iran attacking and stealing equipment from unmanned Qatari gas rigs. Today, Qatar's relations with Iran a=e as pleasant as ever on the surface. However, the fact that Qatar is over=urning one of the key tenets of its foreign policy by antagonizing Iran is a surprising and forthright move by the Qat=ri elite, which clearly does not accept conventional limits on what is and=what is not possible in the Middle East. David B. Roberts is deputy direct=r of the Royal United Services Institute (Qatar) and the creator and autho= of thegulfblog.com. <http://www.thegulfblog.com/> Article 4. Foreign Affairs =span style="font-size:28pt">Why Israel Sh=uld Trade Its Nukes Uri Bar-Joseph October 25, 2012 --=On September 19, to nobody's surprise, Shaul Chorev, the director-genera= of Israel's Atomic Energy Commission, announced that his government would not attend an upcoming conference devoted to establishing a nuclear-free Middle East. The announcement reaffirmed Israeli= long-standing position that a nuclear-free zone can come about only as a =onsequence of a lasting regional peace. Until such a peace is achieved, Jerusalem will not take any tangibl= steps toward eliminating its nuclear weapons. At least on the fac= of it, this stand is sensible. For 45 years, Israel has been the only nuc=ear power in the Middle East, enjoying a formidable strategic safety net against any existential threat. Since 1957= Israel has invested tremendous 7 EFTA_R1_00070734 EFTA01763891 resources in building up a solid nuclear a=senal in Dimona. Today, according to various estimates, this stockpile com=rises some 100-300 devices, including two-stage thermonuclear warheads and a variety of delivery systems, the mo=t important of which are modern German-built submarines, which constitute =he backbone of Israel's second-strike capability. For Israel to give up =hese assets in the midst of an ongoing conflict strikes most Israelis as irrational. This consensus, how=ver, overlooks the fact that Israel's nuclear capability <=ont face="Times New Roman">has not played an important role in the country's defense. chttp://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1373=4/dmitry- adamsky/why-israel-should-learn-to-stop-worrying-and-love-the-bom=?gp=134621:d83124a9SOadl8a2> [1] Unlike other nuclear-armed s=ates, Israel initiated its nuclear project not because of an opponent's real or imagined nuclear capability but bec=use of the worry that, in the long run, Arab conventional forces would out=trip the power of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). As early as the 1950s, =sraeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion sought to manage the threat of modernizing Arab armies, which were inspire= by pan-Arab sentiment and backed by the Soviet Union, by developing the u=timate deterrent. Shimon Peres, the architect of Israel's nuclear progra= and now Israel's president, relentlessly argued in public speeches and writings that Israel needed to compensate fo= the large size of the Arab armies with "science" -- a code word for n=clear arms. As it turned out, h=wever, Arab conventional superiority never materialized. Ever since Israel=crossed the nuclear threshold on the eve of the 1967 war, the qualitative gap between Israel's conventional force= and those of its Arab neighbors has only grown. Today, particularly as th= Syrian army slowly disintegrates, the IDF could decisively rout any combi=ation of Arab (and Iranian) conventional forces. This advantage, combined with the United States' support for Isr=el, is what has kept Arab countries from taking up arms against the Jewish=state -- not the fear of nuclear retaliation. If, of course, Iran=were to obtain a nuclear weapon, the arsenal at Dimona would no longer be =rrelevant; it would be an important hedge against Iran. But far from being a secure balance, as the international re=ations theorist Kenneth Waltz has argued <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1377=1/kenneth-n-waltz/why-iran-should-get-the- bomb?gp=134957:57f66a6e5Oad183=> Fearing the prospec= of living in the shadow of such terror, many Israeli officials have openl= called for a military strike to halt Iran's nuclear program. They are spurred by anxieties that are deeply rooted in l=raeli culture, stemming from the trauma of the Holocaust and of two thousa=d years of perceived and real victimhood throughout the Jewish Diaspora. l=raeli leaders, particularly Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, now evince a belief that the country can rely=only on itself when it comes to ensuring its security and its existence.</=ont> The problem for Isr=el, however, is that a strike on Iran might carry grave consequences, espe=ially since the IDF cannot completely destroy Iran's nuclear infrastructure on its own. Israel can delay Iran's nucl=arization, but it cannot prevent it. Meanwhile, a military strike could pr=voke a great backlash, including missile and rocket attacks by Iran, Hezbo=lah, and Hamas on Israeli population centers. Just as worrisome, a strike would provide the Iranian regime with=a handy justification for its decision to go nuclear../p> And so Israel finds=itself in a strategic dilemma: it considers an Iranian bomb an existential=threat, but it cannot stop Iran's nuclearization by itself or without provoking an unpredictable backlash. Fortunately, Israel=has a way out of this strategic limbo: by agreeing to give up its nuclear =rsenal. Instead of rejecting the calls for a region free of weapons of mass destruction, Jerusalem could participate =n such an initiative -- joining in a similar sacrifice by all other region=l actors, including Iran. The conventional wisdom is that this would be a =ad bargain for Israel, giving up too much in exchange for too little. But such a bold move could set in mot=on a long-term process that might end the bitter stalemate over Iran's n=clear program. Iran has been calling for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the=Middle East since 1974 and perceives the Israeli arsenal as a great threat, so it will have no choice but to su=port the initiative. And purely from a security perspective, Israel would =e safer in a WMD-free region. It would maintain its conventional superiori=y and its ability to deter conventional challenges -- all the while eliminating the prospect of nonconventional th=eats, such as an Iranian nuclear bomb or Syrian chemical weapons.</=pan> 8 EFTA_R1_00070735 EFTA01763892 Of course, Israel i= not likely to actually abandon its own nuclear arsenal anytime soon, and,=even if it did, it would not lose the know-how and the capability to produce nuclear arms in the future. But a change in =olicy that started Israel in this direction would at the very least increa=e the pressure on Iran to give up its own nuclear project.</=pan> Several development= might eventually encourage Jerusalem to take the plunge. As Iran inches i=s way to a bomb, the status quo of the last 45 years, during which Israel succeeded in maintaining its regional nuclea= monopoly with hardly any external pressures, is becoming increasingly unt=nable. If Israel does ultimately resort to the unilateral use of military =orce against Iran, international pressure will build for Israel to </=ont> <http://w=w.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66569/avner-cohen-and-marvin-miller/bringing=israels-bomb-out-of-the- basement?gp=66682:bf11089c50ad1821> [3], to come clean about its own arsenal, and to take=tangible steps toward establishing a nuclear-free Middle East. After all, the logic of using force to secure a nuclear monop=ly flies in the face of international norms. The same pressure might come =bout if the international sanctions against Iran prove to be successful an= Tehran agrees to limit the country's nuclear development, or if an American-led coalition destroys Iran's nuc=ear facilities. Moving toward a nuclear-free Middle East may be the price =hat Jerusalem will be asked to pay for the efforts taken by the internatio=al community to bail Israel out of a threatening situation. On the other hand, if Iran does become a nuclear =tate, Israeli voters may pressure their government to give up the country=92s nuclear weapons in exchange for Iran doing the same. According to a 20=1 survey conducted by Shibley Telhami of the University of Maryland, 65 percent of Israeli Jews prefer that neit=er Iran nor Israel have nuclear weapons. Israel's nuclear =apability has never been essential for the defense of the country, and it =ould become important only if Iran were to get its own nuclear weapon. But that dangerous outcome, especially for a o=e-bomb state like Israel, need not materialize. If Israel commits to a Mid=Ie East free of weapons of mass destruction, offering up its own nuclear c=pability as a bargaining chip, it may finally make good use of its most controversial strategic asset. </=ont> URI BAR-JOSEPH t=aches at the University of Haifa. He specializes in strategic and intellig=nce studies, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Israeli security policy. Links: [1] <http://www.foreignaffairs.com=artides/137374/dmitry-adamsky/why-israel-should-learn-to-stop-worrying-an— love-the-bomb?gp=134621:d83124a950ad18a2> http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137=74/dmitry-adamsky/why- israel-should-learn-to-stop-worrying-and-love-the-borb?gp=134621:d83124a950adl8a2 <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137374/dmitry-adamsky=why-israel-should-learn-to-stop-worrying-and-love- the-bomb?gp=134621:d83=24a950adl8a2> (2] <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137731/kenneth-n-waft=/why-iran-should-get-the- bomb?gp=134957:57f66a6e50ad1831> http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137731/kenneth-n-waltz/why-iran- =hould-get-the-bomb?gp=134957:57f66a6e50ad1831 <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137731/kenneth-n- waltqwhy-iran-should-get-the-bomb?gp=134957:57f66a6e50ad1831> [3] <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66569/avner-cohen-and=marvin-miller/bringing-israels-bomb-out-of-the- basement?gp=66682:bf11089=50ad1821> http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66569/a=ner-cohen-and-marvin- miller/bringing-israels-bomb-out-of-the-basement?gp=3D66682:bf11089c50ad1821 <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66569/avner-cohen-and=marvin-miller/bringing-israels-bomb-out-of-the- basement?gp=66682:bf11089=50ad1821> 9 EFTA_R1_00070736 EFTA01763893 Article 5. Wall Street Journal=/font> =span style="font-size:28pt">The Islamist =hreat Isn't Going Away Michael J. Totten <http://online.wsj.com/search/term.html?KEYWORDS=MICHAEL+1=+TOTTEN&bylinesearch=true> October 25, 2012 --=President Barack Obama and former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney wrapp=d up their trilogy of presidential debates on Monday this week and spent most of the evening arguing foreign policy. =ach demonstrated a reasonable grasp of how the world works and only sharpl= disagreed with his opponent on the margins and in the details. But they b=th seem to think, 11 years after 9/11, that calibrating just the right policy recipe will reduce Islamist e=tremism and anti-Americanism in the Middle East. They're wrong. Mr. Romney said it first, early in the debate: "We're goi=g to have to put in place a very comprehensive and robust strategy to help the world of Islam . . . reject this violent extrerism." Later Mr. Obama spoke as though this objective is already on it= way to being accomplished: "When Tunisians began to protest," h= said, "this nation, me, my administration, stood with them earlier than just about any other country. In Egypt, we stood on=the side of democracy. In Libya, we stood on the side of the people. And a= a consequence, there is no doubt that attitudes about Americans have chan=ed." The Middle East desperately needs economic development, better =ducation, the rule of law and gender equality, as Mr. Romney says. And Mr. Obama was right to take the side of citizens a=ainst dictators—especially in Libya, where Moammar Gadhafi ran one of th= most thoroughly repressive police states in the world, and in Syria, wher= Bashar Assad has turned the country he inherited into a prison spattered with blood. But both presidential can=idates are kidding themselves if they think anti-Americanism and the appea= of radical Islam will vanish any time soon. First, it's simply not true that attitudes toward Americans ha=e changed in the region. I've spent a lot of time in Tunisia and Egypt, both before and after the revolutions, and have=yet to meet or interview a single person whose opinion of Americans has ch=nged an iota. Second, pace Mr. Romney, promoting better education, the rule =f law and gender equality won't reduce the appeal of radical Islam. Egyptians voted for Islamist parties by a two-to-=ne margin. Two-thirds of those votes went to the Muslim Brotherhood, and t=e other third went to the totalitarian Salafists, the ideological brethren=of Osama bin Laden. These people are not even remotely interested in the rule of law, better education or g=nder equality. They want Islamic law, Islamic education and gender aparthe=d. They will resist Mr. Romney's pressure for a more liberal alternative a=d denounce him as a meddling imperialist just for bringing it up. Anti-Americanism has been a default political position=in the Arab world for decades. Radical Islam is the principal vehicle thro=gh which it's expressed at the moment, but anti- Americanism specifically, and anti-Western "imperialism"= generally, likewise lie at the molten core of secular Arab nationalism of=every variety. The Islamists hate the U.S. because it's liberal and decade=t. (The riots in September over a ludicrous Internet video ought to make that abundantly clear.) And both Islamists an= secularists hate the U.S. because it's a superpower.=/p> Everything the United States does is viewed with suspicion acr=ss the political spectrum. Gamal Abdel Gawad Soltan, the director of Egypt's Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategi= Studies, admitted as much to me in Cairo last summer when I asked him abo=t NATO's war against Gadhafi in Libya. "There is a general sympathy w=th the Libyan people," he 10 EFTA_R1_00070737 EFTA01763894 said, "but also concern about the NATO intervention. The fact that the rebels in Liby= are supported by NATO is why many people here are somewhat restrained fro= voicing support for the rebels." When I asked him what Egyptians wou=d think if the U.S. sat the war out, he said, "They would criticize NATO for not helping. It's a lose-lose=situation for you." So we're damned if we do and we're damned if we don't. And not=just on Libya. An enormous swath of the Arab world supported the Iraqi insurgency after an American-led coalition overt=rew Saddam Hussein. Thousands of non-Iraqi Arabs even showed up to fight. =et today the U.S. is roundly criticized all over the region for not taking=Assad out in Syria. The U.S. has decent relations with Tunisia's elected coalition =overnment, yet nearly every liberal Tunisian I interviewed a few months ago looks at that and sees a big conspiracy bet=een Americans and Islamists. The Islamists, of course, see U.S. plots agai=st them. We can't win. We can't even win when we stand against Israel. President Dwigh= D. Eisenhower tried that during the Suez Crisis in 1956. He backed Egypt, not Israel, and not Britain or France. How did E=ypt and its ruler Gamal Abdel Nasser pay back the U.S.? By forging an alli=nce with Moscow and making Egypt a Soviet client state for two decades. Libyans are the big exception. They're more pro-American than =heir neighbors, and they're less prone to extremism. American flags are a common sight there—absolutely unheard of everywhere=else in the Arab world. The Islamists lost the post-Gadhafi elections. The=only demonstrations there recently were against the terrorist cell that as=assinated U.S. Ambassador Chris Stevens and three others at the American consulate in Benghazi. Just a few weeks I=ter, another group of demonstrators forced an Islamist militia to flee tow= by overrunning their headquarters. Here Mr. Obama deserves credit. After all, he helped get rid o= Gadhafi. But Libyans were already something of an exception. They were force-fed anti-American propaganda daily for de=ades, but it came from a lunatic and malevolent tyrant they hated. Libyans=and Americans were quietly on the same side longer than most people there =ave been alive. Libya has at least that much in common with Eastern Europe during the communist period. Unfor=unately, that just isn't true of anywhere else. When he was elected president in 2008, Mr. Obama thought he co=ld improve America's relations with the Arab world by not being George W. Bush, by creating some distance between himse=f and Israel, and by delivering a friendly speech in Cairo. He was naive= He should know better by now, especially after the unpleasantness last mo=th in the countries where he thinks we're popular. It's not his fault that the Middle East is immature and unhing=d politically. Nobody can change that right now. This should be equally obvious to Mr. Romney even though he isn't pre=ident. No American president since Eisenhower could change it, nor can Mr.=Romney. We may be able to help out here and there, and I wholeheartedly ag=ee with him that we should. But Arab countries will mostly have to work this out on their own. It will take a long time. Mr. Totten is a =ontributing editor at World Affairs and City Journal, and is the prize-win=ing author of "Where the West Ends" (Belmont Estate, 2012) and "The Road to Fatima Gate" (Encounter, 2011). <=font> &n=sp; 11 EFTA_R1_00070738 EFTA01763895 Article 6. The New York Times<=font> =span style="font-size:28pt">How Castro He=d the World Hostage James G. Blight and=Janet M. Lang October 25, 2012 --=ON Oct. 26-27, 1962, human civilization came close to being destroyed. Sch=olchildren were ordered into shelters; supermarket shelves were emptied of soup cans and bottled water. It was the most peril=us moment of the Cuban missile crisis <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c=cuban_missile_crisis/index.html?inline=nyt- classifier> = and of the cold war. But the danger of Armageddon did not begin, as legen= has it, when the United States learned that Soviet missiles had reached Cuba <http://www.nytimes.com/info/cuba?inl=ne=nyt-geo>'s shores earlier that month. Rather, it was driv=n by =idel Castro's fe=rs and insecurities after the botched Bay of Pigs invasion and by the fail=res of President John F. Kennedy <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/k/jo=n_fitzgerald_kennedy/index.html?inline=nyt-per> and=Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev=/span> <http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/=imestopics/people/k/nikita_s_khrushchev/index.html> to take him seriously. With Soviet missiles stationed on the island and Am=rica poised to attack, Cuba 50 years ago was far more dangerous than Iran or North Korea is today. But the 1962 crisis shows that a small, determine= revolutionary state, backed into a corner and convinced of its inevitable=demise, can bring the world to the brink of catastrophe. Twenty years ago, w= spent four days in Havana discussing the missile crisis with Mr. Castro, =ormer Soviet officials and American decision makers from the Kennedy administration, including the former defense secre=ary Robert S. McNamara. Mr. Castro's inte=est had been piqued by the declassification and release of Soviet and Amer=can documents in 1991 and 1992, which both surprised and angered him. These included long-suppressed passages from me=oirs, released 20 years after Khrushchev's death, in which he wrote that=Mr. Castro had become irrational and possibly suicidal and that the crisis=had to end before Cuba ignited a nuclear war. In addition, declas=ified letters between Khrushchev and Kennedy revealed the extent to which =ashington and Moscow cut Cuba out of negotiations, refused to consider Cuban demands and eventually resolved the crisis in sp=te of Mr. Castro's objections. So to truly understand how the world came=close to Armageddon, one must look not to Washington and Moscow but to Hav=na. After the American-=ponsored Bay of Pigs debacle, Fidel Castro, then just 35 but already Cuba=92s unquestioned ruler, drew an astonishing conclusion. "The result of aggression against Cuba will be the start of = conflagration of incalculable consequences, and they will be affected too=" he told the Cuban people. "It will no longer be a matter of them fea=ting on us. They will get as good as they give." 12 EFTA_R1_00070739 EFTA01763896 For the next 18 mon=hs, Mr. Castro prepared for nuclear Armageddon, while Kennedy and Khrushch=v sleepwalked toward the abyss. Focused on their global competition, the United States and the Soviet Union were clue=ess about the mind-set of the smaller, weaker, poorer party. Kennedy wante= Cuba off his agenda and he resolved never again to cave in to his hawkish=advisers and critics, who had continued clamoring for an invasion of the island, even after the Bay of Pigs disast=r. Khrushchev, for his=part, was worried about "losing Cuba" and decided in early 1962 to off=r nuclear missiles to Mr. Castro to deter the invasion they both believed was being planned but that Kennedy was private=y resolved to avoid. But as Khrushchev wrote in his memoirs, the Soviet Un=on never intended to actually use the missiles; they were merely pawns in = game of superpower competition. However, Mr. Castro=believed the fundamental purpose of Soviet was to=destroy the United States in the event of an invasion. After centuries of =umiliation and irrelevance, he concluded, Cuba would matter fundamentally to the fate of humanity. Cuba couldn't p=event the onslaught, nor could it expect to survive it. He insisted that t=e Cubans and Russians on the island would resist "to the last day and th= last man, woman or child capable of holding a weapon." Around noon on Oct.=26, Mr. Castro summoned the Soviet ambassador, Aleksandr Alekseev, to his =ommand post. Mr. Castro couldn't understand why Soviet troops in Cuba were sitting on their hands while American plane= were flying over the island with impunity. He urged them to start shootin= at U-2 spy planes with surface-to-air missiles and suggested that Cuban t=oops should begin firing on low-flying planes with antiaircraft guns, contrary to Soviet wishes. Alekseev promise= to relay Mr. Castro's complaints to the Kremlin. Alekseev later told us=he felt "almost schizophrenic" when he sent the cables to Moscow, beca=se it was his duty to represent the cautious Soviet position, yet he himself, like Mr. Castro, expected an American ons=aught. At that moment, "I was almost 100 percent Cuban," he recalled. While Cuba was prep=ring for nuclear war, Khrushchev and Kennedy were, unbeknown to Mr. Castro= moving toward a peaceful resolution of the crisis. Terrified that a catastrophic war might break out, Khrushchev took=the initiative even as Kennedy was preparing an offer of his own. He wrote=to Kennedy on Oct. 26: "Let us then display statesmenlike wisdom. I prop=se: we, for our part, will declare that our ships bound for Cuba are not carrying any armaments. You will dec=are that the United States will not invade Cuba with its troops and will n=t support any other forces which might intend to invade Cuba. Then the nec=ssity for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba will be obviated." It would take another three agoni=ing weeks to work out the details, but Kennedy and Khrushchev had finally =ocked onto a common wavelength. All these letters (=xcept those delivered over the radio at the peak of the crisis) were metho=ically dictated, translated, encrypted and then transmitted. Such slow communication in a time of crisis seems inconc=ivable today, but at the heart of the cold war absolute secrecy was the ob=ective, not speed. (It was only after the missile crisis that the "red p=one" hot line between the White House and the Kremlin was installed.) Unaware of Kennedy=92s and Khrushchev's progress toward a deal, at 2 a.m. on Oct. 27, Mr. C=stro decided to write to Khrushchev, encouraging him to use his nuclear weapons to destroy the United States in the event o= an invasion. At 3 a.m., he arrived at the Soviet Embassy and told Aleksee= that they should go into the bunker beneath the embassy because an attack=was imminent. According to declassified Soviet cables, a groggy but sympathetic Alekseev agreed, and soon they wer= set up underground with Castro dictating and aides transcribing and trans=ating a letter. Mr. Castro became f=ustrated, uncertain about what to say. After nine drafts, with the sun ris=ng, Alekseev finally confronted Mr. Castro: are you asking Comrade Khrushchev to deliver a nuclear strike on the Unite= States? Mr. Castro told him, "If they attack Cuba, we should wipe them =ff the face of the earth!" Alekseev was shocked, but he dutifully assist=d Mr. Castro in fine-tuning the 10th and final draft of the letter. From his bunker, Mr= Castro wrote that, in the event of an American invasion, "the danger th=t that aggressive policy poses for humanity is so great that following that event the Soviet Union must never allow th= circumstances in which the imperialists could launch the first nuclear st=ike against it." An invasion, he added, "would be the moment to 13 EFTA_R1_00070740 EFTA01763897 elimin=te such danger forever through an act of clear, legitimate defense however harsh and terrible the solution would=be, for there is no other." Mr. Castro was calm as he composed this last=will and testament for the 6