📄 Extracted Text (2,512 words)
From: Boris Nikolic < >
Sent: Friday, March 18, 2011 6:32 PM
To: Jeffrey Epstein
Subject: RE: Matter over Mind, part 2: March 17, 2011
How are yo=?
I am still at silicon valley. At goggle headqouters right now.
I will be in Boston sat night to wed. Are You coming?
Sent from my Windows Phone
From: Jeff=ey Epstein
Sent: Thur=day, March 17, 2011 10:38 AM
To: Bori= Nikolic
Subject: Fwd:=Matter over Mind, part 2: March 17, 2011
a good explanation of what and why
Forwarded messa e
From: US GIO
Date: Thu, Mar 17, 2011at 10:21 AM
Subject: Matter over Mind, part 2: March 17, 2011
To:
Eye on the Market, =arch 17, 2011 (today's version has color pictures and tables better view=d in the PDF)
Topics: Japan up=ate, what's next for nuclear power and implications for Asia/US
"Matter over M=nd, Part 2". In our note from Tuesday, we said that the next 72 ho=rs would be critical. The grid below
is an update fro= the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum as of 10 pm March 17, and there's a l=t of red on it. Before getting
i=to the details, I wanted to show a picture, since it gets at why the situa=ion deteriorated so rapidly at the Fukushima
Dai-Ichi plant. It's = before and after shot of what happened to the fuel storage tanks which supply power to the back-
up generators. By =aving them on the beach and not under the ground, they appear to have been=washed away by the
tsunami. It is entirely possible that all subsequ=nt problems (hydrogen explosions, exposure and possible melting of
active and spent fuel rods) emanated from the lack=of electricity to power cooling systems. Note how other structures
j=st a few hundred yards away from the shore withstood the tsunami. Fu=ushima's Daini reactors (10 miles from Dai-
Ichi) are in normal cold shutdown mode since they did not lose their emergency p=wer fuel source.
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What's happening as of March 17 at 10 pm Japan Standard Ti=e:
•• Backup generators not functioning, which is why cooling syst=ms are not working properly (line 9, 10), which led to...
•• ...water level pressure falling and exposing uranium/plutoni=m rods to air, which raises their temperature and makes
them more likely t= melt (line 12)
•• Building integrity (line 11) has been compromised due to hyd=ogen explosions and possible containment or reactor
vessel breaches=/p>
•• Reactor units 1, 2 and 3 are in serious trouble, with sea wa=er injections being attempted on all three (line 15, line
16) to cool nucl=ar reactions
•• Green sections on units 4, 5 and 6 are not "good news", =ince they were in outage mode when the earthquake hit
(line 5)
•• In one or more units, there might have been a breach in cont=inment vessels which house the reactor vessels (line 8)
• • Spent fuel rods are becoming a serious problem (line 18), a =opic worth reviewing in more detail on the next
page<=p>
<=>
Spent fuel pools and what "spent" really means=/u> (a)
When back-up generators failed, systems which add and cool wate= to "spent fuel" pools failed as well. There is
something import=nt to understand: "spent" does not mean "inert" or "reduced power". In fact, it's kind of the
opposite. =uclear power relies on uranium (b) that behaves in a predictable way, wher= "predictable" refers to heat
generated when rods are placed near othe= uranium rods. This way, nuclear reactions can be modulated by plant
operators using boron control rods. But over time= U-238 accumulates neutrons produced from the fission of U-235,
eventually=becoming neptunium and then plutonium. Why does this matter? When this happens, rods become
more</=> uncontrollable and radioactive. That's what is meant by "spent=94, in that their USEFULNESS is spent. The
fission reaction results =n a variety of radioactive elements such as iodine-131, cesium-137, strontium-90 and gases like
xenon and krypton. Spe=t rods are not harmful if there is no damage to their zirconium cas=ngs, but melting of these
rods release these isotopes into the environment= Why spent fuel pools can be worrisome:
•' There are more radioactive fission products in spent fuel po=ls than in the operation reactors themselves
•• Without cooling, spent fuel pool water evaporates and expose= these radioactive materials to the atmosphere. Yet
they are not hou=ed inside a containment unit like nuclear reactors are.
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** Opinions about the rate of evaporation differ. Accordi=g to the Nuclear Energy Institute (c), the rate of evaporation
at plants l=ke Fukushima is slow, only a few percent a day. But a Brookhaven National Laboratory study (d) on Boiling
Water=Reactors like those used in Fukushima estimates that within 40 hours, all the water would evaporate, and that
plant opera=ors only have 25 hours to address the problem. Furthermore, the Broo=haven study dealt with shutdown
plants whose fuel rods were older and less="hot" than the more recently spent rods at Fukushima (implying an even
shorter evaporation period).<=p>
41* Fukushima spent fuel pools are located near the top of the r=actors, making them harder to access. Even if plant
operators refill=emptied spent fuel pools, they may not want to: scientists we spoke with said the behavior of =xposed
rods to water (if they have begun to melt and lose their zirconium =asing) is not predictable; is it like gas on a fire?
The spent fuel pool at unit #4 was reported to be out of water =y the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Either its
water evaporate= (e), or the pool suffered structural damage during one of the hydrogen-fueled explosions and leaked.
Either way,=exposed spent fuel rods render the area highly radioactive and less viable=for human intervention. As for
the nuclear reactor vessels themselve=, there is still hope that even if exposed rods (lines 6 and 12) melt, they will be
contained inside the vessel (line=7) with cooling powered by emergency pumps. But the 1800-degree melt=ng point of
the reactor vessel may be exceeded by the theoretical temperat=re of molten nuclear materials, which could rise to
2400 degrees.
Why on earth are we going into this level of detail in an in=estments newsletter? What's happening is mor= than just a
tragedy for Japan and its people. It's also a potenti=l turning point in the approach to energy policy. The chart s=ows
how planned nuclear capacity is 40% of the current installed base. Will Fukushima change anyone's plans? =he U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission generally recommends a 10-mile barri=r between U.S. nuclear plants and residential
areas. However, the NR= recommended a 50-mile evacuation zone around Fukushima. This may surface questions
about safety issues. The Union of Concern=d Scientists just released a document entitled "The NRC and Nuclear P=wer
Plant Safety in 2010: Brighter Spotlight Needed" after briefing =ongressional staffers. Their conclusion: the chances of a
disaster are low, but the NRC gets mixed reviews after 14="near-misses" at U.S. nuclear plants during 2010. The events
exp=sed a variety of shortcomings, such as inadequate training, faulty mainten=nce, poor design, and failure to
investigate problems thoroughly. The problem: there are not many easy answers for r=placing planned nuclear bars in
the chart, particularly in China.
Whatever the outcome for nuclear power, we have been positio=ing in various ways for a world with increasing and
changing energy needs<=span>. We are working with managers who focus on the exploration and development =f oil
and gas fields, mostly in the U.S., as well as on "midstream&qu=t; businesses involved in the gathering, storage and
distribution of oil a=d gas products. Other dedicated energy managers we work with focus on renewable energy,
primarily in solar, wind =nd bio-mass power generation. Our generalist private equity managers=are involved as well,
including a 2009 investment in the Marcellus shale g=s field which was subsequently sold to a strategic buyer for a
substantial premium. On natural gas=specifically, shale gas only accounted for 1% of North American gas supply=in
2006. It's currently 20% and is expected to grow to 50% by 2030= which is why it has been an area of focus for our
managers.
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Potential economic impacts in Asia: we remain optimistic on =he region's prospects
The first chart looks at which countries export a lot to Japan,=excluding energy. Asia is clearly the potential loser.
However, Southeast Asia is likely to withstand reduced demand from Japan= After all, Japan has only been growing at
1% over the last 5, 1= and 20 years. Furthermore, East Asia entered into a rising number o= free trade agreements over
the last decade which improved its ability to manage around disruptions to supply chains a=d production gaps. When
you strip out Japan from the Asian trade pic=ure, it's clear that Asian trade has a life of its own. We do not foresee a
serious=hit to regional growth, outside Japan itself. More evidence of how w=ll-integrated economic regions withstand
a crisis: note how Texas became a regional shock absorber after Hurricane Katrina, as s=me industrial and service sector
activities migrated there on a temporary =asis.
As for the US, 1=pan accounts for around 1.5% of total S&P 500 revenues, with higher nu=bers (>10%) for multinationals
like IBM, Corning, Altera and KLAC (f). The largest sector exposures are civilian aeros=ace, agriculture, drugs/medical
equipment and telecommunications equipment= Mitigating factor: Japan is a relatively stagnant market for U.S. fi=ms
(U.S. exports to Japan grew just 25% versus 82% to the rest of the worl= from 2003 to 2008) and tend to generate much
lower margins there than els=where. After the initial demand shock, we expect some companies to benefit from
rebuilding efforts in Japa=, particularly those companies focused on heavy equipment, software for en=ineers and
project managers, insurance brokerage, electrical equipment/pro=ess controls and construction.
I hope to return to normal investment commentary very soon, =nd if there are financial assets that are indiscriminately
oversold, we wi=I be sure to highlight them.&n=sp; We are not making any changes to our portfolio allocations, which i=
our way of saying that we do not expect the situation in Japan to tip the=global economy into recession. We still believe
that the manufacturi=g and service sector recoveries taking place in the US, Germany and China, coupled with
exceptionally easy moneta=y policy, are strong enough to survive the various obstacles that have sur=aced during the
worst March I can remember (or at least since 2009).
Michael Cembalest
Chief Investment Officer
</=pan>
Notes=/span>
(a) This=section incorporates conversations with David Walker (Higgins Professor of=Earth and Environmental Sciences,
Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory), and a=separate source with 40 years of experience in the industry as a Naval and
private sector nuclear operations engineer,=engineering manager and project coordinator for the construction and
opera=ion of nuclear power plants.
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(bj Not =11 Fukushima facilities use uranium rods. Some rely on MOx fuel (a blend o= plutonium, natural uranium,
reprocessed uranium, or depleted uranium). Ou= understanding is that MOx fuel has a lower melting point; there is less
experimental experience with it; and th=t it may be less sensitive to boron as a reaction moderator. Plutonium is
=heaper to use due to the surplus of decommissioned weapons.
lc] "<=>Fact Sheet: Used Nuclear Fuel Storage at the Fukushima Dai-lchi nuclear p=wer plant", Nuclear Energy Institute,
March 15, 2011
"<=>A Safety and Regulatory Assessment of Generic BWR and PWR Permanently Shu= Down Nuclear Power Plants",
Brookhaven National Laboratory, August =997. Our sources inform us that the technology used in spent fuel pools have
not changed a lot since that time.
(e] lt=92s possible that hydrogen explosions jostled the spent fuel rods or the b=ron dampers between them,
accelerating their rate of evaporation
if] "<=>lapan and S&P 500 EPS", UBS Global Equity Research, March 16, 2=11
The material contained herein is intended as a general market=commentary. Opinions expressed herein are those of
Michael Cembalest and m=y differ from those of other J.P. Morgan employees and affiliates. This information in no way
constitutes J.P. Morgan research and should not be treated as such. Further, the views exp=essed herein may differ
from that contained in J.P. Morgan research report=. The above summary/prices/quotes/statistics have been obtained
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© 2011 JPMorgan Chase & Co
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