📄 Extracted Text (3,293 words)
Subject: Epstein Views Update 12/12 [I]
From: Tazia Smith ‹ >
Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2013 11:55:42 -0500
To: Paul Morris
Cc: Vahe Stepanian
Classification: For internal use only
Not do anything in FX/significant positioning before FOMC decision
Bullish japanese equities, short yen
hence buy of DXJ
open to a basket of single names but does not want yen exposure. suggested
a quanto'd basket and he is open to it (we had that priced and quanto is
not pricing well. still reviewing - now adding a fx return component to
present)
Bullish Euro
Bearish Latin America
Sold latam mutual fund
Does not like Brazil (evaluating BRL step-up notes that are underwater)
Does not like Mexico, yet said he was open to revisiting DepoPlus
European equities - still long basket of single names
I suggested a Eurostoxx hedge just to protect some of those gains and he
liked that idea...operationally we are not set up for equity derivatives
with CB&S, working with them to onboard as seamlessly as possible (I know
JE would be irritated by this) before I show this pricing. Given cash
levels + DB view still bullish europe, we could price a twin win note as a
'buffer' overlay solution without giving upside participation.
Reminded him about DAG (DB Ag ETF, suggested taking that gain and buying back
in -6mos)
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Tazia Smith
Director I Key Client Partners - US
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc
Deutsche Asset & Wealth Management
345 Park Avenue, 26th Floor
New York, NY 10154
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Email
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From: Paul Morris/db/-
dbcom
To:
Date: 12/18/2013 11:16
AM
Subject: Re: Fw: Into
FOMC...
hi did u get some of his views when u last spoke? high level is good, thx
Paul Morris
Managing Director
Deutsche Bank Private Bank
345 Park Avenue, 27th Floor
New York. NY 10154
From: Tazia Smith/db/-
dbcom
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To: Paul
Morris,
Cc:
Date: 12/18/2013 10:15
AM
Subject: Fw: Into
FOMC...
PM - JE does not like firm views so we do not send him commentary like the
below. Harry is on our distribution list (requested to be), however.
Forwarded by Tazia Smith/db/dbcom on 12/18/2013 10:14 AM
From: Tazia Smith/db/-
dbcom
To:
Cc:
Date: 12/18/2013 10:14
AM
Subject: Into
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FOMC...
Good Morning -
Ahead of today's FOMC announcement at 2pm, please see DB Global Markets'
Chief
Economist, Peter Hooper expectations (ie. $5-15bn of tapering, skewed toward
Treasuries + dovish commentary) below. Please take a look through Hopper's
quick pros/cons, which outline the knife-edge decision on hand. He shows
that
each input (unemployment, GDP growth, asset valuations, Bernanke's
succession,
etc) is only very marginally signalling to taper, or not to taper. Inflation
is an exception to that as Hooper points out "Core PCE inflation is now
uncomfortably low;" a factor reinforced by yesterday's benign CPI data.
Also included here is a replay of yesterday morning's client call,
"Positioning ahead of the FOMC" with Dan Orlando (US Government Trading) and
Oleg Melentyev (US Credit Strategy). Note that the traders' view is that QE
tapering does not happen today due, in part, to the low/inline CPI data as
well as supply-uptake concerns.
1 Week REPLAY:
As you know, DB House Outlook for 2014 continues to favor developed markets
equities (highlighting Germany, as well as upside in the US and Japan) and is
above consensus on expectations Chinese GDP growth (+8.6%).
DB Global Market Strategist, Keith Parker, pointed out last week that flows
into equities have been hedged. DB Global Markets Research comments that
positioning in EM is less extended than it was in May, thus a taper should
not
lead to as a dramatic of a pull-back across EM risk (equities, debt, and FX).
See note attached.
Please contact us with follow-ups,
Tazia, Joe, Vahe & Jay
[attachment "Investor Flows - Pent Up Demand 12.9.13.pdf" deleted by Paul
Morris/db/dbcom]
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Forwarded by Tazia Smith/db/dbcom on 12/17/2013 06:58 PM
From:
To:
Date: 12/17/2013 06:06
AM
Subject: Fed note: What will the Fed do at the December FOMC meeting?
(Peter Hooper)
Fed note: What will the Fed do at the December FOMC meeting?
In brief, in a very close call, we think the Fed will taper light ($5-15 bn,
skewed towards Treasuries). We also think that the taper, if it does come,
will be accompanied by a dovish statement that reinforces the low for long
message on policy rates. In what follows, we first review the various
arguments for and against a December taper. We then provide our "top ten"
list
of ways the Fed could reinforce the low for long message.
Will they taper in Dec? The key factors that will determine the outcome of
that decision are as follows (we consider the arguments for and against a
December taper in each case:
1. Economic conditions are the most important factor. The center of the
committee (Bernanke, Yellen, and Dudley) have all stressed that taper will
require an improving labor market, evidence of self sustaining economic
growth, and inflation projected to return to desired level.
a. Labor market:
Pro taper: payroll employment gains have averaged more than
200k/month for the past 4 months and close to 200k (193k)
since they embarked on QE3 September a year ago. The
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unemployment rate is down to 7%, the level Bernanke said
would be consistent with ending QE, let alone beginning to
taper.
Con: While payroll gains have been solid, the drop in the
unemployment rate has been driven importantly by further
declines in labor force participation. Some Fed folks are
no
doubt uncomfortable with how low labor force participation
has moved. However, consistent with recent research
reported
by the Philly Fed, we find that the decline has been
predominantly among people over age 55, suggesting they may
be less likely to return to the labor market as economic
conditions improve.
Bottom line: the labor market has improved enough (and
seems
to have enough momentum) to warrant a taper in December.
b. Growth:
Pro taper: GDP growth looks to have averaged above trend in
H2, with consumer spending adding significantly (the recent
November retail sales and manufacturing output reports were
impressively positive). The outlook for 2014 remains bright
with household balance sheets well repaired and fiscal drag
set to be much smaller than it was this year. I do not
expect any significant downward revision to the FOMC's
economic projections for growth. Indeed, they may well mark
down the projected path of the unemployment rate.
Con: Weakness in business investment spending, and more
recent softness in capital goods orders augurs against the
sort of self-sustaining economic recovery that the center
of
the FOMC has indicated they need to see to begin to taper.
Homebuilding too has softened in the wake of the taper
tantrum.
Bottom line: growth performance and prospects have
strengthened just barely enough to warrant a December
taper.
c. Inflation.
Pro taper: The FOMC has been projecting inflation to return
to 2% over the next several years. Long-term inflation
expectations have been well anchored within their recent
historical ranges; wage inflation has at least leveled off,
and some indicators have been rising.
Con: Core PCE inflation is now uncomfortably low after
trending down over the past two years. It declined again in
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October, though those numbers may have been tainted by the
government shutdown.
Bottom line: Recent inflation performance comes down
clearly
against a December taper, but that could change with an
upside surprise to core CPI numbers for November tomorrow
(Tuesday)—a reading of 0.2 to 0.3 would help).
Bottom line on overall economic conditions: slightly in
favor of Dec. taper
2. Costs of QE (potential froth in credit markets, interference with markets,
fiscal costs or possible losses in Fed net income down the road).
Pro taper: costs are rising, not declining, many/most on
the
FOMC would like to end the program, everything else equal.
Fed folks have been saying for some time that they wanted
to
begin to taper by the end of the year, and this is why.
While asset valuations do not look extreme, there has been
a
certain amount of reaching for yield, and if QE continues
at
this pace for much longer, valuations could become
stretched.
Con: FOMC leadership has indicated that they do not see
significant signs of financial instability associated with
balance sheet expansion, they do not see markets
malfunctioning, and they are not too concerned about fiscal
issues down the road, given that the Fed is not likely to
sell MBS or long-term Treasuries any time soon. This
suggests that they would not be driven to taper in the near
term by cost considerations.
Bottom line on costs: neutral on December taper
3. Fiscal uncertainties: this was a key factor behind the September surprise,
but these uncertainties have now been largely resolved, with the budget deal
currently in the works set to reduce fiscal drag in 2014 even further. Modest
risk remains around debt ceiling, but a blowup seems quite unlikely in an
election year.
Fiscal: Pro Dec. taper.
4. Communications strategy:
Several FOMC participants have advocated announcing an explicit
schedule
for winding down QE with the initial taper. Doing so could push the bar
for the initial taper somewhat higher and augur for delaying it a bit
further so that they can be more confident they will not have to
interrupt the exit process.
Communications: slight Con.
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5. Market liquidity: Thin markets in second half of December, raise the
possibility of an exaggerated negative price reaction, which could put a
damper on confidence and on retail sales in the final days of the holiday
shopping season.
Market liquidity: slight Con.
6. Leadership transition: Bernanke's term ends January 31. Would he want to
be
the one to deliver the important forward-looking message that would accompany
the initial taper about the future course of policy at the press conference
in
January and then leave two days later? Bernanke could step down or step aside
and let Yellen run the meeting and do the press conference. That could be a
bit awkward, but it would also make Yellen's first move one that leads the
Committee in a less dovish direction.
Leadership transition: neutral.
7. Bernanke legacy: Does Bernanke want to be remembered as the Chairman that
blew up the Fed's balance sheet and then left? Alternatively, would he want
to
risk being remembered for scuttling the recovery by tapering prematurely?
Probably not important in Bernanke's case—has striven to diminish the cult of
the chairmanship.
Legacy: neutral.
As I add up the pros and cons for a December taper, this is a very close one;
it is quite possible they have not made any decisions yet, and that the CPI
inflation data on Tuesday could still tip the scale. At this point, I am now
leaning slightly in favor of a December taper. This is not a consensus view,
though I note that our US Economics team has been more consistently
projecting
a December taper.
If they do taper, I expect it to be a taper light, on the order of $5 to $15
bn (skewed more toward Treasuries than MBS). This would be accompanied by a
statement that is relatively dovish--i.e., that reinforces the message that
they expect rates to be held at very low levels for quite some time to come.
There are a number of ways they could do this. Here is my top ten list of the
things they could do in this regard, starting with the least likely and
ending
with the most likely:
10) Lower unemployment threshold from 6.5%. The October minutes and some
Fedspeak have suggested this is not likely—the 7.0 and even 6.5 numbers have
created communication problems as it is. (likelihood: 15%)
9) Reduce interest on excess reserves. This got more support at the October
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meeting, but my sense it is not a high probability. (25%)
8) Provide weak calendar forward guidance: for example, "we expect the first
rate hike is at least one year away." Possible, but I do not expect the FOMC
to revert to calendar-based guidance. (25%)
7) Add a specific inflation floor. There may be more support here, but still
problematic. A floor of 1.5% does not say much, a floor of 2.0 would be too
high for many members, and a floor of 1.75 would be shaving things pretty
finely. (35%)
6) Lower their projections for the fed funds rate for the coming years.
Marking down the endpoint for the fed funds path several years out (per #5
below) would allow them to revise down their interest rate forecasts for
earlier periods as well. This could be a significant message, especially if
they reduce their forecast for unemployment. (60%)
5) Lower their projections for the neutral level of the fed funds rate in the
longer term based on downward revisions to potential growth estimates. (60%)
4) Point out (again) that their actions could be reversed if financial
markets
react negatively enough to put the economic expansion at serious risk. (75%)
3) Note that they are comfortable with the apparent success of their verbal
guidance to date--that market expectations about the Fed funds rate do not
look unreasonable. (80%)
2) Taper by only a modest amount initially. (85%)
1) Re-emphasize their existing forward guidance, i.e., that they might not
begin to raise rates until unemployment is well below the 6.5 threshold,
depending on what the overall picture in the labor market, growth, and
inflation looks like. (90%)
In brief, a taper is likely to be accompanied by a statement and press
conference that reinforces the low for long message, by reemphasizing what
has
already been said, as well as by reducing interest rate forecasts in the SEP.
Finally, in this light, it is interesting that Stanley Fischer has apparently
become a leading candidate for Fed Vice Chairman. We strongly endorse his
candidacy—he would be an excellent appointment all around. What is
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interesting
is that he has publicly favored giving less, not more forward guidance. We do
not see Fischer's views having a significant effect on the outcome of the
December meeting if the Fed does decide to taper, but this is an issue that
will bear watching in the future.
October FOMC
Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in September
generally suggests that economic activity has continued to expand at a
moderate pace. Indicators of labor market conditions have shown some further
improvement, but the unemployment rate remains elevated. Available data
suggest that household spending and business fixed investment advanced, while
the recovery in the housing sector slowed somewhat in recent months. Fiscal
policy is restraining economic growth. Apart from fluctuations due to changes
in energy prices, inflation has been running below the Committee's longer-run
objective, but longer-term inflation expectations have remained stable.
Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum
employment and price stability. The Committee expects that, with appropriate
policy accommodation, economic growth will pick up from its recent pace and
the unemployment rate will gradually decline toward levels the Committee
judges consistent with its dual mandate. The Committee sees the downside
risks
to the outlook for the economy and the labor market as having diminished, on
net, since last fall. The Committee recognizes that inflation persistently
below its 2 percent objective could pose risks to economic performance, but
it
anticipates that inflation will move back toward its objective over the
medium
term.
Taking into account the extent of federal fiscal retrenchment over the past
year, the Committee sees the improvement in economic activity and labor
market
conditions since it began its asset purchase program as consistent with
growing underlying strength in the broader economy. However, the Committee
decided to await more evidence that progress will be sustained before
adjusting the pace of its purchases. Accordingly, the Committee decided to
continue purchasing additional agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of
$40 billion per month and longer-term Treasury securities at a pace of $45
billion per month. The Committee is maintaining its existing policy of
reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency
mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities and of
rolling
over maturing Treasury securities at auction. Taken together, these actions
should maintain downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, support
mortgage markets, and help to make broader financial conditions more
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accommodative, which in turn should promote a stronger economic recovery and
help to ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with
the Committee's dual mandate.
The Committee will closely monitor incoming information on economic and
financial developments in coming months and will continue its purchases of
Treasury and agency mortgage-backed securities, and employ its other policy
tools as appropriate, until the outlook for the labor market has improved
substantially in a context of price stability. In judging when to moderate
the
pace of asset purchases, the Committee will, at its coming meetings, assess
whether incoming information continues to support the Committee's expectation
of ongoing improvement in labor market conditions and inflation moving back
toward its longer-run objective. Asset purchases are not on a preset course,
and the Committee's decisions about their pace will remain contingent on the
Committee's economic outlook as well as its assessment of the likely efficacy
and costs of such purchases.
To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability,
the Committee today reaffirmed its view that a highly accommodative stance of
monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the
asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens. In
particular, the Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal
funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that this
exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at
least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation
between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half
percentage point above the Committee's 2 percent longer-run goal, and
longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored. In
determining how long to maintain a highly accommodative stance of monetary
policy, the Committee will also consider other information, including
additional measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation
pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial developments.
When the Committee decides to begin to remove policy accommodation, it will
take a balanced approach consistent with its longer-run goals of maximum
employment and inflation of 2 percent.
Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman;
William C. Dudley, Vice Chairman; James Bullard; Charles L. Evans; Jerome H.
Powell; Eric S. Rosengren; Jeremy C. Stein; Daniel K. Tarullo; and Janet L.
Yellen. Voting against the action was Esther L. George, who was concerned
that
the continued high level of monetary accommodation increased the risks of
future economic and financial imbalances and, over time, could cause an
increase in long-term inflation expectations.
Peter Hooper
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Managing Director
Chief Economist
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.
60 Wall Street
New York, NY 10005
Assumptions, estimates and opinions expressed constitute the author's
judgment
as of the date of this communication and are subject to change without
notice.
Past performance is not necessarily indicative of future results. This
communication is based upon information that Deutsche Bank or one of its
affiliates (collectively "Deutsche Bank") considers reliable as of the date
hereof, but Deutsche Bank does not represent that it is accurate and
complete.
Deutsche Bank does not render legal or tax advice, and the information
contained in this communication should not be regarded as such.
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Tazia Smith
Director I Key Client Partners - US
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc
Deutsche Asset & Wealth Management
345 Park Avenue, 26th Floor
New York, NY 10154
Email
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