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[00:00:00] It's crazy for the for for the [00:00:03] Ukrainians to be have giving access to [00:00:05] Starink funded by the Baltic states in [00:00:07] Poland of course provided by Elon Musk. [00:00:10] That's vital and then allow the Russians [00:00:12] to have access to the same service [00:00:13] that's called shooting yourself in the [00:00:14] foot. Measures have been taken against [00:00:16] that and and my understanding is that [00:00:19] the Ukrainian advances at least on the [00:00:21] Russian side Russian commanders have [00:00:23] been attributed to the fact that they [00:00:25] were cut from Starink. Uh if that's a [00:00:27] technological fix that can give the [00:00:29] Ukrainians uh uh help at the moment, [00:00:32] then that is something that absolutely [00:00:33] the West should secure. [00:00:35] >> Well, the world talks about peace. [00:00:37] Ukraine is being offered international [00:00:39] control, pressured into elections, and [00:00:42] pushed toward negotiations that look [00:00:44] increasingly one-sided. To break it [00:00:46] down, I'm joined by Jamie Shei, senior [00:00:48] fellow for peace, security, and defense [00:00:50] at Friends of Europe and former deputy [00:00:53] assistant secretary general for emerging [00:00:55] security challenges at NATO. Welcome to [00:00:58] our program. [00:01:00] >> Thank you, Sophia, for inviting me back. [00:01:01] Pleasure to be with you today. [00:01:03] >> Russia has floated the idea of placing [00:01:06] Ukraine under temporary international [00:01:08] administration eligy under a UN mandate. [00:01:12] This is a serious diplomatic proposal or [00:01:15] just a modern version of colonial [00:01:18] thinking disgued as a conflict [00:01:21] management. [00:01:23] >> Well, it the devil is in the detail as [00:01:25] diplomats like to say and one thing is [00:01:27] certain which is that Ukraine cannot [00:01:30] seed sovereignty over territory that it [00:01:33] still controls. Uh this is Ukrainian [00:01:36] territory. It's not UN territory and [00:01:38] it's certainly not Russian territory. [00:01:40] And obviously any arrangement for sort [00:01:43] of free zones uh uh on the on the border [00:01:46] in the Donbas in particular uh has to [00:01:50] maintain the principle of Ukrainian [00:01:51] sovereignty and mustn't simply become a [00:01:53] cover for some kind of creeping [00:01:55] occupation or creeping annexation by [00:01:58] Russia particularly Russian military [00:02:00] forces or Russian police forces as [00:02:03] happened in Crimea back in 2014. [00:02:06] So although the Ukrainians obviously [00:02:09] want to be nice to the Americans uh and [00:02:12] not dismiss this kind of idea out of [00:02:14] hand uh as a possible compromise in [00:02:17] terms of the way towards a ceasefire uh [00:02:20] and a a a peace agreement. [00:02:23] Clearly uh Ukraine has to be very very [00:02:25] careful that uh any arrangement like [00:02:28] this which leaves the status of [00:02:30] Ukrainian territory somewhat sort of [00:02:32] ambiguous or in the hands of admin uh of [00:02:36] an international administration is [00:02:38] backed up by very very very firm [00:02:41] security guarantees including from the [00:02:43] United States to ensure as I said before [00:02:45] that it won't simply become a kind of [00:02:47] pretext for a a creeping Russian [00:02:49] annexation in disguise. So, um, let's [00:02:52] see. But the idea has been around for a [00:02:53] long time already. And the fact that it [00:02:56] hasn't yet been pinned down, uh, between [00:02:58] the United States and Ukraine, uh, in [00:03:01] the context of the negotiations with [00:03:03] Russia, uh, makes me feel that clearly [00:03:06] from a Ukrainian point of view, there's [00:03:08] not yet a satisfactory technical [00:03:10] solution, political solution on the [00:03:11] table. [00:03:12] >> And is this uh, idea of international [00:03:14] administration being discussed anywhere [00:03:17] outside Russia? I mean, we uh didn't [00:03:19] hear something like that from Europeans [00:03:22] and uh why should Ukraine even consider [00:03:25] agreeing to this option? [00:03:28] >> Well, as I said, I think Ukraine has to [00:03:29] be very careful. I mean, look at Gaza. [00:03:31] You know, we've had a ceasefire in Gaza, [00:03:33] although it's been a very fragile and [00:03:35] tenuous one for the last 6 months or so, [00:03:38] but there's no international [00:03:39] administration in Gaza. There's no [00:03:42] security force in Gaza yet. I know that [00:03:45] Trump's board of peace is meeting this [00:03:47] week to discuss all of this but uh in 6 [00:03:49] months nothing has happened because it's [00:03:51] easy to sort of posit these ideas in [00:03:53] principle an international [00:03:54] administration but then have people who [00:03:57] are really willing to carry it out put [00:03:58] the security forces in funded and manage [00:04:00] it it's a different story altogether. So [00:04:04] uh what we have to make sure here uh is [00:04:07] that things that are put down on paper [00:04:10] in a diplomatic negotiation are actually [00:04:13] implementable to the letter and not [00:04:15] twisted in the implementation uh uh [00:04:18] later on. Um and in terms of who would [00:04:21] be providing this international [00:04:23] administration uh that's far from clear [00:04:26] at the moment. Uh obviously as I've said [00:04:28] it has to be linked to robust Ukrainian [00:04:32] security guarantees. Um and I'm not sure [00:04:35] that at the moment the United Nations [00:04:37] for example is in a position uh for to [00:04:40] carry out that kind of administration or [00:04:43] or to obviously provide those kind of [00:04:45] security guarantees that would be uh uh [00:04:47] required. So I'm sure that Russia likes [00:04:49] this idea because obviously from Putin's [00:04:52] point of view if he's losing, you know, [00:04:54] 30,000 35,000 soldiers at the moment for [00:04:57] every square kilometer of Ukrainian [00:05:00] territory that he's able to take, the [00:05:03] notion of getting something for nothing [00:05:05] uh uh territory uh through negotiation [00:05:09] uh is obviously a very attractive one. [00:05:11] So I'm sure that the Russians like this [00:05:12] idea, but that's not what matters. The [00:05:14] key question is that is this in the [00:05:17] interest of Ukraine and is this [00:05:19] compatible with Ukrainian Ukraine's [00:05:22] continued sovereignty over its own [00:05:24] territory. [00:05:25] Now we are approaching another round of [00:05:27] talks between Ukraine, Russia and the US [00:05:29] and Geneva. And Moscow is sending [00:05:31] Vladimir Medinski, a figure known more [00:05:34] for ideological narratives and also [00:05:37] false historical lectures than basically [00:05:40] real compromise and real solutions on [00:05:43] the ground. What does his presence tell [00:05:46] us about the true nature of the upcoming [00:05:48] peace talks? [00:05:50] It's not very encouraging because [00:05:52] although obviously this individual is [00:05:54] close to the Kremlin, you're right, on [00:05:56] previous occasions he he likes to sort [00:05:58] of lecture the Ukrainians on his version [00:06:00] of Ukrainian history which not many sort [00:06:03] of serious professional historians would [00:06:05] endorse and he clearly is not, you know, [00:06:08] a person who is a serious diplomatic [00:06:10] negotiator with a mandate to negotiate [00:06:14] and reach compromises. Um a and the [00:06:17] person who was there before uh not ideal [00:06:20] either uh and not particularly senior [00:06:22] was at least linked to the Russian [00:06:24] security establishment in the [00:06:25] intelligence services. So clearly was in [00:06:28] a better position to know what he was [00:06:30] discussing. So it's not particularly [00:06:32] encouraging. It doesn't suggest that [00:06:33] Russia is remotely yet ready to uh make [00:06:36] compromises on its part. For example, [00:06:39] regarding the size of its future army, [00:06:41] uh the withdrawal of its forces from [00:06:43] occupied Ukrainian territory. um [00:06:45] payments of reparations, cooperation on [00:06:48] war crimes, the sort of things that [00:06:50] Ukraine and the international community [00:06:52] are demanding. So it tends to suggest to [00:06:55] me that you Russia is happy to go [00:06:57] through the motions of negotiating uh to [00:07:00] try to convince the Americans that [00:07:02] somehow they are seriously interested in [00:07:04] a peace while of course not really being [00:07:06] interested in a peace and carrying on [00:07:08] with the uh Russian offensive [00:07:10] particularly as the winter comes to an [00:07:12] end uh the spring and summer approaches [00:07:15] and maybe Russia believes that the [00:07:17] terrain is more favorable for those kind [00:07:19] of uh uh offenses offensives clearly [00:07:23] It's only when Russia uh sends a much [00:07:27] higher level delegation um administerial [00:07:30] level clearly with a mandate to [00:07:32] negotiate seriously that we'll see a [00:07:34] sort of a change of attitude there. So [00:07:36] uh yes uh um that led many people at the [00:07:39] Munich Security Conference over the [00:07:41] weekend such as the president of Lapia [00:07:43] to be quite gloomy frankly quite [00:07:46] pessimistic about the prospects of a [00:07:47] peace deal in 2026. [00:07:50] You know, Russia refuses not only uh all [00:07:53] demands from Ukrainian and European [00:07:56] side, but also continues to insist on [00:07:58] territorial demands and uh uh on uh [00:08:02] fully occupation of Donbas [00:08:05] um and uh even some uh uh recognition [00:08:08] from uh all countries of Russian um [00:08:13] occupation of Crimea and other [00:08:15] territories. At the same time, Ukraine [00:08:17] categorically rejects this idea. And uh [00:08:21] the question is uh is uh the peace [00:08:23] progress structurally blocked or is [00:08:26] Russia just deliberately dragging it out [00:08:29] to reshape the battlefield uh maybe by [00:08:32] uh time and um what's your take on that? [00:08:36] >> Well, as I said a moment ago, I do think [00:08:38] that Russia is playing for time. uh you [00:08:40] know Putin Lavough these people have not [00:08:43] changed their maximalist demands uh one [00:08:46] single iota they want all of the [00:08:48] concessions to be on the side of uh Kiev [00:08:51] including this idea of having uh [00:08:54] elections while the war is still [00:08:56] continuing which is contrary to [00:08:57] Ukrainian constitution and again we see [00:09:00] President Trump um going backwards and [00:09:03] forwards and again this week in some of [00:09:05] his statements implying that it's up to [00:09:07] President Zalinski to feel the pressure [00:09:10] uh and to make the concessions. I think [00:09:12] the Europeans badly need to get involved [00:09:14] in these peace negotiations in some way [00:09:16] or another uh to be able to sort of give [00:09:18] Kiev uh more support on on on on this. [00:09:23] Um it's also clear uh to my mind that [00:09:26] Russia uh will not make uh serious [00:09:29] concessions um until there is much more [00:09:32] pressure from sanctions. And in Munich [00:09:35] over the weekend, uh there was lots of [00:09:37] talk about, you know, tougher action [00:09:39] against Russia's shadow fleet of oil [00:09:42] tankers. Russia still is operating about [00:09:44] 1,000 of these on the high seas. There's [00:09:46] been, you know, recently some good [00:09:48] signs, the UK, France, US getting more [00:09:50] involved in boarding uh these ships. Uh [00:09:53] uh the Baltic states as as as well [00:09:56] changes to European legislation to allow [00:09:58] a tougher line to be uh taken. But last [00:10:01] week, Denmark was reporting that 400 [00:10:04] Russian uh tankers within a single month [00:10:07] had moved through the Danish straits um [00:10:09] uh from the Baltic into the North Sea. [00:10:11] So this activity is still going on, [00:10:13] other kinds of sanctions. So yes, um [00:10:16] that debate is continuing, but until we [00:10:18] see decisive action in really tightening [00:10:20] up uh Russia's ability to fund its war [00:10:24] uh through uh oil sales and other kinds [00:10:26] of economic activity, uh you know, the [00:10:29] Kremlin, although losing lots and lots [00:10:31] of soldiers, isn't going to feel backed [00:10:32] into a corner and feel the financial [00:10:35] pressure to cut its losses and stop the [00:10:37] conflict. So um you know to my mind [00:10:40] there are many other elements of [00:10:41] strategy that need to be put in place to [00:10:44] really get Russia to negotiate [00:10:46] seriously. And of course the other side [00:10:47] of that is of course stepping up the [00:10:49] provision of air defense weapons of [00:10:51] longrange artillery uh uh uh you [00:10:54] co-production of drones all of these [00:10:56] things to help the Ukrainian army not to [00:10:58] lose further territory uh continue to [00:11:01] impose a very high price in casualties [00:11:03] on Russia and therefore to convince [00:11:05] Russia that it's gone as far in Ukraine [00:11:07] as it's going to be able to go at a [00:11:09] remotely acceptable price. I mean Putin [00:11:12] feels at the moment that he can live [00:11:13] with 1 million casualties and continue. [00:11:16] But if he has 1 million 500,000 [00:11:19] casualties or 2 million plus casualties, [00:11:21] maybe that calculus in the eyes of the [00:11:23] Kremlin would change. So there are a lot [00:11:25] of these other elements that have to be [00:11:27] put in place to really give Russia uh if [00:11:30] you like positive inducements in its own [00:11:32] interest to negotiate uh and there's [00:11:34] talk but until there is action uh I [00:11:37] think Putin to answer your question will [00:11:39] continue to play for time. Yes. [00:11:41] >> Um, since you already mentioned the [00:11:43] topic of the elections, Financial Times [00:11:45] reported that uh, the United States is [00:11:48] pushing for Ukraine to hold elections on [00:11:50] May 15th. And I also read some articles [00:11:53] that basically Trump wants to make a [00:11:55] deal between Ukraine and Russia before [00:11:57] Congress elections. And of course, [00:12:01] Ukrainian side says that elections are [00:12:03] only possible after two month ceasefire. [00:12:05] At the same time, yesterday Russian [00:12:08] officials released statement that they [00:12:12] could ensure no shelling and one day [00:12:15] ceasefire during the elections. What's [00:12:18] your reaction on the Russian statement? [00:12:21] Why actually Ukraine should believe [00:12:23] them? Because we know they also uh they [00:12:26] also promised energy ceasefire but it [00:12:29] lost only four days. and uh why is the [00:12:32] American side pushing for the elections [00:12:35] right now? [00:12:36] >> Well, sir, I I I think that, you know, [00:12:39] we had that statement from President [00:12:40] Trump, but it's interesting that Marco [00:12:42] Rubio uh didn't say much about Ukraine [00:12:45] in his speech in Munich and didn't seem [00:12:47] to be sort of echoing that view of the [00:12:49] administration um in his speech or in [00:12:52] his other bilateral meetings. He had of [00:12:54] course a quick meeting with Zilinski as [00:12:56] well that elections should take place [00:12:59] right away. I mean, clearly it's not [00:13:00] realistic. I mean, first of all, you [00:13:02] can't hold proper elections in wartime. [00:13:05] No democratic country has had it. In my [00:13:07] country, the UK, we had a national [00:13:09] government from 1940 to 1945, but we [00:13:12] didn't have the elections until Hitler [00:13:14] had been defeated. Uh, and the Second [00:13:16] World War was over. That's the way that [00:13:18] it has to be. Uh, you need uh proper [00:13:20] voter registration. uh you need uh all [00:13:23] of the six to seven million Ukrainians [00:13:25] who have had to flee abroad to be proper [00:13:28] properly registered to be able to [00:13:29] participate in some way or another. You [00:13:31] need a proper campaign and it's very [00:13:34] nice of President Putin to suggest that [00:13:36] he would halt the bombing for 24 hours [00:13:38] while people actually vote if anybody [00:13:40] believed him. But that's not what an [00:13:43] election is. An election is also a [00:13:45] campaign uh extending over several weeks [00:13:48] where people are able to freely go into [00:13:50] the towns and villages and to hold [00:13:52] rallies. Who would hold a rally uh [00:13:55] bringing a couple of hundred people [00:13:56] together if there were a prospect of a [00:13:59] uh Russian bombardment uh taking place [00:14:02] uh during that period? It would be [00:14:03] completely uh impossible and and and [00:14:06] unthinkable. And President Silinski, I [00:14:08] think, was quite robust also in his [00:14:11] intervention uh at the Munich Security [00:14:13] Conference in pushing back against the [00:14:15] notion that uh elections can be held [00:14:18] while the war is still uh uh going on. [00:14:21] Uh and that therefore the Russian [00:14:23] argument which is because there's not [00:14:25] been an election, somehow President [00:14:27] Zalinski is not the legitimate leader of [00:14:29] C of of Ukraine. Uh that's bogus. So the [00:14:32] Russians will continue to play for these [00:14:33] arguments, particularly if they think [00:14:35] Trump might pick them up and echo them, [00:14:37] but I think there was a very firm [00:14:38] response from Ukraine and and and Europe [00:14:41] in Munich on that score over the [00:14:43] weekend. [00:14:44] >> One of the key outcomes discussed in [00:14:46] Munich was the possibility of US [00:14:49] security guarantees for Ukraine for 15 [00:14:51] years. It was announced by Voldemort [00:14:53] Zalanski and he said at the same time [00:14:56] Kim is asking for 35 to 50 years [00:15:00] security guarantees. Is such a long-term [00:15:03] guarantee realistic in the current US [00:15:05] political system? [00:15:07] >> Well, we've had in NATO a situation [00:15:09] where the United States has extended a [00:15:11] security guarantee to Europe now for uh [00:15:14] nearly 80 years. Uh uh and that still [00:15:17] continues. So uh these obviously are [00:15:20] permanent arrangements. uh when a [00:15:22] country is part of your democratic [00:15:24] family with the prospect of course of EU [00:15:26] membership even if in Munich nobody was [00:15:29] willing on the European side to set a [00:15:31] firm date for Ukraine's uh EU uh [00:15:34] membership. Uh and of course the length [00:15:36] of those security guarantees has to [00:15:38] depend upon the situation. Uh how big [00:15:41] how long will the Russian threat last? [00:15:44] Um how uh self-reliant will Ukraine be [00:15:47] with its own army in the future? But [00:15:49] given that you that Ukraine is going to [00:15:51] be a part of the European Union and the [00:15:54] and and in Munich Ursula Vonda Lion the [00:15:58] commission president was calling for the [00:16:00] EU to develop its own security guarantee [00:16:03] to its member states under article 42.7 [00:16:07] of the Lisbon Treaty which provides for [00:16:09] that then clearly uh we need a permanent [00:16:12] security guarantee for Ukraine uh the [00:16:14] same that the EU and NATO offer to all [00:16:18] of their member states. [00:16:19] at at the moment. I mean 15 years may be [00:16:21] good in terms of what the Americans are [00:16:24] willing to commit to particularly for [00:16:26] the US Congress to endorse this and for [00:16:29] the US to be uh fully participating in [00:16:32] that in the first phase. I think that's [00:16:35] important for deterrence visa in Moscow. [00:16:38] But of course in the longer run uh I [00:16:40] think we know that that security [00:16:42] guarantee has to be largely a European [00:16:45] affair. um uh albeit hopefully with some [00:16:48] American uh uh uh backing like in NATO [00:16:51] but essentially a European affair and [00:16:53] therefore I think you know we we need to [00:16:55] talk about maybe an initial 15year [00:16:58] arrangement uh but uh transiting [00:17:00] transitioning to another formula which [00:17:03] could be NATO EU 42.7 that article uh [00:17:07] European troops uh staying in Ukraine uh [00:17:10] uh over over the long run but to my mind [00:17:12] it has to be uh from now on uh a [00:17:15] permanent thing uh which is what [00:17:17] European integration provides for for [00:17:19] its member states [00:17:21] >> and it's also interesting to discuss [00:17:23] from Moscow's perspective would Russia [00:17:25] ever accept a peace deal that includes [00:17:28] strong biding security guarantees for [00:17:30] Ukraine and uh do you think that this [00:17:33] topic uh I mean security guarantees for [00:17:35] Ukraine should be on the table uh in [00:17:38] terms of uh discussions with Russian or [00:17:41] uh we can just have security guarantees [00:17:44] and do not ask Russians about their [00:17:47] opinion and that's it. [00:17:49] >> Well, I I certainly think that we, as [00:17:51] I've said before on your program, that [00:17:54] we can't accept the kind of paper [00:17:55] guarantees, the Budapest memoranda and [00:17:58] those kind of approaches we had in the [00:17:59] past because we know that Putin doesn't [00:18:01] respect them. So, that's out. Um, number [00:18:03] two, uh, we have to have obviously [00:18:06] security guarantees that deter Russia [00:18:08] from future attacks by making it crystal [00:18:10] clear that any violation of the, uh, [00:18:12] peace agreement by Russia will be met [00:18:14] with a firm response, including a [00:18:16] military response and that's provided [00:18:18] for in the current, you know, [00:18:20] three-stage plan, uh, of response uh, [00:18:23] that the Americans and the Ukrainians [00:18:26] and and European countries have worked [00:18:28] out together. Thirdly, it has to provide [00:18:30] for a large Ukrainian army, which would [00:18:33] not be limited in terms of size uh not [00:18:36] below 800,000 troops uh uh with reserves [00:18:39] or the types of weaponry that Ukraine is [00:18:42] uh able to uh have. And it's in the [00:18:44] European interest because nobody has uh [00:18:47] any interest in weak security guarantees [00:18:49] leading to a future Russian invasion and [00:18:52] which is simply going to bring us back [00:18:53] into this sort of cycle uh of of helping [00:18:56] Ukraine and arming and interventions uh [00:18:59] that we've had already. We have to break [00:19:02] free of that uh scenario that syndrome I [00:19:05] think rather uh decisively. So uh if [00:19:08] Russia continues to say no to that, [00:19:10] that's an area where clearly the west [00:19:12] has to push back and very very very [00:19:14] firmly indeed uh push back after the the [00:19:18] cold war. Uh the Kremlin did not want to [00:19:20] give the right of Eastern European [00:19:22] countries to be members of NATO. Uh uh [00:19:25] and Yensen at the time threatened all [00:19:27] kinds of uh reprisals if if that [00:19:31] perspective of NATO membership were [00:19:32] given. But the West stuck to its guns, [00:19:34] was firm what it wanted, was firm what [00:19:37] it needed for European security and push [00:19:39] back on that. And and that's an area [00:19:42] well which is really not negotiable. Uh [00:19:45] and the United States and Europeans, [00:19:47] Ukraine have to be crystal clear and be [00:19:50] very firm on on on on that and put [00:19:53] pressure on Moscow to accept that it [00:19:55] won't there won't be a peace agreement [00:19:57] in Ukraine without those security [00:19:59] guarantees. Of course, you know, the the [00:20:01] Kremlin are great at threatening and [00:20:03] bluffing and saying over their dead [00:20:06] body. They always say that. But look at [00:20:08] the 1990s where firmness and unity on [00:20:10] the Western side paid off. Uh and the [00:20:13] Eastern Europeans were given the [00:20:15] military security guarantees that they [00:20:16] required. [00:20:18] >> You know, uh one interesting point, uh [00:20:21] uh a couple days ago, the Telegraph [00:20:23] published an article about uh a counter [00:20:26] offensive of Ukraine. Uh, according to [00:20:29] the media, Ukraine launched a counter [00:20:31] offensive after Russian forces were cut [00:20:33] off from Starling. Uh, do you think this [00:20:36] move could create an additional pressure [00:20:38] at least and maybe strengthen [00:20:40] Ukrainian's position on um uh during [00:20:43] these peace talks? [00:20:45] I I definitely think it's the way to go [00:20:47] because, you know, it's crazy for the [00:20:50] for for the Ukrainians to be giving [00:20:53] access to Starink funded by the Baltic [00:20:55] states in Poland, of course, provided by [00:20:57] uh Elon Musk. That's vital. And then [00:20:59] allow the Russians to have access to the [00:21:01] same service. That's called shooting [00:21:02] yourself in the foot. Measures have been [00:21:04] taken against that. And and my [00:21:06] understanding is that the Ukrainian [00:21:08] advances at least on the Russian side, [00:21:11] Russian commanders have been attributed [00:21:12] to the fact that they were cut off from [00:21:14] Starink. Uh if that's a technological [00:21:16] fix that can give the Ukrainians uh uh [00:21:19] help at the moment, then that is [00:21:21] something that absolutely the West [00:21:22] should secure because in war the first [00:21:25] principle is that you don't help your [00:21:26] enemy. And if by buying Russian oil um [00:21:30] at one stage uh uh in Europe we were [00:21:32] spending more buying Russian oil than we [00:21:35] were giving to Ukraine in weapons um or [00:21:38] or not you know leaving lots of [00:21:40] loopholes in the sanctions so the [00:21:42] Russians can get military technology uh [00:21:45] for example um you know giving them [00:21:47] access to things like Starink uh those [00:21:49] are the obvious things that we simply [00:21:51] shouldn't be doing um and so at least uh [00:21:54] uh that uh avenue seems to be closed off [00:21:56] at the moment But once it's closed off, [00:21:58] we have to make sure that it continues [00:21:59] to be closed off because of course we [00:22:01] know that the Kremlin are experts in [00:22:03] finding workarounds, you know, uh uh [00:22:06] different circuits, you know, use of [00:22:08] organized crime circuit circuits, [00:22:10] sanctions, evasion. They're very good at [00:22:12] all of that. So that's an area which [00:22:14] requires constant vigilance by uh uh the [00:22:17] NATO allies. And uh my last topic for [00:22:20] today uh according to recent survey [00:22:23] published by political western societies [00:22:25] increasingly believe a global war is [00:22:28] coming. And according to their published [00:22:31] survey majorities in the US, Canada, the [00:22:34] UK, France and Germany say the world is [00:22:36] becoming more dangerous and that the [00:22:39] World War II is more likely that not [00:22:42] within the next 5 years. Where do you [00:22:44] think we are actually right now on the [00:22:47] escalation later and looking back at the [00:22:50] takeaways from the Munich from the [00:22:53] security conference did the overall [00:22:56] picture suggest the readiness for a new [00:22:58] threats or a dangerous lack of it? [00:23:02] >> Well, [00:23:04] it it's true that we live in a more [00:23:05] dangerous world today, but that doesn't [00:23:07] make a future global war inevitable. We [00:23:09] know from the experience of the 1930s [00:23:11] that the refusal to make a stand, for [00:23:14] example, over Hitler's reoccupation of [00:23:16] the rhinand in 1936 or his annexation of [00:23:19] Austria in 1938, his invasion of [00:23:21] Czechlovakia uh in 1939 and in Poland. [00:23:25] We know that the refusal to make a stand [00:23:27] only encouraged dictators to think that [00:23:29] they could get away with everything, [00:23:31] that the democracies were weak and would [00:23:33] uh impose them. So, uh, we got into a [00:23:36] war in 1939, 1940 largely by mistake by [00:23:40] failing to convince the, uh, the [00:23:43] authoritarian powers that we were [00:23:44] serious when we really were. And I think [00:23:46] today everybody recognizes that the [00:23:49] Ukraine is, if you like, the rhinland of [00:23:52] the 21st century in that the way that [00:23:55] conflict ends will largely determine if [00:23:58] we have a global war. If we don't, if [00:24:00] Ukraine survives as an independent [00:24:01] sovereign state uh with those security [00:24:04] guarantees, if Putin is seen to have [00:24:06] failed, then not only Russia but many [00:24:08] other authoritarians around the world [00:24:11] will be very very careful and cautious [00:24:13] uh before they start uh these uh [00:24:16] aggressions in the future because [00:24:17] they'll see that they don't work and [00:24:19] they pay a very very heavy price. So [00:24:21] Ukraine is not just important for [00:24:22] Ukrainians, but it's important for the [00:24:24] security of of all of the NATO member [00:24:27] states. Uh Ukraine is not losing the [00:24:29] war. Uh Ukraine is still in a position, [00:24:32] it demonstrates this every day to resist [00:24:34] Russia, to push back. Russia is a weak [00:24:37] country uh compared with the Europeans [00:24:40] and NATO, in terms of military spending, [00:24:42] in terms of economic uh growth. It has [00:24:45] weaknesses and we have to stop seeing [00:24:47] the Russians as 20t tall and learn to [00:24:50] exploit their weaknesses uh much better [00:24:52] than we've been doing in in in the past. [00:24:54] So I think Ukraine shows the dangers, [00:24:56] but I think Ukraine also shows the [00:24:58] opportunities of decisive policy uh to [00:25:03] uh stop the worst from happening and to [00:25:05] reestablish the preeminence of the [00:25:07] rules-based international order. And [00:25:09] after four years of war, those [00:25:11] opportunities are as strong as they were [00:25:14] today as as they were back in February [00:25:17] 2022 when Putin launched his second [00:25:21] offensive into Ukraine. nothing is lost [00:25:23] and everything is still to play for but [00:25:26] it requires firm leadership in order to [00:25:29] diminish the risks and exploit the [00:25:31] opportunities. [00:25:32] >> Mr. She, thank you very much for being [00:25:34] with us today and for this discussion. [00:25:36] It's always a pleasure to have you with [00:25:38] us [00:25:39] >> and thanks again as always for the [00:25:41] invitation and uh glory to Ukraine as [00:25:44] always.