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[00:00:04] We see people taking advantage of [00:00:06] loopholes in the law and operating these [00:00:08] illegal labs with these pathogens as [00:00:11] we've discussed from malaria to HIV. [00:00:13] Where are there other labs? I mean, [00:00:15] these are two that we know of, but [00:00:17] there's probably other labs out there. [00:00:19] Where are they operating? How are they [00:00:21] operating? And who is operating them? [00:00:23] And that is a scary thought. [00:00:26] The sheriff out there in Las Vegas, a [00:00:28] bolab discovered in a Las Vegas home has [00:00:31] raised concerns about Chinese activities [00:00:33] inside this country. Joining us now to [00:00:35] talk about this. Our top story is [00:00:37] Missouri Senator Josh Holly. He's on the [00:00:39] Senate Homeland Security Committee. Uh [00:00:41] Senator, thanks for being here. Fox 11 [00:00:44] out in Las Vegas uh says this bolab. [00:00:46] Here's some of the questions they [00:00:47] answer. The investigation centers on Ory [00:00:50] Solomon, an Israeli citizen and property [00:00:52] manager who allegedly manages [00:00:53] approximately 37 short-term rentals. [00:00:55] Investigators are examining Solomon's [00:00:57] relation extensive relationship with [00:00:59] property owners uh Xia Bay Zoo, also [00:01:02] known as David He and Wang Zho Yan Zoo, [00:01:06] currently a cal in a California prison, [00:01:08] allegedly made 6,945 [00:01:11] calls, including 467 [00:01:14] to Solomon. tying this all together. But [00:01:17] uh what do we know about this and how [00:01:19] extensive could this be? [00:01:22] >> Well, what we don't know, Brett, I think [00:01:24] is the most important, which is we don't [00:01:25] know if this property owner, who is a [00:01:27] Chinese national, what the extent of his [00:01:29] ties are to the Chinese government, and [00:01:31] I think we better find out really quick. [00:01:32] And here's why I say that. This is now [00:01:34] at least the second property that this [00:01:36] owner has that has turned out to have [00:01:38] biolab materials in it. And not just any [00:01:41] pathogens. We're talking about COVID 19 [00:01:43] that was in the previous property. [00:01:44] That's why he's in jail because in 2023 [00:01:47] this Chinese national ran a bolab in [00:01:49] another home. Now it turns out he's got [00:01:51] this one in Vegas. Where might he else [00:01:53] he own property? Who is he in contact [00:01:55] with in China? I don't like the sound of [00:01:57] this at all. Brett, I think we need to [00:01:59] figure out if this is some sort of a [00:02:00] ring and we need to know if there's CCP [00:02:02] involvement at any level. [00:02:04] >> Yeah, and this is 3 years after the [00:02:07] first one uh in California. I asked the [00:02:09] FBI director about this last night. Take [00:02:11] a listen. If that Chinese national has [00:02:14] been behind bars for the past 3 years, [00:02:17] um, how is it just now authorities are [00:02:20] raiding this Las Vegas house? [00:02:21] >> Well, I think that's a great question. [00:02:22] What this FBI did was went back and look [00:02:25] at a report that my predecessor went to [00:02:27] Capitol Hill and said there's no [00:02:28] connection to China. I found that [00:02:30] unbelievable or implausible. So, that is [00:02:32] a state-run investigation right now in [00:02:34] the state of Nevada. [00:02:36] >> It seems so much more urgent with the [00:02:40] what's listed there. If you look back at [00:02:41] the House China Select Committee's [00:02:43] investigation into the California, the [00:02:45] Reedley Bio Bolab contained thousands of [00:02:48] samples of potential pathogens contained [00:02:50] freezer labeled Ebola, a select agent [00:02:53] with 25 to 90% lethality rate, contained [00:02:56] nearly a thousand transgenic mice [00:02:58] designed to carry COVID 19 virus. We've [00:03:00] got reports out of Las Vegas that people [00:03:02] have been really sick, that there were [00:03:04] dead crickets in the house. I mean, this [00:03:06] is serious stuff. [00:03:09] >> It's very serious. I would say the [00:03:11] situation is very urgent, Brett, and I [00:03:12] think we need to get answers really [00:03:14] soon. And I come back to the fact we [00:03:15] need to know if there are chi ties to [00:03:17] mainland ch mainland China to the CCP. [00:03:20] We need to know if there are other homes [00:03:22] and I understand that this Chinese [00:03:24] national who's now in prison owned a [00:03:25] whole network of homes. I assume that [00:03:28] authorities are looking into that. And I [00:03:30] also think this raises the larger issue. [00:03:32] We've got to remember, Brett, that the [00:03:33] Chinese government's not our friend. I [00:03:35] mean, this is a pattern that we've seen [00:03:36] where the Chinese government has tried [00:03:38] to use Chinese nationals. We don't know [00:03:39] if this is true in this case, but we [00:03:41] know it's true in other cases. On our [00:03:42] university campuses, for example, to try [00:03:44] to get access to top research. They've [00:03:46] stood up institutes like the Confucious [00:03:48] Institutes on our campuses that the [00:03:50] Chinese government has directed directly [00:03:52] funded to try to get access. This is a [00:03:55] pattern that we've seen. We need to be [00:03:56] mindful of this and we need to be on [00:03:58] guard against CCP efforts to infiltrate [00:04:01] and influence us here at home. [00:04:04] >> How much do you think China is trying to [00:04:06] do inside the US? You're on the Homeland [00:04:08] Security Committee. Obviously, we've [00:04:09] dealt with the precursor chemicals that [00:04:11] go through Mexico uh through the [00:04:13] cartels, fentanyl coming in. That's a [00:04:15] major threat that the president and his [00:04:17] administration have been dealing with. [00:04:18] But what about other efforts inside the [00:04:20] US by China? [00:04:22] >> Oh, I think that there's a lot and we [00:04:24] know of some of them. I just mentioned a [00:04:26] few of them where they've deliberately, [00:04:27] the Chinese government tried to place [00:04:29] nationals into sensitive research [00:04:31] projects, into sensitive positions at [00:04:33] our universities, into sensitive [00:04:35] laboratories. uh they've tried to stand [00:04:37] up uh front groups essentially like the [00:04:39] Confucious Institutes that appear to be [00:04:41] about education. In fact, they're about [00:04:43] trying to corral Chinese students, make [00:04:45] sure those students stay in line, [00:04:47] surveil them, and then ultimately try to [00:04:49] use them to collect intelligence. Brett, [00:04:51] they've been at this a long time, and I [00:04:53] think we just have to remember they are [00:04:54] not our friends. They are not an ally to [00:04:56] us. They are a serious competitor. In [00:04:58] many ways, they act as an enemy, and we [00:05:00] need to be on our guard on all fronts. [00:05:03] And certainly when it comes to these [00:05:04] biioaterials, we got to figure out where [00:05:06] this guy got this stuff and we need to [00:05:08] figure out if he's running these bolabs [00:05:10] in other places. [00:05:10] >> Yeah, we're going to continue to ask [00:05:12] questions and we'll uh follow this [00:05:14] story. I want to turn to something [00:05:15] yesterday, a hearing on Netflix antirust [00:05:18] hearing. Uh CNN writes that it morphed [00:05:20] into their quote a culture war fight [00:05:23] over wokeness. You questioned the [00:05:25] Netflix CEO uh about children's [00:05:28] programming. Take a listen. [00:05:31] children's program so full of this [00:05:33] highly sexualized, highly controversial, [00:05:37] highly controversial agenda. I don't I [00:05:40] don't I don't understand it. It seems [00:05:41] strange to me. [00:05:42] >> Um, respectfully, sir, it's because it's [00:05:44] inaccurate. We have millions of hours of [00:05:46] children's programming. I get [00:05:48] >> You're saying it's not there. You You [00:05:49] don't You don't have trans You don't [00:05:51] feature trans characters, trans story [00:05:53] lines, trans themes. I'm saying it's not [00:05:55] in your programming. I'm saying we [00:05:56] feature a wide variety of stories and [00:05:58] programs to meet a wide variety of [00:06:00] people's tastes. [00:06:02] >> So, were you satisfied in that exchange? [00:06:04] What came out of it? And does that [00:06:05] somehow hinder um this going through? [00:06:10] >> I'm not satisfied with the exchange and [00:06:11] I'm not satisfied as a parent because I [00:06:13] know firsthand, Brett, and I told this [00:06:15] to the CEO to his face. I've got three [00:06:17] small children at home. I can't let them [00:06:18] watch anything on Netflix unless my wife [00:06:20] or I view it first because the content [00:06:22] is so highly sexualized. A recent study [00:06:25] by Concerned Women for America, for [00:06:26] example, found that almost 50% of [00:06:29] Netflix's programming for minor [00:06:31] children, we're talking about young [00:06:33] children here, has highly sexual [00:06:35] content, including those transgender [00:06:37] themes I was just talking about. I think [00:06:38] it's insane. I mean, this is a an [00:06:40] outfit, a streaming platform that in [00:06:42] 2020 ran a program called Cuties, which [00:06:45] was about small children performing sex [00:06:47] acts on YouTube. They filmed it, they [00:06:50] put it up on their platform, it was [00:06:52] available for all the world, including [00:06:53] children. This is nuts. And my view is [00:06:55] they're asking for something approaching [00:06:57] monopoly status. They want to become the [00:06:59] indisputed, undisputed biggest streamer [00:07:02] in the world. I think we better take a [00:07:04] close look at the content they're [00:07:05] putting out before we do that. [00:07:07] >> Well, Senator Holly, we'll follow it. We [00:07:09] appreciate the time. [00:07:11] >> Thank you.