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[00:00:00] If more European countries decided to [00:00:02] have their own nuclear weapons, it would [00:00:04] be very interesting to see whether they [00:00:06] have it as part of a collective security [00:00:09] agreement or whether it would be to [00:00:11] guarantee their own security. The whole [00:00:14] command and control for the use of [00:00:17] nuclear weapons would need to be [00:00:18] political, not military. And who would [00:00:21] have the say over those weapons, the [00:00:22] country that developed them or would [00:00:24] there be European command and control? I [00:00:26] think that that would have to be [00:00:27] resolved. But also I think you might see [00:00:30] it a wider breakout uh to go beyond the [00:00:33] nuclear non-prololiferation treaty. So [00:00:36] countries whether it's Germany or [00:00:38] Poland, Korea or Japan might also decide [00:00:41] that they need nuclear weapons. [00:00:43] >> When Russia could attack NATO, how [00:00:45] European states could develop their own [00:00:48] nuclear deterrent and is it true that [00:00:50] Russia is capable of fighting endlessly? [00:00:52] All of this I'm going to discuss with my [00:00:54] wellrespected guest, major general and [00:00:57] strategist Mik Ryan. Thank you for [00:00:59] joining us, Mick. [00:01:01] >> It's great to be with you. [00:01:03] >> The report of the 2026 Munich Security [00:01:06] Conference uh stated that Russia is [00:01:09] actively preparing for new conflicts in [00:01:11] Europe and the era of the American [00:01:14] security umbrella is coming to an end. [00:01:17] And uh at the same time the Kremlin is [00:01:19] significant significantly increasing [00:01:21] military spending and continuing its [00:01:24] aggressive foreign policy. U I would [00:01:27] like to ask you how do you assess [00:01:28] chances of Russian attack on NATO in a [00:01:30] shortterm perspective and how this [00:01:33] attack could look like? [00:01:35] >> Well, I think a conventional attack by [00:01:37] the Russians on NATO in the short term [00:01:40] is is quite unlikely. [00:01:42] Um they are certainly continuing a [00:01:46] campaign of subversion and sabotage [00:01:49] uh misinformation and cognitive warfare [00:01:52] against European countries. But a [00:01:54] conventional attack is less likely. This [00:01:56] is because Russia's traditional military [00:02:00] strength lies in defending Russia. It [00:02:03] lies in defending its own territory. [00:02:06] When it has gone on offensive operations [00:02:10] and expeditionary operations beyond its [00:02:13] boundaries in places like Afghanistan [00:02:15] and now in Ukraine, it has been found [00:02:17] wanting. It would be found wanting in [00:02:20] NATO as well. [00:02:21] >> You are talking about hybrid war if I [00:02:24] understood you correctly. Yeah. [00:02:26] >> Yeah. I think this is what they would [00:02:28] prefer to do because it's a strategy of [00:02:30] the weak. Uh Russia is not a strong [00:02:33] power anymore. It is neither rich nor [00:02:36] technologically sophisticated enough to [00:02:39] really take on NATO countries in a [00:02:42] standup fight. So it has to use the [00:02:45] strategy of cowards to uh undermine [00:02:49] European security and its population's [00:02:52] confidence in its governments rather [00:02:54] than a direct attack. [00:02:56] >> Mhm. Uh let's talk about American [00:02:59] security umbrella for Europe. It has [00:03:01] been definitely changed. Uh how could [00:03:04] you indicate it now and what is it and [00:03:07] how it works? [00:03:09] >> Well, it took the Second World War for [00:03:11] Americans to understand that the [00:03:14] security of Europe directly impacted the [00:03:17] security of the United States of [00:03:19] America. Before the Second World War, [00:03:21] Americans hadn't really internalized [00:03:24] that. But at the end of the second world [00:03:26] war, things like the Marshall Plan, the [00:03:29] formation of NATO, and a whole range of [00:03:31] other uh linkages were established to [00:03:35] ensure that Europe could never go to war [00:03:37] with itself again and therefore not [00:03:40] impact on American security. That [00:03:42] understanding has broken down in the [00:03:45] last year. The current Trump [00:03:46] administration does not appear to [00:03:49] support that kind of approach. Indeed, [00:03:51] it would rather align itself with [00:03:54] authoritarians than democracies. [00:03:59] >> Mhm. Uh several European states are [00:04:02] openly supporting the idea of [00:04:04] negotiating their own nuclear deterrent [00:04:06] to complement the American one amid a [00:04:09] decline in trust in the United States [00:04:12] under Donald Trump. How could change [00:04:15] nuclear power balance and global [00:04:17] security architecture if this comes [00:04:19] true? [00:04:21] Well, I think if more European countries [00:04:24] decided to have their own nuclear [00:04:26] weapons, it would be very interesting to [00:04:28] see whether they have it as part of a [00:04:29] collective security agreement or whether [00:04:32] it would be to guarantee their own [00:04:34] security. The whole command and control [00:04:37] for the use of nuclear weapons would [00:04:40] need to be political, not military. And [00:04:42] who would have the say over those [00:04:44] weapons? The country that developed them [00:04:45] or would there be European command and [00:04:47] control? I think that that would have to [00:04:49] be resolved but also I think you might [00:04:52] see the wider breakout uh to go beyond [00:04:55] the nuclear non-prololiferation treaty. [00:04:58] So countries whether it's Germany or [00:05:00] Poland, Korea or Japan might also decide [00:05:03] that they need nuclear weapons. [00:05:06] >> We see that European security is caught [00:05:08] in the I would say crossfire. I mean [00:05:11] literal fire from Russia and political [00:05:13] fire from Washington. uh how European [00:05:16] security could evolve efficiently under [00:05:19] under such circumstances in your [00:05:20] opinion? [00:05:22] >> Well, certainly European countries can [00:05:25] afford to spend more on their own [00:05:26] defense. The 2% barrier has been broken [00:05:29] by many of them. uh 3 to 4% is probably [00:05:32] a more realistic target, but that will [00:05:34] require um either more borrowing, higher [00:05:37] taxes or decrease spending on the huge [00:05:41] number of social services that European [00:05:44] citizens are used to receiving. Uh they [00:05:46] could do that. That doesn't mean, [00:05:48] however, they have to entirely break [00:05:50] their relationship with the United [00:05:52] States. The United States is still the [00:05:54] most powerful nation in the world. It is [00:05:56] the most powerful democracy. Uh, it's in [00:05:59] all our interest to retain good [00:06:01] relations with the United States, even [00:06:03] if relations at the moment under the [00:06:05] Trump administration are not what we [00:06:07] would like them to be. [00:06:09] Some experts say that Russia is capable [00:06:11] of fighting endlessly. How do you assess [00:06:14] Russian military, economic, and [00:06:16] political capabilities to hold this war [00:06:19] efficiently in a long-term perspective? [00:06:22] And how long will Putin have enough [00:06:25] resources? [00:06:27] Well, I think the only circumstances [00:06:29] where that might be true is if Russia [00:06:31] was defending its own territory. That is [00:06:34] not what it is doing here. Russia isn't [00:06:36] engaged in a legal war of territorial [00:06:40] expansion and aggression under these [00:06:42] circumstances. I do not believe Russia [00:06:45] can fight endlessly even though it may [00:06:47] have mobilized the resources to fight [00:06:50] for longer than anyone anticipated. Um, [00:06:52] Russia is not capable of an endless war [00:06:55] in a expeditionary sense only in [00:06:58] defending its own homeland. [00:07:03] when it come when it comes to Russian u [00:07:06] human resources. Uh in your opinion when [00:07:09] Putin is ready to [00:07:13] uh when Putin is ready to to to to [00:07:15] global uh mobilization I mean to general [00:07:18] mobilization [00:07:21] >> well he's no he's not shown any [00:07:23] inclination to do that because he knows [00:07:25] there's a cost to his regime for doing [00:07:28] that. Um certainly he has not [00:07:31] demonstrated the inclination to mobilize [00:07:34] people from uh key Russian cities [00:07:37] including Moscow. He would rather [00:07:39] recruit people from Africa, South Asia [00:07:42] and lie to them about where they might [00:07:44] be serving uh in the Russian armed [00:07:47] forces. I think once again it would have [00:07:50] to be a national emergency where Russia [00:07:52] was defending its own territory where it [00:07:55] could get away with general mobilization [00:07:57] of the population. So I think this is a [00:07:59] pressure point. This is where Ukraine [00:08:01] can hurt Russia. And if Ukraine can do, [00:08:04] as the minister of defense furovv has [00:08:06] said, increase casualties to 50,000 a [00:08:10] month, this will force Putin for the [00:08:12] first time, I think, to really confront [00:08:14] is Ukraine worth the casualties. I hope [00:08:18] it does. uh because like all Ukrainians, [00:08:20] we would like to see peace under the [00:08:23] kind of circumstances that are favorable [00:08:25] to Ukraine this year, not favorable to [00:08:27] Russia. [00:08:29] >> Peace talks in Geneva. Uh how do you [00:08:31] assess prospects of trilateral [00:08:33] negotiations in general and do you [00:08:36] believe in successful outcome? [00:08:39] >> I think we uh are very unlikely to see [00:08:42] any major outcomes of the next round of [00:08:44] peace talks in Geneva. the Russians have [00:08:46] put in charge of it a a chief negotiator [00:08:49] who's been proven to be inept and and [00:08:52] unable to really negotiate effectively [00:08:54] with Ukrainians in the past. I think [00:08:56] that's the Russians signaling that [00:08:58] they're just playing for time. The fact [00:09:00] of the matter is Putin desperately needs [00:09:03] something that he can sell as a victory [00:09:05] to the Russian people. He does not have [00:09:07] that at the moment. Uh and therefore I [00:09:10] believe he will continue dragging out [00:09:11] negotiations [00:09:13] and leading the Trump administration [00:09:15] down a garden path until he thinks he [00:09:18] can get something that looks like a [00:09:19] victory. That's unlikely, but I think he [00:09:21] will continue delaying. [00:09:24] >> How could be solved territorial issue? I [00:09:27] would say the the most difficult in in [00:09:30] these negotiations. [00:09:32] >> Well, the simplest way to do it is the [00:09:34] Russians go home. But I don't think the [00:09:36] Russians appear willing to do that. Um, [00:09:39] this is a very difficult uh political [00:09:42] and societal challenge for uh Ukraine [00:09:45] given the laws around territorial [00:09:47] integrity and the fact that uh Russia [00:09:50] has seized Ukrainian territory illegally [00:09:54] over the period of time not since 2022 [00:09:57] but 2014. So I think this is going to [00:10:00] have to be something that potentially [00:10:03] could be parked. uh there could be a [00:10:05] ceasefire along current lines and then [00:10:08] the the situation with territory and [00:10:11] what happens with territory might be [00:10:13] subject to further negotiations but I [00:10:16] think this is such a consequential such [00:10:18] a difficult issue it's hard to see being [00:10:21] resolved in the short term [00:10:24] >> uh Rubio flew to Orban and FISO they are [00:10:26] known for maintaining tines with Moscow [00:10:29] opposing military aid to Ukraine and [00:10:31] previously even blocking you sanctions [00:10:33] against Russia [00:10:34] U what is the main interest of [00:10:36] cooperation between the US, Slovakia and [00:10:38] Hungary? [00:10:40] >> Well, I think it's more him signaling [00:10:43] that his president uh feels uh some kind [00:10:47] of feelalty or at least feels that they [00:10:51] have similar political interests and how [00:10:53] they govern their countries. In fact, I [00:10:56] think the US Secretary of State talking [00:10:59] with those people straight after he gave [00:11:01] what was a reasonably consiliatory [00:11:04] speech at the Munich Security Conference [00:11:06] indicates that the speech really wasn't [00:11:08] consiliatory. It was exactly what JD Van [00:11:11] said last year, just sugarcoated. [00:11:15] >> I got you. Uh Zilinski said that Trump [00:11:18] offered security guarantees for 15 years [00:11:21] but he requires 30 or 50 years. How do [00:11:25] you understand American logic in terms [00:11:27] of security guarantees and its time [00:11:29] frames? [00:11:32] >> Well, I'm not sure there is a logic uh [00:11:34] to the American offer of 15 years and I [00:11:37] think this is something that could be [00:11:39] part of the negotiation. [00:11:41] um whether it's 15 or 30 or 100 years as [00:11:44] the UK agreement is I think the most [00:11:46] important thing is getting some kind of [00:11:49] security guarantee from the United [00:11:51] States and when that's in place uh it [00:11:53] can be negotiated to have that [00:11:55] lengthened over time. So even a 10-year [00:11:58] guarantee I think would be good as a [00:12:00] start point and then immediately start [00:12:02] negotiating for lengthening it at the [00:12:05] back end. Mhm. According to publications [00:12:08] of foreign press, there are three levels [00:12:10] of security guarantees in case of uh [00:12:14] Russian reattack uh on Ukraine. The [00:12:17] first one is military response of [00:12:19] Ukrainian army and political response of [00:12:21] European Union. Uh the second step is [00:12:24] military presence of European troops and [00:12:26] the third one is American troops in [00:12:28] Ukraine after 74 hours of Russian [00:12:31] escalations of Russian escalation. uh we [00:12:35] know that during the whole period of [00:12:37] Russian aggression the main thing uh [00:12:40] that USA and Europe want to avoid and it [00:12:43] is the biggest fear uh it's a direct [00:12:46] confrontation with Russia what can lead [00:12:48] to nuclear war so why USA and Europe are [00:12:52] ready to allow this confrontation now in [00:12:54] order to security guarantees for Ukraine [00:12:58] >> well I think there's sufficient evidence [00:13:00] that the presence of European and [00:13:02] American troops on the ground might be [00:13:04] uh a sufficient deterrent against [00:13:06] further Russian activity. We know this [00:13:09] from Asia where American presence on the [00:13:12] ground in South Korea has guaranteed [00:13:15] that country's security and [00:13:17] significantly reduced North Korean [00:13:20] aggression. It hasn't entirely removed [00:13:22] it, but it's significantly reduced it uh [00:13:24] over the period since 1953. [00:13:28] Um, we would be hoping that the presence [00:13:30] on the ground of American troops and [00:13:33] European troops, just as European [00:13:35] American troops in Europe guaranteed the [00:13:38] peace there after the Second World War, [00:13:40] might do the same for Ukraine well into [00:13:42] the future. [00:13:45] >> Uh, there are many conversation and [00:13:47] speculations about the end of the war by [00:13:50] summer. Uh, under what circumstances [00:13:52] this scenario can come true? [00:13:55] >> Well, I think there's only two. One is [00:13:57] that there is a very significant shift [00:14:00] in the technology and tactics on the [00:14:02] battlefield and one side or the other [00:14:04] makes a an important breakthrough uh [00:14:07] that achieves some kind of operational [00:14:09] impact and destruction of large numbers [00:14:12] of the other side's forces. The only [00:14:15] other uh reasonable circumstance that [00:14:18] might be applicable is a significant [00:14:20] change in will where the Ukrainian [00:14:23] government or the Russian government [00:14:25] decides they've reached the point where [00:14:27] it is no longer worth fighting and that [00:14:30] a political accommodation now becomes an [00:14:33] imperative. I'm not sure either of those [00:14:35] circumstances are possible in the next [00:14:37] six months. [00:14:41] Uh we clearly understand which leverages [00:14:43] uh United States can use to put pressure [00:14:45] on Ukraine to get concessions from Kiev [00:14:48] but it's not very clear which efficient [00:14:50] tools US can use to get concessions from [00:14:53] Moscow in current period of time. What [00:14:56] can you say about it? [00:14:58] Well, I think uh under the Trump [00:15:00] administration, to their credit, they [00:15:02] have provided more intelligence to the [00:15:04] Ukrainian armed forces to support deeper [00:15:06] strikes inside uh Russia. They have also [00:15:11] been um capturing the shadow fleet that [00:15:15] Russia uses to generate foreign revenue [00:15:18] from its uh oil industry. It could [00:15:22] expand both of those initiatives, but it [00:15:24] could also do things like provide [00:15:27] Tomahawk missiles. It could provide air [00:15:30] defense missiles uh of a greater [00:15:32] quantity and in more timely fashion so [00:15:36] that air defense batteries aren't [00:15:38] running out of missiles halfway through [00:15:40] Russian attacks. I think stepping up [00:15:43] training of uh Ukrainian forces inside [00:15:47] Ukraine by uh Ukraine's partners [00:15:49] including America but including other [00:15:51] countries including Australia would also [00:15:53] help. [00:15:56] >> Mick uh thank you very much for this [00:15:57] interview for this conversation. I [00:16:00] appreciate your expertise. Thank you [00:16:02] again and have a good day. [00:16:04] >> Thank you. It's a pleasure to talk with [00:16:05] you.