📄 Extracted Text (620 words)
[00:00:00] Why shouldn't we treat the querying of
[00:00:02] US persons out of this dragnet database?
[00:00:06] Why shouldn't we treat that as a
[00:00:07] separate Fourth Amendment event
[00:00:09] requiring some additional process? Maybe
[00:00:11] a warrant as Senator Lee has proposed,
[00:00:14] maybe some other process, but why
[00:00:16] shouldn't we say, you know, actually,
[00:00:17] yes, when you go to this massive
[00:00:19] database and ask about a US person,
[00:00:22] that's a Fourth Amendment event that
[00:00:23] requires some process, some scrutiny.
[00:00:26] >> Yes. And so there are two answers to
[00:00:27] that. One is a legal answer and we've
[00:00:29] covered that a lot. But in in short, we
[00:00:31] don't require the FBI agent to get a
[00:00:33] warrant before going to check the filing
[00:00:35] cabinet.
[00:00:35] >> But this is totally analogous to that as
[00:00:37] the hosami court said, right?
[00:00:39] >> And as indeed the court the US Supreme
[00:00:41] Court said in Riley,
[00:00:42] >> I mean this this is a completely
[00:00:44] analogous to saying that you have a
[00:00:46] piece of information down in a locker
[00:00:47] somewhere that you got pursuant to
[00:00:49] probable cause and indeed a warrant for
[00:00:52] a particular case. Here you have a
[00:00:54] massive drag net of information. You
[00:00:57] just told me a second ago that you
[00:00:58] couldn't target the American citizens.
[00:01:00] So the the none of this none of this
[00:01:03] information with the American citizens
[00:01:04] has received any process whatsoever. But
[00:01:07] now the FBI or the inter same whomever
[00:01:10] can go and query this database for the
[00:01:12] first time and get information on US
[00:01:15] citizens particularly for the first
[00:01:16] time. And you're telling me that that's
[00:01:18] not a separate fourth amendment event.
[00:01:21] Well, Senator, I don't know if the the
[00:01:22] first time and when this information
[00:01:24] comes across the transom, there's an
[00:01:25] analyst, let's say at NSA who's
[00:01:27] monitoring that target or at the FBI if
[00:01:28] it's one of their investigations and
[00:01:30] they can read the whole thing.
[00:01:32] >> It's the first time that the US person
[00:01:34] has been the subject of inquiry, though.
[00:01:35] It has to be under the statute because
[00:01:36] you told me a second ago you can't
[00:01:38] target a US person, right?
[00:01:39] >> It's got to be purely incidental. And
[00:01:41] the statute also says you can't target a
[00:01:42] foreign person for the purpose of
[00:01:44] getting information on a US person
[00:01:46] through the back door. So it therefore
[00:01:48] follows that when you go to query the
[00:01:50] database later query a US person in the
[00:01:54] database that's the first time the US
[00:01:56] person is the subject of the inquiry and
[00:01:58] my question to you is that looks an
[00:02:00] awful lot like a search a search and
[00:02:03] seizure for a fourth amendment purposes.
[00:02:05] Why shouldn't we say yeah okay that's a
[00:02:07] fourth amendment event. We need some
[00:02:09] additional process around that.
[00:02:11] >> Yeah and senator I think the government
[00:02:13] has already collected this information.
[00:02:15] In many cases, an analyst may have sat
[00:02:16] there and read the email. To me, it
[00:02:18] seems passing strange to say that
[00:02:20] someone has a reasonable expectation of
[00:02:22] privacy still in something that an
[00:02:23] intelligence analyst has sat there and
[00:02:25] read as it came across in their
[00:02:27] collection.
[00:02:28] >> I it just seems to me you can't have it
[00:02:29] both ways. You you can't say that
[00:02:30] there's no targeting of US persons.
[00:02:32] That's forbidden under the statute. But
[00:02:33] then when they do want to actually
[00:02:35] target a US person, they don't need any
[00:02:36] process for it. You're saying on the one
[00:02:38] hand, no, no process need on the front
[00:02:40] end, no process need on the back end. I
[00:02:41] I just think, Mr. Chairman, this is this
[00:02:43] is an extremely extremely important
[00:02:46] issue. 278,000
[00:02:49] improper queries of Americans in one
[00:02:51] year alone. The idea that we would renew
[00:02:54] 702 without some sort of reforms to
[00:02:56] protect US citizens, I think is just
[00:02:59] totally irresponsible.
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