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[00:00:02] What? Hello and welcome to State of Play
[00:00:05] on Mint Press News, your Monday evening
[00:00:08] geopolitical analysis stream that goes
[00:00:10] over the biggest story of the weekend
[00:00:12] which has to do with the Russia Ukraine
[00:00:15] settlement, the Iranian nuclear deal and
[00:00:17] the geostrategic shift to isolate China.
[00:00:21] We are trying to grow the platform over
[00:00:23] here and a lot of people over the past
[00:00:25] year started following this show due to
[00:00:27] Palestine reporting and honestly the
[00:00:29] Ukraine war gets a lot less engagement
[00:00:32] but I encourage you to stick around
[00:00:33] since all these wars uh though you know
[00:00:36] I don't believe the military action in
[00:00:38] Gaza is a war uh are connected by
[00:00:40] belligerent unilateral US foreign
[00:00:42] policies and the system that they
[00:00:45] represent capitalism maximizing
[00:00:47] shareholder profits protecting the USI
[00:00:50] Israeli defense and high-tech industries
[00:00:52] which we mobilize against our own
[00:00:54] citizens, isolating Russia into a second
[00:00:57] rate power and establishing he hegemony
[00:01:00] over our biggest rival, China. It's all
[00:01:03] connected, man. And it really is. And
[00:01:04] this is going to be kind of more of an
[00:01:06] expansive episode that takes in a lot of
[00:01:08] these different issues because they're
[00:01:11] all in my opinion, as I've expressed
[00:01:14] over the past like year and change that
[00:01:16] I've been doing this show that they're
[00:01:18] all connected and all equally relevant.
[00:01:22] All these adventures basically won't
[00:01:24] work too. Uh but Lord help us, we're
[00:01:26] still going to try. Hey, that's why we
[00:01:28] want to discuss the Russia Ukraine in
[00:01:30] the context also of West Asia because
[00:01:32] the more of these projects that fail,
[00:01:35] the more likely it is that Iran won't be
[00:01:36] bombed and Palestine might
[00:01:39] actually have a shot. So anyways, to
[00:01:43] really help us get in the weeds, we are
[00:01:45] joined by my colleague from across the
[00:01:46] pond in London, Alina Zenapontos,
[00:01:49] international law and globalization
[00:01:51] specialist. She has worked as a
[00:01:52] researcher in international EU policy
[00:01:54] throughout uh the EU with special focus
[00:01:57] on financial and corporate crime. Much
[00:01:59] of her work is centered on geopolitical
[00:02:01] analysis of policy and the economic
[00:02:02] underpinnings of EU economic foreign
[00:02:05] policy objectives. She has worked with
[00:02:07] organizations such as SOMO, the center
[00:02:09] for research on multinational
[00:02:10] corporations based in the Netherlands.
[00:02:12] Thanks so much for coming on this
[00:02:14] evening.
[00:02:15] Thank you for having me. It's going to
[00:02:17] be a really interesting conversation
[00:02:18] today. It should be. Um, this is a
[00:02:22] totally I'm just going to do a quick
[00:02:23] headlines because this is technically a
[00:02:26] new show. So, we do want to talk about a
[00:02:27] couple things before we uh jump into the
[00:02:29] main segment which is the Russia Ukraine
[00:02:31] settlement followed by uh probably a
[00:02:34] shorter segment on the progress made uh
[00:02:37] on a potential Iranian nuclear deal.
[00:02:39] Whether or not you trust the process
[00:02:41] they are moving to a fourth rounds of
[00:02:43] talks hopefully that they'll become
[00:02:45] direct eventually but more on that at
[00:02:48] the second half of the episode. So, one,
[00:02:50] some blurbs for your consideration.
[00:02:52] Haret's leading headline for today.
[00:02:55] Trump signals progress towards Iran
[00:02:57] deal, leaving Israel on the sidelines as
[00:03:00] Trump indicates he is headed towards the
[00:03:02] deal with Iran. Israel is paralyzed by
[00:03:04] its diplomatic failures, political
[00:03:06] infighting, and a government
[00:03:08] increasingly indifferent to the fate of
[00:03:09] the hostages in Gaza. Yeah, that's
[00:03:12] what's happening right now. And we'll
[00:03:13] talk about the deal after. Again, the
[00:03:15] Ukrainian block. It's kind of like a
[00:03:18] Zionist political nightmare that's
[00:03:19] happening right now. Um, so two C uh CIA
[00:03:24] CNN, sorry, I almost uh I think I almost
[00:03:27] did a Freudian slip and called the CNN
[00:03:30] leading headline the CIA leading
[00:03:33] headline. So Iran is tight
[00:03:36] difference. Iran is tight lipped on
[00:03:39] cause of deadly port explosion that
[00:03:41] killed at least 46 people. Uh, Iranian
[00:03:43] authorities have not said what caused
[00:03:45] the massive explosion at the port of
[00:03:47] Bandar Abbas on Saturday, killing at
[00:03:49] least again 46 people amid unconfirmed
[00:03:52] reports of the possible presence of a
[00:03:53] chemical used to make missile
[00:03:55] propellant. All right, so I just wanted
[00:03:58] to address this. I follow a lot of
[00:04:00] social media accounts and I don't really
[00:04:03] want to talk about this. Uh, everyone in
[00:04:05] our media space is shouting that this is
[00:04:07] the Beirut port bombing 2.0 for which
[00:04:09] Israel is generally thought to be
[00:04:10] responsible. We literally don't know
[00:04:12] anything right now. Uh there hasn't been
[00:04:14] an investigation. There hasn't, as of
[00:04:16] time of recording, there hasn't been an
[00:04:17] official statement about the cause of uh
[00:04:19] the explosion from the government
[00:04:21] itself. I've spoken to people in the
[00:04:22] area, and there are a zillion rumors
[00:04:24] going around. So, we'll circle back on
[00:04:26] that in a couple of days, but I don't
[00:04:28] think uh either you or I want to touch
[00:04:30] that right now. Yeah, there's nowhere
[00:04:32] near enough evidence for us to make sort
[00:04:34] of any sort of sound analysis at the
[00:04:36] moment. Although, yeah, I get the
[00:04:38] conspiracy theories at the moment, but I
[00:04:40] feel if we want to have a conversation
[00:04:42] of substance, probably just leave it for
[00:04:44] now. Yeah. See what the events will
[00:04:48] teach us or what they shall unravel, so
[00:04:50] to speak. And our third little blurb
[00:04:53] that we have to address real quick. And
[00:04:55] speaking of conspiracy theories,
[00:04:56] Pakistan defense minister says military
[00:05:00] incursion by India is imminent. uh you
[00:05:03] know said on Monday a military incursion
[00:05:05] by neighboring India was imminent in the
[00:05:06] aftermath of a deadly militant attack on
[00:05:08] tourists in Kashmir last week as
[00:05:11] tensions rise between the two nuclear
[00:05:13] armed
[00:05:14] nations again social media spaces are
[00:05:17] like it's a Modi false flag and of
[00:05:19] course like I wouldn't pass put it past
[00:05:21] Modi to do anything but again no
[00:05:23] evidence right now so the attack killed
[00:05:25] at least 26 people and triggered outrage
[00:05:27] in Hindu majority India along with calls
[00:05:30] for actions against Muslim majority in
[00:05:31] Pakistan And I lived in, you know, South
[00:05:34] India for a while. I've I've noticed the
[00:05:37] rise of extreme jangoism from certain
[00:05:41] MPs and uh civilians within the country.
[00:05:45] And so yeah, I kind of agree with uh
[00:05:46] this this headline from Reuters. Uh
[00:05:49] India accuses Pakistan of backing
[00:05:50] militancy in Kashmir, a region both
[00:05:52] claimed to have fought two wars over.
[00:05:54] You know, I lived there for a while, as
[00:05:56] I said, studied the partition pretty
[00:05:58] exhaustively. I guess I can make the
[00:05:59] cont uh contention that I'm better
[00:06:01] informed on this than like many western
[00:06:02] commentators. I don't know. You can be
[00:06:04] the judge of that. But like my take is
[00:06:06] neither India's increasingly fascist
[00:06:09] Islamophobic government and Pakistan's
[00:06:11] military regime are really in a position
[00:06:13] for any such misadventures. You know,
[00:06:16] but with the growing US and China crisis
[00:06:18] and the history of US and Pakistani
[00:06:20] wararmongering allyship, you never know
[00:06:22] if the current chief of the army of
[00:06:24] India is also trying to start something
[00:06:26] like Musharif did. you know the
[00:06:28] Pakistani general who kicked off the
[00:06:29] cargo border war in 1999. We talked
[00:06:32] about this briefly before we started
[00:06:34] recording. I think it's a nothing
[00:06:36] burger. It's going to be some like saber
[00:06:39] rattling as usual and they'll go back to
[00:06:41] funding militancy in both Kashmir and
[00:06:44] below just down through the use of
[00:06:45] proxies.
[00:06:47] Yeah, I would agree with you. Um I think
[00:06:49] people are always very quick to say oh
[00:06:50] well because these are two nuclear power
[00:06:52] nuclear powerful countries that
[00:06:53] automatically this means some sort of
[00:06:55] nuclear war. Absolutely not. I think for
[00:06:58] both countries that are volatile
[00:06:59] situations right now and also
[00:07:02] considering the global phenomenon that
[00:07:03] are occurring globally
[00:07:05] economically it would be economic
[00:07:07] suicide for both of them at this
[00:07:10] particular point to actually engage in a
[00:07:11] fullout war when it's actually an
[00:07:12] opportune moment for for Pakistan and an
[00:07:14] opportune moment for India as well going
[00:07:16] forward in terms of like their relations
[00:07:18] with both uh bricks and the west. So I
[00:07:20] don't see this escalating be beyond that
[00:07:22] but it's just more of posturing at this
[00:07:24] point. It's just posturing. Um I don't
[00:07:26] think it's going to escalate to the
[00:07:28] degree that people assume it will.
[00:07:31] Right. And again, you made the point
[00:07:34] about two nuclear powers. Uh they've had
[00:07:36] both limited conflicts after they were
[00:07:38] nuclearized and it didn't really turn
[00:07:40] out to be anything. Uh there were very
[00:07:42] limited conflicts and hopefully the the
[00:07:46] principle of mutually assured
[00:07:47] destruction will continue to prevail. Uh
[00:07:50] hope some people have thought that it
[00:07:53] kind of serves as a template just like
[00:07:54] the like the Russian Sino border
[00:07:57] conflict u uh during the USSR kind of
[00:08:01] serves as a template for like limited
[00:08:03] conflicts between nuclear powers that
[00:08:05] don't end in absolute annihilation. But
[00:08:08] anyways, I don't think it's even going
[00:08:09] to get to that point. So we're just
[00:08:12] going to move on. I just would like to
[00:08:13] make the point that uh I know I know
[00:08:15] that Indian some more uh hardline Indian
[00:08:19] generals and uh their upper echelon of
[00:08:21] command are looking at Gaza and being
[00:08:23] like huh can we do this in in Kashmir or
[00:08:26] like looking at the West Bank and being
[00:08:28] like can we do this in Kashmir? So
[00:08:31] that's fun. Anyways all right let's get
[00:08:33] into our first segment on Ukraine by
[00:08:36] watching some liberal media far more
[00:08:38] sympathetic to the Ukrainian cause than
[00:08:40] say Fox News. I always like to watch it.
[00:08:42] The central issue in the public sphere
[00:08:44] of the negotiations on the issue of
[00:08:46] Crimea essentially annexed by Russia
[00:08:48] after the overthrow of Ukrainian
[00:08:49] President Yanukovic in 2014. That's a
[00:08:52] whole complicated process and history.
[00:08:54] Uh it's complicated. It's also just the
[00:08:56] tip of the iceberg of these negotiations
[00:08:59] which are looking more and more like a
[00:09:01] Gordian knot. If you're not familiar
[00:09:03] with like Greek folklore, there's this
[00:09:05] knot that no one could untie. So,
[00:09:08] Alexander the Great had to cut it with
[00:09:09] his sword. Slice it up. Had to slice it
[00:09:12] up. Uh, I think Trump thinks like
[00:09:14] thought he could come in like Alexander
[00:09:16] the Great and just slash the Gordon N be
[00:09:18] like, I I told him I want it done in a
[00:09:20] week. And it turns out that was a good
[00:09:24] little impression there. Yeah. Uh, turns
[00:09:26] out he wasn't uh the the sword that
[00:09:29] could uh do that. But anyways, we wanted
[00:09:32] to talk about all the roadblocks that
[00:09:36] part of these negotiations. the
[00:09:37] overriding complexity because even like
[00:09:40] news and media reporting uh like
[00:09:43] breaking points which I listen to all
[00:09:45] the time and I love all the work that
[00:09:47] they do but they don't really because
[00:09:49] they're more of a news show. This is
[00:09:50] more of like an analysis show analysis
[00:09:53] show we want to go a little bit more in
[00:09:55] depth you know that other people don't
[00:09:57] really have time to do. So, we're going
[00:09:59] to begin and we're going to go through
[00:10:00] this step by step. And I guess um just
[00:10:04] because I enjoy this, I've been told I'm
[00:10:06] on the spectrum, but who knows? Okay,
[00:10:07] let's start with um the uh the the C CBS
[00:10:12] morning news reporting from earlier
[00:10:14] today. Right now, President Donald Trump
[00:10:16] is urging Russian President Vladimir
[00:10:19] Putin to quote, "Stop shooting and sign
[00:10:21] a deal to end the war in Ukraine." This
[00:10:24] comes after President Trump and the
[00:10:25] Ukrainian president had a surprise
[00:10:27] meeting ahead of Pope Francis's funeral
[00:10:29] at the Vatican. The White House said it
[00:10:31] was a very productive discussion. CBS
[00:10:34] News correspondent Natalie Bran brings
[00:10:35] us more on this from the White House
[00:10:37] this morning. Natalie, good morning to
[00:10:39] you. Um, this is Trump and Zilinsk's
[00:10:41] first face toface meeting since that
[00:10:43] infamous Oval Office blow up. So, didn't
[00:10:46] wear a suit, didn't say thank you.
[00:10:48] What's new?
[00:10:50] Yeah, good morning, Errol. And President
[00:10:52] Trump described this meeting as nice and
[00:10:55] beautiful. The setting of course was the
[00:10:57] Vatican, but he also acknowledged that
[00:11:00] these ongoing negotiations are very
[00:11:02] complicated. He says Ukraine has a tough
[00:11:04] road ahead. Now, Vladimir Zalinsky, for
[00:11:07] his part, posted about this meeting on
[00:11:10] social media, calling it symbolic. He
[00:11:13] also said he's hoping for results on
[00:11:15] everything we covered, including
[00:11:17] protecting lives for Ukraine's people,
[00:11:19] full and unconditional ceasefire,
[00:11:22] reliable and lasting peace that will
[00:11:24] prevent another war from breaking out.
[00:11:27] Now, President Trump returning to the
[00:11:29] White House yesterday was asked by
[00:11:31] reporters about his relationship with
[00:11:33] Ukraine's president in light of that
[00:11:36] Oval Office clash we saw weeks ago.
[00:11:39] Here's what he had to say on that front.
[00:11:42] We had a little dispute because I
[00:11:43] disagreed with something he said and the
[00:11:46] cameras were rolling and that was okay
[00:11:47] with me. But we had a dispute, but I uh
[00:11:52] look, he's in he's in a tough situation,
[00:11:55] a very tough situation. He's been
[00:11:58] fighting a much bigger force.
[00:12:02] Now, as for Russia, President Trump was
[00:12:05] asked if he can trust President Putin.
[00:12:07] He said, "Ask him in about two weeks."
[00:12:10] But again, he's expressed disappointment
[00:12:12] with Russia for these ongoing strikes
[00:12:15] during these ceasefire negotiations on
[00:12:17] social media over the weekend. He said
[00:12:20] there was no reason for Putin to be
[00:12:22] shooting missiles into civilian areas,
[00:12:24] cities, and towns. It makes me think he
[00:12:26] doesn't want to stop the war. Uh he says
[00:12:30] that he wants Putin to stop shooting,
[00:12:32] sit down, and sign a deal. Arrow and
[00:12:35] Natalie, we know that Russian occupation
[00:12:38] of Crimea is this is the main point uh
[00:12:41] in the negotiations right now uh at
[00:12:44] least again in the public sphere.
[00:12:45] There's a lot of other stuff going on in
[00:12:47] the background, but uh this is now the
[00:12:49] new focus of public attention with
[00:12:51] regards to this issue. One, if not the
[00:12:54] major sticking point, uh Russian Foreign
[00:12:56] Minister Sergey Lavrov discussed that on
[00:12:58] Face the Nation this weekend. And we
[00:12:59] should note this clip was recorded
[00:13:01] before Trump's meeting with Zilinski.
[00:13:03] Let's just quickly listen to that.
[00:13:05] President Trump said Crimea is not even
[00:13:07] being discussed right now. Yes, because
[00:13:10] this is a done deal. You mean Russia
[00:13:13] occupies and controls and will not
[00:13:16] negotiate the future of Crimea? Is that
[00:13:19] what you're saying? Russia do not
[00:13:20] negotiate its own territory.
[00:13:23] So, where do things stand with Crimea
[00:13:26] considering that?
[00:13:28] Yeah. President Trump was also asked
[00:13:30] about Crimea on Sunday. And he said he
[00:13:32] doesn't know how it can be brought up
[00:13:34] given that this happened more than a
[00:13:37] decade ago. It was 2014 when Crimea was
[00:13:41] seized uh by Russia. So those remarks
[00:13:44] really echo what he said in Yeah. I mean
[00:13:47] Trump's whole position seem and real
[00:13:49] real quick before I get your whole take
[00:13:50] on this is kind of like just look at the
[00:13:53] realities on the ground. You're probably
[00:13:55] going to have to give up territory. And
[00:13:56] then we've got uh exclusives from the
[00:13:59] AP, Associated Press, coming out uh last
[00:14:01] night shocked by US peace proposal.
[00:14:03] Ukrainians say they will not accept any
[00:14:05] formal surrender of Crimea. Uh according
[00:14:08] to legal experts in like the Ukrainian
[00:14:10] constitution, they're not even sure if
[00:14:13] Zalinski signing over Crimea essentially
[00:14:16] that's kind of reductive, but uh
[00:14:19] would entail an unconstitutional and
[00:14:22] illegal act. So, like the entire legal
[00:14:24] apparatus of the Ukraine is also kind of
[00:14:27] trying to figure out what this means,
[00:14:29] what this looks like. Um, you know, it
[00:14:33] just kind of seems like I I don't know
[00:14:35] the I don't know. What are your peace
[00:14:37] talks? Uh, your your take on this whole
[00:14:39] thing. My peace talks. I could give you
[00:14:40] my peace talks. Oh, yeah. Sorry.
[00:14:44] No. So, my take on all of this is
[00:14:48] um I think I don't even think that Trump
[00:14:50] has miscalculated. I don't even think
[00:14:52] that Trump has said, "All right, we need
[00:14:53] to go into this and resolve the
[00:14:55] problem." My personal take in on this is
[00:14:57] that um I think the United States and
[00:14:59] Ukraine and Russia, I think all parties
[00:15:01] involved in this sort of peace
[00:15:03] negotiation process are very aware that
[00:15:06] um this isn't really going to go
[00:15:08] anywhere. And there's multiple reasons
[00:15:10] why I'm saying that. Um when it comes to
[00:15:12] Crimea specifically, this has been a
[00:15:14] speaking point now for the last couple
[00:15:15] of years. I remember when it was going
[00:15:16] to be the whole Ukrainian offensive that
[00:15:19] was planned in 2023 and Biden was saying
[00:15:21] that the offensive was going to be so
[00:15:23] grand that they were going to be uh
[00:15:24] renegotiating Crimea. But Russia has
[00:15:26] effectively said from the very
[00:15:28] beginning, I mean not from the very
[00:15:29] beginning, I mean back from 2014, Crimea
[00:15:31] was a done deal. And in fact, Crimea at
[00:15:33] that particular point, it was even
[00:15:35] acknowledged by the European Union as
[00:15:36] essentially being part now of Russia.
[00:15:38] This is actually something that isn't
[00:15:39] often discussed. Germany had even
[00:15:41] accepted it. many states within the
[00:15:42] European Union had even had even
[00:15:44] accepted this particular point and um I
[00:15:47] think it was even um European polls that
[00:15:50] had been conducted in Crimea and all
[00:15:52] around 98% had actually said that this
[00:15:54] was after obviously the annexation that
[00:15:56] had taken place they were happy to at
[00:15:58] this point be a part of Crimea and this
[00:16:00] part of Russia and there is a history
[00:16:02] there with the particular region of
[00:16:03] Crimea as well and consistent sort of
[00:16:06] polls from pretty much 1991 onwards uh
[00:16:09] in independence or being a
[00:16:11] semi-autonomous region or becoming a
[00:16:13] part of Russia and they have obviously
[00:16:15] always they have advocated for that for
[00:16:16] a very long time and they even demanded
[00:16:18] from the Ukrainian state back when they
[00:16:19] were part of obviously Ukraine uh that
[00:16:22] they wanted um referendums to take
[00:16:24] place. has been consistent even up
[00:16:25] until, you know, throughout the '90s uh
[00:16:27] up until 2014. And there's obviously a
[00:16:30] plethora of reasons why Crimea is very
[00:16:32] significant uh when it comes to Russia
[00:16:35] and Russia's security as well as
[00:16:37] Russia's uh economic uh independence and
[00:16:39] security beyond obviously its military
[00:16:41] um security. Um but the the point that I
[00:16:45] want to make here is that um Crimea is
[00:16:48] no longer negotiable and I think that's
[00:16:50] understandable. Um the reason they're
[00:16:53] bringing this up is essentially to make
[00:16:55] it look as though um all right well if
[00:16:58] we're going to give up Crimea but
[00:17:00] eastern the rest of eastern Ukraine now
[00:17:02] so that's the area of Zabar Roa Donetsk
[00:17:04] Luhang uh and her son which are going to
[00:17:08] be the most contended issues and that's
[00:17:10] where the most that's that's where um I
[00:17:13] think uh the the you know you're going
[00:17:15] to see the like the vast majority of the
[00:17:18] negotiations taking place. So, if we
[00:17:20] concede Crimea, will you give over the
[00:17:22] rest of the eastern part of Ukrainian
[00:17:24] territories that you've taken up until
[00:17:25] this point? And for reasons that we'll
[00:17:27] get into, I don't think Russia will. I
[00:17:31] think the United States is aware of
[00:17:33] that. And my personal belief is, and
[00:17:35] again, we'll get into that. Um, this is
[00:17:38] just more so an opportunity to buy time
[00:17:41] more than it is to actually find a
[00:17:43] resolution to this that will appease
[00:17:45] both, well, the United States in this
[00:17:47] instance and Russia.
[00:17:51] Yeah. And I I think like when I was
[00:17:53] writing notes for this, we've been
[00:17:54] meaning to do this episode for a while.
[00:17:56] I'm glad we waited uh an extra week to
[00:17:59] see how this develops. But I I would say
[00:18:01] that the current Trump administration's
[00:18:03] strategy of treating war or the war in
[00:18:06] Ukraine as this bilateral dispute
[00:18:08] between solely Russia and Ukraine and
[00:18:12] pressing only for an immediate ceasefire
[00:18:14] with no multi-track long-term settlement
[00:18:16] process is not going to work. and it's
[00:18:19] not working. Um, uh, the Secretary of
[00:18:22] State, Marco Rubio, warned, you know,
[00:18:23] this past weekend or, uh, warned on
[00:18:25] Easter Sunday that the US may abandon
[00:18:29] Ukraine peace talks if no progress is
[00:18:31] made soon. I think President Trump said
[00:18:33] the US will pass on Ukraine. But
[00:18:36] apparently that's just part of his like
[00:18:38] art of the deal negotiation tactic
[00:18:41] because now a week later after Easter
[00:18:43] Sunday, he's re-engaged uh with these
[00:18:46] peace talks. You know, it's fine. That's
[00:18:47] something that the Russians are clearly
[00:18:49] willing to endure if the US passes on
[00:18:52] Ukraine. Uh because these types of
[00:18:55] narrow negotiations, i.e. just focusing
[00:18:57] on the Russia Ukraine issue, uh you
[00:19:00] know, they have a ton of advantages.
[00:19:02] I.e. the Russians have a ton of
[00:19:03] advantages. You know, they can keep this
[00:19:04] going. They have a gradable greater
[00:19:06] recruitable military-aged population,
[00:19:09] larger military industrial base. The US
[00:19:11] and Europe lack the capacity to mask the
[00:19:13] industrial and manpower gap without
[00:19:15] direct military intervention, which
[00:19:17] isn't going to happen as things stand
[00:19:19] geopolitically. So if the Trump
[00:19:20] officials, both America first and neocon
[00:19:24] alike, want to walk away, you know, so
[00:19:26] what? It won't change what's happening
[00:19:28] on the ground.
[00:19:29] Washington, I think, and the current
[00:19:31] administration need to recognize that
[00:19:32] Moscow's security concerns extend far
[00:19:36] beyond the Ukrainian border to the
[00:19:38] everinccreasing threat posed by NATO
[00:19:40] expansionism since 1952 with a more
[00:19:43] substantial expan uh expansion after the
[00:19:45] fall of the Berlin wall and the
[00:19:47] dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. And this
[00:19:50] is the crux of where negotiations should
[00:19:52] be happening. Russia Russia cannot
[00:19:54] decrease NATO military threat or attain
[00:19:57] economic sanctions relief by conquering
[00:19:59] Ukraine even if they even if they wanted
[00:20:01] to which I personally don't see any
[00:20:04] evidence of that and the collective west
[00:20:06] has failed to collapse the Russian
[00:20:08] economy implement a regime change in the
[00:20:10] Kremlin or defeat the Russian army in
[00:20:12] the field
[00:20:14] so yeah that's kind of like what what
[00:20:17] they they're they're just addressing
[00:20:19] this as a bilateral negotiation between
[00:20:22] Ukraine Ukraine and Russia and and not
[00:20:25] necessarily dealing with the broader
[00:20:27] security concerns of NATO and they're
[00:20:29] not dealing with the uh western security
[00:20:32] concerns or at least what they pretend
[00:20:34] to care about like the you know what's
[00:20:36] happening uh in eastern Ukraine. So
[00:20:39] they're just the the Trump
[00:20:40] administration or at least Trump himself
[00:20:42] is just treating this as an isolated
[00:20:45] issue. Just Russia and Ukraine come to
[00:20:47] the table, work it out or we're walking
[00:20:49] away.
[00:20:50] Right. So this is what I was actually
[00:20:52] going to bring up that point with Maric
[00:20:53] Rubio as well because the way they're
[00:20:54] presenting it the way Maric Rubio said
[00:20:56] all right we're giving it this is going
[00:20:57] to be I don't know what did he say
[00:20:58] something along the lines of we're going
[00:20:59] to discuss this for I don't know if if a
[00:21:00] solution isn't found in the next few
[00:21:02] days or something like that or he said
[00:21:03] like couple weeks oh a couple of weeks
[00:21:06] something like that he said something
[00:21:07] along he gave like a very short like
[00:21:08] sort of time span by which to find some
[00:21:10] sort of solution between the two parties
[00:21:12] then we're going to sort of walk away
[00:21:13] from the situation but walk away from
[00:21:15] what situation Ukraine wouldn't be able
[00:21:17] to sustain a war against Russia would it
[00:21:19] had it not been for the obviously aid
[00:21:21] that they're receiving from NATO ally
[00:21:23] states and from the United States
[00:21:24] whether it's through the you know
[00:21:26] weapons shipments and missiles and
[00:21:28] satellite sort of um sort of satellites
[00:21:32] so in order to help them with GPS guided
[00:21:34] missiles etc. So I mean the and I think
[00:21:36] actually the the Russian sort of
[00:21:38] political class has even stated this
[00:21:40] like repetitively where they've said
[00:21:42] that you know if Ukraine hadn't received
[00:21:45] aid from the western states whether it's
[00:21:47] from the United Kingdom whether it's
[00:21:48] from the United States Ukraine wouldn't
[00:21:50] be able to survive as long as it has.
[00:21:52] Sure maybe for a few months but not
[00:21:54] obviously for what it's like three years
[00:21:56] now. Um, so I mean when they're saying
[00:21:58] we're walking away, does this mean
[00:21:59] effectively that you will no longer
[00:22:01] provide Ukraine with military
[00:22:02] assistance? Because as it currently
[00:22:04] stands, Ukraine's entire base in order
[00:22:06] to combat uh uh Russia is through the
[00:22:09] United States. Um, so this is this is
[00:22:13] why I I'm of the personal belief um
[00:22:16] they're not when they say they're going
[00:22:17] to walk away from the agreement, my
[00:22:19] perspective is this.
[00:22:21] Trump has obviously been voted into
[00:22:23] power in the United States on a basis
[00:22:25] that he's going to be the peace
[00:22:27] president, that he's going to be the one
[00:22:28] that's going to end the war in Ukraine,
[00:22:30] that he's going to be the one that's
[00:22:32] going to set the record straight and
[00:22:33] resolve all global conflicts. Because
[00:22:35] there is a very legitimate base within
[00:22:37] the United States that no longer want to
[00:22:38] see their tax dollars being spent in the
[00:22:41] billions to fund the military-industrial
[00:22:43] complex through the through the Ukraine
[00:22:45] uh Russia war. They absolutely do not
[00:22:47] want that to continue anymore given
[00:22:49] their own deterioration and material
[00:22:50] conditions. So Trump has definitely
[00:22:52] capitalized on that voter base. So now
[00:22:54] he's trying to appear quite literally as
[00:22:56] if he's trying to negotiate with Russia
[00:22:59] to bring about a peace plan. And then
[00:23:00] what's essentially going to happen is
[00:23:01] because he doesn't have anything to
[00:23:03] offer over the table and we can and I
[00:23:04] think it's very important to see what
[00:23:06] he's actually offering when he has when
[00:23:09] obviously the negotiations will fail to
[00:23:11] you know deliver he will then ultimately
[00:23:14] blame Russia quite quite extensively by
[00:23:17] saying that they were not willing to
[00:23:19] negotiate in good faith and then
[00:23:21] probably find the means by which to
[00:23:22] justify the consist like the
[00:23:24] continuation rather of the war you know
[00:23:28] the war against Russia or the war the
[00:23:30] Russia Ukraine war and because like I
[00:23:32] said it will be the US military uh or
[00:23:35] the US state that will continue to fund
[00:23:36] or if it's not them it will be Europe
[00:23:38] but that's the thing like you said if I
[00:23:41] mean the western military-industrial
[00:23:42] like capacity has significantly
[00:23:44] deteriorated but the EU more so than
[00:23:47] even the United States and in fact the
[00:23:49] EU has now cashed out 2.7 trillion euros
[00:23:53] in order to basically militarize itself
[00:23:55] which is the most that the EU has uh
[00:23:58] invested in militarization since World
[00:24:00] War II and I think something like a 17%
[00:24:02] increase and even change their
[00:24:04] regulations when it comes to their um
[00:24:07] deficit sort of laws. Therefore, meaning
[00:24:09] that they're essentially bypassing
[00:24:11] deficit laws in order now to essentially
[00:24:14] uh kind of fuel uh the militarization of
[00:24:17] the EU. Um and this is at coming by the
[00:24:19] way at the expense of uh welfare for you
[00:24:22] know um Europeans within the European
[00:24:24] Union. So yeah, a slashing of social
[00:24:26] going to take time. Yeah, but this is
[00:24:28] going to take time. It's not going to be
[00:24:29] possible. So, if if Marco Rubio really
[00:24:32] means, okay, well, we're going to walk
[00:24:33] away from this situation, does that mean
[00:24:34] you're going to actually walk away, does
[00:24:36] that mean that you're actually going to
[00:24:37] stop uh providing Ukraine with the kind
[00:24:40] of military infrastructure that it needs
[00:24:42] to uh combat Russia? I don't think so.
[00:24:45] So, I do believe that we're going to see
[00:24:46] a continuation of this. And like I just
[00:24:48] want to say one last thing before you
[00:24:50] say something because when we look at
[00:24:51] the the as well um what what what was
[00:24:55] Trump's offer to begin with? Trump's
[00:24:57] offer to begin with was freeze the
[00:24:59] conflict and and essentially put in uh I
[00:25:03] think sort of like a create a buffer
[00:25:04] zone uh by which you know UN
[00:25:06] peacekeeping forces will be placed in
[00:25:08] Ukraine which is also significant if
[00:25:10] they actually do want to perform mineral
[00:25:12] extractions in Ukraine in the first
[00:25:14] place because you do need to provide
[00:25:15] some sort of security for investors to
[00:25:16] actually invest in Ukraine extraction of
[00:25:18] minerals if the United States really
[00:25:20] wants to sort of extract that. But that
[00:25:22] will not be acceptable to to Russia
[00:25:25] either because that's essentially
[00:25:27] placing NATO military within um Ukraine.
[00:25:30] So any option that Trump has put forward
[00:25:33] and I think they're very aware of it.
[00:25:34] It's something that's just going to be
[00:25:35] non-negotiable. It's meant to fail.
[00:25:38] That's that's the way that I see it.
[00:25:41] Meant to uh Yeah. I I perhaps I I I just
[00:25:47] think it's kind of like US foreign
[00:25:49] policy is not so much real politic. It's
[00:25:53] it's ideology. It's heavily ideological
[00:25:55] based more so than other governments we
[00:25:58] look at. Whether it's meant to fail or
[00:26:01] going to fail, I think the performative
[00:26:03] effect is is the same. I do
[00:26:06] anticipate seeing
[00:26:08] uh arms continue to flow to Ukraine.
[00:26:12] Maybe they'll try to hush it up a little
[00:26:14] bit. Uh maybe they'll be like less high
[00:26:16] mars and attack them long range missiles
[00:26:19] and more like defensive weaponry to I
[00:26:23] don't know allow them to continue
[00:26:25] negotiations with Russia while still
[00:26:27] putting up some sort of military
[00:26:29] pressure. But with regards to
[00:26:32] negotiations in Washington is at least
[00:26:34] saying publicly end it or we're out. And
[00:26:36] I don't believe again like you that's
[00:26:37] really on the table. And with the
[00:26:39] mineral rights uh issue, they're saying,
[00:26:41] "We want mineral rights because we've
[00:26:43] pumped so much money into this war, we
[00:26:46] deserve something in return." Kind of
[00:26:47] like a sunk cost
[00:26:49] fallacy adjacent argument. And this is
[00:26:52] not the point to focus on because the
[00:26:54] Ukrainians believe that those deposits
[00:26:56] are theirs, but now they're mostly in
[00:26:57] Russian controlled territory. And Russia
[00:26:59] lacks logistics currently to extract
[00:27:01] them and deliver them to enduser
[00:27:03] markets. And maybe an arrangement can be
[00:27:05] made between the three parties over
[00:27:07] this. But as you say, if they need like
[00:27:08] a buffer zone with NATO, essentially
[00:27:11] NATO troops uh for investors, Russia uh
[00:27:14] in order to provide security for the uh
[00:27:16] industrialization and extraction of that
[00:27:18] region, they're not going to be cool
[00:27:19] with this. But this is one contentious
[00:27:21] issue that the Trump administration
[00:27:23] insists on sticking to. It's just one
[00:27:25] small piece of a larger diplomatic
[00:27:28] puzzle. And now that they've left this
[00:27:29] talking point and we're moving on to the
[00:27:32] de facto Russian annexation of Ukraine
[00:27:34] and whether or not the Ukrainian western
[00:27:36] governments will recognize the de jure
[00:27:38] Russian control and administration of
[00:27:40] the Crimean princ uh peninsula. I I
[00:27:44] don't know. The I I just feel like the
[00:27:46] the the search for a stable and lasting
[00:27:48] peace settlement to end the Ukraine war
[00:27:50] must also be founded on a recognition of
[00:27:52] certain inescapable realities, which I
[00:27:54] do credit the Trump administration for
[00:27:56] being like, hey, you know, you're
[00:27:58] probably not going to get this territory
[00:27:59] back. I don't think you have anything to
[00:28:01] offer for it. The Russians are in a
[00:28:03] strong position right now and uh we
[00:28:05] can't really pressure them to do it. We
[00:28:08] can offer sanctions relief. you know, we
[00:28:10] receive $300 billion dollars in Russian
[00:28:13] assets which were then funding to fund
[00:28:14] the Ukrainians against the Russians. We
[00:28:17] have that leverage, but also didn't
[00:28:19] again failed to collapse the economy,
[00:28:21] failed to institute regime change in the
[00:28:23] Kremlin. Uh
[00:28:25] so I guess I don't know it just doesn't
[00:28:29] seem like Ukraine will not abandon its
[00:28:32] desire
[00:28:34] u to be part of the West socially,
[00:28:37] culturally, and economically. and Russia
[00:28:39] will not accept any settlement that
[00:28:40] allows Ukraine to become part of the
[00:28:42] West militarily.
[00:28:46] All right. So, I wanted to bring up two
[00:28:47] points because I agree with what you're
[00:28:49] saying and I'm going to tie it all
[00:28:50] together. Just bear with me. So, the one
[00:28:53] point, no. So, basically, we also saw
[00:28:56] this week uh was it a couple of days ago
[00:28:58] now? I think not this week, a couple of
[00:29:00] days ago, there was also a killing of a
[00:29:02] Russian military commander in Russia,
[00:29:04] which uh I don't know if you saw, this
[00:29:06] is like the second time they killed like
[00:29:07] a high-profile sort of uh Russian uh
[00:29:09] general in Russian ter like within
[00:29:12] mainland Russia. Um and obviously this
[00:29:14] was most likely, as we've seen them
[00:29:16] before, uh executed by uh Ukrainian
[00:29:19] intelligence. Um and something that's
[00:29:21] always worth noting is that as we
[00:29:23] remember in the New York Times article
[00:29:24] that was published last year after
[00:29:26] interviewing over 2,000 not 2,200
[00:29:29] um uh you know uh US uh officials or
[00:29:33] members of the intelligence apparatus in
[00:29:35] the United States. It was um we know for
[00:29:38] a fact that you know US intelligence and
[00:29:40] Ukrainian intelligence have very strong
[00:29:42] ties and in that article I think it was
[00:29:45] uh uh Budanov which is like uh like what
[00:29:48] the chief directorate of intelligence of
[00:29:50] the of the Ukrainian sort of state uh he
[00:29:53] in that article it's outlined how he has
[00:29:55] very deep ties with the CIA and he's
[00:29:57] also the one that has disclosed back in
[00:30:00] 2020 uh3 of intelligence operations
[00:30:03] inside Russia. So it's very interesting
[00:30:05] to see that you know the United States
[00:30:07] is apparently in you know trying to
[00:30:08] enter negotiations on in good faith with
[00:30:11] Russia to try to resolve this issue but
[00:30:13] yet their intelligence
[00:30:15] uh apparatus which works with the
[00:30:17] Ukrainian intelligence um has just you
[00:30:19] know committed you know had killed one
[00:30:21] of their like official like high ranking
[00:30:23] generals within um Russian territory. So
[00:30:26] that's telling in of itself as to what
[00:30:27] whether there is an actual intention to
[00:30:30] uh reach some sort of negotiation. And
[00:30:32] the other aspect beyond Crimea um like I
[00:30:35] said before is you know uh has to do
[00:30:38] with the rest of the territories that
[00:30:40] now Russia Dejura controls and that is
[00:30:42] like the areas of Zabaroa uh Luhans
[00:30:45] Jonetsk and Heron and they these are
[00:30:48] these are also very significant
[00:30:50] territories and I think something that a
[00:30:52] lot of people are not discussing is the
[00:30:53] fact that these are the industrial sort
[00:30:55] of uh powerhouse it's the industrial
[00:30:57] power powerhouse of um of Ukraine but
[00:31:01] this is the thing the eastern part of
[00:31:02] Ukraine historically and I think it's
[00:31:04] important to understand things with from
[00:31:06] a historical context it it was part of
[00:31:08] Russia and it was provided to Ukraine uh
[00:31:10] when Lennin had given it over to Ukraine
[00:31:12] in order to industrialize the country
[00:31:14] because that's part of the process of
[00:31:15] creating an industrial capacity that you
[00:31:16] can then socialize right um but the
[00:31:19] basic infrastructure the industrial
[00:31:21] infrastructure of eastern Ukraine has
[00:31:23] always been geared towards um I guess
[00:31:26] the former Soviet states and their
[00:31:28] economic demands so that would include
[00:31:30] Russia uh you know Bellarus um it would
[00:31:34] Kazakhstan etc. These are the countries
[00:31:36] that are tailored towards working with
[00:31:38] Ukraine and why that like that
[00:31:40] infrastructure is fundamental to what is
[00:31:42] you know the Eurasian customs union and
[00:31:45] the CIS which is the um uh what's it
[00:31:48] called the Commonwealth of Independent
[00:31:50] States which is all the states that were
[00:31:51] part of the USSR uh that sort of
[00:31:53] collaborate together. And why I bring
[00:31:55] this up because I remember reading an
[00:31:57] article I think it was published by
[00:31:59] Reuters a few years ago. This is before
[00:32:01] even the uh Russia Ukraine war had
[00:32:03] actually even broken out. And they said
[00:32:04] that if if Ukraine had become a full
[00:32:06] member state of the EU or if uh Ukraine
[00:32:09] yeah essentially had become a full
[00:32:10] member state of the EU uh this would
[00:32:12] cause Russia to lose billions in its
[00:32:14] investments in eastern Ukraine because
[00:32:16] the entire capacity the entire
[00:32:18] infrastructure the industrial capacity
[00:32:19] that was in eastern Ukraine was not just
[00:32:22] built in many ways by Russia but
[00:32:24] maintained by Russia and all its
[00:32:26] investments there and it became
[00:32:27] fundamental like even the Zabarosha
[00:32:29] plant it was fundamental for Russia's
[00:32:31] trade and its economic sort
[00:32:33] sustainability and this is something
[00:32:35] that's often missed. It's the same
[00:32:37] reasons for why, for example, the Black
[00:32:38] Sea is also important to Russia, not
[00:32:40] just because of its military fleet
[00:32:41] that's there. Um, but also because the
[00:32:44] Black Sea is one of one of the uh, you
[00:32:48] know, all year round warm water ports
[00:32:50] that Russia can use for international
[00:32:51] trade. So if you can basically take over
[00:32:54] the Black Sea and control eastern
[00:32:55] Ukraine, you have a you have significant
[00:32:58] ability to economically Russia
[00:33:00] in many ways, which is why another
[00:33:03] reason why it will not be easy at this
[00:33:05] stage to get Russia to concede at this
[00:33:07] point to even essentially give away the
[00:33:10] territories has gained in eastern
[00:33:12] Ukraine. And um that's I think something
[00:33:15] that a lot of people do not discuss
[00:33:17] enough. It's mostly focused on NATO and
[00:33:19] obviously the threat that NATO is to
[00:33:21] Russia militarily and obviously it need
[00:33:23] to surround Russia militarily but
[00:33:25] there's also another aspect here and
[00:33:26] that's the economic factor.
[00:33:29] Yeah. Uh yeah people talk about NATO
[00:33:31] expansionism be like you know Russia
[00:33:33] Russia also is acting like any other
[00:33:36] state in its own best interests. U and
[00:33:40] and yeah great power politics dictates
[00:33:42] that they're going to try to hang on to
[00:33:44] this uh no matter what. And so another
[00:33:47] thing that's happening as a result of
[00:33:49] this and we've talked about this
[00:33:51] multiple times is about Washington also
[00:33:55] does not like the increasing and
[00:33:56] unprecedented security relationship
[00:33:58] between like Russia, China, Iran mostly
[00:34:01] again in my in my estimation due to US
[00:34:04] belligerance as a collapsing uniolar
[00:34:06] power. And if the Trump administration
[00:34:09] were any way cany about this settlement
[00:34:12] process, they would like invite
[00:34:14] Beijing's special envoy to Ukraine to
[00:34:16] visit uh the the US to discuss a
[00:34:20] settlement which Biden refused to do
[00:34:22] even though it was something Beijing
[00:34:24] wanted. And this would kind of like
[00:34:25] pressure the Russian government a little
[00:34:27] bit. It's just a small lever. uh for
[00:34:29] example offering China a role in a post
[00:34:31] settlement reconstruction scheme in
[00:34:33] Ukraine is just one example of a
[00:34:35] political and economic mechanism that is
[00:34:37] outside of NATO or Euroentric
[00:34:40] peacekeeping solutions. Uh there's also
[00:34:43] the possibility and this is more of like
[00:34:44] a like a neoliberal take a conscientious
[00:34:47] neoliberal take like put forward by like
[00:34:49] the Quincy Institute you know who I
[00:34:52] think generally as in terms of things
[00:34:54] think tanks go. Meanwhile, um, uh, you
[00:34:58] know, a couple of position papers, uh,
[00:35:00] mapped out this idea of like potentially
[00:35:02] in order to allay Russian security
[00:35:05] concerns about ethnically Russian people
[00:35:07] in the eastern Ukraine, which were
[00:35:09] demonstrabably being persecuted by uh,
[00:35:11] Ukrainian nationalists uh, prior to the
[00:35:14] uh, the opening of hostilities a couple
[00:35:17] years ago, uh, would be to make take
[00:35:20] NATO membership for Ukraine permanently
[00:35:22] off the table and maybe start a UN or
[00:35:27] sorry EU ascension process where if
[00:35:30] Ukraine wants to be part of the west
[00:35:33] like culturally and socially by EU
[00:35:36] membership uh they would have to aced to
[00:35:39] certain like human rights pan population
[00:35:42] across the board standards protections
[00:35:44] etc so that that couldn't happen u
[00:35:48] that's just kind of like one solution
[00:35:51] I've seen that these more uh centrist
[00:35:54] think tanks like non- hawkish think
[00:35:57] tanks have been putting forward. What do
[00:35:59] you think about that?
[00:36:02] I mean there's two things. So the one
[00:36:04] thing let's discuss first I will discuss
[00:36:06] China first and then the EU obviously
[00:36:09] inducting Ukraine into the EU. With
[00:36:11] regards to China I I mean it's
[00:36:13] definitely that would be a potential you
[00:36:15] know way to approach the topic. bring
[00:36:17] China into the negotiations and then
[00:36:19] offer China some sort of uh you know
[00:36:21] economic deal in eastern Ukraine that
[00:36:23] will therefore act as a buffer between
[00:36:26] um Russia and uh uh um and and Ukraine
[00:36:30] but also and the west in many ways. Um
[00:36:33] but you know the problem with that is I
[00:36:35] mean the United States has a has a
[00:36:38] direct conflict of like they have direct
[00:36:41] conflict with China because China is an
[00:36:43] uprising uh superpower but also a major
[00:36:46] competitor and a lot of what we're
[00:36:48] seeing when it comes to US foreign
[00:36:50] policy irrespective of who's in power
[00:36:52] what parties in power is the desire to
[00:36:54] obviously break um uni uh you know the
[00:36:57] uh the multipolarity that's currently
[00:37:00] unraveling with China in the leading
[00:37:02] position. They want to sustain uh global
[00:37:04] hegemony. And so by providing China with
[00:37:08] that degree of power, you're directly
[00:37:10] going to be contradicting uh the
[00:37:13] objectives that you have, which is total
[00:37:15] uniolar control. You don't want to give
[00:37:17] China that control. you don't want
[00:37:19] Russia to essentially come out on the
[00:37:20] other side as a uh as a not only you
[00:37:23] know uh uh you having essentially kind
[00:37:25] of got what they wanted out of Ukraine
[00:37:27] but also more powerful and now with
[00:37:29] closer relations with China and with
[00:37:31] bricks continuing to exist in a
[00:37:34] harmonious way because that's the
[00:37:35] greatest threat right now to uh I guess
[00:37:37] the western imper western imperialism uh
[00:37:40] western corporations and their uh their
[00:37:43] need to be driven which is rather their
[00:37:45] the entire basis of western capitalism
[00:37:47] is their need for constant profit
[00:37:49] maximization. And so this is, you know,
[00:37:52] any sort of competition that will deter
[00:37:54] obstruct their their ability to sustain
[00:37:57] their profit margins uh will not be
[00:37:59] tolerated. And in order to obstruct
[00:38:02] that, you need to destroy China, you
[00:38:03] need to destroy Russia and Iran, which
[00:38:05] you can get into at a different point.
[00:38:07] So that would be giving China a huge
[00:38:10] huge leverage over the United States if
[00:38:12] they did something like that. I mean,
[00:38:13] you can before I get into the EU, yeah,
[00:38:14] if you want to say something. Yeah. I I
[00:38:16] I just have to say for not saying that I
[00:38:19] trust Marco Rubio as far as I can throw
[00:38:21] him because I don't uh just for the sake
[00:38:23] of
[00:38:24] like journalistic I guess fairness and
[00:38:27] integrity. There have been multiple
[00:38:29] interviews that he has done over the
[00:38:31] past year even before he was confirmed
[00:38:33] as Secretary of State uh where he talks
[00:38:35] about the the moment of unipolarity is
[00:38:38] unavoidable and that's why he's kind of
[00:38:40] pushed for this Monroe Doctrine 2.0 you
[00:38:42] know, like like getting out of
[00:38:44] geopolitical uh conflicts and focusing
[00:38:47] more on the hegemony over the American
[00:38:50] continent more so than anything. That's
[00:38:52] where kind of this idea that you know
[00:38:54] where we talk about Panama, where we
[00:38:56] talk about Greenland, where we talk
[00:38:58] about having um a a uh increasing
[00:39:01] relationship between the United States
[00:39:03] and Boule, the world's coolest dictator
[00:39:06] in El Salvador. Uh, so I do see a
[00:39:08] genuine push for more engagement within
[00:39:10] the American continent and maybe I don't
[00:39:13] know if you believe him or not, a a
[00:39:14] withdrawal from all of these kind of
[00:39:16] bonfires that we're starting around the
[00:39:18] world. I mean, Trump definitely does
[00:39:20] want a Nobel Prize. Yeah, but that's the
[00:39:23] thing. I mean, um, all right. So if you
[00:39:26] lose control over I don't know say
[00:39:29] Western Asia uh you lose control over
[00:39:31] Eastern Europe you lose control over
[00:39:33] Asia as a whole rather um and you've
[00:39:36] just focused just on just the Americas
[00:39:38] um and uh you've got the rise
[00:39:40] essentially of bricks you're essentially
[00:39:41] going to be losing your ability to um I
[00:39:46] mean you have to understand the United
[00:39:48] States unfortunately is not you know
[00:39:49] driven by its political class or even
[00:39:51] like a you know the political parties
[00:39:53] it's driven by corporate interests. Uh
[00:39:55] and that's that's where we have to
[00:39:57] understand like the the ability to
[00:40:00] sustain profits within the current wait
[00:40:03] within an environment where uh direct
[00:40:05] competition is now going to take place
[00:40:07] in the form of bricks and China. Even if
[00:40:09] bricks and China were supposed to you
[00:40:10] know be contained within I guess the
[00:40:12] African continent and uh Asia uh that
[00:40:15] would automatically diminish these
[00:40:18] corporate these corporations ability to
[00:40:21] sustain themselves in the same way that
[00:40:23] they currently are. they will be
[00:40:24] significantly weakened because you need
[00:40:26] to be able to consistently find new
[00:40:29] mediums by which to exploit and extract
[00:40:32] in order to preserve uh I guess your
[00:40:34] your your profit margins otherwise that
[00:40:36] will begin to fall. I mean this is one
[00:40:37] of I mean like I said I think I've
[00:40:39] mentioned it before on you know one of
[00:40:41] the other programs that we've had
[00:40:42] together you know there within standard
[00:40:44] economics even within classical
[00:40:45] economics there is a tendency for the
[00:40:47] rate of profitable within competition
[00:40:49] unless you change the kind of system
[00:40:50] that you kind of function within this is
[00:40:52] going to happen in the United States
[00:40:54] even if they were to focus uh in on in
[00:40:56] in just the Americas alone. But
[00:40:58] furthermore, I mean, if China grows
[00:41:01] significantly, if bricks grow
[00:41:02] significantly and Iran becomes more
[00:41:04] powerful and Russia becomes more
[00:41:05] powerful and they begin to industrialize
[00:41:07] and and you know the BRRI actually
[00:41:09] continue to uh grow in a way that begins
[00:41:12] to industrialize countries even within
[00:41:14] the African continent. I mean th this
[00:41:17] would increase their level of power and
[00:41:19] influence that will then eventually
[00:41:20] filter into the Americas. So I mean if
[00:41:23] you're the United States and you want to
[00:41:24] s you know sustain your power but also
[00:41:27] you know maintain global hedgemony even
[00:41:29] through dollar dominance which is one of
[00:41:31] the main sources by which the United
[00:41:32] States has been able to uh you know be
[00:41:35] able to control uh the global economy
[00:41:37] and and enrich itself well the corporate
[00:41:40] class in this particular case has been
[00:41:42] through the dollarization of the world
[00:41:44] and that will continue to be the case if
[00:41:46] they allow for example China, BRICS uh
[00:41:49] Russia and Iran to grow and just focus
[00:41:51] on Central South America. That's why I'm
[00:41:54] of that opinion that you know um Marco
[00:41:56] Rubio had yeah he can make these sorts
[00:41:58] of statements but then I think it was JD
[00:42:00] Vance he was at AI summit like a few
[00:42:02] weeks ago or maybe even a month ago now
[00:42:04] um and he had basically attacked
[00:42:06] globalization but as he was attacking
[00:42:08] globalization he had outlined um exactly
[00:42:11] why globalization came to be in the
[00:42:13] first place saying that the whole point
[00:42:14] of globalization was for the first world
[00:42:16] nations to continue ex you know
[00:42:18] extracting wealth from uh the the
[00:42:20] world's poorest nations and they will
[00:42:22] continue to grow economically whilst
[00:42:25] essentially the world's poorest nations
[00:42:27] will you know be kept at producing low
[00:42:30] uh value added goods so that they never
[00:42:32] actually develop an industry they never
[00:42:34] actually industrialize and they never
[00:42:36] actually grow economically in a way that
[00:42:37] will threaten the west but he said what
[00:42:39] we've seen is the reverse um so and then
[00:42:42] he sort of goes into an explanation of
[00:42:43] what the issues are with globalization
[00:42:44] and how that threatens the United States
[00:42:47] but in doing so he identifies he makes a
[00:42:50] like he inadvertently admits that the ve
[00:42:52] the soul whole sort of focus of this
[00:42:54] administration is to preserve power for
[00:42:57] a select group of I guess nations uh
[00:43:00] particularly that are home to certain
[00:43:02] corporations. So I would say that yeah I
[00:43:05] know that Mark Rubio has said that but
[00:43:07] actions in this case and I think the
[00:43:08] logical sort of uh conclusion given the
[00:43:11] economic realities of the United States
[00:43:13] and their corporate interests to me
[00:43:16] dictate that um they won't just stay in
[00:43:18] the Americas. So they won't definitely
[00:43:20] and this is also why they also the
[00:43:23] tariff war in China. I mean, if they
[00:43:25] were just going to be focused on the
[00:43:26] Americas, they've just tariffed. I mean,
[00:43:28] they tried to tariff over 90 countries
[00:43:29] around the world, although they've, you
[00:43:31] know, suspended that or pause that for
[00:43:32] like the next 90 days, which is
[00:43:33] absolutely ridiculous. But, I mean, the
[00:43:36] whole war, everything is tailored
[00:43:37] towards war on China. And now even in
[00:43:39] the negotiations, just to wrap that up,
[00:43:42] but even in the negotiations with uh
[00:43:44] countries that are trying to now
[00:43:45] negotiate with Trump to avoid the
[00:43:48] tariffs, I think it was the Wall Street
[00:43:50] Journal, I'm not I might be wrong on
[00:43:52] that. I might be wrong, but I think it
[00:43:53] was the Wall Street Journal published a
[00:43:54] piece that were saying that the Trump
[00:43:56] administration based on insider
[00:43:57] information is using these negotiations
[00:43:59] to coers countries into limiting their
[00:44:01] uh trade with China. So all of this,
[00:44:04] their focus on China, this Trump's
[00:44:06] administration's focus on China eludes
[00:44:09] to me to believe that they're not just
[00:44:10] going to focus on the Americas. So,
[00:44:12] there's no way they're going to bring
[00:44:13] China into the Ukraine Russia war.
[00:44:15] That's my conclusion. I I can get into
[00:44:17] Europe, but I I want to see if you want
[00:44:19] to say something before I get into the
[00:44:20] European Union. No. Um I I I don't I
[00:44:24] don't think that um I I just wanted to
[00:44:27] for for completeness kind of uh offer
[00:44:30] kind of like a novel idea put forth
[00:44:33] through. I mean, it's an interesting
[00:44:35] prospect put through by more li liberal
[00:44:37] liberal think tanks in Washington that
[00:44:40] are kind of anti-hawk. Uh, but I I again
[00:44:43] I I I don't see that happening. Just
[00:44:45] like this idea of
[00:44:47] uh making NATO forever a
[00:44:52] nonpossibility in exchange for EU
[00:44:55] ascension for Ukraine.
[00:44:58] Yeah. So, I was going to get into that.
[00:45:00] This is the thing with the EU as well.
[00:45:02] [Music]
[00:45:03] Um now the problem is uh you know uh the
[00:45:08] European Union is in a very dire
[00:45:10] economic state as was established
[00:45:11] before. I don't want to get into it too
[00:45:13] much, but obviously, as we've said
[00:45:14] before, when you have some of their
[00:45:15] major economies that have severely
[00:45:17] de-industrialized, a lot of their their
[00:45:19] industries are moving out of Europe, and
[00:45:22] uh they don't really have a competitive
[00:45:23] edge with the rest of the world anymore.
[00:45:25] And um uh you know, it's uh a lot of
[00:45:28] their money has been flushed out into
[00:45:30] warfare, left, right, and center. And
[00:45:31] we're seeing severe cuts in the welfare
[00:45:33] throughout the European Union. Um the
[00:45:36] European Union is not it's very it's a
[00:45:38] very it's a in a very fragile economic
[00:45:40] state. And so to bring Ukraine into the
[00:45:42] European Union is going to be a very big
[00:45:45] problem. And it's not just a problem now
[00:45:47] following the Ukraine Russia war, but
[00:45:48] it's been a problem since prior even to
[00:45:51] 2014 because of the very particular the
[00:45:54] economic fragility that um Ukraine has
[00:45:56] always been in, but also the way that
[00:45:58] the Ukrainian market was always tailored
[00:46:00] towards. Um I mean right now, first of
[00:46:03] all, Ukraine is in major debt, major
[00:46:06] debt. I mean this was the case before
[00:46:08] obviously 2022 and now I mean it's
[00:46:11] essentially owned by you know west you
[00:46:13] know investment backs and black rockck
[00:46:15] which essentially has now taken control
[00:46:17] over Ukraine's uh investment plans and
[00:46:20] strategies and you know Rathon and
[00:46:22] Loheed Martin essentially own and
[00:46:25] essentially own you know well not
[00:46:27] technically them but like all these you
[00:46:29] know these uh financial institutions
[00:46:31] that loan money to pay for all this uh
[00:46:33] military equipment that they're
[00:46:35] essentially getting Ukraine is
[00:46:37] effectively uh doesn't exist as a state
[00:46:39] as an economic entity anymore. And most
[00:46:42] importantly as well the fact of the
[00:46:44] matter is that I said before all its
[00:46:45] industrial capacity was always in the
[00:46:47] eastern part of Ukraine. So even if a
[00:46:50] temporary even if we try to freeze the
[00:46:52] conflict as it currently is and
[00:46:54] establish a buffer zone something that
[00:46:56] Trump has suggested I mean this means
[00:46:58] that all the industrial capacity that
[00:47:00] Ukraine has uh would actually be left in
[00:47:03] the hands of what is you know well
[00:47:04] Russia today and the interesting aspect
[00:47:07] here as well was that even with the FTA
[00:47:09] which is a free trade agreement that was
[00:47:11] established with the EU um even prior to
[00:47:14] the war in Ukraine uh in 2022 it Ukraine
[00:47:18] was always going to turn into an like an
[00:47:20] agricultural economy because to become a
[00:47:23] part of the EU it's a very expensive
[00:47:26] project. It means that they would have
[00:47:28] to change the way they run their
[00:47:29] economy, the way that they run their
[00:47:30] industries. They'll need to meet EU
[00:47:32] standards which are incredibly
[00:47:33] expensive. This would eventually wipe
[00:47:35] out a lot of their small to medium
[00:47:37] businesses that won't be able to compete
[00:47:39] with the sort of standards of the EU.
[00:47:41] And um this was actually there was a
[00:47:43] report published and I think I sent it
[00:47:44] to you before by the TNI which is a
[00:47:47] transnational institute. It's a think
[00:47:48] tank which I actually quite like based
[00:47:50] in uh I think it's in am I think it's in
[00:47:53] Amsterdam the Netherlands um and they
[00:47:55] had actually done it in conjunction with
[00:47:56] the Rosa Luxembourg institute based in
[00:47:58] Belgium and I think the labor and
[00:48:00] research institute based in Kiev
[00:48:02] actually in Ukraine and they had even
[00:48:04] run computer simulations and they had
[00:48:06] actually found that the FTA or any sort
[00:48:09] of recession of Ukraine into the EU
[00:48:11] would essentially completely
[00:48:12] industrialize uh Ukraine and it would
[00:48:15] effectively turn into an agricultural
[00:48:17] economy in essentially impoverishing the
[00:48:19] Ukrainian people. And this is obviously
[00:48:21] this this report was published in 2016.
[00:48:23] This is actually going to become far
[00:48:25] worse now. Um given the war in the war
[00:48:29] and the impact that it's had on the
[00:48:30] Ukrainian people and this is going to be
[00:48:32] terrible uh for the entirety of the EU
[00:48:34] because now you're bringing in a country
[00:48:36] that is economically destroyed. Um, a
[00:48:39] lot of European industries are probably
[00:48:41] going to try, not a lot of, but there's
[00:48:43] going to be European industries are
[00:48:44] going to try to exploit Ukraine's cheap
[00:48:45] labor at this point because obviously
[00:48:47] there's also going to be the, uh,
[00:48:49] difference in currency. Um, uh, they're
[00:48:52] going to obviously move into Ukraine to
[00:48:53] exploit the cheap labor. This is
[00:48:54] obviously going to affect the labor
[00:48:57] markets in the EU. It would also mean
[00:48:59] that Ukrainians will be able to move
[00:49:01] into the EU freely now. So a lot of
[00:49:03] Ukrainians will probably opt the
[00:49:05] opportunity if they become part of the
[00:49:06] EU to enter into the EU markets. Uh
[00:49:09] which and and you're seeing the rise of
[00:49:11] the far right in the EU who have already
[00:49:13] have a major issue with with uh the
[00:49:14] Russian Ukraine war and the impact that
[00:49:16] it's had and all the Ukrainian refugees
[00:49:18] but also the refugees that are coming
[00:49:19] now from the Levant region because of
[00:49:21] the you know uh of everything that's
[00:49:23] going on there. So you know tensions are
[00:49:26] high, people's material conditions are
[00:49:28] deteriorating. Any more you I mean have
[00:49:31] Ukraine join the EU at any particular
[00:49:33] point will flood the market with you
[00:49:35] know the labor uh army reserve which is
[00:49:38] going to essentially just uh completely
[00:49:41] destroy the material conditions of the
[00:49:42] European working class. It will exploit
[00:49:45] the Ukrainian working class even more so
[00:49:47] and you know ultimately the whole thing
[00:49:49] will just create you it would just erupt
[00:49:52] the European Union basically what I'm
[00:49:54] concluding in uh concluding with rather
[00:49:56] is they cannot have the EU the Ukraine
[00:50:00] become part of the EU that is out of the
[00:50:02] question. So the idea that they'll
[00:50:04] become part of the EU as a prophylactic
[00:50:06] measure for NATO I don't see that
[00:50:08] happening either because the EU can't
[00:50:09] afford that. Well, okay. I I mean, I
[00:50:12] don't really believe in this
[00:50:14] counterargument. It's not even
[00:50:16] um I I guess a solid parallel at all,
[00:50:20] but I I just want to point out that a
[00:50:23] lot of these EU policy makers aren't
[00:50:25] doing like a material analysis of the
[00:50:27] situation. you know, a lot of it and
[00:50:29] there is precedent for this uh I'm going
[00:50:32] to bring it up from like 2009 for them
[00:50:34] taking on uh because of ideological
[00:50:38] reasons the ascension process for a
[00:50:41] country that was very de-industrialized
[00:50:43] that was in debt had a whole bunch of
[00:50:44] economic issues and that would be
[00:50:51] uh Greece.
[00:50:54] Oh yeah, Greece. Oh yeah. So this uh if
[00:50:56] you're just listening to the audio, I
[00:50:57] pulled up this uh article from 2009. Why
[00:51:01] on earth is Greece in the EU? Reverence
[00:51:04] for the ancient Greek le Greeks led to
[00:51:07] the modern crisis. And if you go through
[00:51:09] this article, it it's an it's an
[00:51:11] absolutely
[00:51:13] uh pretty damning piece about all these
[00:51:15] uh you know, Greece's uh you know, EU
[00:51:19] and IMF emergency creditors, the
[00:51:21] politicians
[00:51:22] uh trying to get Greece implemented into
[00:51:26] the EU. It's it's basically all
[00:51:28] ideological. It was such a horrendous
[00:51:32] process. Uh but they still went through
[00:51:34] it and it didn't make any sense. Um, it
[00:51:37] did. Well, actually it did. That's the
[00:51:38] thing. I mean, Goldman Sachs was the one
[00:51:40] that uh, you know, essentially balanced
[00:51:42] the books for Greece to enter the EU
[00:51:44] because that's the thing. For you to be
[00:51:45] able to enter the EU, you have to meet
[00:51:47] supposedly, right? The protocol is you
[00:51:49] have to uh, meet certain economic
[00:51:50] criteria so you're able to sustain
[00:51:52] yourself within the markets and give the
[00:51:54] sort of directives so you can withstand
[00:51:56] the EU essentially. And um although you
[00:51:59] know Goldman Sachs among other sort of
[00:52:01] investment banks as well they were very
[00:52:03] aware that Greece didn't have the cap
[00:52:04] economic capability to be able to uh um
[00:52:08] you know uh manage itself within the EU
[00:52:11] but they essentially balanced the books
[00:52:12] and what happened this is yeah but it
[00:52:14] was such a painful process it took yeah
[00:52:17] but they but who made money I mean
[00:52:19] that's the thing it's something called
[00:52:20] the bailout business right uh the
[00:52:22] corporations and banks involved uh you
[00:52:24] know whether it was you know Deutsch
[00:52:26] Bank or a lot of the German banks the
[00:52:27] French banks, they I mean it's a form of
[00:52:29] predatory loaning almost. They're very
[00:52:31] aware that they weren't going to be able
[00:52:32] to pay back, but they make money off of
[00:52:34] default of the of countries defaulting.
[00:52:35] You know, a sort I mean, look at the
[00:52:37] same thing happened with Argentina. It's
[00:52:39] about to happen again with Argentina.
[00:52:40] They love it when countries uh go into
[00:52:42] default. I mean, the the the political
[00:52:44] class in Greece, for example, yeah, they
[00:52:46] made they're corrupt. They made uh
[00:52:48] significant gains out of it, but the
[00:52:49] working class suffered austerity as a
[00:52:51] result of that. And in the meantime, um
[00:52:53] I mean every major bailout that Greece
[00:52:55] had, all three bailouts, 98% of the
[00:52:58] bailouts with the money that was given
[00:52:59] to them essentially went to German and
[00:53:00] French banks who so who was the so they
[00:53:03] they they lent money to Greece in the
[00:53:05] first place. They allowed Greece to
[00:53:06] become part of the EU knowing that they
[00:53:08] weren't going to be able to manage and
[00:53:10] then they made money off of it. It was
[00:53:11] in a massive scam. I mean it's what we
[00:53:14] call the bailout business. That's what
[00:53:15] it was. I think there was a term for
[00:53:17] that. So I mean same thing with Ukraine.
[00:53:20] I think the conditions with Ukraine are
[00:53:22] are are different. And again, I don't
[00:53:24] think this is kind of like a really tidy
[00:53:26] counterargument. I just wanted to put it
[00:53:28] forward that they could do this a
[00:53:30] similar thing for Ukraine in a post-war
[00:53:32] settlement.
[00:53:35] Yeah, they could. But the I mean that's
[00:53:39] my my argument would be they did this
[00:53:41] before with you know Spain, they did it
[00:53:43] with Greece, they did it with Cypus and
[00:53:44] we saw the impact that that had on the
[00:53:46] European Union because it's collapsing
[00:53:47] under its own contradictions. But and
[00:53:49] that was at a point where the European
[00:53:50] Union was was at its peak. Let's say it
[00:53:53] was at the point when it was stronger.
[00:53:55] Now following three years of war,
[00:53:57] economic warfare against Russia and how
[00:53:59] that essentially boomerang back onto its
[00:54:00] own economies and how it's completely
[00:54:02] de-industrializing and its economies are
[00:54:04] collapsing. I don't think they have that
[00:54:06] kind of capacity anymore to even try
[00:54:08] that with um with Ukraine because like I
[00:54:11] said, I mean this is why you have the
[00:54:12] rise of the far right in in Europe at
[00:54:15] the moment because you know
[00:54:17] um like I said people people are losing
[00:54:20] their jobs. I mean bankruptcies are have
[00:54:22] skyrocketed in a lot of uh particularly
[00:54:25] in Germany but in a lot of countries
[00:54:26] within the European Union. So you know
[00:54:29] people are you know they're suffering uh
[00:54:32] and they're trying to find someone to
[00:54:33] blame. obviously blaming the refugees
[00:54:34] and now induct uh Ukraine into the
[00:54:38] European Union and this automatically
[00:54:39] Europeans know this means that
[00:54:41] Ukrainians will be able to flood the EU
[00:54:42] market. That will be unacceptable. It'll
[00:54:44] be a very hard selling point. It'll be a
[00:54:47] very hard selling point to get
[00:54:48] Europeans. I can't see Ursula Vanderly
[00:54:50] getting up and say we're going to bring
[00:54:52] uh Ukraine as it currently is with all
[00:54:53] its debt crisis and the fact I think
[00:54:55] actually by May uh I was reading an
[00:54:57] article the other day Ukraine's already
[00:54:59] going to start defaulting on all its uh
[00:55:02] on all its loans. So this is not a
[00:55:04] country you're going to bring into the
[00:55:05] EU. It's just not sustainable. Uh and
[00:55:07] this is you know the European Union is
[00:55:09] no longer at the position that it was a
[00:55:11] decade or more ago. Right? So what we're
[00:55:14] basically looking at and before I get to
[00:55:16] my final point about denoxification as
[00:55:19] as a negotiation sticking point would be
[00:55:21] yes China is not going to get involved
[00:55:23] or I I we doubt seriously that the US
[00:55:26] will involve China in negotiations as an
[00:55:29] alternative non-NATO non peacekeeping
[00:55:32] force mechanism for peace and stability
[00:55:34] and investment in eastern Ukraine. Uh I
[00:55:37] believe it's going to end as as a frozen
[00:55:39] conflict. I I I don't like to make
[00:55:41] predictions, especially with this
[00:55:42] administration, but again, circling
[00:55:44] back, it's a Gordian knot. Uh and Trump
[00:55:47] is not the the sword to cut through
[00:55:50] it. Okay, everyone. Uh my internet
[00:55:53] crapped out briefly. Hopefully, it
[00:55:55] doesn't happen again. And I was making a
[00:55:56] point about before going into
[00:55:57] denazification where you basically
[00:55:59] talked about how uh the Trump
[00:56:00] administration's approach to all of this
[00:56:04] uh Gordian knot of a negotiation
[00:56:07] situation between Russia and Ukraine and
[00:56:09] all of uh backers and all
[00:56:12] the political country or the u all the
[00:56:15] countries involved in what's going on
[00:56:16] their bilateral approach to only viewing
[00:56:20] this as Russia and Ukraine and without
[00:56:22] taking any other uh realities into
[00:56:25] account and just saying end it. Uh it is
[00:56:28] not really going to work and we're not
[00:56:31] going to see I think we're still going
[00:56:32] to see a frozen conflict. However, there
[00:56:35] are interesting signs coming out. Uh and
[00:56:37] before we move on to Iran, what do you
[00:56:41] make of this? Hang on. Where we go?
[00:56:45] Okay. Final piece of news breaking from
[00:56:47] yesterday or from this morning actually.
[00:56:50] Putin
[00:56:51] announces May 8th to 10th ceasefire.
[00:56:54] Ukraine wants truce. Now, this is by
[00:56:57] Reuters coming out an hour before time
[00:57:00] of recording, April 28th, uh Monday. So,
[00:57:03] yes, uh President Putin said that they
[00:57:06] want a ceasefire to commemorate uh VE
[00:57:10] Day victory in Europe against uh the
[00:57:13] allies against the Germans and Italians
[00:57:16] in World War II.
[00:57:20] Yeah, I mean, you know, this doesn't
[00:57:21] really surprise me given that the stage
[00:57:23] that we're at. Um, you know, because
[00:57:25] obviously they're in talks at the
[00:57:27] moment. They, you know, this is Russia's
[00:57:28] wave as well trying to show, listen, we
[00:57:31] do want to find some resolution. I guess
[00:57:33] it's more like I guess it's like a I
[00:57:35] guess one could say a bit somewhat
[00:57:37] performative and also yeah, we're in a
[00:57:39] different stage than we were in the
[00:57:41] previous years. Um, so this would make
[00:57:44] sense and yeah, I mean the the May 9th
[00:57:48] parade in Russia um is a it's a very big
[00:57:52] holiday. You know, it's the it's the
[00:57:53] great win over you know, it's the great
[00:57:55] patriotic war. So it would make sense at
[00:57:58] this particular stage for I guess in my
[00:58:00] opinion for Russia to actually say
[00:58:02] right, we're going to issue a temporary
[00:58:03] cease. We also saw them do the same
[00:58:04] thing for Easter Sunday, which was like
[00:58:07] the first time I think they had done
[00:58:08] that. I might be wrong there, but um
[00:58:11] yeah, I guess it's their it's Russia's
[00:58:13] way. It could be PR. Call it what you
[00:58:15] want to call it, but you're trying to
[00:58:17] show that they are willing to make some
[00:58:21] sort of peaceful resolution. Yeah. And I
[00:58:24] will um put out there that during the
[00:58:27] 30-hour Easter ceasefire, there is
[00:58:30] pretty compelling evidence that it was
[00:58:31] broken on different parts of the front
[00:58:33] line by by both forces. So, yeah. Yeah.
[00:58:38] Uh so I guess cool. Uh good to go.
[00:58:42] Anyways, this isn't really going to be
[00:58:44] any sort of game changer. Uh finally the
[00:58:47] point about uh what I wrote in the notes
[00:58:51] before uh last week I wanted to say that
[00:58:56] I wanted
[00:58:57] to oh my god allergies here in Austin. I
[00:59:00] wanted to discuss for the sake of
[00:59:01] completeness the problematic term uh I
[00:59:04] think it's kind of problematic
[00:59:06] denazify used by uh the uh Russ uh
[00:59:09] Russian public officials. Uh it's not
[00:59:12] really defined and of course you did
[00:59:14] some more digging and you think it is
[00:59:16] kind of and from the perspective of
[00:59:18] great power politics this seems
[00:59:19] intentional. Dennazification is an
[00:59:22] important sticking point that Russian
[00:59:23] hardliners equate to regime change in
[00:59:26] Kiev which seems unlikely in the extreme
[00:59:29] from my perspective and intolerable to
[00:59:31] the west. I wonder then therefore if we
[00:59:34] may in the future see a political
[00:59:36] solution again involving EU ascension
[00:59:38] for denazification essentially but of
[00:59:41] course that's probably not going to
[00:59:42] work. Now your term uh after you did
[00:59:46] some digging, what do you believe from
[00:59:48] the Russian position, even the hardline
[00:59:50] position, uh that denoxification
[00:59:53] actually entails? Because they've said
[00:59:54] it was a really important part of these
[00:59:57] negotiations in the past. Yeah.
[01:00:00] So um to it all sort of boils back to I
[01:00:05] guess the 2014 Euromaidan uh sort of
[01:00:09] protests and how what what sort of came
[01:00:12] to become of those um the fact of the
[01:00:15] matter is that even by um you know even
[01:00:19] according to western reports whether
[01:00:20] it's the whether it's Amnesty
[01:00:21] International that has published letters
[01:00:23] on this or even human rights watch um
[01:00:26] even the Council of Europe report in
[01:00:28] 2019 when it comes to Ukraine Uh the one
[01:00:30] thing that we do know and like I said uh
[01:00:33] multiple western reports have verified
[01:00:35] this is that there have been since 2014
[01:00:38] onwards there has been um a sort of not
[01:00:40] just a rise in neo-Nazi movements in in
[01:00:43] Ukraine. They've been there prior but
[01:00:44] they have been encouraged to participate
[01:00:46] and have been given particular positions
[01:00:48] of power uh within not just the
[01:00:50] Ukrainian political class but
[01:00:52] particularly within its uh uh defense
[01:00:55] apparatus. And um it's it's it's it's
[01:00:59] become incredibly dangerous. It's not
[01:01:02] that all Ukrainians are far right, you
[01:01:04] know, neo-Nazis, not at all. But it's
[01:01:06] more so how these organizations, for
[01:01:08] example, we all know of the now infamous
[01:01:10] Azov battalion and how has been
[01:01:12] incorporated into Ukrainian military.
[01:01:14] But there's another at least 30 to 40
[01:01:15] neo-Nazi groups such as the C14 for
[01:01:18] example which back in 201 I think in 15
[01:01:21] and 2016 uh you know the former
[01:01:24] president which was Portoenko had
[01:01:26] actually given uh C14 the rights to
[01:01:29] become you know the city municipal
[01:01:31] guards essentially to restore law and
[01:01:34] order in cities uh such as Kiev for
[01:01:37] example and they were harassing and
[01:01:39] intimidating the Ukrainian public um and
[01:01:43] you
[01:01:44] I had also I mean there was actually a
[01:01:45] really great article that I did send to
[01:01:47] you that was published I think back in
[01:01:48] 2018 by Josh Cohen. Uh he had published
[01:01:51] it on multiple different media outlets
[01:01:53] and he had sort of gone into a very deep
[01:01:55] dive and explanation as to how um the
[01:01:58] even the Ukrainian government is
[01:02:00] essentially held hostage by a lot of
[01:02:01] these far-right militias because they
[01:02:04] have acquired this particular power. Um
[01:02:07] you for example at the time the main
[01:02:08] opposition leader which is um Avakov I
[01:02:10] think his name was he had very close
[01:02:12] ties to Andre Billetki who was like one
[01:02:15] of the primary leaders of these
[01:02:16] far-right sort of movements and you know
[01:02:19] uh Avakov he was also essentially I
[01:02:21] think the def like the defense minister
[01:02:23] he's also the minister that was in
[01:02:24] charge of the policing in the United
[01:02:26] States sorry in Ukraine um so you know
[01:02:29] Boroshenko at the time was even
[01:02:30] intimidated out of you know um holding
[01:02:33] holding a lot of these organizations
[01:02:35] accountable uh for crimes they were
[01:02:37] committing. I mean they were attacking
[01:02:39] Roma peoples. They were attacking ethnic
[01:02:41] Russians. They were attacking members of
[01:02:42] the LGBTQ community, which is why
[01:02:44] Amnesty International also issued issued
[01:02:46] sort of letters to Borashanka at the
[01:02:48] time, a human rights that documented
[01:02:49] that. Um they were um and and they were
[01:02:52] open like C-14 was openly stating that
[01:02:54] yes, we're the ones that are attacking
[01:02:55] the Roma communities, for example. And I
[01:02:58] think it was a Ukrainian media outlet at
[01:02:59] the time that had actually called them
[01:03:01] far-right neo-Nazis. And they had
[01:03:02] actually a C-14 had taken them to court.
[01:03:04] and the Ukrainian high court had ruled
[01:03:06] against the Ukrainian outlet that called
[01:03:08] them neo-Nazis because they were being
[01:03:10] held hostage. Uh, and this is I think
[01:03:13] this is where the problem lies that a
[01:03:15] lot of these far-right groups um have
[01:03:18] become very prominent within Ukraine.
[01:03:20] And this began to happen because when
[01:03:22] the 2014 uh invasion happened or rather
[01:03:25] the annexation of Crimea had happened,
[01:03:27] the Ukrainian military was in a very
[01:03:29] poor state, like an incredibly poor
[01:03:31] state. And so a lot of these militias um
[01:03:34] they had become essentially like the
[01:03:35] military wing, the first line of defense
[01:03:37] for the Ukrainian military and they have
[01:03:39] been somewhat glorified and they have
[01:03:42] now I mean I think it was even sky
[01:03:43] channel 4 in the UK they had run a
[01:03:45] documentary on how now I mean it was
[01:03:47] several years later as of was you know
[01:03:49] has entire schools where they're
[01:03:51] training children to endorse this sort
[01:03:54] of very faright uh racially sup racial
[01:03:57] superiority supremacy sort of ideology
[01:04:00] and ethnic purity of Ukrainians and what
[01:04:03] the hell that means. This is a dangerous
[01:04:05] ideology that's becoming very um uh
[01:04:08] ubiquitous right now in in Ukraine. And
[01:04:10] I think this is this is what I was going
[01:04:12] to say is what Russia where Russia
[01:04:15] stands on that and why it's important
[01:04:17] for Russia is that they because they
[01:04:21] understand that so many of these
[01:04:22] organizations have become such a strong
[01:04:24] part of the defense in Ukraine uh as
[01:04:26] well as its uh policing and also part of
[01:04:28] its political class and it's holding the
[01:04:30] Ukrainian like uh political class
[01:04:32] hostage as well because they are afraid
[01:04:34] of these groups. They are dangerous
[01:04:35] organizations. they need to be
[01:04:37] dismantled and I have seen even Lavrov
[01:04:39] come out and say in fact the west should
[01:04:40] also be helping us dismantle these
[01:04:41] organizations because they are a threat
[01:04:43] and the reason this concerns Russia
[01:04:45] specifically I mean if you want to see
[01:04:47] what their self-interest is in that is
[01:04:49] that when you have uh far-right
[01:04:51] organizations that have become so
[01:04:53] prominent in the country and they're
[01:04:54] attaching their far ideology to that of
[01:04:57] national sort of um not even national
[01:04:59] liberation but like a sense of
[01:05:00] nationalism Ukrainian nationalism which
[01:05:02] has now been linked to this ethnic
[01:05:04] purity of these far-right groups even if
[01:05:08] there's going to be a peace deal
[01:05:09] tomorrow and uh Russia says okay we'll
[01:05:12] agree to all the terms and conditions
[01:05:14] etc these groups are going to be still
[01:05:17] present in Ukraine and at any given
[01:05:19] point they will instigate conflict again
[01:05:22] because they are dangerous and they are
[01:05:24] they also become they because of their
[01:05:27] ideology they're also the prime targets
[01:05:29] and they lend themselves over to I guess
[01:05:31] western imperial powers uh who will use
[01:05:33] them fund them and we know had already
[01:05:36] been trained like for example Canada had
[01:05:37] been trained as of and operation or
[01:05:39] brutal UK had been training uh a lot of
[01:05:41] these sort of um organizations through
[01:05:43] the so-called Ukrainian military but
[01:05:45] they were essentially knew who they were
[01:05:47] dealing with at the time. So they will
[01:05:49] become easy mediums by which to
[01:05:52] instigate uh conflict again uh that
[01:05:55] would probably target Russia because of
[01:05:57] this whole uh you know ethnic purity
[01:05:59] argument. So if Russia wants to
[01:06:01] establish or secure its borders,
[01:06:02] obviously it needs to eradicate anything
[01:06:04] that they can be used as a weapon
[01:06:05] against it because we've seen this
[01:06:07] happen. I mean even in Syria when you
[01:06:08] have radicalized groups in a particular
[01:06:10] country, they can be used uh against
[01:06:13] you. And I think this is where uh this
[01:06:15] is why Russia's concerned about dealing
[01:06:17] and dismantling these groups, right? It
[01:06:21] would also be nice if they could start
[01:06:23] by denoxifying Vagner group as well. But
[01:06:26] anyways, the It's true. But they do.
[01:06:29] Yeah, they do.
[01:06:31] So, so I guess the point here is this is
[01:06:35] the kind of like nail in the coffin for
[01:06:37] me uh in terms of the the the current
[01:06:41] negotiation uh stance for Ukraine,
[01:06:44] Russia as it stands right now because
[01:06:46] what what is the Ukraine going to do to
[01:06:50] denazify based off these preconditions?
[01:06:52] What send troops against Azov and other
[01:06:55] other militias that are fighting on the
[01:06:57] front? It's just not going to happen.
[01:06:59] It's just not. They're the most powerful
[01:07:00] force that they have in Ukraine. As of
[01:07:02] pattalian is one of the most powerful
[01:07:03] forces that they have in Ukraine. And I
[01:07:05] think this is where the problem lies. Um
[01:07:06] and I you know a lot of these Russian
[01:07:08] officials have said you know we not just
[01:07:10] Russia but as a collective even the
[01:07:12] European Union if they're so concerned
[01:07:14] about international human rights etc.
[01:07:16] they should not be sponsoring and
[01:07:18] supporting and giving media space to
[01:07:20] these organizations because every time
[01:07:21] even CNN talks about the Azaf fatality
[01:07:23] like yes we know they're a far they're
[01:07:25] just brushing it off but the seriousness
[01:07:28] that these groups um you know their
[01:07:31] ideology and the threat that they are
[01:07:33] not just to Russians but to the
[01:07:34] Ukrainian people Ukrainian people of you
[01:07:36] know whether they're Tatar whether
[01:07:38] they're like I said Roma whether they're
[01:07:41] uh leftists even I mean back in 2015
[01:07:44] they had actually established the anti
[01:07:46] communist. Yeah. Anti-communist laws or
[01:07:48] anything. Oh, yeah. Yeah. You know, you
[01:07:49] know definitely um come from the left
[01:07:53] first. But anyways, but it's true. Yeah.
[01:07:56] I I think
[01:07:57] um I think now uh that we've kind of
[01:08:01] highlight all the the challenges to
[01:08:03] these negotiations. Uh which I I
[01:08:05] definitely want to do a deep dive in
[01:08:06] because I don't know I I keep seeing
[01:08:09] like I guess you would say the kind of
[01:08:11] like center center right liberal media.
[01:08:15] uh you know seeing hope in this and
[01:08:18] people uh in MAGA world being like yeah
[01:08:20] he's going to get a deal done. It's like
[01:08:21] I don't see it I don't see it happening
[01:08:24] anytime soon. Uh so I I basically don't
[01:08:26] believe this administration when they
[01:08:28] say anything. I also think there's so
[01:08:30] much bombast and back and forth and like
[01:08:34] Trump can be dis persuaded for a
[01:08:36] different course of action based off the
[01:08:38] last person he's talked to. In fact, uh,
[01:08:40] Reuters, was it Reuters just came out
[01:08:43] with an article today, or was it Axios?
[01:08:46] Oh, yeah. Axio, the, uh, the art of
[01:08:48] persuading Trump. Uh, that's a good
[01:08:52] title. I don't even know what it's about
[01:08:54] yet, but I'm interested. It's a good
[01:08:55] title.
[01:08:57] Uh, behind the curtain, the art of
[01:08:58] persuading Trump 10 hours ago. uh
[01:09:02] basically bas details from an insider
[01:09:05] point of view uh how you properly
[01:09:08] influence Trump and it's how people in
[01:09:10] Washington are acting around him and
[01:09:12] getting him to switch his position every
[01:09:14] now and again. And so this kind of
[01:09:17] brings us to Iran for the kind of final
[01:09:21] like 15 minutes maybe.
[01:09:24] Um yeah so basically the thrust is
[01:09:28] nuclear deal US and this is again from
[01:09:31] Axius US says further progress was made
[01:09:34] in third round of nuclear talks uh by
[01:09:36] Iran. The US and Iran concluded on
[01:09:39] Saturday the third round of nuclear
[01:09:40] talks agreed to meet again on May 3rd,
[01:09:43] said Omani foreign minister Badr al
[01:09:46] Busedi who is mediating between the
[01:09:48] parties. Again, let's highlight here
[01:09:50] these are still indirect talks done
[01:09:54] through Oman, the Omani government
[01:09:57] because they both have equitable
[01:09:58] relations both with the United States
[01:10:00] and Iran. The United States currently
[01:10:03] does not have any formal relations,
[01:10:05] diplomatic relations with the Iranian
[01:10:07] government. So the talks on Muscat on
[01:10:09] Saturday were the first time the parties
[01:10:11] divided into technical details of a
[01:10:13] possible nuclear deal, especially the
[01:10:15] limitations the US wants to impose on
[01:10:17] Iran's nuclear program. So basically,
[01:10:20] they're just building trust and rapport
[01:10:23] uh through this new diplomatic
[01:10:25] relationship they're trying to cultivate
[01:10:26] in order to get these talks through. Um
[01:10:28] it it's important to kind of realize
[01:10:31] that the first round of talks in Oman
[01:10:34] were to kind of like set the framework
[01:10:36] and now we're finally getting into
[01:10:37] technical details. Of course, the four
[01:10:40] uh the the fourth meeting will be about
[01:10:42] even more of that. So the talks on
[01:10:44] Saturday took place between working
[01:10:45] level TMs from both sides and between
[01:10:47] the chief negotiators Steve Witkoff and
[01:10:50] foreign minister Abbas Arachi who said
[01:10:53] last week that
[01:10:56] um quote looking ahead whatever
[01:10:58] agreement that may be concluded should
[01:10:59] be pillared on guaranteeing Iran's
[01:11:01] economic benefits i.e. sanction relief
[01:11:05] coupled with a robust monitoring and
[01:11:07] verification program i.e. the US going
[01:11:10] in and monitoring their sites for
[01:11:11] civilian purposes and ensuring the
[01:11:14] peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear
[01:11:15] program. So they seem to be very
[01:11:18] interested in extensive monitoring. The
[01:11:20] scope of continuing the quote, the scope
[01:11:22] of negotiations must also be clear.
[01:11:24] Negotiations should remain solely
[01:11:26] focused on removal of sanctions and the
[01:11:29] nuclear issue. In a region as rough and
[01:11:32] volatile as ours, Iran will never put
[01:11:34] its security up for negotiations. Now, I
[01:11:37] think I am perhaps more hopeful about
[01:11:40] these nuclear talks than you. Um, how
[01:11:44] about you go through your concerns right
[01:11:46] now? All right. So, the way I see what's
[01:11:49] happening with Iran is sort of what I
[01:11:51] said is happening with Russia. So, what
[01:11:52] we're seeing is that the Trump
[01:11:53] administration is trying to I think his
[01:11:56] whole legacy is I went in and I've tried
[01:11:58] to negotiate with both Iran and Russia,
[01:12:01] but I think ultimately just like I
[01:12:03] concluded in the case of Russia, it's
[01:12:05] going to fail. And then ultimately it's
[01:12:06] going to be dumped the blame is going to
[01:12:08] be dumped on Russia by which then they
[01:12:10] should continue the war and he would
[01:12:11] have appeased his fan base by saying
[01:12:12] well I did the best that I could but
[01:12:14] Russia is an unreasonable actor in this
[01:12:16] and they're going to you know just give
[01:12:17] them enough time to strategize and maybe
[01:12:20] uh see how they're going to deal with
[01:12:22] Russia in a different way as well as
[01:12:25] rejuvenate all military stockpile and
[01:12:26] capacity. Um similarly I think that the
[01:12:29] same thing is happening with Iran. If we
[01:12:32] go back and I know I've referenced this
[01:12:33] before but I think it's always a
[01:12:34] worthwhile read. If we go back to the
[01:12:36] path of path to pers article that was uh
[01:12:38] not article uh report that was published
[01:12:41] uh back in 2009 the report explicitly
[01:12:45] states that the path to diplomatic
[01:12:47] persuasion um uh you know began under
[01:12:50] actually the Bush administration the
[01:12:53] entire paper which I think is 170 pages
[01:12:55] um it's an it's a report that uh
[01:12:58] essentially yeah by the Brookings
[01:12:59] Institute strategizes on how to bring
[01:13:01] about regime change in Iran or invade
[01:13:03] Iran or to break down Iran or
[01:13:05] essentially to take over Iran whether
[01:13:07] directly or indirectly. This is what
[01:13:09] this report is and they go through a
[01:13:10] plethora of options. In part one, it
[01:13:12] says uh I think yeah I think it's part
[01:13:14] one uh an offer Iran shouldn't refuse.
[01:13:17] That's called chapter one page 23. Um
[01:13:20] and in that it it says that back going
[01:13:22] back to the Bush administration like I
[01:13:24] said the objective was to begin to
[01:13:26] renegotiate with Iran on a different
[01:13:27] way. And the idea is to offer Iran a
[01:13:30] deal that uh would look as though you
[01:13:32] know they can't refuse it. it's a great
[01:13:34] deal, they should accept it, we saw the
[01:13:36] Obama administration actually did
[01:13:37] something along those lines and then
[01:13:39] essentially to find a reason to blame
[01:13:41] that the collapse of the deal or if it
[01:13:43] doesn't go through is is effectively
[01:13:45] blamed on Iran in order to galvanize the
[01:13:47] international community in order to
[01:13:50] generate sort of pretext for a war or
[01:13:52] some sort of attack on Iran. Now um in
[01:13:55] this article specific because it's it's
[01:13:58] like I said it's 170 pages. It's quite
[01:14:00] extensive, but it even actually
[01:14:02] highlights and I really want to bring
[01:14:03] this point up that
[01:14:05] um they the United States is very aware
[01:14:07] that nuclear weapons even if Iran tried
[01:14:10] to develop a nuclear weapons would not
[01:14:11] in any way threaten the United States in
[01:14:13] any way, shape or form. Not even they
[01:14:15] have no they have no delivery system.
[01:14:17] No, but like but that's but even this is
[01:14:20] the thing that it wouldn't even be a
[01:14:22] threat even if that be the case. Like it
[01:14:24] it wouldn't even be a threat. But the
[01:14:26] reason that they're focusing on it, um,
[01:14:29] sorry about that. The reason they're
[01:14:30] focusing on it and as the article
[01:14:32] actually or rather this report actually
[01:14:34] states, the biggest threat that Iran is
[01:14:36] to the United States is the axis of uh,
[01:14:39] resistance. It actually outlines that
[01:14:41] rather clearly because it is a threat to
[01:14:43] the status quo and it is a threat to the
[01:14:45] normalization of Arab of the
[01:14:47] Arab-Israeli relations and it actually
[01:14:50] says specifically it is a threat Iran is
[01:14:52] a threat to the status quo. But the
[01:14:54] international community will not be
[01:14:56] galvanized by that because it doesn't
[01:14:58] threaten them in any direct form. This
[01:15:00] is a threat to the United States and its
[01:15:01] interests in the region. So how do you
[01:15:03] galvanize support against Iran and a war
[01:15:06] against Iran who doesn't appear to be a
[01:15:08] threat to the vast majority of nations
[01:15:09] around the world? And that is attaching
[01:15:12] the idea of nuclear power and threat um
[01:15:15] to to Iran. So um what they're going to
[01:15:19] try to do and this is one of the options
[01:15:20] like I said is they're going to try to
[01:15:22] say okay well look we're trying to
[01:15:23] peaceful negotiations with Iran and if
[01:15:25] it fails it's on them and similarly at
[01:15:28] the same time if you're looking uh
[01:15:29] what's happening in Israel Israel has
[01:15:31] been carrying out sort of quite
[01:15:33] extensively like these sort of practice
[01:15:36] like these sort of uh military drills
[01:15:37] and practice as to how you know if they
[01:15:39] were to invade Iran etc um whilst all
[01:15:42] this is going on and if you look at one
[01:15:43] of the chapters on the Brookings
[01:15:45] Institute report one of Um, I think it
[01:15:47] was chapter three, it's labeled as uh uh
[01:15:51] uh leave a chibbe and it's it literally
[01:15:53] says encouraging Israel to essentially
[01:15:56] do the United States dirty work. So,
[01:15:59] this is the way I see it. We're going to
[01:16:01] see more negotiations take place. We're
[01:16:03] going to see them buy time, this is my
[01:16:05] personal perspective, uh as we've seen
[01:16:07] them do before, to try to entice Iran
[01:16:09] into supposed nuclear deal. They are
[01:16:11] then going to either pull out of the
[01:16:13] deal like they did back in 2018 with
[01:16:14] Trump uh and then blame Iran for failing
[01:16:18] at some point or another to actually
[01:16:20] essentially abide by the deal. And then
[01:16:22] by that point when this happens, this
[01:16:25] gives the West and Israel enough time to
[01:16:28] solidify or rather consolidate power in
[01:16:31] Syria uh which is very unstable at the
[01:16:34] moment and they need to try to
[01:16:35] consolidate it and also to normalize
[01:16:37] with the Abrahamic Accords and to set
[01:16:40] themselves up militarily within the
[01:16:42] region whether it's in Syria, Iraq, etc.
[01:16:45] in order to be able to target Iran at
[01:16:46] the right time because right now they
[01:16:48] don't have that capacity to do so
[01:16:50] because any and this is where I'm going
[01:16:52] to conclude the idea that the United
[01:16:54] States would ever want to collaborate
[01:16:56] with Iran or will allow Iran to exist is
[01:16:59] a fallacy from the perspective of
[01:17:01] imperialism because as we saw I think he
[01:17:03] was the foreign minister of Iran he was
[01:17:05] recently in China he's actually keeping
[01:17:07] China up to date with the talks this is
[01:17:09] how significant China is to Iran and in
[01:17:12] fact Iran is now trying to ramp up
[01:17:14] They're uh they because they entered a
[01:17:16] 25-y year long agreement. There's a 25
[01:17:18] year long agreement that was entered
[01:17:19] between Iran and China to whereby China
[01:17:21] is going to in like heavily invest in
[01:17:23] Iran's infrastructure and uh Iran is
[01:17:25] actually trying to rapid up that process
[01:17:27] so that even more investment in Iran so
[01:17:29] they can uh kind of develop the kind of
[01:17:31] uh industrial capacity that it needs to
[01:17:33] grow significantly. Um, and this is the
[01:17:37] thing. If there was actually in genuine
[01:17:39] good faith intention by the United
[01:17:40] States again to see Iran simply adhere
[01:17:43] to the nuclear deal, uh, etc., that
[01:17:46] means that you allow Iran to reenter the
[01:17:48] markets as a normal, you know, as a
[01:17:51] normal state. No more sanctions, uh,
[01:17:53] which means that they're able now to
[01:17:54] work with the European Union as well as
[01:17:55] the rest of the global economy. Whilst
[01:17:57] they have close ties with China and
[01:18:00] they're going to continue to grow in
[01:18:01] that direction, Iran will become an
[01:18:04] economically powerful country that is
[01:18:06] still not subservient to the US that
[01:18:08] will have more capabilities to therefore
[01:18:11] aid the access in the region which is as
[01:18:15] per this report one of the main reasons
[01:18:17] that Iran is a threat according to again
[01:18:20] this report to the United States. And
[01:18:23] not just that, it also means that you're
[01:18:24] threat you're you're emboldening and
[01:18:27] giving uh you know emboldening bricks
[01:18:29] which is uh and the BRRI which Iran is a
[01:18:32] central part of which is the greatest
[01:18:34] threat that you as a United States have
[01:18:37] to global hedgemony. So my personal
[01:18:39] belief is that they won't allow for that
[01:18:41] to happen. There's a there's a plethora
[01:18:42] of reasons why you need to see the
[01:18:44] current state of Iran that is completely
[01:18:47] uh I guess a resistant state in a way to
[01:18:50] western imperialism. you would need to
[01:18:52] see them um essentially either you want
[01:18:55] to see regime change or the complete
[01:18:57] subordination of Iran. I don't think
[01:18:59] there's any two ways about it and that's
[01:19:00] why I think that this deal or it's just
[01:19:03] what we saw before. Um just an
[01:19:06] opportunity to buy time and then blame
[01:19:08] any collapse on Iran and then by that
[01:19:11] point they would have better prepared
[01:19:12] themselves to tackle Iran. That's my
[01:19:15] perspective.
[01:19:16] Um uh what's interesting though and what
[01:19:19] I what I'd be remiss if I not bring uh
[01:19:22] bring it up. It's like even even
[01:19:24] experienced Israeli political operatives
[01:19:27] are very disturbed by the state of the
[01:19:30] negotiations right now. uh and they
[01:19:34] clearly think it's making progress and
[01:19:36] you know there are really two big points
[01:19:37] of disagreement where if you say it was
[01:19:39] going to collapse you know between both
[01:19:41] sides you both of which can be solved in
[01:19:44] some formulation or another. The first
[01:19:46] is that the US essentially demands that
[01:19:49] Iran not enrich uranium beyond like
[01:19:52] 3.6% level required to operate power
[01:19:55] plants. Uh Iran wishes to preserve
[01:19:57] enrichment up to 20% claiming that it
[01:20:00] needs to export uranium to other
[01:20:01] countries and the west believes that a
[01:20:03] supervision formula based off of what
[01:20:05] officials have been saying will be found
[01:20:07] to facilitate a resolution of this
[01:20:09] issue. But the other matter is Iran's
[01:20:11] missile program which Iran you know
[01:20:14] uh foreign minister Araki uh said uh you
[01:20:19] know we're not going to bring up
[01:20:21] security concerns. It's unwilling to
[01:20:23] discuss it, claiming it's not pertinent
[01:20:25] to the nuclear issue. And of course,
[01:20:27] this position is currently unacceptable
[01:20:29] to the US in part due to the possibility
[01:20:31] of Iran arming missiles with nuclear
[01:20:34] warheads. Of course, they don't have
[01:20:35] anything we don't think that could reach
[01:20:37] US soil, but the atmosphere and the
[01:20:38] talks is apparently good and productive.
[01:20:41] That's what like all the water cooler
[01:20:42] talk on the beltway is. And it's hard.
[01:20:46] It's it's worth mentioning that Israel
[01:20:47] for the first time is out of the loop in
[01:20:49] the negotiations room. And this is the
[01:20:52] Trump administration and different rules
[01:20:53] apply. Like I often look because US
[01:20:56] foreign policy doesn't really change but
[01:20:59] there is some stark differences between
[01:21:01] the Bush Obama and administration
[01:21:05] uh uh crap administrations than there is
[01:21:09] right now. U of course this is also
[01:21:11] completely different from as you
[01:21:14] mentioned Trump's first administration
[01:21:16] where he waited a year then tore apart
[01:21:18] the JCPOA.
[01:21:20] uh you know the first nuclear arms deal
[01:21:22] uh spearheaded by Obama which he
[01:21:24] scrapped partly because I believe he's
[01:21:27] dictated in some part by ideology he
[01:21:29] doesn't want to be associated with Obama
[01:21:32] he is
[01:21:33] a intense loathing of Obama it seems at
[01:21:38] least publicly uh he was one of the big
[01:21:41] birther conspiracies where you know he's
[01:21:43] not actually an American citizen and
[01:21:45] therefore couldn't be public you know
[01:21:47] he's from Kenya uh he also is incredibly
[01:21:50] resentful that Obama has got a Nobel
[01:21:53] Prize when he was president. Uh it was
[01:21:56] something that he mentions all the time.
[01:21:58] Even Scott Bessett, Treasury Secretary,
[01:22:01] brought up in an interview last week how
[01:22:03] Trump deserves the Nobel Prize. At least
[01:22:05] Stefonic has brought it up. All his
[01:22:07] inner cabinet, inner circle are like
[01:22:09] kind of on board with this idea and it's
[01:22:11] been a lasting talking point over the
[01:22:12] past 100 days. I do think that of course
[01:22:15] he's very volatile and compreitious and
[01:22:17] if someone reminds him like one of his
[01:22:19] aids reminds him hey the current nuclear
[01:22:21] deal is looking a lot like Obama's JCPOA
[01:22:23] so you're completing his legacy and then
[01:22:25] Trump might just decide to just scrap
[01:22:27] the whole thing. I think
[01:22:29] like of course I believe that US foreign
[01:22:32] policy is not necessarily determined by
[01:22:35] the president obviously butt sticks that
[01:22:38] like Netanyahu and the pro-Israel lobby
[01:22:40] used during the Obama administration
[01:22:42] like trying to bypass the president
[01:22:44] through elected officials will not work
[01:22:46] with the Trump administration because he
[01:22:48] cannot politically outflank Trump from
[01:22:50] the right and whatever Trump decides
[01:22:52] Netanyahu will have to praise and adore
[01:22:55] as the greatest achievement in history.
[01:22:58] Uh yeah. So I I I don't know. It's it's
[01:23:01] kind of up in the air. I'm kind of torn
[01:23:03] on how I feel about it. Uh of course,
[01:23:04] you know, US the United States
[01:23:09] is completely intolerant of what what
[01:23:13] they would consider regional challenges
[01:23:15] or regional hegeimones that challenge
[01:23:18] their interests within the region. I
[01:23:19] know you probably uh disagree with the
[01:23:21] the term uh applied to Iran as a
[01:23:24] regional hedgeimone, but that's besides
[01:23:26] the point. That's how US policy makers
[01:23:28] see it. Um, so there's that, but also we
[01:23:32] are seeing different rules that we kind
[01:23:35] of haven't seen before with regards to
[01:23:36] the Iran stance stance. That's the only
[01:23:40] point I wanted to bring up. The thing is
[01:23:43] I I see what you're I see what you're
[01:23:44] saying. It's just that the way I see it
[01:23:46] is this. um these sort these sort of PR
[01:23:50] stunts, this sort of like, oh well, you
[01:23:52] know, uh certain Israeli officials are
[01:23:53] saying, oh, well, we're alarmed because
[01:23:55] we're not directly involved and all this
[01:23:58] sort of uh these discussions and
[01:24:00] insiders are saying this that Israel's
[01:24:02] being kept out. I think a lot of it as
[01:24:04] well is just um it's uh it's a form like
[01:24:08] it's a form of PR as well to to show
[01:24:12] that you know Trump has sort of sense of
[01:24:14] control of these things that the United
[01:24:16] States um is um you know uh I guess I
[01:24:21] guess the alpha dog in these sort of
[01:24:23] negotiations and that Israel doesn't
[01:24:24] really have much Israel is not involved
[01:24:26] in this sort of like it doesn't have any
[01:24:27] sort of knowledge as to what's really
[01:24:29] going on but I think even again the
[01:24:31] Iranian uh foreign minister he had said
[01:24:33] I the Iranians have made it very clear
[01:24:34] that they're very aware and I think you
[01:24:36] I was reading a report about it today
[01:24:38] that Israel is very uh not not not even
[01:24:41] necessarily involved but is influencing
[01:24:43] the talks and this is something that
[01:24:44] that Iran is rightfully very
[01:24:46] conscientious of. Um I'm I'm personally
[01:24:50] I mean like you said there isn't even
[01:24:51] that much of a difference between the
[01:24:53] current deal that has been discussed to
[01:24:54] the one that Obama had actually
[01:24:56] discussed uh and actually agreed to with
[01:24:58] Iran at the time. I mean the way we're
[01:25:00] looking at it doesn't even look too
[01:25:01] different. So my personal perspective is
[01:25:04] that um I think they're trying to bring
[01:25:07] about like I said I I do think that
[01:25:09] they're trying to bring about a deal
[01:25:10] that ultimately they're going to find a
[01:25:13] reason to pull out of. I mean I know
[01:25:15] that there's oh you know Israel is
[01:25:17] surprised etc. But you know the the the
[01:25:20] deal went through the first time and
[01:25:22] even though yes you could argue that uh
[01:25:24] the Israelis tried to bypass uh the
[01:25:26] Obama into the Obama administration etc
[01:25:29] and they failed to do so. I think we're
[01:25:31] I think this is the thing we're playing
[01:25:34] I feel like in this case we're playing a
[01:25:35] bit too much into like the political
[01:25:38] um uh I guess game here a bit because at
[01:25:42] the end of the day the United States uh
[01:25:45] has a you know the reason that they even
[01:25:48] back Israel to the degree they do is
[01:25:49] because Israel serves the strategic
[01:25:51] interest in the region. Iran doesn't and
[01:25:53] I think you know I don't want to repeat
[01:25:55] myself but like at the end of the day
[01:25:57] they don't an empowered Iran uh that
[01:26:00] will continue to exist as it currently
[01:26:02] is re-entering the market whilst they
[01:26:04] working and entering to deeper coord
[01:26:07] sorry uh collaborations with China and
[01:26:09] Russia and all that that will uh sort of
[01:26:11] bring about I mean honestly I don't
[01:26:14] think that that serves the United States
[01:26:16] in the long run. doesn't even serve
[01:26:17] their their uh I guess Israel in the
[01:26:19] long run or Western Asia in the long run
[01:26:21] because it's more powerful Iran. Well,
[01:26:24] they're going to continue uh I guess
[01:26:26] supporting resistance factions within
[01:26:27] the region. And that might even be the
[01:26:29] point that they say, "Right, well,
[01:26:30] enough is enough. We're not going to,
[01:26:31] you know, you're aiding, for example,
[01:26:33] the resistance factions within the
[01:26:35] region or what you call terrorists in
[01:26:36] the region." And that might even become
[01:26:38] an opportunity like that might become
[01:26:40] the the reason that they pull out of the
[01:26:41] deal. There's so many variables here. Um
[01:26:44] but yeah, I like I said, one of the main
[01:26:48] reasons Iran has been a threat that it
[01:26:49] is is because of its um its asymmetrical
[01:26:53] warfare in the region that has and and
[01:26:55] number one in that report that I said
[01:26:57] it's for its position on Palestine as
[01:26:59] well. Like its position on Palestine.
[01:27:01] Yeah. But I will have to say that I I
[01:27:05] definitely feel like that the whole and
[01:27:07] I'm sorry I don't I don't want to have
[01:27:08] to like cut up, but we do I'm being told
[01:27:10] by the producer like we we have to rap.
[01:27:12] All right, we'll wrap. Okay, I know this
[01:27:15] could go on for another three hours,
[01:27:16] especially because I bring up the point
[01:27:18] where, you know, the US from a foreign
[01:27:20] policy and intelligence perspective is
[01:27:22] not like too unpleased with the state of
[01:27:26] the access of resistance in West Asia
[01:27:28] right now. Uh yeah, but could of course
[01:27:30] they want but they want to eliminate it
[01:27:32] completely. That's my argument.
[01:27:34] grow again. I I don't I don't think that
[01:27:36] they I mean, yes, there is some hope
[01:27:39] that they can do that in Lebanon by
[01:27:40] politically and financially and socially
[01:27:44] isolating Hezbollah. We'll see if that's
[01:27:46] even possible. U you you know, there's
[01:27:49] still factions in Iraq and groups in
[01:27:51] Iraq. Uh but I don't think that anyone
[01:27:55] in that after uh in that sphere actually
[01:27:59] believes that those groups are going to
[01:28:00] be gone forever. But with in the context
[01:28:03] of this these Iranian negotiations, I'm
[01:28:06] not sure. And of course, I could be
[01:28:08] completely wrong that they that there
[01:28:10] it's taking such a
[01:28:13] u central place in getting this done,
[01:28:16] but we'll see. Like I hope hopefully it
[01:28:18] works out. Hopefully uh we we end wars
[01:28:21] and do all that. I have very little
[01:28:24] faith in the uh political leaders and
[01:28:27] the corporate interests of the United
[01:28:29] States and Europe. So, uh, there's still
[01:28:32] a lot of roadblocks. And what I wanted
[01:28:34] to get out of this episode would be to
[01:28:36] just explain to people why when
[01:28:38] politicians say like, "We're close to a
[01:28:40] deal and we're going to get this done."
[01:28:43] I don't know, just think about any
[01:28:44] campaign promise they made. All right?
[01:28:47] You know, don't don't listen to the
[01:28:48] noise. Uh, we we hoped to kind of like
[01:28:51] get into the broader underpinnings and
[01:28:54] the complexities regarding with both
[01:28:56] issues. focus mainly on Russia, Ukraine
[01:28:58] because the most developments happened
[01:29:00] there. So, and of course, we're not even
[01:29:02] in direct talks with uh Iran and the
[01:29:06] United States yet with the nuclear deal.
[01:29:07] So, we'll see. We'll keep continuing to
[01:29:10] report on this as things develop. And
[01:29:13] thank you so much for listening. And of
[01:29:14] course, Alina Zenapontos, thanks so much
[01:29:16] for coming on.
[01:29:18] It was a good It was a good episode. I
[01:29:20] enjoyed it. All right, y'all. Well, that
[01:29:23] has been the bracing discussion about
[01:29:25] all the developments that happened with
[01:29:27] regards to these things over the
[01:29:29] weekend. And of course, we might be
[01:29:31] doing an IndiaPakistan episode, but I
[01:29:34] honestly believe it's going to blow
[01:29:35] over. Could be wrong. Uh, but anyways,
[01:29:39] be looking out for that. And thanks so
[01:29:40] much for watching. Y'all have a
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