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😱Russians have upgraded their drones! Army veteran reveals the most important changes

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[00:00:00] This is a Russian FPV drone that was [00:00:03] downed outside of Vchensk. And so what I [00:00:06] want to point out is that you can see [00:00:07] that this frame is aluminum. And that [00:00:09] makes sense. Russia has a huge aluminum [00:00:10] industry that because of sanctions, no [00:00:12] one's around to buy it. But aluminum [00:00:14] frames, they're going to be much [00:00:15] heavier. Uh they're they are uh whereas [00:00:19] Ukrainians use carbon fiber frames that [00:00:20] are much lighter. Ukrainians also have a [00:00:23] wider variety of frames. The Russians [00:00:25] use a single frame for essentially all [00:00:26] of their drones. And so they end up with [00:00:30] drones that are technically inferior. Uh [00:00:32] but because of their strong relationship [00:00:36] to China and because of their um larger [00:00:41] economy and and really Putin's [00:00:43] commitment to industrializing or [00:00:45] militarizing the whole economy, um they [00:00:47] can produce a lot a high volume. And so [00:00:50] the qualitative advantage seems [00:00:52] overwhelmingly for in favor of Ukraine. [00:00:55] But the but Russia maintains a [00:00:57] quantitative advantage um in most of [00:01:00] these these uh drones. [00:01:04] >> Okay. [clears throat] [00:01:04] Um Paul, since you [00:01:07] touched the ground drones question and [00:01:10] you have dedicated a lot of time in your [00:01:12] documentary about them, could you just [00:01:14] just really uh explain more how now they [00:01:18] operating in real combat and where do [00:01:21] they really change the situation? Sure. [00:01:26] So in uh the most practical missions and [00:01:29] there's really two missions that these [00:01:31] ground drones uh are [00:01:34] function best and that is in resupply. [00:01:38] So often times it is not quite the last [00:01:41] mile of resupply. So if you have that [00:01:43] soldier in positions who says, "Hey, I'm [00:01:45] out of water. I'm out of food. I'm out [00:01:46] of ammunition." Well, how do you get [00:01:49] them those supplies without risking [00:01:51] another soldier's life? And the answer [00:01:53] for the last several kilometers is [00:01:56] actually to use small drones. In most [00:01:58] cases, a uh vampire team or a uh uh an [00:02:03] FPV or reconnaissance team will actually [00:02:06] package up a droppable supply drop and [00:02:10] fly it out to the position and drop it [00:02:12] in. But the pre the prior 10 km let's [00:02:16] say that is often that is also extremely [00:02:20] dangerous uh for any kind of soldier or [00:02:23] vehicle. And so ground drones function [00:02:25] really well to move supplies from a safe [00:02:28] relatively safe area outside of the kill [00:02:31] zone and move it to a kind of [00:02:34] distribution hub inside the kill zone. [00:02:36] And then from that distribution hub, [00:02:38] drones will send the supplies out to all [00:02:41] the positions that need it. So that's [00:02:42] where they thrive because again, the [00:02:44] alternative there is a soldier on an ATV [00:02:47] or um a pickup truck, which is a huge [00:02:50] target and very visible and um and [00:02:54] obviously operated by a human being. Uh [00:02:57] the other area where they thrive that I [00:02:59] think is really important to acknowledge [00:03:00] is um Kazak or evacuating wounded [00:03:03] soldiers. This is a very difficult [00:03:05] problem for both sides to solve. But the [00:03:08] Russians, because they have so many [00:03:10] people and because they're Russian, they [00:03:13] don't seem to really worry about getting [00:03:15] wounded soldiers out. Uh the Ukrainians, [00:03:17] in contrast, it's a it's something they [00:03:20] work tirelessly to do and try very hard. [00:03:22] Um and so these ground drones, because [00:03:25] they can cover some of that distance, [00:03:27] often times in a pinch, they will [00:03:29] actually become uh the the ambulance [00:03:32] effectively. a wounded soldier will get [00:03:34] placed in the ground drone um and that [00:03:36] ground drone will ferry that soldier [00:03:38] back out of the kill zone to an area [00:03:40] where to a stabilization point or to [00:03:43] medical care. [00:03:44] >> So while Ukrainians worried about [00:03:46] wounded or dead soldiers, Russian are [00:03:49] not using that tactics. I mean the [00:03:51] ground drones or something similar to [00:03:53] that. [00:03:54] I've seen Russians experiment with some [00:03:57] ground drones, but it it just seems to [00:04:00] be less of a priority for them because [00:04:03] the cost of a human life is so low, [00:04:06] relatively speaking. you know, the the [00:04:08] Russian Minister of Defense is an [00:04:10] economist, and so he looks at the cost [00:04:13] to recruit a soldier, the cost to train [00:04:15] a soldier, um, and he looks at the cost [00:04:18] to build a ground drone, and he simply [00:04:20] says ground drones are, uh, are more [00:04:25] costly than saving the lives of a [00:04:27] soldier. Um, again, there's some Russian [00:04:29] cultural assumptions baked in there. Um [00:04:32] there's obviously the the Russian [00:04:34] recruitment machine that is able to [00:04:37] continually mobilize um you know [00:04:39] something like 30,000 troops a month, [00:04:41] but the fact is that it's just not seen [00:04:44] as a priority right now for the Russian [00:04:47] armed forces. But again, as their [00:04:48] casualties mount and as their [00:04:50] recruitment pools dry up, you're going [00:04:52] to see the Russians have to make come to [00:04:55] the same conclusion ultimately. I think [00:04:58] >> Paul from a radio physics point of view [00:05:00] can video transmission frequencies on [00:05:03] normal tactical FPV drones keep going [00:05:05] higher and higher so soldiers Ukrainian [00:05:08] soldiers they are telling me they're [00:05:10] already above six gigahertz and is there [00:05:13] any hard physical limit of that? [00:05:16] >> That is a way more technical question [00:05:19] than I'm able to answer. Um I I really [00:05:22] can't speak to the uh technical [00:05:26] specifics of uh jamming equipment or [00:05:28] jamming frequencies. Um I did talking on [00:05:31] the front line. Every unit, every sector [00:05:34] is totally unique and is one of the [00:05:36] reasons why every single battalion [00:05:39] essentially has its own drone lab where [00:05:41] they modify the drones to uh operate in [00:05:43] their specific conditions. So, it [00:05:46] wouldn't even shock me if you told me [00:05:48] that the the uh jamming arms race ends [00:05:52] up cycling back around, right? As as [00:05:55] frequencies change, it's about matching [00:05:57] your your adversary where they're [00:05:59] operating. Um, and there's no particular [00:06:01] reason. There's no there's no there's no [00:06:03] reason that you can't jump back to a [00:06:05] frequency that was used two years prior [00:06:07] or three years prior, [00:06:08] >> right? [clears throat] [00:06:09] >> At least to my knowledge. [00:06:10] >> Yeah. Paul. So if to without emotions, [00:06:14] how would you rate how would you rate [00:06:16] the current state of a Russian equipment [00:06:18] and like overall gear? [00:06:22] >> The current state of the Russian [00:06:24] equipment and gear. I mean it it seems [00:06:26] poor, but it's it's important to know [00:06:30] that again this is this is a war run by [00:06:34] an economist. And so it doesn't have to [00:06:37] be of good quality if it is functional [00:06:41] for what Russia needs it for. And again, [00:06:43] Russia's goal is to just push troops [00:06:46] forward and get them to hide in a [00:06:51] bunker, uh, a billiondage, a hole in the [00:06:53] ground, the basement of a building, and [00:06:56] sit there and basically wait until more [00:07:00] Russians advance. And that doesn't [00:07:03] require that sophisticated a gear, [00:07:05] particularly if you're willing to absorb [00:07:07] the level of casualties that Russia is. [00:07:10] And so, you know, qualitatively, I mean, [00:07:13] the the Ukrainian gear seems a cut [00:07:16] above. Uh but again the the it's [00:07:20] important to not sort of grade the [00:07:24] Russians the Russian military against [00:07:26] the Ukrainian armed forces like in a [00:07:29] gearby-ear sort of assessment. [00:07:32] >> And there was a recent strike on a large [00:07:35] warehouse with FPV drones on occupied [00:07:38] territory by Russia. How painful are [00:07:41] hits like this for Russian logistics and [00:07:44] supply? [00:07:46] Yeah, I mean for for Russia, this is a [00:07:49] logistics war first and foremost. Um, [00:07:52] you know, a and anytime the further back [00:07:55] in a logistics chain you can target, the [00:07:58] more effective that's going to be. The [00:08:01] attrition rate on both sides of FPV [00:08:03] drones is high. It's built into the [00:08:05] system. You know, I talked to one uh [00:08:08] drone manufacturing hub uh you know, [00:08:11] well behind the front lines who told us [00:08:14] that essentially they expect that of a [00:08:16] 100 FPV drones pushed to the front, um [00:08:18] they expect only about 25 to actually [00:08:20] fly against the enemy. And I assume [00:08:24] that's at least a starting point for the [00:08:26] Russian forces. I I nothing would shock [00:08:29] me less than if you told me that the [00:08:30] Russians actually have a higher [00:08:32] attrition rate. Uh because again the [00:08:34] problem, the fundamental military [00:08:37] reality for the Russian armed forces is [00:08:39] that the Ukrainians are with with a few [00:08:43] exceptions, the Ukrainians are on the [00:08:46] defense, which means that as their [00:08:48] positions pull back, their supply lines [00:08:51] get shorter. Whereas when the Russians [00:08:53] push forward, they have to move all of [00:08:56] their supply lines forward as well. So [00:08:58] that drone warehouse if the Russians [00:09:01] advance a kilometer or 10 km then that [00:09:04] drone warehouse is going to have to move [00:09:06] forward again or it will have to do [00:09:09] there'll be more vehicles loaded with [00:09:10] drones driving along the open road able [00:09:13] to be targeted by Ukrainian forces. So [00:09:15] this is kind of a a I mean this is this [00:09:18] is something that for has been discussed [00:09:20] in military doctrine thinkers for 500 [00:09:24] years that if you're on the the attack [00:09:27] your attrition rate is just going to be [00:09:29] substantially higher. So I imagine that [00:09:31] for the Russians if you told me only one [00:09:34] in 10 uh drones uh one in 10 Russian [00:09:38] drones actually flies that wouldn't [00:09:40] surprise me in the least.
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πŸ“„ Extracted Text (1,513 words)
[00:00:00] This is a Russian FPV drone that was [00:00:03] downed outside of Vchensk. And so what I [00:00:06] want to point out is that you can see [00:00:07] that this frame is aluminum. And that [00:00:09] makes sense. Russia has a huge aluminum [00:00:10] industry that because of sanctions, no [00:00:12] one's around to buy it. But aluminum [00:00:14] frames, they're going to be much [00:00:15] heavier. Uh they're they are uh whereas [00:00:19] Ukrainians use carbon fiber frames that [00:00:20] are much lighter. Ukrainians also have a [00:00:23] wider variety of frames. The Russians [00:00:25] use a single frame for essentially all [00:00:26] of their drones. And so they end up with [00:00:30] drones that are technically inferior. Uh [00:00:32] but because of their strong relationship [00:00:36] to China and because of their um larger [00:00:41] economy and and really Putin's [00:00:43] commitment to industrializing or [00:00:45] militarizing the whole economy, um they [00:00:47] can produce a lot a high volume. And so [00:00:50] the qualitative advantage seems [00:00:52] overwhelmingly for in favor of Ukraine. [00:00:55] But the but Russia maintains a [00:00:57] quantitative advantage um in most of [00:01:00] these these uh drones. [00:01:04] >> Okay. [clears throat] [00:01:04] Um Paul, since you [00:01:07] touched the ground drones question and [00:01:10] you have dedicated a lot of time in your [00:01:12] documentary about them, could you just [00:01:14] just really uh explain more how now they [00:01:18] operating in real combat and where do [00:01:21] they really change the situation? Sure. [00:01:26] So in uh the most practical missions and [00:01:29] there's really two missions that these [00:01:31] ground drones uh are [00:01:34] function best and that is in resupply. [00:01:38] So often times it is not quite the last [00:01:41] mile of resupply. So if you have that [00:01:43] soldier in positions who says, "Hey, I'm [00:01:45] out of water. I'm out of food. I'm out [00:01:46] of ammunition." Well, how do you get [00:01:49] them those supplies without risking [00:01:51] another soldier's life? And the answer [00:01:53] for the last several kilometers is [00:01:56] actually to use small drones. In most [00:01:58] cases, a uh vampire team or a uh uh an [00:02:03] FPV or reconnaissance team will actually [00:02:06] package up a droppable supply drop and [00:02:10] fly it out to the position and drop it [00:02:12] in. But the pre the prior 10 km let's [00:02:16] say that is often that is also extremely [00:02:20] dangerous uh for any kind of soldier or [00:02:23] vehicle. And so ground drones function [00:02:25] really well to move supplies from a safe [00:02:28] relatively safe area outside of the kill [00:02:31] zone and move it to a kind of [00:02:34] distribution hub inside the kill zone. [00:02:36] And then from that distribution hub, [00:02:38] drones will send the supplies out to all [00:02:41] the positions that need it. So that's [00:02:42] where they thrive because again, the [00:02:44] alternative there is a soldier on an ATV [00:02:47] or um a pickup truck, which is a huge [00:02:50] target and very visible and um and [00:02:54] obviously operated by a human being. Uh [00:02:57] the other area where they thrive that I [00:02:59] think is really important to acknowledge [00:03:00] is um Kazak or evacuating wounded [00:03:03] soldiers. This is a very difficult [00:03:05] problem for both sides to solve. But the [00:03:08] Russians, because they have so many [00:03:10] people and because they're Russian, they [00:03:13] don't seem to really worry about getting [00:03:15] wounded soldiers out. Uh the Ukrainians, [00:03:17] in contrast, it's a it's something they [00:03:20] work tirelessly to do and try very hard. [00:03:22] Um and so these ground drones, because [00:03:25] they can cover some of that distance, [00:03:27] often times in a pinch, they will [00:03:29] actually become uh the the ambulance [00:03:32] effectively. a wounded soldier will get [00:03:34] placed in the ground drone um and that [00:03:36] ground drone will ferry that soldier [00:03:38] back out of the kill zone to an area [00:03:40] where to a stabilization point or to [00:03:43] medical care. [00:03:44] >> So while Ukrainians worried about [00:03:46] wounded or dead soldiers, Russian are [00:03:49] not using that tactics. I mean the [00:03:51] ground drones or something similar to [00:03:53] that. [00:03:54] I've seen Russians experiment with some [00:03:57] ground drones, but it it just seems to [00:04:00] be less of a priority for them because [00:04:03] the cost of a human life is so low, [00:04:06] relatively speaking. you know, the the [00:04:08] Russian Minister of Defense is an [00:04:10] economist, and so he looks at the cost [00:04:13] to recruit a soldier, the cost to train [00:04:15] a soldier, um, and he looks at the cost [00:04:18] to build a ground drone, and he simply [00:04:20] says ground drones are, uh, are more [00:04:25] costly than saving the lives of a [00:04:27] soldier. Um, again, there's some Russian [00:04:29] cultural assumptions baked in there. Um [00:04:32] there's obviously the the Russian [00:04:34] recruitment machine that is able to [00:04:37] continually mobilize um you know [00:04:39] something like 30,000 troops a month, [00:04:41] but the fact is that it's just not seen [00:04:44] as a priority right now for the Russian [00:04:47] armed forces. But again, as their [00:04:48] casualties mount and as their [00:04:50] recruitment pools dry up, you're going [00:04:52] to see the Russians have to make come to [00:04:55] the same conclusion ultimately. I think [00:04:58] >> Paul from a radio physics point of view [00:05:00] can video transmission frequencies on [00:05:03] normal tactical FPV drones keep going [00:05:05] higher and higher so soldiers Ukrainian [00:05:08] soldiers they are telling me they're [00:05:10] already above six gigahertz and is there [00:05:13] any hard physical limit of that? [00:05:16] >> That is a way more technical question [00:05:19] than I'm able to answer. Um I I really [00:05:22] can't speak to the uh technical [00:05:26] specifics of uh jamming equipment or [00:05:28] jamming frequencies. Um I did talking on [00:05:31] the front line. Every unit, every sector [00:05:34] is totally unique and is one of the [00:05:36] reasons why every single battalion [00:05:39] essentially has its own drone lab where [00:05:41] they modify the drones to uh operate in [00:05:43] their specific conditions. So, it [00:05:46] wouldn't even shock me if you told me [00:05:48] that the the uh jamming arms race ends [00:05:52] up cycling back around, right? As as [00:05:55] frequencies change, it's about matching [00:05:57] your your adversary where they're [00:05:59] operating. Um, and there's no particular [00:06:01] reason. There's no there's no there's no [00:06:03] reason that you can't jump back to a [00:06:05] frequency that was used two years prior [00:06:07] or three years prior, [00:06:08] >> right? [clears throat] [00:06:09] >> At least to my knowledge. [00:06:10] >> Yeah. Paul. So if to without emotions, [00:06:14] how would you rate how would you rate [00:06:16] the current state of a Russian equipment [00:06:18] and like overall gear? [00:06:22] >> The current state of the Russian [00:06:24] equipment and gear. I mean it it seems [00:06:26] poor, but it's it's important to know [00:06:30] that again this is this is a war run by [00:06:34] an economist. And so it doesn't have to [00:06:37] be of good quality if it is functional [00:06:41] for what Russia needs it for. And again, [00:06:43] Russia's goal is to just push troops [00:06:46] forward and get them to hide in a [00:06:51] bunker, uh, a billiondage, a hole in the [00:06:53] ground, the basement of a building, and [00:06:56] sit there and basically wait until more [00:07:00] Russians advance. And that doesn't [00:07:03] require that sophisticated a gear, [00:07:05] particularly if you're willing to absorb [00:07:07] the level of casualties that Russia is. [00:07:10] And so, you know, qualitatively, I mean, [00:07:13] the the Ukrainian gear seems a cut [00:07:16] above. Uh but again the the it's [00:07:20] important to not sort of grade the [00:07:24] Russians the Russian military against [00:07:26] the Ukrainian armed forces like in a [00:07:29] gearby-ear sort of assessment. [00:07:32] >> And there was a recent strike on a large [00:07:35] warehouse with FPV drones on occupied [00:07:38] territory by Russia. How painful are [00:07:41] hits like this for Russian logistics and [00:07:44] supply? [00:07:46] Yeah, I mean for for Russia, this is a [00:07:49] logistics war first and foremost. Um, [00:07:52] you know, a and anytime the further back [00:07:55] in a logistics chain you can target, the [00:07:58] more effective that's going to be. The [00:08:01] attrition rate on both sides of FPV [00:08:03] drones is high. It's built into the [00:08:05] system. You know, I talked to one uh [00:08:08] drone manufacturing hub uh you know, [00:08:11] well behind the front lines who told us [00:08:14] that essentially they expect that of a [00:08:16] 100 FPV drones pushed to the front, um [00:08:18] they expect only about 25 to actually [00:08:20] fly against the enemy. And I assume [00:08:24] that's at least a starting point for the [00:08:26] Russian forces. I I nothing would shock [00:08:29] me less than if you told me that the [00:08:30] Russians actually have a higher [00:08:32] attrition rate. Uh because again the [00:08:34] problem, the fundamental military [00:08:37] reality for the Russian armed forces is [00:08:39] that the Ukrainians are with with a few [00:08:43] exceptions, the Ukrainians are on the [00:08:46] defense, which means that as their [00:08:48] positions pull back, their supply lines [00:08:51] get shorter. Whereas when the Russians [00:08:53] push forward, they have to move all of [00:08:56] their supply lines forward as well. So [00:08:58] that drone warehouse if the Russians [00:09:01] advance a kilometer or 10 km then that [00:09:04] drone warehouse is going to have to move [00:09:06] forward again or it will have to do [00:09:09] there'll be more vehicles loaded with [00:09:10] drones driving along the open road able [00:09:13] to be targeted by Ukrainian forces. So [00:09:15] this is kind of a a I mean this is this [00:09:18] is something that for has been discussed [00:09:20] in military doctrine thinkers for 500 [00:09:24] years that if you're on the the attack [00:09:27] your attrition rate is just going to be [00:09:29] substantially higher. So I imagine that [00:09:31] for the Russians if you told me only one [00:09:34] in 10 uh drones uh one in 10 Russian [00:09:38] drones actually flies that wouldn't [00:09:40] surprise me in the least.
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