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[00:00:00] Russia is once again threatening with [00:00:02] Arishnik and says no progress should be [00:00:05] expected from the negotiations. We'll [00:00:07] talk about Russia's current position and [00:00:10] the role of China in the Russian Ukraine [00:00:13] war with Andresland's the center for [00:00:15] East European status analyst. Mr. Thank [00:00:19] you for joining us. [00:00:22] >> Thanks for having me again. [00:00:23] >> So today there was another threat of the [00:00:26] Arishnik from Russian territory. What is [00:00:29] Russia's goal in keeping this threat? [00:00:34] >> I think it's um simply an um an attempt [00:00:38] to exert pressure during the current [00:00:42] pseudo negotiations that are taking [00:00:44] place in Geneva and to force Ukraine to [00:00:48] give up territory that um Russia is not [00:00:52] able to conquer. Um this is in [00:00:57] particular the so-called western donbas [00:01:00] uh the western part of the donetsk [00:01:02] oblast that Russia is trying to conquer [00:01:06] already for 12 years one should not [00:01:08] forget so this is a a very old aim of [00:01:12] Russia that um Russia is trying to get [00:01:16] and um so I think the situation is now [00:01:21] in Moscow that in principle perhaps [00:01:24] Putin would be ready for a ceasefire [00:01:26] because the economy is in um in dire [00:01:30] straits and um social problems are [00:01:33] accumulating. The situation on the front [00:01:35] line is not good. Um there's the [00:01:38] Starling problem. Um currently Ukraine [00:01:42] is on the offensive. Um and um but and [00:01:47] he is maybe now ready to go for a [00:01:50] temporary ceasefire, but he needs some [00:01:52] sort of victory. And so he is now [00:01:55] through these negotiations um and also [00:01:59] through pressure on Ukraine um trying to [00:02:02] get um these territorial concessions [00:02:06] from Ukraine in order to be able to [00:02:09] present something to the domestic [00:02:12] audience that is um expecting some sort [00:02:15] of gain, some sort of partial at least [00:02:17] victory. Um and ornik is just one one of [00:02:22] the sort of um ways to pressure Ukraine. [00:02:26] >> Uh do you think that Russia is using [00:02:28] Arnik not only to pressure Ukraine but [00:02:30] also Europe? [00:02:33] Yes, that is certainly also a sort of [00:02:36] secondary I would call it um function of [00:02:39] um this [00:02:42] missile and of of these attacks to scare [00:02:46] western countries to not get involved in [00:02:49] Ukraine, to um to threaten the West, to [00:02:54] not engage too much with Ukraine [00:02:58] because otherwise um these missiles [00:03:01] could be also used against NATO member [00:03:03] countries. Um this is also a [00:03:07] psychological game. Um obviously and um [00:03:12] the the threat here the eventual threat [00:03:14] here is of course that these missiles [00:03:16] could be then also equipped with nuclear [00:03:20] warheads. And u this is in general I [00:03:24] would say one of the major sort of [00:03:27] background conditions for this entire [00:03:29] war that Russia is either explicitly or [00:03:33] at least implicitly threatening [00:03:35] everybody who gets involved with Ukra [00:03:38] with Ukraine with um a retaliation and [00:03:42] potentially even a nuclear retaliation. [00:03:44] and Orashnik is now one of the carrier [00:03:48] systems that um could deliver such a [00:03:52] nuclear warhead um to a European [00:03:54] country. [00:03:56] >> At this moment, uh talks are taking [00:03:58] place between Ukraine, Russia and the [00:04:00] United States. Do you have any specific [00:04:02] expectations from them? [00:04:06] >> No, I don't yet have um expectations. As [00:04:09] I said, um the situation has changed [00:04:12] changed. I think Russia is under [00:04:15] pressure now to um to perhaps end or at [00:04:20] least interrupt the war because we know [00:04:22] from more and more reports that there is [00:04:25] um um an economic crisis uh developing [00:04:29] in in Russia. There are social problems. [00:04:33] um there is a standstill on the front [00:04:35] line or even [00:04:37] uh successful counterattacks by uh by [00:04:42] Ukraine and liberation of Ukrainian [00:04:44] territories by the Ukrainian armed [00:04:46] forces. So that is I think a new [00:04:48] condition that is different from a year [00:04:50] ago. But I don't think that this is yet [00:04:53] enough um for Russia to to look for a [00:04:57] serious compromise and to look for a [00:05:00] quick end to this war. I think I think [00:05:03] for that the pressure the economic [00:05:06] pressure and the military pressure on on [00:05:09] Russia has to increase and then perhaps [00:05:12] um Putin will um will be willing to to [00:05:18] seriously look for a compromise. [00:05:20] Currently, I think this is more of a [00:05:22] negotiation theater for above all for [00:05:25] for Trump and um the attempt to um to [00:05:29] use Trump's influence on Ukraine, [00:05:33] as I said, to get territory that Russia [00:05:37] was not able to conquer with military [00:05:39] means. [00:05:41] >> Um we'll talk next about China. Why did [00:05:44] China recently say that Europe should [00:05:46] take part in the negotiations? [00:05:51] That's a good question. I guess that [00:05:54] would be I'm not a China expert. [00:05:56] Somebody who is actually studying China [00:05:59] more intensely would perhaps have an a [00:06:02] quick answer to that. I guess in [00:06:05] general, China's interests are multi- [00:06:08] multivarious multifarious in this war. [00:06:12] Um, [00:06:14] one of the motivations perhaps um, of [00:06:17] China to now um, go for such a new [00:06:23] negotiation format is to perhaps come to [00:06:26] some sort of end or of of this war. [00:06:30] Because what China may be um fearing [00:06:33] from this war is that an escalation [00:06:36] could then motivate countries around [00:06:39] China [00:06:41] to arm themselves with uh with weapons [00:06:44] of mass destruction. um and that [00:06:48] countries that are um in one way or [00:06:52] another in conflict with Russia may draw [00:06:55] the lesson from this Russian Ukrainian [00:06:57] war, especially if it's escalates, if uh [00:07:01] if um Russia starts um um using in the [00:07:05] worst case scenario a tactical nuclear [00:07:07] weapon that these countries then will [00:07:10] also um look for weapons of mass [00:07:14] destruction to not become in the same [00:07:17] way as Ukraine today is a victim of [00:07:19] Russia then to become a victim of China. [00:07:23] So I think that is one of the aspects of [00:07:25] this Chinese um policy towards this war. [00:07:29] On the other hand, China has been [00:07:31] supporting [00:07:32] Russia in the um in the war [00:07:35] economically. Without China, Russia [00:07:38] would not be able to conduct this war. [00:07:40] That is also something that um um Russia [00:07:44] is doing that China is doing and [00:07:46] obviously doing to distract the US and [00:07:49] um and Europe from um from the Pacific [00:07:53] um uh region um because there China may [00:07:58] have plans for Taiwan for in other [00:08:02] directions and this war in Europe [00:08:05] distracts the US and the European [00:08:07] countries from the Pacific region. So [00:08:10] the I guess there are conflicting [00:08:14] interests, perhaps even conflicting [00:08:16] factions in Beijing that have different [00:08:19] preferences and perhaps this idea of [00:08:22] including Europe into the negotiations [00:08:26] is one of the ways in which China is [00:08:29] trying to to follow its own interests [00:08:32] and perhaps to bring some sort of end to [00:08:35] this war. [00:08:37] uh and um this is such an interesting [00:08:40] fact that China also said it is against [00:08:43] continuing the war but at the same time [00:08:45] it keeps supporting Russia. What do you [00:08:47] think about it? [00:08:50] >> Well the I think the rhetoric of China [00:08:53] is sort of peaceful pacifist and China [00:08:57] is trying to create a good oppression [00:09:01] worldwide and it has its own peace [00:09:03] plans. There was even um an initiative [00:09:08] a couple of years ago by China to create [00:09:10] a sort of coalition of pro peace um [00:09:13] countries. Um but the actual the [00:09:16] material behavior of of China has been [00:09:19] such during the last four years that [00:09:23] China has been supporting economically. [00:09:26] Russia [00:09:27] has also been u taking advantage um of [00:09:31] Russia of the sanctions and um has also [00:09:35] made good deals good deals for China um [00:09:40] during this war. So China potentially [00:09:44] has the instruments to pressure Russia [00:09:47] into a peace but it does not um use [00:09:51] these instruments. Um and maybe um China [00:09:55] also doesn't want to alienate Russia [00:09:57] because it needs Russia as a junior [00:10:00] partner in the confrontation with the US [00:10:02] and perhaps that is why China is now um [00:10:07] perhaps interested after all in in an [00:10:09] end to this war is and is then promoting [00:10:13] this idea of including the Europeans in [00:10:16] the negotiations. [00:10:17] Um, I mean that is these are all [00:10:20] questions that a China expert would [00:10:23] would better um answer than myself. [00:10:27] >> Okay, let's talk about the USA. The US [00:10:29] ambassador of NATO Matthew Whitaker said [00:10:32] progress on territorial issues is [00:10:34] possible. What could this mean? [00:10:38] That's a good question because I don't [00:10:40] see um Ukraine giving up territory that [00:10:45] um the Ukrainian government currently [00:10:46] controls. I think um this is some idea [00:10:52] fix of Russia. It wants to get this [00:10:56] these western part of the donuts oblast [00:10:59] that it couldn't conquer and um and [00:11:03] apparently Trump is supporting that. [00:11:05] This is by the way a direct violation of [00:11:09] the security assurances of the Budapest [00:11:11] memorandum in 1994 where the US assured [00:11:16] the Ukrainian government that it [00:11:18] respects um the Ukrainian state border [00:11:21] and the Ukrainian sovereignty. [00:11:23] Therefore, this pressure is um uh [00:11:27] unacceptable and it violates the logic [00:11:29] of the nuclear non-prololiferation [00:11:31] regime to which um um the the logic of [00:11:34] the nuclear non-prololiferation treaty [00:11:36] to which the Budapest memorandum is an [00:11:38] appendix. So in a way this is a [00:11:42] scandalous behavior um against the [00:11:44] background of the pressure of the US um [00:11:48] 30 years ago on Ukraine to give up its [00:11:52] nuclear weapons. Um [00:11:54] but perhaps you know what is now [00:11:58] important for uh for Trump is to um [00:12:02] appear here as a peacemaker. And uh [00:12:05] since Trump is either unwilling or [00:12:08] unable to exert more pressure on Putin, [00:12:10] he is trying to exert this pressure now [00:12:13] on Zalinski to give up territory and has [00:12:16] perhaps the illusion that this will [00:12:18] happen and then um Russia may agree to a [00:12:22] ceasefire and then perhaps um uh Trump [00:12:27] could have hopes to get the Nobel Peace [00:12:28] Prize and um that would also be good for [00:12:32] Trump in the upcoming Congress [00:12:34] elections. [00:12:35] in the US. So um so that is perhaps [00:12:38] behind this um this conversation [00:12:42] um by the American um different [00:12:45] representatives but I don't see Ukraine [00:12:48] giving um up simply territory. [00:12:52] >> Um I think it's definitely [00:12:56] as you say Ukraine didn't get any [00:13:00] territories to Russia uh and [00:13:04] Estonia foreign minister said that about [00:13:08] NATO some facts and um I'd like to talk [00:13:11] about this next because it's um um I [00:13:15] think it's um big connection between [00:13:19] Russ between Ukraine um Russia Ukraine [00:13:22] war and the threatening threat for NATO [00:13:26] countries. So um he said that NATO could [00:13:30] strike deep inside Russia if Russia [00:13:32] invades the Baltic states. How do you [00:13:35] see the [00:13:37] use of NATO's article 5 in such a [00:13:40] situation? [00:13:43] If Russia goes for a confrontation with [00:13:45] a NATO country, that will be a different [00:13:47] situation than um in a way unfortunately [00:13:50] than there is now with with Ukraine [00:13:52] because Ukraine is unfortunately not a [00:13:55] member of NATO. And um and what could [00:13:58] happen is that if um there is a [00:14:01] ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine, [00:14:04] then um I think the um the risk of an [00:14:08] escalation um somewhere else along the [00:14:12] Russian border will um go up um rapidly [00:14:17] because Russia will then have the [00:14:18] problem what to do with the large army, [00:14:21] with the economy, with um the [00:14:23] militarized society [00:14:26] and to simply um go into a peace motives [00:14:30] will be difficult for the Russian state [00:14:32] operators and perhaps even difficult for [00:14:34] the Russian society and then other [00:14:37] countries could become um the target of [00:14:40] Russian military operations. Frankly, I [00:14:43] think that non-NATO members are in [00:14:47] bigger um um danger here because the [00:14:51] stakes are much lower. if um there is a [00:14:55] an escalation in the southern caucuses [00:14:57] in central Asia somewhere else where um [00:15:01] Russia could also escalate and then use [00:15:04] its troops um to [00:15:08] keep them busy so to say um to keep the [00:15:11] u the society militarized and um to keep [00:15:16] the escalation level up. Uh but it could [00:15:19] also happen to um towards a NATO member [00:15:22] country and um and then um Estonia or [00:15:27] Latwell, Lithuania. These three [00:15:30] countries are I think the most um at [00:15:33] risk [00:15:34] and therefore now these countries are [00:15:36] obviously preparing um themselves and [00:15:39] also preparing the context for such a [00:15:42] possible um confrontation and are trying [00:15:45] to increase the stakes for Russia with [00:15:48] such um statements to deter Russia from [00:15:52] an escalation in the Baltic region. [00:15:56] uh if NATO countries are attacked uh how [00:16:01] ready are the United States to defend [00:16:03] Europe? How do you think? [00:16:06] >> Well, that's the big question. Um the [00:16:09] signals have been such that um the US is [00:16:13] after all committed to article 5 of the [00:16:16] Washington treaty which is about the [00:16:19] mutual aid of the member countries of [00:16:21] NATO. So um I think there would be then [00:16:25] even if Trump doesn't want to do that [00:16:27] very strong pressure within the US [00:16:29] within the congress within civil society [00:16:33] in the US to actually fulfill article 5 [00:16:37] and to uh to participate in the defense [00:16:41] of European NATO member countries [00:16:43] because otherwise the the the [00:16:45] organization will be undermined. Um and [00:16:49] then um this will also be to the [00:16:51] disadvantage of the US. The US also [00:16:54] profits from NATO and from having um 31 [00:16:58] allies um in North America and in Europe [00:17:02] um that are committed also to the [00:17:05] defense of of the US. So um so that will [00:17:10] be then a situation that [00:17:13] that will be interesting to see. Um and [00:17:17] uh um the US I think still will fulfill [00:17:21] its obligations under NATO. But um in [00:17:25] Moscow people may may think that they [00:17:29] should try and see whether whether [00:17:32] really um the US is still um committed [00:17:35] to NATO and they may still try to uh to [00:17:39] do something in in the Baltic states and [00:17:41] to escalate. Um we cannot always assume [00:17:44] that people in uh Moscow are still um [00:17:48] functioning uh rationally and they may [00:17:52] may make irrational decisions that may [00:17:55] be to the disadvantage of Russia. Um but [00:17:59] um um you know arguably the attack on [00:18:04] Ukraine was also very much to the [00:18:05] disadvantage of Russia and was an [00:18:08] irrational decision but it was made. [00:18:12] Let's talk next about the security [00:18:13] guarantees. Um what security guarantees [00:18:17] can Ukraine receive from the US and the [00:18:19] European countries? Um um should Ukraine [00:18:25] really um really think that it will [00:18:28] works considering the experience of the [00:18:31] Budapest memorandum? [00:18:34] One has to say first that the Budapest [00:18:36] memorandum [00:18:38] uh only spoke of security guarantees in [00:18:41] the Ukrainian translation and in the [00:18:44] Russian translation. the term that was [00:18:47] used in the English translation um and [00:18:49] that was then relevant for the [00:18:52] commitments by the US and by Great [00:18:54] Britain that which also signed the [00:18:56] Budapest memorandum was not security [00:18:58] guarantees but security asurances [00:19:02] and um the if you read the Budapest [00:19:05] memorandum um I mean in a way it's an [00:19:08] absurd document because it says that the [00:19:12] US and and Great Britain um guarant [00:19:15] or assure the um um the Ukrainian [00:19:19] government that they will not attack [00:19:22] Ukraine and um and so and that they [00:19:25] respect the the border and the [00:19:27] sovereignty of of Ukraine although [00:19:29] obviously there was no no such threat. [00:19:32] So I think one one can make a decision [00:19:35] between a distinction between um the [00:19:38] security asurances that were given in [00:19:40] the Budapest memorandum in 1994 and the [00:19:43] security guarantees that are now being [00:19:46] discussed. I think um this uh this [00:19:50] distinction can be made. But still one [00:19:52] wonders how much um then at the end of [00:19:56] the day the various countries [00:19:59] will be committed to these security [00:20:01] guarantees. In particular, I have my [00:20:04] doubts that um western troops will [00:20:07] actually be um deployed to Ukraine to [00:20:11] fight against the Russian army, [00:20:12] something like that. I I don't see that [00:20:15] happening. uh so there can be security [00:20:18] guarantees and they will be important [00:20:20] but um I don't see them uh in a way that [00:20:24] really um American troops or European [00:20:27] troops will actually fight Russia but [00:20:30] there are many other ways in which both [00:20:32] the US and Europe and the European [00:20:35] countries can support Ukraine and where [00:20:38] they can give guarantees of support and [00:20:42] um and that's why these security [00:20:44] guarantees are after all important and [00:20:47] um and they should be formulated as [00:20:50] concrete as possible and then um also be [00:20:53] formalized in a ideally in a treaty that [00:20:56] will be ratified also then by various [00:20:59] parliaments. [00:21:01] >> You know uh there is such an interesting [00:21:03] situation Pisco made a statement that in [00:21:08] Russia Ukraine was blamed for Hungary [00:21:10] not receiving cheap energy resources. [00:21:12] Orban tells Europe the problem is [00:21:15] Ukraine. What are European public [00:21:17] attitudes now toward the war, toward [00:21:20] Russia as a threat, but also as a [00:21:22] supplier of cheap energy? [00:21:26] >> I think Orban is now isolated in um in [00:21:31] Europe. The other countries have [00:21:34] basically gotten rid of these direct [00:21:36] deliveries of Russian energy. there's [00:21:38] still indirect um um um Russian energy [00:21:43] coming also through other channels. So [00:21:46] for instance, there's Indian oil that is [00:21:48] de facto um Russian oil that is coming [00:21:50] into Europe. Um and Orban um is now [00:21:55] still relying on this on this Russian [00:21:57] oil and wants to also keep the Russian [00:21:59] oil. He doesn't want to replace it with [00:22:01] other with other oil although there are [00:22:04] opportu opportunities for that and um [00:22:08] he's now isolated with this position and [00:22:11] um um is trying to make it into a [00:22:14] domestic issue is trying to present [00:22:16] himself in the upcoming elections um as [00:22:20] a defender of Hungarian national [00:22:22] interest um and hopefully he will lose [00:22:25] these these elections and finally [00:22:27] Hungary will be um will be rejoining, I [00:22:31] would call it, put it that way, Europe [00:22:33] in its common position towards um [00:22:37] towards Ukraine, towards supporting [00:22:38] Ukraine and its common opposition [00:22:41] towards Russia. [00:22:43] >> Uh and um at the end of our [00:22:46] conversation, I would like to talk with [00:22:47] you about the scandal with the [00:22:49] International Olympic Committee uh where [00:22:52] Ukraine athletes [00:22:54] was disqualified because of a moral [00:22:56] helmet. How do you personally assess [00:22:58] this situation? [00:23:00] >> Well, it was a scandal that he was [00:23:02] disqualified and I think it backfired [00:23:05] for the International Olympic Committee [00:23:07] because it it then became a huge media [00:23:10] um incident and uh it was widely [00:23:14] publicized. It was on the front pages of [00:23:16] the Wall Street Journal of New York [00:23:18] Times of in the in the TV shows and so [00:23:22] on. And in an odd way, it became [00:23:24] actually something quite useful and good [00:23:27] for for Ukraine. Although it's of course [00:23:29] sad for Heroskeich personally that he [00:23:32] was disqualified. But um I think the the [00:23:35] whole scandal has developed then into [00:23:38] something um into a sort of PR um public [00:23:41] relations success for for Ukraine [00:23:44] because it raised the issue of these u [00:23:47] of these killed um sports people who who [00:23:51] cannot participate in Olympic games [00:23:53] because they were killed during the war. [00:23:56] So um as sad as it was and as scandalous [00:24:00] as it was it turned out then in the way [00:24:03] in a way as a as a as a success for [00:24:07] Ukraine on the international stage. [00:24:10] >> Yeah, it's really true. Uh Mr. Thank you [00:24:13] for this conversation and dear viewers, [00:24:15] please like this video. Write in the [00:24:17] comments where are you watching us from [00:24:19] and um I remind today on the stream with [00:24:23] me was Andres the Gum Center for East [00:24:26] European status analyst. Thank you. [00:24:30] >> Thanks for having me.