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[00:00:00] Let's talk about American security [00:00:02] umbrella for Europe. It has been [00:00:04] definitely changed. Uh how could you [00:00:06] indicate it now and what is it and how [00:00:09] it works? [00:00:11] >> Well, it took the Second World War for [00:00:14] Americans to understand that the [00:00:16] security of Europe directly impacted the [00:00:19] security of the United States of [00:00:21] America. Before the Second World War, [00:00:23] Americans hadn't really internalized [00:00:26] that. But at the end of the second world [00:00:28] war, things like the Marshall Plan, the [00:00:31] formation of NATO, and a whole range of [00:00:34] other uh linkages were established to [00:00:37] ensure that Europe could never go to war [00:00:40] with itself again and therefore not [00:00:42] impact on American security. That [00:00:44] understanding has broken down in the [00:00:47] last year. The current Trump [00:00:49] administration does not appear to [00:00:51] support that kind of approach. Indeed, [00:00:54] it would rather align itself with [00:00:56] authoritarians than democracies. [00:01:01] >> Mhm. Uh several European states are [00:01:04] openly supporting the idea of [00:01:06] negotiating their own nuclear deterrent [00:01:09] to complement the American one amid a [00:01:11] decline in trust in the United States [00:01:14] under Donald Trump. How could change [00:01:17] nuclear power balance and global [00:01:19] security architecture if this comes [00:01:21] true? [00:01:23] Well, I think if more European countries [00:01:26] decided to have their own nuclear [00:01:28] weapons, it would be very interesting to [00:01:30] see whether they have it as part of a [00:01:32] collective security agreement or whether [00:01:35] it would be to guarantee their own [00:01:37] security, the whole command and control [00:01:39] for the use of nuclear weapons would [00:01:42] need to be political, not military. And [00:01:44] who would have the say over those [00:01:46] weapons? The country that developed them [00:01:47] or would there be European command and [00:01:49] control? I think that that would have to [00:01:52] be resolved but also I think you might [00:01:54] see the wider breakout uh to go beyond [00:01:57] the nuclear non-prololiferation treaty. [00:02:00] So countries whether it's Germany or [00:02:02] Poland, Korea or Japan might also decide [00:02:05] that they need nuclear weapons. [00:02:09] >> We see that European security is caught [00:02:11] in the I would say crossfire. I mean [00:02:13] literal fire from Russia and political [00:02:16] fire from Washington. uh how European [00:02:18] security could evolve efficiently under [00:02:21] under such circumstances in your [00:02:23] opinion? [00:02:24] >> Well, certainly European countries can [00:02:27] afford to spend more on their own [00:02:28] defense. The 2% barrier has been broken [00:02:32] by many of them. uh 3 to 4% is probably [00:02:35] a more realistic target, but that will [00:02:37] require um either more borrowing, higher [00:02:40] taxes or decrease spending on the huge [00:02:43] number of social services that European [00:02:46] citizens are used to receiving. Uh they [00:02:48] could do that. That doesn't mean, [00:02:50] however, they have to entirely break [00:02:52] their relationship with the United [00:02:54] States. The United States is still the [00:02:56] most powerful nation in the world. It is [00:02:59] the most powerful democracy. Uh, it's in [00:03:01] all our interest to retain good [00:03:03] relations with the United States, even [00:03:06] if relations at the moment under the [00:03:07] Trump administration are not what we [00:03:09] would like them to be. [00:03:11] Some experts say that Russia is capable [00:03:14] of fighting endlessly. How do you assess [00:03:16] Russian military, economic, and [00:03:19] political capabilities to hold this war [00:03:21] efficiently in a long-term perspective? [00:03:24] And how long will Putin have enough [00:03:27] resources? [00:03:29] Well, I think the only circumstances [00:03:31] where that might be true is if Russia [00:03:34] was defending its own territory. That is [00:03:36] not what it is doing here. Russia isn't [00:03:39] engaged in a legal war of territorial [00:03:42] expansion and aggression under these [00:03:45] circumstances. I do not believe Russia [00:03:47] can fight endlessly even though it may [00:03:49] have mobilized the resources to fight [00:03:52] for longer than anyone anticipated. Um, [00:03:55] Russia is not capable of an endless war [00:03:57] in a expeditionary sense only in [00:04:00] defending its own homeland. [00:04:05] when it come when it comes to Russian u [00:04:09] human resources. Uh in your opinion when [00:04:12] Putin is ready to [00:04:15] uh when Putin is ready to to to to [00:04:18] global uh mobilization I mean to general [00:04:20] mobilization [00:04:23] >> well he's no he's not shown any [00:04:25] inclination to do that because he knows [00:04:28] there's a cost to his regime for doing [00:04:30] that. Um certainly he has not [00:04:33] demonstrated the inclination to mobilize [00:04:37] people from uh key Russian cities [00:04:39] including Moscow. He would rather [00:04:41] recruit people from Africa, South Asia [00:04:44] and lie to them about where they might [00:04:46] be serving uh in the Russian armed [00:04:49] forces. I think once again it would have [00:04:52] to be a national emergency where Russia [00:04:55] was defending its own territory where it [00:04:57] could get away with general mobilization [00:04:59] of the population. So I think this is a [00:05:01] pressure point. This is where Ukraine [00:05:04] can hurt Russia. And if Ukraine can do, [00:05:06] as the Minister of Defense Federov has [00:05:09] said, increase casualties to 50,000 a [00:05:12] month, this will force Putin for the [00:05:14] first time, I think, to really confront [00:05:17] is Ukraine worth the casualties. I hope [00:05:20] it does. uh because like all Ukrainians, [00:05:22] we would like to see peace under the [00:05:25] kind of circumstances that are favorable [00:05:27] to Ukraine this year, not favorable to [00:05:30] Russia. [00:05:31] >> Peace talks in Geneva. Uh how do you [00:05:34] assess prospects of trilateral [00:05:36] negotiations in general and do you [00:05:38] believe in successful outcome? [00:05:41] >> I think we uh are very unlikely to see [00:05:44] any major outcomes of the next round of [00:05:46] peace talks in Geneva. the Russians have [00:05:49] put in charge of it a a chief negotiator [00:05:51] who's been proven to be inept and and [00:05:54] unable to really negotiate effectively [00:05:56] with Ukrainians in the past. I think [00:05:58] that's the Russians signaling that [00:06:00] they're just playing for time. The fact [00:06:02] of the matter is Putin desperately needs [00:06:05] something that he can sell as a victory [00:06:07] to the Russian people. He does not have [00:06:09] that at the moment. Uh and therefore I [00:06:12] believe he will continue dragging out [00:06:14] negotiations [00:06:15] and leading the Trump administration [00:06:18] down a garden path until he thinks he [00:06:20] can get something that looks like a [00:06:22] victory. That's unlikely, but I think he [00:06:24] will continue delaying. [00:06:26] >> How could be solved territorial issue? I [00:06:29] would say the the most difficult in in [00:06:32] these negotiations. [snorts] [00:06:35] >> Well, the simplest way to do it is the [00:06:36] Russians go home. But I don't think the [00:06:38] Russians appear willing to do that. Um, [00:06:41] this is a very difficult uh political [00:06:44] and societal challenge for uh Ukraine [00:06:47] given the laws around territorial [00:06:49] integrity and the fact that uh Russia [00:06:52] has seized Ukrainian territory illegally [00:06:56] over the period of time not since 2022 [00:06:59] but 2014. So I think this is going to [00:07:03] have to be something that potentially [00:07:05] could be parked. uh there could be a [00:07:07] ceasefire along current lines and then [00:07:11] the the situation with territory and [00:07:13] what happens with territory might be [00:07:15] subject to further negotiations but I [00:07:18] think this is such a consequential such [00:07:20] a difficult issue it's hard to see being [00:07:23] resolved in the short term [00:07:26] >> uh Rubio flew to Orban and FISO they are [00:07:29] known for maintaining tines with Moscow [00:07:31] opposing military aid to Ukraine and [00:07:33] previously even blocking new sanctions [00:07:35] against Russia [00:07:36] U what is the main interest of [00:07:38] cooperation between the US, Slovakia and [00:07:40] Hungary? [00:07:43] >> Well, I think it's more him signaling [00:07:45] that his president uh feels uh some kind [00:07:49] of feelalty or at least feels that they [00:07:53] have similar political interests and how [00:07:55] they govern their countries. In fact, I [00:07:58] think the US Secretary of State talking [00:08:01] with those people straight after he gave [00:08:03] what was a reasonably consiliatory [00:08:06] speech at the Munich Security Conference [00:08:08] indicates that the speech really wasn't [00:08:10] consiliatory. It was exactly what JD Van [00:08:13] said last year, just sugarcoated. [00:08:17] >> I got you. Uh Zilinski said that Trump [00:08:20] offered security guarantees for 15 years [00:08:23] but he requires 30 or 50 years. How do [00:08:27] you understand American logic in terms [00:08:29] of security guarantees and its time [00:08:32] frames? [00:08:34] >> Well, I'm not sure there is a logic uh [00:08:36] to the American offer of 15 years and I [00:08:39] think this is something that could be [00:08:41] part of the negotiation. [00:08:43] um whether it's 15 or 30 or 100 years as [00:08:46] the UK agreement is I think the most [00:08:49] important thing is getting some kind of [00:08:51] security guarantee from the United [00:08:53] States and when that's in place uh it [00:08:55] can be negotiated to have that [00:08:57] lengthened over time. So even a 10-year [00:09:00] guarantee I think would be good as a [00:09:02] start point and then immediately start [00:09:04] negotiating for lengthening it at the [00:09:07] back end.